oil

The US has taken over Venezuela’s oil. The problem is that the package includes a gigantic debt with China

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The map of world power has been redrawn in just one week. The capture of Nicolás Maduro by US forces is not just a regime change; is the birth of the “Donroe Doctrine”, a movement with which Washington seeks to consolidate an energy empire “from Alaska to Patagonia” to control 40% of world production. However, after the military euphoria in the White House, a dilemma of trillion-dollar proportions looms: the oil has been taken, but it is mortgaged, and China demands its bills. The collector at the door. Control of the largest reserves on the planet has put the US face to face with the great creditor of the Caribbean. According to the South China Morning Post (SCMP)the current exposure in a state of “limbo” is estimated at $10 billion, although other estimates by think tanks collected by the same medium raise the historical debt to more than 60,000 million, much of it structured under the “oil for loans” model. But how was this sum arrived at? China needed energy for its industrial rise and Venezuela needed cash. Under this premise, Beijing financed railways, power plants and more than 600 bilateral agreements. Now, the great fear of the Asian giant is that the new government in Caracas —protected by the Trump administration— invoke the doctrine of “hateful debt”. As Cui Shoujun explains in SCMPthis legal remedy would allow the loans to be repudiated, alleging that China’s money did not benefit the people, but rather financed the survival of the regime. It would be the perfect “legal pretext” to clean up the balance sheets before the American oil companies take the reins. The agony of the Chinese state companies and the shield of the “Teapots”. The anxiety in Beijing is not just political, it is corporate. As revealed by Bloomberggiants such as China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) are carrying out damage assessments amid fears that decades of investments will evaporate. Nevertheless, according to information from Reutersthese companies still operate in the country through joint ventures such as Sinovensa, and control rights to reserves amounting to billions of barrels. However, China has an “ace up its sleeve.” A couple of months ago, they were absorbing 90% of measurable crude oil storage. Besides, as detailed by the Financial Timesmuch of the flow of Venezuelan crude oil arrived in China through the “teapots” (independent refineries), which bought the oil at steep discounts to avoid previous sanctions. By taking control of exports, the United States not only recovers crude oil, but also eliminates a key competitive advantage for the Chinese industry, raising its energy costs at a stroke. The technical paradox. Many wonder why Trump would risk so much for oil that seems “bad.” The answer is a necessary technical symbiosisAmerican and Spanish refineries (like Repsol’s) act as “stomachs” designed for heavy crude oil from Venezuela, which needs to be mixed with light oil from the fracking to produce diesel efficiently. However, the prize comes with a bill astronomical repair. The infrastructure is literally in ruins: loading an oil tanker today takes five days compared to the one day that was enough seven years ago, and the crude oil arrives “dirty” (with excess water and salt) due to lack of maintenance. Reconstructing the sector will require 10 billion dollars annually for a decade, to which is added the drama of natural gas: Venezuela today burns in “smoke” the equivalent of the consumption of all of Colombia due to pure technical negligence. The battle of the offices. Trump has taken control of the energy crown jewel, but has found himself with an astronomical repair bill and a Chinese creditor who won’t go away quietly. As the Financial Times warnsif the US decides to also suffocate supplies from Iran after this blow in Venezuela, China could see 20% of its cheap crude oil imports compromised, which would force Beijing into an unpredictable reaction. The real battle did not end with the capture of Maduro; It is just beginning in the offices of Washington and Beijing. Venezuela is the jackpot, but it is a prize that comes with fine print that could go bankrupt the financial balances of half the world. The oil era is not over, but the map of who controls it and who pays for it has been rewritten with blood and debt. Image | Luisovalles Xataka | The war in Ukraine has just met that of Venezuela: that means that its two invaders are facing each other

While the whole world looks at oil, Venezuela’s true treasure is hidden in the basements of London: its gold

