threat

Faced with the threat of an “orbital Pearl Harbor”, Europe has made the same decision as the US: shield space

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The race to militarize space has accelerated to an extent unprecedented since the end of the Cold War. The reasons are several, but the main one is driven by the combination of explicit russian threatscovert sabotage and an international architecture incapable of containing the emergence of atomic weapons out of the atmosphere. The last one to join: Europe. The war in orbit. Moscow not only has reactivated its classic nuclear discourse, but has opened a second front in low Earth orbit through the development of anti-satellite systems equipped with nuclear warheads that openly violate the Outer Space Treaty. In this context, European and North American experts match in which the Kremlin is lowering the threshold for the use of tactical nuclear weapons both on Earth like in spacewhile experimenting with platforms capable of camouflaging orbital bombs designed to disable satellites essential for the economy, defense and communication. Thus, the very idea of ​​a “Space Pearl Harbor” (a nuclear explosion that destroyed thousands of satellites, blinded entire continents and turned low orbit into a radioactive dump for generations) has forced Europe to abandon the romantic vision of an exclusively civil space and enter a new strategic reality which combines deterrence, diplomacy and operational preparedness. The bet of the old continent. This turn has crystallized in a historic decision: For the first time, European Space Agency countries have approved funding a program designed explicitly for military functions. He ERS projectconceived as a “system of systems” equipped with surveillance capabilities, secure navigation, encrypted communications and Earth observation, marks Europe’s entry into the club of actors who recognize that their future security depends both on what happens on the ground and what happens hundreds of kilometers above it. The approved financing (1.2 billion euros with more to come) comes accompanied by an unprecedented political mandate that redefines the concept of “peaceful purposes” at a time when China multiplies its space capabilities and Russia turns orbit into a space hybrid pressure. The magnitude of the support, bordering 100% of what was requestedreflects an internal consensus: without its own capabilities, Europe would be a vulnerable spectator in a conflict that would be decided by the speed and resilience of its satellite constellations. The French and German response. On this new board, France and Germany have assumed a central role both for its industrial capacity and for its newly adopted conviction that the wars of the future will begin (or be decided) in space. Paris has invested 10 billion euros in its new Space Command, oriented to military operations in orbit, to shield satellites against kinetic attacks and to promote an interoperable architecture with NATO. Berlin, for its part, has announced an investment of 35 billion until 2030 to reinforce its own Space Command, develop guardian satellites and equip itself with advanced early warning systems. Both countries have publicly assumed that orbital infrastructure is so critical such as energy or digitaland that any Russian aggression could paralyze not only defense, but European civil society as a whole. National security is no longer decided solely on the eastern land border, but in a three-dimensional environment where the loss of a single satellite node can destabilize entire sectors. Nuclear beyond the atmosphere. Analysts agree that the most feared scenario is not a specific attack against specific satellites, but the detonation of a nuclear charge in orbitcapable of generating devastating electromagnetic pulses and cascading space junk that would render low orbit useless for decades. Historical precedents, such as try Starfish Prime that destroyed a third of existing satellites in the 1960s, serve as a warning of what it would mean to repeat a similar experiment today, with more than 10,000 active satellites. Such an explosion would kill astronauts, destroy global navigation infrastructure, fossilize the digital economy and cause a domino effect that could move the war from space to Earth. Although some experts hold While Moscow would only resort to such action in a scenario of terminal collapse, the mere existence of these capabilities forces Europe to prepare for a type of conflict that would break the traditional limits of deterrence. Political pressure and a new order. Fear of an orbital conflict has reactivated debates on nuclear disarmamentboth in the United States and in Europe, where legislators are promoting initiatives to revitalize multilateral negotiations that have been stagnant for decades. At the same time, ESA has achieved a record budget (22.1 billion euros) that not only finances its transition towards space security, but also promotes scientific and commercial programs, such as reusable rockets, Martian exploration or new astrobiological missions. This growth, supported by Germany, France, Italy and Spain, reflects the strategic convergence between defense, research and technological sovereignty. In the new scenario, Europe seeks not to be a secondary actor in the face of spatial duopolization between the United States and China, but to develop real autonomy that reduces dependence on private platforms like starlink or American systems such as the space interceptors of the Golden Dome. Militarize space. If you also want, the intersection between russian threatsAmerican technological advances and the European strategic awakening marks the beginning of a stage in which the Earth’s orbit is consolidated as the new global scenario military competition. What was once a scientific and commercial domain has become a space where the resilience of entire societies is decided. He ERS projectthe expansion of national space commands and the growing funding of dual capabilities make up a defense ecosystem that seeks to avoid a conflict that no one wants to imagine. And in that scenario, Europe seems to have understood that the only way to deter orbital escalation is to demonstrate that it has the same means to resist it, respond to it and recover. Image | RawPixelESA/Mlabspace In Xataka | The US wants to build an unprecedented anti-missile shield called “Golden Dome.” And SpaceX has the ideal technology In Xataka | Space solar never worked. A military escalation in orbit is making it a reality

