nuclear

In 2011 Japan closed the largest nuclear power plant on the planet. Now he has decided to reopen it in the midst of the energy debate

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The nuclear debate, which Japan thought closed, returns to the scene. The authorization of the governor of Niigata to reactivate Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, the largest atomic plant in the world, has set off alarms: citizen distrust, the shadow of Fukushima and doubts about whether TEPCO is the right company to lead the country’s new energy stage are emerging. A new nuclear revival? The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant, managed by Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), has not produced a single kilowatt since 2012. The closure was a direct consequence of the 2011 tsunami and the three meltdowns from Fukushima Daiichia blow that left reactors with similar designs under suspicion. That technical coincidence was enough to keep its seven reactors on hold for more than ten years, despite the fact that the plant was essential for the electricity supply of northeastern Japan. According to Japan TimesHideyo Hanazumi has authorized a step-by-step reactivation that will start with reactor 6—one of the most recent and powerful—and that, later, will also include reactor 7. Altogether, the complex exceeds 8,000 MW of capacity, a figure that not only imposes: it maintains it as the largest nuclear facility on the planet. A significant change for the Japanese country. Kashiwazaki-Kariwa has gone from a technical project to a strategic move. As reported by the Financial TimesTokyo trusts that its reactivation will contribute to lowering the electricity bill and ensuring energy sources with fewer emissions, at a time complicated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the fall of the yen, which makes fossil fuel imports more expensive. Japan, which before Fukushima generated almost 30% of its electricity with atomic plants, fell to practically zero after the disaster. Since then 14 reactors have reopened and others await local or regulatory approvals. The government aims for nuclear energy to once again represent 20% of the mix in 2040. In addition, TEPCO would improve its annual accounts by around 100 billion yen thanks to the restart, according to Japan Forwardat a time when it continues to face enormous costs for the dismantling of Fukushima Daiichi. The reactivation process. The restart will begin with unit 6, which already has fuel loaded and will begin commercial operations before March of next year. To move forward, TEPCO must respond to the Government’s demands, which include updating all security systems and improving emergency evacuation plans. The process has not been easy. As detailed by Japan Timesthe plant passed safety reviews in 2017, but then suffered a veto from the Nuclear Regulatory Authority due to deficiencies in anti-terrorist measures, lifted in 2023. In addition, TEPCO had to incorporate biometric controls and correct security flaws after new internal incidents. Is there controversy? Yes, and a lot. According to a survey cited by the BBC50% of Niigata residents support the revival, while 47% oppose it. However, almost 70% express their concern because the person operating the plant is the same company that caused the accident. From Japan Times He adds that the rejection intensifies in some of the towns located within 30 kilometers of the plant, where the majority fear a new disaster or distrust the company. Another source of discomfort, also pointed out by this medium, is that the electricity generated is not used in Niigata, but in the Tokyo region. The political dimension is equally tense. Hanazumi, aware of the sensitivity of her decision, has announced that he will submit his continuity as governor to the vote of the prefectural assembly, the only body that can remove him. But there is something else at play. The reopening of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa is seen as a pillar to ensure the country’s energy security and avoid possible power outages in Tokyo. It would also allow reducing electricity rates that have increased notably since 2011. At the same time, Japan is not only restarting reactors: it is also is planning the construction of new plants with fourth generation reactors, which would mark a new chapter in the country’s energy policy. More than a return to the atom. The country that one day vowed not to depend on atomic energy again has ended up returning to it, driven by necessity, geopolitics and the urgency to decarbonize. It remains to be seen if this decision will also ignite the confidence of a citizenry that still carries the memory of Fukushima or if, on the contrary, the return to the atom will deepen a division that has been open for more than a decade. Although the governor’s approval is the decisive step, there are still procedures: the prefectural assembly must debate and vote on the decision in December, and the Japanese nuclear regulator must complete the formal procedures for reactivation. Image | IAEA Imagebank Xataka | In 2011, Japan promised itself not to bet on nuclear energy again. Until he met reality

Reopening nuclear power plants sounds very spectacular, but Google has a plan B in case it’s not enough: solar energy