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Perhaps the great treasure of Venezuela not oil. In fact, since the United States attacked Caracasa series of theories have begun to be heard loudly that have a common denominator: the greatest Venezuelan loot is thousands of kilometers from the nation, under the soil of the capital of the United Kingdom. The gold trapped in London. Yes, under the streets of the cityin the vaults of the Bank of England, remain immobilized about 31 tons of gold belonging to Venezuela, an asset that in 2020 was valued around 1.4 billion pounds and that today it is worth much more after the strong rebound of the metal price. The capture of Nicolás Maduro for the United States has returned This issue is brought to the international forefront, reopening a question that has been without a clear answer for years: who really has the right to control these reserves. Although global attention often focuses on Venezuelan oil, gold represents about 15% of the country’s foreign reserves and has become a key piece of a political, legal and geopolitical pulse that far transcends Caracas. Recognition and blocking. The origin of the blockage dates back to 2018after a disputed presidential election and the tightening of sanctions promoted by Trump during his first term. The United Kingdom, along with dozens of countries, stopped recognizing Maduro as legitimate president and, under pressure from the Venezuelan opposition, refused to authorize the repatriation of the gold, alleging the risk that it would be used to prop up an authoritarian regime or directly diverted. Added to this, as later revealed former national security advisor John Bolton, an express request from Washington for London to maintain the blockade, which placed the British central bank and the Government at the center of a battle that mixed international law, sanctions and diplomacy. Bank of England A judicial labyrinth. In 2020, Caracas went to court British to claim the gold, arguing that they needed those funds to deal with the pandemic. However, the process became complicated when Juan Guaidó, then recognized by London As interim president, he also claimed ownership of the reserves. The litigation led to a legal tangle about who the Bank of England should obey, a question that remains unresolved even after Guaidó lost international recognition. The result is a legal limbo in which the gold remains immobilized, without any of the parties being able to dispose of it. Piracy accusations. From the Chavista environment, the retention of gold was denounced as an act of “piracy”an accusation made at the time by Delcy Rodríguez, which was later marred by the scandal known as Delcygate following his alleged secret trip to Madrid in 2020 despite an EU entry ban and the alleged sale of Venezuelan bullion. Although Rodríguez has adopted a more conciliatory tone After the fall of Maduro, offering cooperation to the United States, the British position remains firm: Foreign Minister Yvette Cooper has reiterated that London maintains political pressure because it considers it key to force a democratic transition, even underlining the formal independence of the Bank of England in the management of assets. The dangerous precedent. The Venezuelan case is not an exception, but rather part of a trend increasingly controversial: the immobilization of sovereign reserves in a context of growing geopolitical confrontation. We have told it: after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Western countries froze about 300,000 million of dollars from the Russian central bank, largely deposited in Eurocleara measure that has generated tensions with Moscow and has revived the debate about the security of keeping assets abroad. Historically, these sanctions have been rare but not unprecedented, from the Soviet confiscation of Romanian gold in 1918 to blockades of countries like Iran or North Korea in the second half of the 20th century. Global distrust. Thus, the climate of uncertainty is leading many countries to rethink where do you keep your reservesdriving repatriation movements and fueling the recent gold rally as an active refuge. For analysts and central banks, the Venezuelan episode is a clear warning of how politics can interfere with assets that were traditionally considered untouchable. While the Bank of England remains officially silent (and many ingots), Venezuelan gold remains buried under London, converted into a symbol of an increasingly international financial order. more fragile and politicized. Image | Bank of England, Eluveitie In Xataka | The mission in Caracas revealed that the best kept secret in the US is not a drone: it is called DAP and you will not see it in the movies In Xataka | The attack on Venezuela has recovered an uncomfortable truth: that it would not have happened to North Korea for a very simple reason

How Venezuelan crude oil became a risk

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On December 14, 1922, the Los Barrosos-2 well in Venezuela exploded into a 60-meter geyser of crude oil that took a week to stop. As CNN remembersthat ecological disaster set the country on a path of dazzling wealth and political turmoil that has led, a century later, in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro by US forces. While in Washington they celebrate the “Donroe Doctrine”in the control centers of the Cartagena and Bilbao refineries there is a different tension. For Spain, Venezuela is not just foreign policy news; It is an economic black hole of 1,160 million euros. A deficit out of control. The commercial relationship between Spain and Venezuela has gone from being a balanced exchange to a financial abyss. According to data collected by El EconomistaIn 2024, Spain registered a trade deficit of 1,160 million euros with the Caribbean country. It is triple that in 2022 and the highest figure in the last 18 years. The cause is an alarming asymmetry. While our sales barely reach 230 million euros, our purchases have multiplied by 22 since 2021. Spain has become Venezuela’s fourth best customer in the world, behind the US, India and China. However, it is not a diversified purchase but 94.59% of what we import is oil and derivatives. Repsol: the jewel exposed on the board. If there is a proper name in this conflict, it is Repsol. According to Expansionthe Spanish oil company is the company with the most money at stake in the area. Venezuela is not just another asset; is its second largest source of reserves tested in the world (256 million barrels), only behind the United States. This represents almost 15% of the company’s entire underground treasure. But the risk is not only what is underground, but what is owed. Repsol’s equity exposure due to commercial debts of the state-owned PDVSA amounted to 330 million euros in June 2025. In addition, the Spanish oil company extracts 33% of the gas consumed by Venezuela. As the same source points out, without Repsol gas, the Venezuelan economy would come to a standstill, but without Venezuela’s legal security, the Spanish company’s balance sheet could suffer a “hole” of more than 13 billion euros in reserve valuation. The paradox of “heavy food.” Many wonder why Spanish companies insist on a country with obsolete infrastructure. The answer is technical. Venezuela’s oil is “extra-heavy”, dense as tar. Ironically, the oil that the US extracts through fracking is “too good” (light). To produce diesel and asphalt efficiently, Gulf Coast and Spanish refineries need to blend their light crude with Venezuela’s dense “stuff.” However, this is a “gas station without hoses.” The crude oil arrives “dirty” (with excess salt, water and metals) because PDVSA has dismantled pipelines to sell them as scrap. This turns refining into an expensive and risky process that only companies with decades of roots, such as Repsol – since 1993 – dare to manage. The wall of 100,000 million. Trump’s optimism, which already mobilizes private funds of 2 billion dollars led by former Chevron executives, clashes with technical reality. In fact, analysts consulted by The Wall Street Journal They warn that there will not be an immediate miracle. Rebuilding the sector requires an investment of $10 billion a year for a decade. The infrastructure is so deteriorated that PDVSA acknowledges that its pipelines have not been modernized in half a century. The total repair bill amounts to $100 billion. The Trump factor and the “Donroe Doctrine.” In an analysis by market expert Robert Armstrong highlights a paradigm shift: Trump has shown that his geopolitical ideology is above market stability. By capturing Maduro, he has put his legacy at stake for the objective of controlling the energy flow from Alaska to Patagonia. This movement a priori benefits Repsol, which had been negotiating for months to avoid the export blockade. However, the risk is that the US will prioritize the landing of its own colossi (Exxon, Chevron, ConocoPhillips) displacing the European partners that, such as Repsol or the Italian Eni, stayed when the Americans fled during Chávez’s expropriations. A prize with small print. Spain has before it a historic opportunity to recover its investments and lead the reconstruction, given its historical roots. But the 1.16 billion “hole” is only the symptom of a deeper illness: dependence on an asset that requires massive investment to be profitable in a world that is already beginning to say goodbye to fossil fuels. Venezuela continues to be the largest gas station in the world, but today it is a dilapidated facility whose repair bill threatens to stain the balance sheets of the large Spanish company if the transition is not “surgical.” Image | Pexels and Repsol Xataka | Venezuela has shown that the US can find anyone no matter how hidden they are. You only have to invoke one name: RQ-170