We have returned to an era that we thought forgotten. That of the nuclear threat of the US and Russia launching their reply: Poseidon

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In recent days all roads trace a common landscape: from Moscow exhibit and test “superweapons” that defy traditional categories (autonomous nuclear torpedoes, nuclear cruise engines, and indefinite-range missiles) while in Washington the political and media reaction accentuates a dynamic action-reaction that could return the world to an (il)logic of open competition between nuclear powers. Someone should stop it. Poseidon. He Russian Poseidon has returned to the forefront as the epitome of the hybrid between a fantasy factory and a real military program: an unmanned, reactor-powered underwater vehicle, conceived to transport a nuclear warhead to coastal targets or naval groupings, operate at great depth and high speed and (according to the official Russian narrative) bypass conventional defenses. The impact figures published in Moscow (speeds between 60–100 knots, operational depth ~1,000 m, “megaton” capacity that some sources stretch up to 100 Mt) feed the symbolic dread. However, analysts remember physical limits and Soviet precedents that qualify both the real effectiveness and the plausibility of “tsunami” type effects capable of sweeping away cities. In practice. Thus, the majority agrees that Poseidon It is best described as a capability designed for political and strategic cost: suitable to reinforce a “second strike” or to be used as a system of intimidation, not necessarily as an everyday weapon in an escalated conflict. Burevestnik and a persistence. We told it last week. Along with the torpedo, Russia has shown the Burevestnik (a nuclear-powered cruise missile that promises essentially unlimited range) and other platforms that the Kremlin lumps together under the label of “invincible weapons.” These initiatives obey a logic of modernization that combines technological ambition, industrial vulnerabilities (sanctions, reliability problems) and media staging: the public demonstration of tests does not detonate charges, but announces theoretical capabilities and forces adversaries to regroup resources and doctrine. Continuity with the Soviet tradition of studying large-scale underwater effects and the historical experience with essays they show that ideas can persist even when physics and engineering limit their real usefulness. Washington’s response. The political reaction in the United States, personified by presidential statements about “restarting testing” and public instruction to military departments, has been immediate (and disorderly). The announcements arrive in a critical moment (with the New START treaty close to expiration and with China throwing uncertainties about its own nuclear growth) and can be read as strategic messages, instruments of pressure and, sometimes, as gestures directed at the internal public. One thing remains clear: Trump’s formulation was more than ambiguous and it is not clear whether it refers to nuclear detonations (critical/non-critical), increased testing of delivery systems, or increased sub-critical experiments and simulations. There is no doubt, this ambiguity is dangerous because conditions perceptions and responses international without the technical and legal scaffolding that a decision of shock would demand. Burevestnik How “nuclear” is prescribed. On TWZ Several experts consulted describe the practical path to resume nuclear detonations: The president can order actions, but execution requires the involvement of specific agencies (Department of Energy, NNSA and national laboratories), budget authorization from Congress and logistics focused on the Nevada National Security Site as the only realistic site for contained underground testing. In any case, the deadlines they are long: A “simple burst” could be organized in months, a useful instrumented test would require 18–36 months, and a new design development program would take years. Furthermore, the cost would be high and would most likely provoke retorts from Russia, China and others, reigniting a cycle of arms races that post-Cold War agreements had managed to tacitly contain. Technical dimension. The technical usefulness of returning to explosive tests to maintain the national arsenal is, obviously, discussed: US laboratories maintain that, thanks to advanced simulations, subcritical experimentation and vast historical data, the reliability of nuclear warheads can sustain without detonations. The tests would serve, in theory, to validate new designs and increase confidence in specific features. In practice, they would reopen the door to developments that amplify offensive capabilities and complicate the balance of terror, in addition to generating environmental and proliferation risks. The media theater. Plus: not everything is technology. There is a strong performative component. Putin and the Russian media apparatus have known convert essaysimages and statements in one power narrative which includes synchronies with popular culture (television series) to magnify its psychological impact. In Washington, the improvised communication from social networks it has a similar but less institutionalized effect: statements without clarifying technique or procedure can be interpreted as a political will to rupture and push allies and adversaries to take asymmetric measures. Geopolitical consequences. The costs of a back to testing are not limited to budgets: there is talk of reactivation of the nuclear race, of degradation of international trustor the erosion of regulatory regimes (the CTBT and the verification architecture), in addition to a probable expansion of arsenals by China and other actors who do not participate in treaties today. Added to this is the risk that the US internal debate (political polarization, legislative pressures and the dynamic of “showing” without a technical roadmap) will generate hasty decisions. Worse still, the media normalization of “anti-coastal weapons” or “Frankenstein” torpedoes may facilitate usage doctrines that lower the threshold for tactical uses of nuclear weapons, an especially dangerous prospect. Uncertainty. In summary, the news of the last days They are, more than anything else, a warning: we are witnessing the sum of three processes (modernization and Russian technological experimentationpoliticization and theatrics of deterrenceand American answers marked by tactical uncertainty and political haste) that, together, fuel a dangerous inertia. The question is no longer just whether Poseidon either Burevestnik are fully operational, it is whether the international community, and especially the capitals with decision-making power, will recover the technical prudence and diplomatic rigor necessary to contain the escalation. Image | US Space Force, Russian Defense Ministry, Los Alamos National Laboratory In Xataka | Last week, Russia launched its fearsome Satan II nuclear missile, Putin’s “invincible weapon.” It came out regular In Xataka | There is something more disturbing than “a Chernobyl”: it … Read more