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Data centers for are insatiable monsters those who are responsible for them must feed. OpenAI, Meta, Microsoft, xAI, Anthropic and Google are burning money riding colossal data centers for training and management of artificial intelligence. But these installations are not expensive to set up: they are also expensive to maintain. They require a considerable amount of energy to functionand Google has just received a ‘shot’ of renewables. All thanks to a direct connection to the largest system in the United States. Renewables to power AI. Google and TotalEnergies have just signed a agreement of energy purchases for 15 years. The contract stipulates that the energy company will deliver 1.5 TWh of electricity from its Montpelier solar plant, in Ohio, to Google. The plant is still under construction and they estimate that it will have a capacity of 49 MW, but the most important thing is that it will be connected directly to the electricity system. PJM. It is the largest network operator in the United States. It covers 13 states and data centers are representing a relevant portion of the operator’s pie: in its last annual auction, the load of these facilities PJM capacity sale triggered at 7.3 billion dollars, 82% more. Astronomical needs. In the statement from TotalEnergies, the company that this agreement illustrates its ability to meet the growing energy demands of the major technology companies. The problem is that it is not enough. If we focus on Google, the consumption of its data centers was 30.8 million megawatt hours of electricity. The company has been focused on AI for years, but the recent ‘boom’ has made it double what its centers consumed in 2020 (14.4 million MWh). Currently, data centers are estimated to account for 95.8% of Google’s total electricity budget. But it’s not just Google: the International Energy Agency esteem that global data centers consumed 415 TWh last year, representing approximately 1.5% of global electricity consumption. It seems little put in percentage, but Spain consumed in 2024 231,808 GWh, or 231 TWh, in 2024. The data centers of a handful of companies alone consumed twice as much as an entire country. And the estimate is that this data center consumption will double by 2030, reaching 945 TWh. Renewables are not enough. Now, although renewables are a support for the total energy required by data centerssolar and wind power have two limitations: intermittency and variability. Generation depends on weather conditions and time of day, meaning it fluctuates dramatically even throughout the same day. This instability clashes head-on with the high reliability and availability requirements of data centers. These are installations that must operate continuously and cannot assume cuts or Unforeseeable drops in supplysince AI or cloud storage would suffer the consequences. These renewables require backup batteries, but it is complicated and expensive to have such a large number of batteries just to power data centers. Pulling the gas and looking at the nuclear. That’s where other sources come into play. On the one hand, nuclear. In October 2024, Google signed the world’s first corporate agreement to acquire nuclear energy from SMR reactors. The first will come into operation in 230 and it is expected that, together, they will be able to satisfy the technology company with 500 MW of capacity by 2035. On the other hand, natural gas. In October of this year, the Broadwing Energy Center project began, a new natural gas power plant that will have a capacity of 400 MW and is scheduled to come into play at the end of 2029. Decarbonization and pressure. And the big question is… doesn’t the use of gas for AI clash with the technology companies’ objectives of achieving decarbonization percentages for both 2030 and 2050? We have already seen that oil companies have been getting off the renewables bandwagon because they have seen that fossil fuels are still relevant in the technology industry, but in the case of Google, they rely on the fact that projects like the Broadwing Energy Center They will have CCS systems. This means that it will have carbon capture system that will be able to permanently “sequester” 90% of the emissions. It means burying the problem, literally, since the CO₂ will be stored a mile underground. In 2020, before the AI ​​boom, the company established the goal of operating with carbon-free energy 24 hours a day, seven days a week by 2030. It will be interesting to see how they plan to offset these emissions thanks to renewables, but the IAE estimates that the demand for data centers will not stop growing in the short term and that adds another problem: a increased pressure on the electrical grid which is added as another element to manage. Because the big underlying problem is that the demand for energy is growing at a faster rate than the capacity to generate new electricity, and it is something that has an impact on companies’ bills, but also in homes. Images | Unsplash, Google Data Center In Xataka | China does not have a spending problem with AI. What it has is a huge income gap compared to its main rival

The largest nuclear power plant in Europe has been connected to diesel generators for a month. It’s as encouraging as it sounds.