Getting hold of Venezuela’s immense oil reserves seems like a “bargain.” It’s actually an engineering nightmare.

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The geopolitical board has been blown up with the establishment of the “Donroe Doctrine.” According to energy analyst Javier Blasthis movement seeks to consolidate an energy empire from Alaska to Patagonia to control 40% of world production. Trump has not hesitated, making it clear that his objective is oil, recovering “stolen” assets and executing a lightning reconstruction led by American oil companies. However, Washington’s optimism clashes with technical reality. Analysts consulted by The Wall Street Journal They warn that there will not be an immediate miracle in the wells. In fact, the market has stopped fearing shortages and has begun to discount a future saturation of crude oil that is already pushing prices down. It’s not “black gold”, it’s asphalt. The narrative of easy success collides with geology. Venezuela It has 303,000 million barrels of proven reserves, but the vast majority is located in the Orinoco Belt and is extra-heavy crude oil. Unlike light oil, it is viscous, dense and does not flow naturally; It is more like tar than fuel. Added to the geological complexity is an alarming degradation of quality. A Reuters investigationbased on internal PDVSA documents, reveals that refiners in India (Reliance) and China (CNPC) have canceled orders or demanded drastic discounts because the crude oil arrives “dirty”, with excessive levels of water, salt and metals. These impurities corrode distillation towers and refining equipment, making processing an expensive and risky process. According to the researcher Luisa Palaciosthe country does not even produce the diluents (gasoline) necessary to transport this crude oil through pipelines, which forces it to depend on imports or inefficient mixtures. Low profitability. Despite the magnitude of the reserves, Venezuelan oil is far from being a profitable business. Its current low profitability is based on three critical pillars that any investor must consider. First of all, geology works against us. According to Forbesextracting this heavy crude oil requires massive and constant technical investment in steam injection and “upgrading” plants to transform the bitumen into a marketable product. Without this expensive technology, the resource is simply inaccessible. Added to this are the structural discounts in the market. As Al Jazeera explainsDue to its high density and sulfur content, this crude oil always trades below markers such as Brent or WTI. With a barrel that could fall to 50-60 dollars in 2026, the profit margin for Venezuela would be reduced to a minimum. The bottleneck: logistics. As an analysis in Bloomberg points outthe infrastructure is literally in ruins because loading a supertanker now requires five days, compared to just one day seven years ago. The collapse is such that the state oil company itself has gone so far as to dismantle oil pipelines to sell them for scrap, while key complexes such as Paraguaná are dying due to lack of maintenance. The rescue recipe. Venezuela dreams of the 4 million barrels per day that marked its rise in the 70s, but the financial reality is a bucket of cold water. Francisco Monaldi, director of energy policy at Rice University, calculates that the energy rescue demands 10 billion dollars a year for an entire decade. A goal as ambitious as it is expensive. However, money is not everything when human capital is lacking. CBCNews remember that In 2003, 23,000 skilled professionals were laid off, many of whom ended up in the Canadian tar sands. Without this talent, American cutting-edge technology has no hands to operate it. Furthermore, giants such as ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips will not move a single drill until legal certainty is guaranteed and settlements are made. billionaire debts of the expropriations of the Chávez era. But why Venezuela if Canada already exists? If crude oil is so “bad” and expensive, why Trump’s interest? The key is a necessary technical symbiosis. Gulf Coast refineries (Texas and Louisiana) They are like “stomachs” Designed for heavy food. Ironically, the oil that the US extracts through fracking is “too good” (too light). To optimize your plants and produce diesel, they need to mix its light crude oil with Venezuela’s heavy crude oil. Rory Johnston and Lino Carrillo they explain thatAlthough Canada’s crude oil is identical to Venezuelan crude, the latter has an unbeatable advantage: it is three days away by ship and has access to deep waters, while Canada suffers from “geographic confinement” due to saturated oil pipelines. Furthermore, by controlling this flow, the US cuts off the supply to “teapot” (independent refiners) of China, which until now bought Venezuelan crude at a discount, thus eliminating a competitive advantage for Beijing. There was a small pulse. Behind Trump’s mobilization, as the New York Times emphasizesChevron has positioned itself as a key player in the entire equation. This desire to go after Venezuelais also explained because it had a single major oil company that has maintained its presence in the country since 1923, surviving nationalizations and crises while competitors such as ExxonMobil left the board. There is a hidden treasure. Beyond oil, Venezuela is a “gas station” that wastes its own product. Luisa Palacios and The Kobeissi Letter The 200 billion cubic feet of natural gas stand out (the largest reserve in the region). Due to pure technical negligence, PDVSA today burns or vents an amount of gas equivalent to the consumption of all of Colombia, losing 1 billion dollars annually in smoke. Added to this is the potential of Mining Bow with critical minerals (nickel, coltan, bauxite) essential for the defense and technology industry. The paradox of the “gas station without hoses.” Trump has taken control of the largest reserve on the planet, but he has found himself with a facility that has no hoses, whose electrical grid is collapsing and whose fuel requires intensive processing so as not to destroy the engines. Although the flow of exports can be redirected quickly from China to the US in a matter of months—benefiting refineries in Texas and Louisiana—the actual reconstruction of the sector is a long-term project. The real battle has not been the capture of Maduro, but the management … Read more