A new threat has arrived in the skies of Europe. They are not drones or fighters, and the order is to shoot before you ask

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For weeks now, the European sky has has converted in a silent front of hybrid war: brief incursions, weak signals, ambiguous trajectories and objects that, without carrying clear flags, force airport closures, diversions of trade routes and military responses that consume resources and erode civil normality. The pattern is repeated from the Baltics to Central Europe and seems designed to measure the NATO reflexes. Now something else has arrived, and it’s not drones or fighter jets. Balloon waves. Lithuania has announced that will bring down any balloon that crosses from Belarus after detecting in one go 66 night intrusions and chain closures of Vilnius airport. The government described the phenomenon as hybrid attack and activated the closure of the eastern border, initially temporary but set to become indefinite, with minimal exceptions for diplomats and EU citizens in transit. The decision marks a turning point on NATO’s eastern flank, where violations of airspace by drones, balloons and Russian aircraft are increasing. have become recurring in recent weeks, from Estonia and Poland to Denmark, Norway and Germany, fueling the impression of a sustained campaign of provocations calibrated to measure reflexes, saturate defenses and erode political tolerance at the cost of deterrence. Nature and sign. The balloons (some weighing more than 50 kilos, also used for tobacco smuggling) are interpreted not only as a criminal economy but also as a cheap instrument. psychological warfare and technical rehearsal: they stretch the “gray zone” five kilometers inward, force airport closures, degrade logistics, strain the civil and military decision chain and expose the friction of activating rules of engagement against targets no classic military sign. Lithuania will involve NASAMS, RBS-70, Avengers and MANPADS in neutralization, despite stocks depleted by transfers to Ukraine and the intrinsic difficulty of shooting down balloons with low radar signature and low kinetic energy. The political message is deliberate: any permeability (even if it seems marginal) will be treated as a strategic precedent. Escalation in NATO. We said it at the beginning, the episode arrives after penetrations of Su-30, Il-78 and MiG-31 in the Baltics, and after the recording of swarms of drones over Poland, Denmark, Munich or the Baltic, with more than 170 flights disrupted in one week in Vilnius and almost 14,000 passengers affected. Reiteration converts the episodic in pattern: state actors exploit loopholes in regulations (civil balloons, meteorological assumptions, smuggling) to degrade the continuity of European civil aviation and test the elasticity of ROE and allied cohesion without crossing explicit thresholds of article 5. Lithuania, in fact, studies consultations under article 4and has hinted that the closure could extend to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, raising the economic-logistical vector of the pulse. Hybrid war as a framework. Vilnius is clearand describes the phenomenon as a psychological operation aimed at disrupting daily life, testing NATO-EU synchrony and normalizing aggression (of low lethality, of course) as noise permanent. The background signal (at no point is Moscow explicitly named) fits into the repertoire hybrid warfare: discreet sabotage, information manipulation, low signal intrusion, erosion of trust and critical infrastructure, in conjunction with the war in Ukraine and under the plausible protection of Belarus. Plus: the closure of borders is accompanied by tougher criminal penalties against smuggling and coordination with Poland and Latvia to shield the eastern edge as a strategic unit, given the calculation that firmness, the earlier, will define how much the enemy will dare later. Image | LITHUANIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE In Xataka | Europe has decided to take action against Moscow’s hybrid war. So Germany has started hunting for Russian drones In Xataka | The Spanish invention that simplifies the hunt for Europe’s biggest threat: how to detect the arrival of drones in a matter of seconds

Russia’s biggest threat in Ukraine is not a drone or a missile. It is a film agency with 30 secret floors