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Europe is once again walking a nuclear tightrope. After more than three years of war, the largest atomic plant on the continent —the Ukrainian Zaporizhia plant— has gone from being an industrial symbol to becoming at a point of friction capable of triggering an emergency of continental reach. In parallel, other plants in the country operate at reduced power after attacks on the electrical grid. The situation is so unstable that the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, recently traveled to Kaliningrad, Russia, for emergency talks with the head of Rosatom, Alexey Likhachev, according to the Anadolu agency. It is a gesture that reflects the extent to which the risk is real. An attack that left two centers at minimum. According to a statement from the IAEAa military attack during the night of November 7 damaged an electrical substation critical to nuclear security. This incident left the Khmelnitsky and Rivne plants disconnected from one of their two 750 kilovolt lines and forced the electricity operator to order a power reduction in several of its reactors. Ten days later, one of the lines was still out of service and three reactors continued to operate at limited power. The agency emphasizes that these substations are essential nodes of the network: they allow the voltage levels that feed the security and cooling systems to be transformed and maintained. Without them, plants cannot guarantee safe operation. One month depending on diesel generators. The situation in Zaporizhzhia is even more critical. According to an opinion column by Najmedin Meshkati, professor of engineering and international relations published in the Financial Timesthe plant spent a full month without outside power after its two main lines were cut. During that time it survived solely on diesel generators, a resource that the industry considers strictly temporary: they are designed to run for around 24 hours, not for weeks. Technicians were only able to repair the lines under the protection of localized ceasefires negotiated by the IAEA, according to NucNet. Even so, one of the two restored lines was disconnected again on November 14 due to the activation of a protection system. Grossi summed it up like this: “The electrical situation at the plant remains extremely fragile.” The condition for a shut down reactor to remain safe. Although Zaporizhzhia’s six reactors have been on cold shutdown for more than three years, the plant requires a constant three to four megawatts to maintain cooling pumps and other essential systems, according to Meshkati. The professor emphasizes that even huge emergency batteries require external electricity to stay charged. It is a vicious circle: without the electrical grid, batteries are used, but without external electricity, these batteries cannot be recharged and, without both, the cooling systems fail. And without cooling the risk of nuclear fuel melting or overheating increases. The University of Southern California professor warns that this scenario reproduces the conditions that transformed Fukushima into a global disaster: “What turned an earthquake into a catastrophe was the total failure of the electrical system.” And he adds that, unlike 2011 in Japan, this time the risk comes from deliberate human action. A network reduced to its minimum expression. Before the war, according to the Kyiv Independentthe Zaporizhia plant was connected through ten power lines. Today it only has one or two operations and has lost all connection ten times since the beginning of the invasion. The IAEA itself has described the situation power plant as “extremely precarious” and “clearly not sustainable” when it depends for long periods on diesel generators. Short and medium term risks. The notices in the last report on Ukraine by the IAEA point in the same direction: the main danger is not a Chernobyl-type explosion, but a prolonged cooling failure. This scenario could cause overheating of the reactors in cold shutdown, damage to the spent fuel pools and a possible localized or regional radioactive release, with the consequent need to create an exclusion zone in the heart of agricultural Europe. For its part, according to Meshkatiadds two other relevant elements. On the one hand, it points out that a serious accident will exceed the economic impact of Fukushima, estimated at about $500 billion. An incident of that magnitude would affect agriculture, transport, supply chains and the European insurance market. On the other hand, he maintains that if Russia manages to consolidate the precedent that an occupying army can take control of a nuclear power plant and connect it to its own network, the global nuclear security architecture would be seriously compromised. It would be a precedent without equivalent since the creation of international standards that regulate the civil use of atomic energy. Is there a meeting point? The IAEA has acted as an intermediary between Moscow and kyiv on multiple occasions. According to the Anadolu agencyGrossi traveled to Kaliningrad to meet with Likhachev, director of Rosatom, in order to directly discuss the situation in Zaporizhzhia and the minimum conditions to guarantee nuclear safety. At the same time, the agency is trying to technically shore up the Ukrainian electrical system. According to their own statementshas so far coordinated 174 deliveries of essential equipment – ​​switches, electrical cabinets, radiation monitoring stations, vehicles and computer equipment – ​​worth more than 20.5 million euros, intended to sustain nuclear security in Ukraine during the war. Nuclear security supported by fragile cables Europe breathes thanks to a handful of cables repaired under fire and diesel generators that have already proven to be well beyond their limits. As the Financial Times explainsthe continent’s security depends on electricity continuing to arrive and on the parties respecting the fragile ceasefires needed to repair lines when they go down. Grossi summed it up with a mix of relief and alarm after the restoration of one of the lines: “It is a good day for nuclear security, although the situation remains highly precarious.” And the precarious thing, in this case, is that a new attack, a mechanical failure or a downed line is enough to bring … Read more