the high possibilities that the US plan for Venezuela will sink the price of oil

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The global geopolitical board has been blown up at the start of 2026. If the oil market was already limping after 2025 characterized by excess supplythe capture of Nicolás Maduro by US forces This weekend has acted as the definitive catalyst. What in another time would have caused a “shock” of rising prices due to fear of shortages, today is having the opposite effect: investors are beginning to discount a flood of crude oil in the medium term that could push the barrel of WTI directly towards the basement of $50. The Trump factor. The military operation to arrest Maduro and transfer him to New York has not come wrapped in the usual diplomatic alibis. On the contrary, President Donald Trump has been unusually explicit: the goal is oil. Under what some analysts already call the “Donroe Doctrine“, the White House has demanded the return of assets that it considers “stolen” from the United States since the era of Hugo Chávez. Trump does not seem interested in a change in the traditional democratic regime; has minimized María Machado’s opposition and has conditioned stability on US oil companies (Chevron, Exxon, ConocoPhillips) taking the reins of PDVSA to “fix” a ruined infrastructure, as Bloomberg has had access. A market in free fall. Despite the tension, prices are trading lower today. WTI stands at $57.12 and Brent barely defends $60.55 —at the time of writing this report. The market was already coming from 2025 where the barrels took a 20% annual cut. According to the Financial Timessentiment is the most bearish in a decade. The newspaper highlights that the operators (traders) maintain record levels of short positions (bets on the fall), ignoring any geopolitical risk premium. Amrita Sen, founder of Energy Aspectsexplains to the same medium that psychology has changed because it is assumed that there will be “much more oil in the medium term”, which cancels out any rebound due to military tension. The $50 plan. The real fear of traditional exporters is not only Venezuela, but the consolidation of a bloc under US influence. According to a JP Morgan reportIf Washington manages to reactivate Venezuelan production and add it to that of Guyana (controlled by Exxon) and its own domestic production (world leader with 13.3 million barrels per day), the United States would de facto control 30% of all world reserves. This “superblock” would neutralize OPEC’s ability to set prices. Oil would cease to be a purely market good and become a strategic tool administered from Washington to keep prices in low ranges (50-60 dollars) and thus promote its internal economic expansion. The OPEC+ axis: a fight for fiscal survival. This scenario of low prices creates a lethal clamp that squeezes Moscow and Riyadh equally. For Russia, a barrel at 50 dollars It is a weapon of economic war more effective than sanctions; The country already suffers from a chronic lack of investment and the siege of its income to sustain the conflict in Ukraine. This weakness spreads to the rest of OPEC+. According to the recent press releasethe eight countries have decided to pause production increases until April 2026 due to “seasonality.” However, its capacity for influence is exhausted: each cut by the cartel is compensated by the increase in supply from foreign countries such as Brazil or Canada. In addition, doubts are already bleeding into the Gulf financial markets. According to ReutersSaudi Arabia’s stock markets have closed in the red on the prospect of a chronic surplus. Riyadh has approved a borrowing plan of 217 billion riyals by 2026 to support its “Vision 2030”. Without oil above 70-80 dollars, their megaprojects become financially unsustainable. Is a flood of Venezuelan crude oil realistic? In the short term, technical skepticism persists. According to Bloombergreviving the Venezuelan industry so that it returns to its 3 million barrels per day of yesteryear would require an investment of 10 billion dollars annually for a decade. The infrastructure is so deteriorated that loading a supertanker today takes five days, compared to the single day it took seven years ago. Additionally, there is the factor of internal resistance. Delcy Rodríguez, current interim president, has already warned that Venezuela “will not be anyone’s colony.” However, the market looks further: the simple possibility that Venezuelan heavy crude (vital for US Gulf Coast refineries) return to the legal circuit is enough to keep prices under structural pressure. It is worth remembering that the market moves by expectations. The International Energy Agency (IEA) already foresees a surplus record of 4 million barrels per day for this year due to the China slowdown and technological efficiency. The new era of transactional oil. Trump’s success when eliminating an opponent and “lay your hand” on the largest reserves in the world In a matter of hours he sent a message maximum global pressure. If this trend is consolidated, 2026 will be remembered as the year in which oil stopped being an instrument of balance to become the hammer with which the United States redraws the map of power. Barring an unexpected disruption, the path to $50 seems less like a hypothesis and more like a sentence for traditional petrostates. Image | freepik and Gage Skidmore Xataka | This graph shows that Venezuela has more oil than anyone else. Its production is another story