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That the war in Ukraine has become the largest drone laboratory combat power on the planet is beyond any doubt. In fact, both Russia like, to a greater extent, Ukraine, have elevated these devices to configure a war industry unprecedented that places machines as the army of the future of any conflict. What was not so well known was where most of Ukraine’s drones came from. Origin and metamorphosis. What started three years ago as a location and props agency in basements and garages has mutated into a war industry on an almost industrial scale: Fire Point, whose owner and executives come from from the world of cinema and the construction of outdoor furniture, has gone from assembling drones with commercial parts to producing, according to its executives, hundreds of propelled and long-range munitions from at least thirty secret locations scattered throughout Ukraine. But there is much more, because the company has grown so much that it has currently consolidated itself with contracts for around billion dollars in a single year. A transit that reflects the rapid professionalization and commercialization of initiatives born out of patriotism and urgency in February 2022, when improvised underground workshops became an effective (although precarious and fragmentary) response to a large-scale invasion. Production, design and employment. Fire Point products, such as your FP-1 droneare simple machines in materials (polystyrene, plywood, plastics, and carbon fiber from cycling) but assembled with a logic of volume production: rocket-assisted takeoff, two-stroke engine, range measured in hundreds of kilometers and warheads of more than fifty kilos in some designs. Its catalog also includes the promising Flamingo missilea larger device, with a jet engine and a theoretical autonomy and load that, if confirmed at scale, could reconfigure the Ukrainian capacity to hit deep targets. The Ukrainian industrial philosophy here is clear: cheap, disposable, massive. Efficiency does not require reprocessing or longevity, only that some specimens cross the defense networks and fulfill their unique mission. An FP-1 Military strategy and effects. The proliferation of these munitions has allowed Ukraine to sustain a systematic campaign against energy infrastructure Russian companies (refineries and logistics nodes) seeking not only a tactical effect but also strategic pressure and leverage in eventual negotiations. In fact, the multiplicity of manufacturers domestic forces and technical adaptability have forced Russia to face a daily erosion of its apparent air immunity, forcing it to reallocate defensive resources and contemplate low-cost warfare as a decisive vector. Transparency and control. Fire Point’s meteoric rise has not been free of shadows: Public complaints and audits point out opaque awards, absence of mandatory price negotiations, questions about initial technical quality and the possible involvement of actors linked to the media and business environment close to power. In fact, the National Anti-Corruption Agency has inspected links with figures associated with the presidential circle and there are parliamentary calls to investigate pricesspecifications and the destination of multimillion-dollar benefits. Despite this, the public narrative combines suspicion and exaltation: national heroes and strategic businessmen who have shored up the defensive capacity, while activists and analysts demand more controls and transparency in war contracts. Industrialization and ecosystem. The phenomenon is not an isolated case but the center of an industrial revolution: Thousands of companies, hundreds focused on long-range drones and dozens competing for contracts, attract foreign funds, partners and joint venture projects. State agencies charter incentiveswhile international funds (such as the recent Norwegian-Ukrainian vehicle) show that the ecosystem is beginning to professionalize and seek commercial and technological legitimation beyond the emergency. For European and North American defense, Ukraine now offers a unique experience in unmanned missions and rapid design, which arouses interest both military as industrial. Ethical dilemmas. There is no doubt, the balance raises dilemmas: the domestic war economy reduces dependence on allied donations and scales offensive capacity, but it raises questions on democratic control, accountability and the risk that lucrative war businesses are perpetuated beyond strategic necessity. Plus: the proliferation of cheap and massive systems exacerbates the asymmetric nature of the conflict and poses risks of escalation and diffuse responsibility for selective objectives and collateral damage. Perspectives. In sum, the Fire Point history summarizes the Ukrainian phenomenon: industrial creativity (in many cases, they have no other choice) converted into a strategic muscle, an industry that emerged from volunteering transformed into key actor of the military apparatusbut also in focus of controversy due to its speed, its margins and the opacity typical of a country at war. The future challenge is twofold: to consolidate technological and productive capabilities that continue to perform in combat, and at the same time insert this thriving sector into frameworks of governance and transparency that prevent war efficiency from evolving towards economies of corruption or political capture. How Ukraine resolves this binomial will define whether its revolution dronistics It remains a collective merit or becomes an institutional burden. Image | xMezha In Xataka | They call it Skyfall, Burevestnik, or flying Chernobyl. The problem is not the name, it is what Russia’s latest missile does In Xataka | The war in Ukraine was a drone war. Now it is a war of drones that are not actually combat drones

As if we didn’t have enough climate worries on Earth, a new threat is coming: space tornadoes