nuclear and the next war

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The recent history of the Chinese Communist Party has entered in a phase in which internal discipline, political surveillance and a certain systematic distrust are already a structural part of the system, and in which Xi Jinping has been erected in absolute protagonist not only by institutional accumulation of titles, but by incessant use of the most feared mechanism in Chinese politics: the purge. The rise of fear. Over the last long decade, coinciding with his rule, China has experienced a continuous cycle of beheadings political and military that not only have not slowed down, but have acquired a new character. What initially seemed like a mechanism of consolidation against rivals and chiefs inherited from the past has transformed into a permanent processunpredictable and increasingly deep, capable of engulfing elite figures previously considered immovable. The visible absence of dozens of senior officials at the last plenary session of the Central Committee (deliberately leaked by official cameras by showing entire rows empty) graphically condensed This new normal: Xi rules through fear, and no one, not even his own protégés, can take his position for granted. The purge as an instrument. The current cycle of purges began since Xi came to power in 2012, but has reached an unprecedented scale as of 2023. Its scope covers almost all levels of the Party and, especially, the armed forces. Of the 376 members and alternates of the Central Committee elected in 2022, about 16% was absent from the 2024 plenary session, a proportion incompatible with chance or illness. many of them They occupied key positionsincluding generals who commanded units responsible for preparing an invasion of Taiwan or managing internal troop loyalty. A mechanism that does not stop. In parallel, corruption investigations have reached neuralgic points of the military apparatus: the second officer in command of the People’s Liberation Army fell for alleged crimes of illicit enrichment and for promoting alternative loyalty networks, and others were expelled for their role in appointments that they didn’t like to the leading nucleus. Even the Minister of Defense himself and his predecessor disappeared from the scene after brief periods in office. Each outing has been accompanied by an official silence which, far from weakening Xi’s image of power, reinforces it. His message is unequivocal: no position has intrinsic value, no career offers protection, no past loyalty guarantees indulgence. Loyalty as a criterion. The official narrative presents these purges as a crusade against endemic corruption which would have weakened Chinese war preparation and reduced the effectiveness of weapons systems. It is true that there are indications real cases of irregularities: serious errors in the construction of missile silos, bribery in promotions, diversion of funds and internal patronage networks that affected the rocket forcethe most critical body of the nuclear arsenal. But even when these deviations exist, The New York Times said that Xi’s logic goes beyond exemplary punishment. For him, corruption is both a problem operational as ideological. He perceives it as a fissure through which Western values, professionalizing tendencies that separate the army from the Party or autonomous power networks can leak. obedience His obsession with the Soviet precedent (the idea that the USSR fell because the Party lost control of the Army) fuels a permanent surveillance approach. Each purged officer is presented as a reminder that loyalty, understood as total obedience to Xi’s personal leadership, is the only guarantee of political survival. Hence, after more than a decade in power, when theoretically there should no longer be organized resistance in the Army, the purges not only continue, but that increase. The earthquake in Rocket Force. The most profound shock has been that affecting China’s nuclear arm. Since 2023, the Rocket Force has lost a large part of its leadership, which has caused confusion among analysts who considered this force the best protected strategic core in the country. The corruption investigation in the construction of silos and in the management of enormous budgets has coincided with the accelerated expansion of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, which aims to double the number of warheads by 2030. For Xi, any sign of corruption in this structure, no matter how small, constitutes an existential threat: If the arsenal does not guarantee deterrent credibility, China’s own strategy against the United States is destabilized. The laboratory expands. Paradoxically, this massive purge in the nuclear force coexists with a construction program of tunnels, silos and underground chambers in Lop Nurthe historic test center, which aims for greater technical preparation for low-throughput tests. China maintains that it respects the testing moratorium, but the pace of excavation, electrical installation and deep drilling suggests it is providing capabilities for a scenario in which advanced designs need to be validated in the event of a possible reactivation of North American tests. The impact on the army. The fall of commanders at all levels it has left key vacancies in the five theaters of operations and in the command structures of the Navy, the Land Force and the internal discipline bodies. The simultaneous disappearance of so many cadres has raised doubts about the real degree of preparation for a war, especially in the Taiwan Strait. From mid-2024, Chinese military activity around the island has been reducedwith fewer planes crossing the median line of the Strait and fewer incursions close to its airspace. Some analysts interpret this as an operational weakening due to to the command vacuum. Others point to strategic changes driven by surviving generals, who prefer to focus on substantive training and longer-range maneuvers in the Pacific. Extra ball. However, everyone agrees that the climate of suspicion and fear it discourages tactical initiative, a central element of modern warfare. The risk is twofold: a less effective force and, at the same time, the possibility that new massive promotions of very young commanders, without networks or brakes, generate a more aggressive and nationalist military culture. The dimension of the purges. The Diplomat told that the purges also raise a doubt: the possibility that these are no longer solely a … Read more