Energy companies are switching from oil to MW. The new mine is the support for data centers

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Gluttonous artificial intelligence and its demanding data centers are reshaping the decarbonization plans. When the world had begun a journey towards renewableswith countries like Chinaand Europeans betting big, and even some US states getting on the traindata centers arrived with needs that were almost impossible to satisfy. At the end of December 2024 we already have that data center consumption had skyrocketedpushing big technology companies to bet so much on renewable as, above all, for immediate access energy such as gas and even coal. Some were even aiming for nuclear to be able to operate. Shortly after, in January 2025, a Reuters report noted that European energy companies, which had embarked on a path of commitment to renewables, were doubling down on oil and gas. Giants like BP and Shell slowed down their investments in clean energy to return to fossil fuel projects. But it’s not all about where data centers extract energy from, but rather who provides them infrastructure. And that, and not so much oil or gas, may be the next energy mine. The new oil mine In an article of Financial Times It is suggested that the fleeting growth of data centers is generating a market that energy companies do not want to miss. As demand for traditional drilling weakens (although it is something that goes by “neighborhoods”), energy sector groups such as Baker Hughes, Halliburton or SLB are taking advantage to pivot to the data center sector. Not building them, not just supplying energy: supporting logistics. Taking advantage of their knowledge of the energy sector, these large companies would be providing equipment such as turbines and power generation systems to those who own data centers, but they also provide generators, batteries, dissipation systems and all the necessary framework to maintain correct energy efficiency. They would also oversee the team. It is, in short, what they already know how to do, but applied to a new sector such as data centers. Because these three examples are not typical oil companies, but technology providers for other companies to extract gas or oil. All three provide services to companies with oil fields, but also supply technology such as gas turbines, compressors or systems. LNG and they were inside sectors such as new energywith carbon capture and storage systems. All of this resonates with the idea that ‘Big Tech’ had when they began to build huge data centers, until they saw that increasingly demanding equipment needed more immediate and stable sources of energy. Data centers = El Dorado It is estimated that US electricity demand will increase by 90 GW -a real nonsense- from now to 2030 only to power the data centers. Traditional electrical grids may not support this load, and it is at that point that these companies that provide energy services They seem like a key entity. Pivoting toward artificial intelligence infrastructure is “key to the evolution of oil and gas,” said Lorenzo Simonelli, CEO of Baker Hughes. And it makes sense when we see that the number of US oil rigs contracted 7% year-over-year in 2025, margins have contracted and demand for drilling services is in interdict. On a business level, it is a masterstroke. Hypothetically speaking, when the new oil crisis arrives and the fall of the market for both crude oil and gas, companies that have pivoted to data centers, going from being service providers for energy companies to being service providers for ‘Big Tech‘, they will not have to take a turn in their strategy because they will already be where the money will be. Because that’s another question: whether the new MW gold for AI will be a lasting business or a passing fever. Image | freepik and Harpagornis In Xataka | The problem with renewables is what to do when there is excess energy. China believes it has the answer with a unique turbine

