technology

The European Union has been ruminating for some time that depending on third parties to manage its data, its chips and its digital infrastructure is a risk that it can no longer afford, so next Wednesday, June 3, it will put on the table a package of measures to achieve its technological sovereignty (or at least, to depend less on countries like the United States or China) whose draft they have already had access to. Financial Times either Political. The sovereignty package is so ambitious that it aims to mark a before and after at the level of the RGPD and it is not something general and intangible: there are four specific measures so that vulnerabilities such as that of Nexperia don’t happen again. But the dependence on the United States is just as worrying, as the slam of the Netherlands on the purchase of Solvinity. Two concrete examples from two different countries for the same problem: European critical infrastructure is in the hands of others. The EU package of measures. Next Wednesday, technology commissioner Henna Virkkunen will present the review of two laws known as the Chips Act and the Cloud and AI Development Actin addition to an open source software strategy and a roadmap for the digitalization of the energy sector. More specifically: The cloud, tested. Audits and stress tests to discover vulnerabilities and thus anticipate a possible US blackout. Chips Act 2. The Commission imposes the power to, in an emergency, cancel semiconductor supply contracts in the event of a shortage, fine companies that hide information about their supply chain and act as a central buyer for the 27 member states, as it did with vaccines during COVID. Open source as an alternative way. The EU wants to promote European free software companies, will encourage collaboration between states and create an instrument to maintain indigenous solutions against US proprietary software. A lot of financing: 200 billion euros are needed to expand data center capacity until 2036 and another 20 billion to execute digitalization and AI plans in the energy sector. Where from? Fundamentally, attracting private investment. Why is it important. Because Europe does not manage its own data or control the core of its critical industry and this has clear and direct consequences. The old continent has already seen the wolf’s ears. A good example is the cloud: three American companies occupy 70% of the European market, according to Sinergy datacompared to a pyrrhic 15% made in Europe. These are hospitals, public administration, defense of all of Europe operating on servers where Washington rules. In terms of chips, it has already experienced it with Nexperia: the Dutch government took control of the company to prevent China from destroying it and Beijing responded by cutting off the supply of chips, which resulted in a shortage of processors and even stops in an industry as essential for the old continent as the automobile. Context. This package of measures comes with clear bases: the recommendations of the Mario Draghi’s competitiveness report of 2024 and the Competitiveness Compass of the EU and in reality it is not more bureaucracy, but a way of simplifying everything to see the objective more clearly. In fact, a year ago the European Parliament defined what he understood as technological sovereignty: “the ability to build capacity, resilience and security by reducing strategic dependencies, avoiding dependence on foreign actors and single suppliers, and safeguarding critical technologies and infrastructure.” Regarding the chip manufacturing industry, a paradigm shift is observed: we have gone from the practical “just in time” to streamline inventories seeking efficiency and low cost to manufacturing “just in case”, something that is already contemplated by both the European chip law and its American counterpart. Europe’s problem is that it arrives late and with a tiny manufacturing muscle. Yes, but. The European record invites us to take this ambitious plan with caution. The different projects to manufacture chips in the old continent have progressed unevenly, the funds from the original law were dispersed among different state projects without a common industrial strategy (for example, Germany negotiated with Intel and France with STMicroelectronics) and the reality today is that chip manufacturing conditions in Europe continue to be worse than in China, South Korea or the United States. That Europe legislates and each state goes to war on its own also applies to the cloud: the government of each state has the power to decide what to do after the relevant audits. The new package of measures starts from the same point and runs the same risks of fragmentation. On the other hand, there is the economic issue: public financing may be dispersed, but private financing for data centers is not yet assured. And finally there is a big underlying problem: Europe has laws, but it lacks a powerful and complete industrial ecosystem to achieve technological sovereignty. In Xataka | Europe has proposed to become technologically independent from the US: And it has started with the most difficult thing: chips In Xataka | Europe is moving from words to action in its “independence” from Microsoft and Google. First step: critical data Cover | Intel and Carl Gruner