to develop its own nuclear submarine

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Brazil takes almost half a century pursuing an ambition that no other Latin American country has managed to pursue: developing its own nuclear-powered submarine. This objective takes shape around the “Alvaro Alberto”, a project that combines specialized infrastructure, technology transfer and a naval nuclear program that launched late 1970s. It is not an operational submarine nor an immediate advance, but it is a plan with specific pieces in place that explain why the country has located itself in a terrain reserved for very few countries in the world. The official documentation It places its launch in 2023. It is a work forecast within the program calendar, not a closed guarantee. The initiative aims at a submarine significantly more complex than the diesel-electric propulsion ones used by the region. It is a platform that will combine its own nuclear reactor with combat systems and sensors derived from those used in conventional submarines of the Riachuelo classdeveloped from the Scorpène family, but adapted to a hull of greater length and displacement. It is a conventionally armed attack submarine, with nuclear propulsion but without nuclear weapons, in line with nonproliferation commitments assumed by Brazil. Nuclear propulsion would allow operation without the need to go to the surface to recharge batteries, extending the range and discretion in prolonged missions, and according to data released by Nuclepthe state company that manufactures part of the hull, the design will be around 100 meters in length and 6,000 tons in displacement. Half a century to reach a Brazilian nuclear submarine The Brazilian nuclear submarine project is better understood if we go back to the seventies, when the Navy started its own program to master the fuel cycle and develop nuclear technology applied to propulsion. That effort was born with the idea of reduce external dependencies and guarantee that Brazil could advance in sensitive areas without being conditioned by foreign suppliers. Over time, the Marinha Nuclear Program was consolidated, which laid the foundations for designing a naval reactor autonomously. That line of work is what, decades later, leads to the current attempt to build a nuclear-powered submarine. The current structure of the project is not understood without the PROSUBthe program signed with France in 2008 that drove the construction of shipyards, docks and specialized workshops in Itaguaí. Thanks to that agreement, Brazil incorporated technologies from the Scorpène family and formed teams capable of producing advanced conventional submarines. The Riachuelo class units served as an industrial and operational learning stage, showing that the country could undertake a complex construction process. This journey is what allows us to consider the transition towards a nuclear-powered submarine developed in Brazilian territory. A Riachuelo-class submarine The concept of Blue Amazon summarizes the importance that Brazil gives to its maritime space, an area of ​​millions of square kilometers where strategic resources and key routes are concentrated. Surveillance of this environment requires means capable of operate for long periods without depending on stopovers or frequent recharges. The infrastructure developed in Itaguaí, together with the support network deployed on the coast, provides the logistics base for that type of operations. In this framework, the Navy considers that a nuclear-powered submarine would provide the necessary autonomy to reinforce its presence in the South Atlantic. Before there is an operational submarine, Brazil must demonstrate that it can safely integrate a naval reactor, and that work is done at LABGENEa ground module that reproduces the key systems of the future “Álvaro Alberto”. The prototype incorporates a pressurized water reactor of national design and uses fuel produced by the nuclear program itself under international supervision. Testing the plant on land allows failures to be identified and performance optimized without the risks that would entail doing so inside the hull. This phase constitutes the most demanding technical element of the project. The current situation of the “Álvaro Alberto” reflects a balance between what has already been built and what has yet to be completed. On the one hand, Brazil has a defined design in its master lines, an industrial chain cpeaceful to produce sections of the submarine and nuclear development that progresses within the facilities planned for it. On the other hand, the final integration of the reactor, propulsion systems and hull will require time, testing and independent supervision. The program advances with a gradual logic, typical of a project that aspires to a technological level unprecedented in the region. If the project is completed, Brazil would become part of the small group of countries capable of operating a nuclear-powered submarine, a leap that would have a clear impact on the naval balance of the South Atlantic. It would also be the first ship of this type in Latin America, a circumstance that reinforces the strategic weight of the program and explains the sustained interest of the Navy. This progress, however, is conditioned by political continuity, non-proliferation commitments and the costs associated with maintaining such a specialized industrial chain for decades. The result will depend on the country’s ability to sustain that effort in the long term. Images | Brazilian Navy (CC BY-SA 2.0) In Xataka | The shortest launch in history: a million-dollar luxury yacht sank just 200 meters from the dock