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Before we looked at the sky to predict the weather. Now we look at the forecast in an app provided by incredibly powerful simulations based on radar and satellite data. Thus, we can see the path of a hurricane days before it makes landfall, potentially saving thousands of lives. But what about the “tornadoes” that come from space? Sorry? It turns out that interplanetary space is not a quiet vacuum, and a new study warns of a phenomenon that has already been baptized with a disturbing name: “space tornadoes.” They are not wind funnels that carry the debris of the galaxy with them; They are actually rotating vortexes of plasma and magnetic fields that travel at insane speeds through space. But the most worrying thing is not that they exist, but where are formed. The research reveals that these vortices do not necessarily originate from the Sun, but can be born spontaneously in deep space, as a result of collisions between larger solar storms. And yes, they are powerful enough to wreak havoc on Earth. A magnetic problem. When astronomers talk about space weather, they’re not talking about a meteor shower. The weather engine of our solar system is the Sun. From time to time, our star spits out gigantic eruptions of charged particles and magnetic fields. The most powerful event of this type is Coronal Mass Ejections (CMEs). CMEs travel at speeds of up to 2,900 kilometers per second. When one hits the Earth, it interacts with our natural magnetic shield (the magnetosphere) and can cause a geomagnetic storm. The good thing is that this interaction produces incredibly beautiful northern and southern lights. The downside is that a severe geomagnetic storm can interfere with power grids, overheat transformers to the point of failure, and damage satellites vital to communications and GPS. The mystery of ghost storms. This is where the new research begins. In 2023, a team of scientists at the University of Michigan ran into a problem: They were recording geomagnetic storms on Earth that didn’t match any CME that had been predicted to hit us. They were “phantom storms.” The hypothesis: that smaller, more dangerous space weather events were forming on the way from the Sun to the Earth, rather than directly at the Sun. According to a paper by the researchers in The ConversationThe main suspect was structures known as “flux ropes,” bundles of magnetic fields twisted back on themselves that are affectionately referred to as magnetic tornadoes. They had already been observed, but their exact origin and whether they were powerful enough to cause problems on their own were unknown. The problem was how to detect them. Current space weather simulations are designed to look at “big” things (CMEs), not little vortices. These flux ropes were too small for the models to resolve. The researchers compare it to “trying to forecast a hurricane with a simulation that only shows you global weather patterns.” Since they couldn’t increase the resolution of the entire solar system (it would be computationally prohibitive), the team did something smarter: they created an ultra-high-resolution simulation “corridor,” nearly 100 times finer than previous models, centered on the path of a specific solar flare that occurred in May 2024. And then they saw them. The simulation revealed the birth mechanism of these tornadoes. It happened when the CME “crashed” into the slower solar wind in front of it. The researchers’ own analogy is perfect: it was like “watching a hurricane generate a cluster of tornadoes in its wake.” The study confirms this phenomenon for the first time through simulation. The collision between the CME and the solar wind creates an intense “current sheet.” In that area, a process called magnetic reconnection (when magnetic field lines violently break and reconfigure) “spits out” these mesoscale vortices. Why are they dangerous? The simulation demonstrated that these mesoscopic “flow ropes” are not minor phenomena. They contain magnetic fields (about 30 nanoTeslas) “strong enough to trigger a significant geomagnetic storm” on their own. The real danger is that, to our current systems, they are almost invisible. While a giant CME is an obvious and massive threat that we can track from the Sun, these “space tornadoes” that form along the way would appear, at best, as a “small blip” on monitors. We could be hit by a geomagnetic storm capable of damaging the electrical grid with little prior warning. Our best weapon. Satellite constellations. This discovery shows that our way of monitoring space weather is insufficient. Instead of single-point satellites (like the DSCOVR observatory, which can only measure what passes in front of it), we need a constellation of satellites flying in formation. Researchers have proposed a mission designed precisely for this. It would be called SWIFT (Space Weather Investigation Frontier) and it would be a constellation of four satellites flying in a tetrahedron formation, capable of measuring these vortices with precision. Only by measuring the same phenomenon from multiple points at the same time can we understand its real 3D structure and its danger. Image | NOAA, Mojtaba Akhavan-Tafti and Chip Manchester In Xataka | NASA has calculated how much time we would have to prepare for a devastating solar storm and has set to work to get that time

The real threat from US warships off Venezuela is supersonic. It is called Kh-31 and it is Made In Russia