The price of olive oil has begun to skyrocket at Christmas

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The price of olive oil sang “the wolf is coming” a few months ago. At the end of August, and after a few months of free fallwith prices very far of the peaks from a couple of years agothe “liquid gold” seemed to was picking up again. This has been the case, and a worse than expected harvest has negative consequences on the price of extra virgin oil. The good news is that it is not as alarming as it was a few years ago. In short. 2024 and 2025 have not been years of good harvests for some products. In South America it has spent with coffee (and we carry the consequences throughout the year). It has happened with the grapes (and we will notice it in the wine), and it seems that it has not been favorable for the olive either. As they point out from The Confidentialthe latest data from Department of agriculture (some great graphs for database lovers) indicate an average price at origin of 4.56 euros per liter of extra virgin. The data offered in Oleista (which shows both extra virgin and virgin through various market sources) are in the same line: 4.11 euros, which translates into 53% more in the last 10 days compared to the previous period. And you may think “it’s not that much”, but the problem is that a white label bottle (final product, not origin) is around 4.65 euros per liter. Margins. Those nine cents difference are few, but it means that the chains have fewer margins, which is why they raise the price of that final product. Some chains are already doing it. There are several ways to see the price history of some supermarkets to follow its evolution. An example is SuperSupersbut FACUA also offers a somewhat clearer service: less historical, but more short-term information that can help us see recent evolution. According to their information, a liter of Hacendado extra virgin olive oil cost 4.65 euros 30 days ago. Today it is for 4.95 euros after an increase of 6.45%. But you don’t have to go back a month: according to the ‘snitch’, a week ago the price was 6.45% lower. When will we notice it?. The answer is obvious: now. And, of course, the question that arises is why a few months ago it took us a while to see that oil prices in the supermarket were still high when originally they had fallen sharply… and now that the situation is the other way around, they are readjusting so quickly. Times depend on several factors, but above all on stock and supply contracts. In general, adjustment is usually seen after a few monthsbut when that applies to increases, the change is much more immediate. In the end, it is a tremendously volatile market and, although In March the rains invited optimism in the price of olive oil, if these last years have taught us anything it is that two weeks of heat are enough above normal so that an entire olive campaign goes to waste. Far from the peak. It is similar to egg pricewhich has had a negative streak, but when the stabilization was there, the outbreak of avian flu appeared, which has skyrocketed the price of eggs and has had other disastrous consequences: touch the price of nougat. It’s like a pyramid of cards. However, and despite those close to five euros per liter of white label extra virgin oil, the way to console ourselves is that we are far – very far – from what we experienced just two years agowhen going to the ‘supermarket’ was a pain because you knew you were going to pay about 10 euros per liter of oil. Preumification. But in the background there is another important issue – that house of cards that I was commenting on. A few prices is a sum and continues in a supermarket basket that is increasingly more expensive when salaries do not rise at the same rate. It is one more element that supports household income, especially in countries like Spain where olive oil is a basic product. And, although this is a much more personal note, it will be a sad day when olive oil in Spain is a premium product like in other countriesand we have to use other vegetable oils or even butter to cook. A cultural and even identity loss. Images | David Clode, Antonio Molin In Xataka | Mercadona has bought the company that has been supplying pallets and boxes for decades. And there is a very simple reason

Russia’s ghost fleet has changed its business model. Oil has given way to a much bigger target: Europe

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Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has not only built a vast fleet of tankers to avoid Western sanctions and continue exporting crude oil from the Baltic and the Black Sea, but has turned that logistical infrastructure into something much more ambitious. How much? The size of an old continent. The fleet in the shadows. According to Western and Ukrainian intelligence sources cited by CNN, Part of this so-called shadow fleet is being used as a covert platform for espionage and hybrid operations in European waters. We are talking about hundreds of ships that routinely sail near the coasts of EU and NATO countries, generating income of hundreds of millions of dollars for Moscow while, at the same time, expanding the radius of action of its security services away from Russian territory. “Civilian” crews with a detail. The pattern detected by the intelligence services is revealing. Many of these tankers, registered under flags of convenience and with mostly Asian or African crews, incorporate just before setting sail to one or two Russian citizens additional. The crew lists show as simple “technicians”but his background tells another story: former police officers, members of special units of the Ministry of the Interior, veterans of the Russian army or former mercenaries linked to Wagner. They are often the only Russians on board and, according to testimonies of Danish maritime pilots and European observers, exercise an authority that goes beyond the civilian chain of command, even imposing itself over the ship’s captain. Moran Security and privatization. Many of these men would be linked to Moran Security Groupa private Russian company with deep ties to the FSB, GRU, and the Kremlin’s military contractor ecosystem. Moran was sanctioned by the United States Treasury in 2024 for providing armed security services to Russian state companies, and his history connects directly with Wagner and with operations in scenarios such as Syria or Somalia. Its corporate structure (with registrations in Moscow and in opaque jurisdictions such as Belize) and its professional profile, explicitly oriented to recruit veterans of special forces, fit perfectly into the logic of hybrid warfare: formally private actors that allow the Russian state to operate with a high degree of plausible deniability. Espionage and internal control. The functions of these “technicians” would not be limited to protecting the cargo. Ukrainian and Western sources maintain that also supervise captains non-Russian vessels to ensure that the ships are acting in the interests of the Kremlin and that, in at least one documented case, took photographs of European military installations from one of these tankers. Furthermore, although details are scarce, intelligence services suggest that some of these men have participated in acts of sabotage. These would not be direct confrontations, but rather low-profile actions designed to collect information, generate uncertainty and strain the limits of the Western response. The Boracay case. He Boracay tanker illustrates this dynamic well. Sanctioned, with frequent changes of name and flag, two Russian citizens embarked in September in the port of Primorsk, near Saint Petersburg. Both were listed as technicians and were the only Russians among a crew of Chinese, Burmese and Bangladeshis. Coincidence or not, his crossing through Danish waters overlapped with a wave of sightings of drones near the Copenhagen airport and Danish military bases. Days later, the ship was boarded by the French navy against Brittany for irregularities in their documentation. No drones were found on board, but the presence of the two Russians came to light and they were discreetly questioned. For some analyststemporal correlation proves nothing, but for others It fits too well with the pattern of trial and error in the “gray zone.” Drones, sensors and something new. Beyond Boracay, Swedish and Danish authorities have detected on other ships in the shadow fleet antennas and masts not usually found on civilian merchant ships, as well as hostile behavior towards inspectors and an obsession with photographing critical infrastructure. In an environment like the Baltic, a strategic bottleneck surrounded by NATO countries, any anomalous activity becomes a disproportionate weight. For European security services, these ships are ideal mobile platforms: seemingly legal, difficult to intercept without diplomatic escalation and capable of approaching ports, cables, bases and airports without raising immediate alarms. Hybrid warfare at sea. All this fits with a broader strategy that senior intelligence officials, such as the new head of British MI6describe as constant testing “below the threshold of war.” Drones near airports, aggressive activity at sea, discreet sabotage and covert espionage are part of the same repertoire. The shadow fleet is not only an economic instrument to circumvent sanctions, but an extension of the Russian security apparatus, capable of operating in a space where Western legal and military responses are slow and politically sensitive. The European dilemma. Europe thus faces an uncomfortable decision. Intercepting ships without insurance, with dubious documentation or with armed personnel on board could stop these practices, but it also carries the risk of a direct russian reaction. As summarized on CNN a veteran Danish maritime pilot, no small country wants to be the first to make the move. The answer, if it comes, will have to be collective. Meanwhile, the shadow fleet continues growing and sailingdemonstrating that for the Kremlin the war is not only being fought in Ukraine, but also in the seas surrounding Europe, silently and in civilian uniform. Image | kees torn, Greg Bishop In Xataka | For years Europe has wondered how to stop the Russian ghost fleet. Ukraine just showed you the way: with AI In Xataka | A ghost fleet has mapped the entire underwater structure of the EU. The question is what Moscow is going to do with that information.