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The satellite images left no room for doubt: the United States has been adding pieces in the southern Caribbean until it forms the closest thing to a military army prepared for an attack against Venezuela, it remains to be seen on what scale and if that is really Washington’s idea. And in the face of this artillery, the greatest threat to American warships lies in the Venezuelan Air Force. To be more exact, in one of their fighters and their missile. Supersonic capability. The presence of Russian supersonic anti-ship missiles Kh-31A in the hands of Venezuela, integrated into their Soviet fighters Su-30MK2V of the Bolivarian Military Aviation, turns the Venezuelan coast into a high-risk environment for US ships that today operate at very short distances. The missile, conceived by the USSR to pierce Western air defenses and later adapted to anti-ship penetration rolescombines low flight over the sea, active tracking guidance before or after launch, terminal maneuvers of up to 15 G and a penetration warhead that detonates after passing through the side of the hull, making it difficult to intercept when the ship is within its short warning zone. The very fact that the US Navy purchased units to convert them into targets MA-31 to test its defenses illustrates that, although it is not cutting-edge technology, it is a system whose lethality is taken very seriously. Launching platform. Venezuela has of 21 fighters Su-30 Flanker in service, has advertised early warning exercises with Kh-31 off the coast and has spread images of armed flights with the clear intention of signaling their denial capacity to Washington. Although it is not certain that the Kh-31P anti-radiation variant will be available in significant quantities, it could be used de facto against naval radars. Close-range encounters (even with Venezuelan F-16s approaching to US ships) show that, in an improvised incident, fighters could be placed within the launch envelope before being detected or deterred. Promotional image of a Kh 31 Physics, distance and reaction. The profile of Kh-31A missile (initial acceleration by rocket to Mach 1.8 and transition to Mach 3.5 at high altitude or Mach 1.8 at sea level) drastically reduces the defense reaction time, especially when the ship is close to the coast, with a shortened radar horizon and degraded early warning. The employment envelope (the three-dimensional zone in which the missile can be launched, fly and reach its target, encompassing variables such as range, altitude and speed), means that an approaching armed aircraft without being ejected from the zone can place missiles in flight before the ship completes its defense cycle. Comparison of arsenals. They counted the TWZ analysts than the rest of the Venezuelan anti-ship arsenal (Otomat Mk 2 on a frigate Marshal Sucreaged versions in Constitution boatsmissiles Sea Killer in helicopters and Iranian CM-90s) is sub-sonic, of doubtful availability and much inferior in penetration and probability of impact compared to modern defenses. In practice, the only vector that alters the American calculation is that Su-30/Kh-31 pairing: is sufficiently fast, sufficiently provided, and sufficiently close to impose significant risk. Missile infographic United States position. It we counted yesterday. The American deployment (ARG/MEU Iwo Jima, Arleigh Burke destroyersa cruise Ticonderoga and the special operations ship Ocean Trader) is in itself a coercive message designed to project the capacity for punishment or specific assault from international waters. However, this same deployment creates specific vulnerabilities: the Ocean Trader lacks organic defense and has operated very close to the coast. A successful attack, even isolated, would have far-reaching strategic and political consequences, turning a limited clash into cause for war. The Pentagon has reinforced kinetic and electronic warfare subsystems (including Burkes ahead of Rota to operate under threat of cruise missiles), but the speed and proximity of the theater mean that the risk is far from theoretical. The logic of last resort. While a direct Venezuelan attack would almost certainly amount to an open war with the United States, the variables that could make it imaginable exist: a regime collapse scenario, an outbreak of operational error in a close air encounter, or a misattributed US covert operation could precipitate “last resort” decisions from Caracas. Precisely because the probability of something like this happening is low but the expected damage if it occurs is extreme, the US Navy treats the Kh-31 as a priority threat of active management, not as technological waste. Implications. The mere presence of a supersonic missile of denial in the hands of a sanctioned State amplifies political pressure: it forces the United States to assume more heavy (cruises as escort, separation cordons, additional ISR), makes persistent operations more expensive and raises the threshold for intervention. The tactical result (a reaction window of seconds) translates into a strategic effect: Venezuela has a de facto veto on the degree of safe intrusion of American ships, if you will, a kind of chip of negotiation that Caracas has already turned into a public message with its armed flights at short distance. Image | NavyRosoboronexport, Boeing In Xataka | Satellite images leave no doubt: there are 10,000 soldiers and unusual artillery pointing at the same place in the Caribbean In Xataka | A disturbing idea is gaining strength: that what the US wants is not drugs, and that is why it is targeting Venezuela

US soybean silos are bursting because China no longer buys them. The threat to the US is used oil

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The trade war and the exchange of tariffs between the US and China is having repercussions at many levels and agriculture is one of the sectors that is suffering the most from the consequences. Due to its size, China is one of the main importers of food products and is using this advantage to punish its rival. They are doing it with beef and also with soybeans. Now Trump has a threat to China. What has happened? China was the main US customer in the soybean business, but the trade war is reconfiguring the game board and soybeans are being one of China’s main weapons in this tug of war. The decision to stop buying soy is wreaking havoc in the US and now Trump pushes to stop buying another product from them: used cooking oil. The president has used your social network Thruth to describe China’s move with soybeans as “an act of economic hostility” and has assured that “we can easily produce cooking oil ourselves, we do not need to buy it from China.” Why it is important. The used cooking oil market moved 6.9 billion dollars in 2024. This oil is used to create biofuels, and with increased recycling and sustainability initiatives, the figure is expected to double by 2032. The United States is the world’s largest buyer of used oil and China is its largest supplier. According to data from the Department of Agriculture American, in 2024 the United States bought 43% of all the used oil produced by China. The soy problem. China was the US’s main customer in the soybean business. Until not long ago, they bought 40% of all production from them, a figure that was reduced to 20% in 2024. Despite the reduction, it was still a lot: 27 million tons and a value of 12.8 billion dollars. In 2025 only about 16 million tons have been imported until July, but this was just the beginning. Currently, China has further reduced imports of US soybeans, which aim to be practically zero in the last quarter of the year. Instead, China is doing business with other countries: Brazil and Argentina. Consequences. American farmers’ silos are bursting with soybeans. They count in the New York Times that states like North Dakota sold more than 70% of their production to China and now find that their best customer no longer buys from them. It is an enormous amount to be able to place before production goes to waste. The damage to the agriculture sector is enormous, with farms projecting losses of up to $400,000 this year. Tensions. A few days ago we learned of Beijing’s decision to consolidate its dominance over rare earthsa strategic sector in which they are the key player. The United States responded with a 100% tariff which is accumulated to those already imposed previously. Trump exploded on social Thruth against the measure, but in one of his usual changes of position, days later posted another message in which he lowered his tone: “Don’t worry about China, everything will be fine. The highly respected President Xi has only had a bad time.” The threat to stop buying used oil represents a new escalation of tension, although there are voices like that of Rush Doshi, Biden’s former security adviser, They believe that it will not have great consequences and in Beijing it will be seen as a sign of weakness. Image | Pexels 1, 2In Xataka | Holland has just declared war on China in the most important battle of the century: control of semiconductors

OpenAI is building the biggest house of cards in history. Its “circular financing” aggravates the threat of the AI ​​bubble

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Yesterday OpenAI and Broadcom announced a collaboration agreement that will see both companies design and deploy 10 GW of custom AI chips over the course of four years. It’s a new episode of that unusual strategy that OpenAI has carried out and which is summarized in an increasingly disturbing concept: that of circular financing. Multimillion-dollar agreements. In recent weeks we have seen how OpenAI has reached new agreements worth billions of dollars with large companies in the semiconductor sector. Thus, we have: Circular financing. All these advertisements respond to a unique circular financing strategy in which chip companies (the suppliers) not only sell their products to an AI startup (customer), but also invest capital in that startup, which in turn uses that capital to buy more products from its investor. In reality, the supplier “does not invest” as such, because that money ends up going back into purchases of its products and services. It is in fact something similar to what OpenAI did with Microsoft when the latter invested $13 billion in it. Rather than investing them, it allowed him to use a kind of subscription for that amount to use his cloud, Azure, and its computing resources. It’s a win-win for some and for others. OpenAI wins. These agreements allow OpenAI to have guaranteed access to computing, something you need like eating. The startup spends billions a year and still not profitablebut thanks to this strategy he obtains a massive flow of capital. In the case of Broadcom, it also manages to collaborate in the design of customized chips for minimize future dependence on other partners (such as NVIDIA or AMD) and thus enjoy a lower total cost of ownership in the long term. And by signing with three different semiconductor suppliers, it encourages competition and improves its bargaining power. Bright. Suppliers win. The circular strategy also benefits NVIDIA, AMD and Broadcom. All of them gain a customer with almost unlimited demand, and can register immediate income from the sale of chips while the cost of the investment is amortized over time. NVIDIA also manages to maintain its dominant position, while AMD and Broadcom manage to expand in this market. If there are also actions involved, all of them are revalued and participating in each other is another element of interest in these financial operations. They reinforce and grow larger among themselves, and while they weaken all the others. A gigantic house of cards. But compared to that strategy, reality. And the reality is that this circular flow of capital is creating artificial demand in which the supplier pays itself. The systemic risk is enormous: if OpenAI fails or AI growth slows, the domino effect can significantly affect these vendors and their investors. We are facing a huge (and fragile) house of cards that, if it collapses, will have equally enormous consequences. The AI ​​bubbleif it really exists, continues to grow and grow. Total uncertainty. There is also absolute uncertainty about the promise of AI: will we really use it as much as these companies think we will? Will OpenAI be able to deliver on its promise and turn a profit in 2030? It is impossible to know. Finally, another problem: these circular agreements make these companies larger, but they make the entry of new competitors in both markets increasingly complicated. There are winners, but also losers. While all this is happening and the shares of these companies are skyrocketing, the reality is that there are also losers. The retail investor is blind to these events—and suspicions about cases of insider trading They are inevitable. And of course when talking about competition we are not talking about new competitors, but also current ones. Anthropic or Perplexity, with already established businesses, now finds it more difficult to compete. Google, Microsoft or Meta have plenty of infrastructure and economic resources, but they are still seeing how OpenAI is getting bigger and bigger without being able to prevent it. If successful, OpenAI may end up being above all of them, because it seeks the same thing that every company seeks even if it does not admit it: become a monopoly. Image | Xataka with Freepik – Gemini In Xataka | You thought you had an amazing connection on Tinder, but you were actually chatting with ChatGPT

US responds to China’s new rare earths rules with 100% tariff threat that screams negotiation