Rome turned North Africa into its great oil fountain. And we have found the mega-oil mills of the Empire

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He Roman empire He founded the foundations of Western civilization both socially and in the most functional part: the infrastructure. Its roads are famousbut wherever they passed, They also founded industry. And an international group of archaeologists has found one of the most significant discoveries related to the roman industry. The second largest oil pressing complex in the entire Empire. Mega-oil mill. In the Tunisian region of Kasserine is the archaeological site identified as ‘Henchir el Begar’. Specifically, there are two settlements found to the north and west of Kasserine (the ancient Roman Cillium), and archaeologists are clear that they are part of the same industry dedicated to oil. They estimate that both were operational between the 3rd and 6th centuries AD, demonstrating that they were incredibly valuable to the Empire, and the data reflects the productive ambition of the area: The settlement has 33 hectares with two main sectors: Hr Begar 1 and Hr Begar 2. Hr Begar 1 has twelve beam presses, being the largest mill in Tunisia and the second largest in the entire Roman world. We are talking about beams and counterweights capable of exerting tons of pressure. It has cisterns and a water collection basin. HR Begar 2 has another eight presses of the same type, as well as another water collection basin and cisterns. Context. In addition to the two “oil mills”, georadar has identified a network of settling tanks for oil, warehouses, a dense fabric of housing for workers and the site’s population, and road tracks for the ‘trucks’ of the erato, trains that transported the amphoraethey will reach the coast and places of distribution. Apart from making it clear that the site was an oil megafactory, they have also found stone mills. They estimate that production was mixed: oil and also cereals, which points to the strategic importance of this region around Kasserine. Strategic good. In it releasearchaeologists highlight that the territory is characterized by high steppes and a continental climate with modest rainfall that would have been collected in wells, all of this favoring ideal conditions for the cultivation of olive trees. This border area of ​​Africa would have been a point of exchange between cultures, but a discovery of these dimensions shows that this Proconsular province of Africa would have been the great supplier of oil to the Roman Empire both for consumption (the highest quality oil) and for fuel and other consumables (oil for lighting, bases for medical ointments and cosmetics). Perspectives. That powerful Henchir el Begar oil industry is not the only thing the team has found. They have also found pieces such as a bracelet decorated in copper or brass, a stone projectile and some architectural elements that had later been reused in a Byzantine wall. The mission in Kasserine began in 2023 as a project co-led by the Ca’Foscari University of Venice, the University of La Manouba in Tunisia and the Complutense University of Madrid and, according to Professor Luigi Sperti, one of the project coordinators, it allows “an unprecedented perspective on the agrarian and socioeconomic organization of the border regions of Roman Africa.” We will see what they find in future prospecting, but the investigations of this third campaign have borne fruit in understanding the importance of the region in issues such as the production, marketing and transportation of oil on a scale not seen until now in that area. Images | UCM, Unive In Xataka | Modern tunnel boring machines are real monsters compared to those of 1950. The paradox is that they are just as slow

Russian oil never stopped arriving in Europe and this 30-year-old German knows it well because he has earned millions by supporting the system.