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Just a couple of days ago we knew China’s new rare earth rules with which it completely disrupted the global map of strategic minerals. Taking into account that the Asian giant supplies approximately 70% of strategic minerals to the world, it could be said that China is the global mine of an essential raw material for the technology industry. And that gives it a privileged position to apply a standard of this caliber: any product manufactured outside of China with at least 0.1% of materials of Chinese origin. will require a license for export. That is, it not only controls what leaves China, but also what other countries produce with their materials and technologies, being able to decide what is exported, to whom and for what purpose following national security criteria. After a few hours assimilating the news and speculation of a response from Donald Trump and even his non-attendance at the next event where he will meet Chinese President Xi Jinping, The United States has announced new 100% tariffs unparalleled. New tariffs, more control and a date that invites negotiation The president of the United States has exploded in Truth Social talking about ‘an extraordinarily aggressive stance on commercial matters‘, of ‘an extremely hostile letter‘and of’a moral shame in dealing with other nations‘referring to China’s new measures on its rare earths, insisting that it affects both the products they manufacture and those they do not. Furthermore, he has asserted that ‘It was evidently a plan drawn up by them years ago.‘. More tariffs. Because Donald Trump has announced in Truth Social that the United States will impose a new 100% tariff on China, which will be added to any other tariffs already in place. Likewise, they will also impose export controls on all critical software. It must be taken into account that practically all products imported from China to the United States already have high tariffs, ranging from 50% on steel and aluminum to only 7.5% on consumer goods, with an effective tariff rate of around 40%, according to expert analysts from Wells Fargo Economics and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. AND has left a key date of entry into force: next November 1, 2025. Between the lines. The date chosen by Trump is not coincidental: it is exactly the same as China’s for the measures on rare earths to be operational. And its message hides several key words that refer to a predisposition to negotiation ‘from the November 1, 2025 (or sooner, depending on the actions or changes China takes)‘. He also insists that he (obviously) speaks on behalf of the United States and not ‘from other countries equally threatened‘ Throwing down a gauntlet to potential allies for their coup d’état. In Xataka | In 1978 Chinese engineers visited two key US companies. Upon his return, an empire began: rare earths In Xataka | An industry in the hands of TSMC and Asian factories: the map of global chip production Cover | Jose Alberto Lizana with AI

Mobile phone manufacturers first stopped including the charger with every purchase. Your next threat is clear: the USB cable

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There was a (wonderful) time when when you bought an iPhone, Apple not only included the cable and charger, but also included EarPods headphones. In 2020 the iPhone 12 arrived and They broke that tradition: that box It included the phone and the charging cable, but nothing else. All manufacturers released following that trail with the same speech from Apple: at that point, users they used to tell with their own headphones and some charger, so what they were doing was protect the environment although that argument was not particularly convincing. Of course, they did something else: first They saved money by not including those elementsand then they earned it when you bought them official headphones and adapters if you ended up needing them. Of course one could resort to third-party accessories, although Lumafield CT scans have been demonstrating for some time that cables, chargers and headphones from companies like Apple are expensive because they are small works of art of engineering. In fact, those same images reveal that the same you shouldn’t trust of “strange” cables, lest they be tools to hack your computers. The truth is that Apple’s decision – which other companies such as Fairphone had previously made – made a deep impact on the industryand nowadays it is very rare to find a mobile phone whose box includes a charger, much less headphones. But the thing is can go further. USB charging cables may also be about to disappear from those boxes. Do we really need the USB cable to be included with our devices? A Reddit user revealed recently how when buying his Sony Xperia 10 VII he had found a surprise: in the box There was no charger, but there was no charging cable either.. In the photo included in the post it was clearly seen how this absence was made evident on the back of the box. The Sony Xperia 10 VII does not include a charger or charging cable. It is true that Sony is no longer a major player in the field of mobility, but these types of decisions are what can begin to establish an important precedent that other manufacturers end up adopting as well. At Xataka we have contacted those responsible for Sony to try to find out the reasons behind that decision. In the absence of confirmation, it seems clear that the environmental protection and the reduction of electronic waste may once again be the clear argument, although obviously the savings for Sony may also be relevant. The European Union precisely wanted mitigate the problem of electronic waste years ago. He did it at set the USB-C connector as the standard connector to charge mobile devices, something that for example forced Apple to ditch your Lightning connector. In these years it seems clear that users We have ended up accumulating a good number of USB-C cables to charge our devices. It is something similar to what happened with chargers: a priori we all have one at home, so the need to include them in the box, as is now the case with cables, is debatable. Of course, it also happens that over time mobile phones tend to allow charging at higher power or transferring data at higher speeds, and this makes it necessary to use chargers and cables specially prepared to take advantage of these options. But even in those cases, including the charger or cable doesn’t seem to make much sense. Especially because Those accessories that manufacturers include are the “basic” models that allow you to upload or transfer data, but not at maximum speed. The usual thing here for years is that manufacturers offer that option on the mobile, but we have to buy the specific charger and cable separately, which imposes an extra cost. Will we therefore see fewer and fewer USB cables included in mobile phone boxes? It seems quite possible. Now all that’s left is for the manufacturers of those USB-C cables to solve their big problem: label them well so that we know which one to use at all times. Image | Zana Latif In Xataka | The USB-C standard promised to solve the connector chaos. The situation is worse than ever

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