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JR Ewing, the oil magnate dallasused to repeat that “the essential thing in this business was to always be one step ahead.” If I lived in 2025, I probably wouldn’t be wearing a Texan hat: I’d be a trader in my late 30s with a laptop, a rented office in Dubai, and a German passport. And perhaps he would look a lot like Christopher Eppinger, the young man who, according to an extensive report in the Financial Timeshas managed to become a millionaire by speculating with sanctioned Russian oil while Europe proclaimed from the rooftops that it was breaking dependence on the Kremlin. Because while Brussels talked about “energy sovereignty” and announced price caps, a parallel ecosystem of nomadic traders, ghost fleets and opaque companies continued to move millions of barrels away from the official radar. In that underground of the global economy, Eppinger found his opportunity. The sanctioned oil never stopped flowing; It simply stopped being visible. And he knew how to make it profitable. When a door closes. Christopher Eppinger, marked since childhood by the chapters of dallas that he saw with his grandmother, he found in the war a window to get rich. The young German moved with the same logic that much more veteran intermediaries have used for decades: special purpose companies in the United Arab Emirates, triangulated operations with India or China, sales contracts for discounted crude oil and the logistics of a ghost fleet that operates on the margins of maritime law. While European governments presented sanctions in solemn press conferences, he took advantage of every crack in the system to buy low and resell high. He didn’t need his own ships, or infrastructure, or even physically touching a barrel: it was enough to know where the opportunities were and who didn’t want to look too closely. Showing an uncomfortable truth. The story of this young German is not an anecdote, but evidence that the sanctioning system never acted as intended. Organization reports like Public Eye show that, between 2023 and 2024 alone, newly created companies or companies relocated to Dubai accounted for more than half of the Russian oil exported by sea, displacing traditional centers such as Switzerland and Singapore. According to Bloombergkey figures in the energy trade, such as Murtaza Lakhani, helped Rosneft reconfigure its export chains through the Emirates to keep flows active despite sanctions. And while much of Europe tried to break ties with Moscow, some countries —like Hungary and Slovakia— took advantage of exceptions to continue receiving crude oil and gas through the Druzhba pipeline. Energy dependence, far from being broken, fragmented into a more chaotic, less transparent and more vulnerable system. In this environment, profiles like Eppinger’s are not only possible: they are almost inevitable. The recipe for enrichment. Eppinger’s method follows a clear logic that the Financial Times details precisely. The first step is to move to Dubai, which has become the “Desert Ireland”thanks to minimal taxation, thousands of special purpose companies created in record time and a confidentiality regime that allows operations without revealing the beneficial owner. The United Arab Emirates does not apply sanctions against Moscow and serves as a perfect platform to move cargo, contracts and dividends without European surveillance. The second pillar is the ghost fleet: hundreds of aging, poorly insured oil tankers, with registrations in opaque countries and with transponders that turn off just when the ship approaches a Russian cargo. These ships They are the heart of parallel trade which has kept Russia exporting above the $60 limit imposed by the G7. The third consists of the Offshore transfers and triangulations. The scheme is simple: buy cheap Russian crude, transfer it to another tanker in international waters, mix it or rename it “Malaysian” or “Indian”, and resell it at an international price. A digital business, fast and — above all — difficult to track. And the fourth element is the ambiguous tolerance of the West. As Bloomberg has detailedthe United States avoided acting harshly for months to avoid causing a global rise in the price of oil. In the EU, exceptions and loopholes allowed non-European companies, although controlled by Europeans, to operate without restrictions. Eppinger moved precisely in that gray space: a legally ambiguous but economically explosive territory. The great gray void where everything is possible. The short answer is: it depends. The long answer is more uncomfortable. According to regulators cited in the different sources, an operation can be technically legal if Russian oil is purchased below the price ceiling, transported to a country that does not apply sanctions and is executed from a legally established entity outside the EU. Switzerland even recognizedaccording to Public Eye— that subsidiaries of Swiss companies established in Dubai are not subject to Swiss sanctioning legislation, as long as they are formally “independent.” This legal architecture allows traders like Eppinger to act without violating the letter of the law, even if they clearly violate its spirit. The question is not so much whether what you do is legal, but why it is possible to do it. Will there be consequences? The cracks in the system are beginning to produce visible effects. On the military front, Ukraine has expanded the war towards Russian energy infrastructure: attacking refineries thousands of kilometers from the front and disabled tankers linked to sanctioned crude oil trading. Russia has lost around 13% of its refining capacity and several regions have suffered queues and gasoline rationing, according to the Financial Times. On the diplomatic and economic level, according to BloombergWashington is already studying specific sanctions against intermediaries in the Emirates, while the United Kingdom has begun to penalize marketing companies with opaque property registered in Dubai. In Europe, pressure is growing on countries that continue to receive Russian energy by land, such as Hungary and Slovakia, identified as leakage points in the system. Eppinger’s business, like that of many others, could have its days numbered if the regulatory fence tightens. For now, it is still profitable. Russia gets richer while Europe … Read more

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