If with the Fujian it sat at the US table, the images of the next aircraft carrier place China in another dimension: the nuclear one

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Last week China announced its first 100% national aircraft carrier hitting the table and making it very clear what its naval aspirations are. Now the appearance of new images from the Dalian shipyard has revived one of the most significant naval movements of the 21st century: China’s advance towards an aircraft carrier that places it at an unknown level. The strategic leap. We are referring to what aims to be the first nuclear-powered one, provisionally known as Type 004. He visible discovery of a structure reminiscent of a reactor compartment (similar to those found on US supercarriers) suggests that Beijing is taking the definitive step towards a capability that until now only the United States and France have. The transition is not symbolic, but structural: A nuclear aircraft carrier offers virtually unlimited autonomy, massive electrical power for advanced sensors, and sustained ability to operate further from shore, an essential element for a China that aims to project power beyond its immediate periphery. The Fujian catapult. The recent entry into service from Fujianits first aircraft carrier with electromagnetic catapults had already marked a break with the It was STOBAR.but Type 004 represents a technological leap even greater by integrating nuclear propulsion with the most advanced launch ecosystem that the Chinese navy has. Even so, Chinese naval planning appears to bifurcate: as it builds this ambitious vessel, reports indicate who also works in another conventional aircraft carrier improved, a sign that Beijing wants a combination of mass and elite to accelerate its naval transformation. On new aircraft carrier under construction Comparative architecture. The reason why Type 004 arouses so much attention is that, in its designconcentrates the synthesis of global trends: a helmet inspired by the lines of the American Ford, EMALS catapults similar to the North American and French ones, and a deck capable of operating from J-35 stealth fighters even naval drones GJ-11 or airplanes AEW&C KJ-600. The satellite images reveal a deck under construction that will include two catapults in the port area (in addition to two in the bow), matching the layout of American ships and surpassing the capacity of Fujian itselfwhich only has a catapult in the oblique section. Extra ball. The vision of the program is clear: provide the Type 004 with a heaviest air wingvaried and technologically complex, optimized for sustained operations and for air and maritime space control roles beyond the Chinese coastline. The parallel development of a possible “Type 003A” conventional (cheaper, faster to produce and based on an already dominated architecture) demonstrates how China combines disruptive innovation with industrial iterationensuring sufficient volume to saturate any attempt at regional containment. If nuclearization provides range and resilience, the simultaneous construction of conventional ships ensures pace and fleet density. Unlimited energy. Plus: its function is not only to move aircraft further, but to serve as an energy platform for a set of emerging weapons that would transform naval warfare. Official voices, such as Professor Liang Fang of the National Defense University, they claim that the future Chinese nuclear class could carry directed energy weapons (including high-power laser weapons and the long-awaited electromagnetic cannon or rail gun). These weapons are not mere futuristic add-ons: they require colossal amounts of energy and an electrical stability that only a naval nuclear reactor can offer. He rail gunbased on the acceleration of metal projectiles to hypersonic speeds using electromagnetic fields, is a system that the United States abandoned due to costs and technological maturity, but that China continues to develop as part of its strategic disruption. And more. Its appeal lies in exit speedthe lack of explosive and the possibility of devastating kinetic impact at low cost per shot, although its electrical consumption is gigantic. The convergence between nuclear aircraft carriers and electromagnetic weapons aligns with the plans already outlined by figures such as Admiral Ma Weimingresponsible for the PLA’s electromagnetic program, and represents a clear attempt to turn a flagship into a technological node capable of challenging US naval dominance in emerging domains. The operational dimension. TWZ analysts recalled that the future Type 004 air wing combines aviation advanced manned and drones large in size, creating a hybrid system Designed for offensive projection and situational awareness over an extended range. The integration of stealth drones like the GJ-11, heavy AEW&C aircraft like the KJ-600, and fifth-generation J-35 fighters would allow China to adopt an operating model closer to the American one: extended air-to-air combat, persistent surveillance, distributed electronic warfare, and deep strike capability. Added to this are the new amphibious ships Type 076 (also equipped with electromagnetic catapults to launch drones) that would complement the aircraft carriers with saturation functions, regional air control and operations support directed towards Taiwan or the South China Sea. The result is, a priori, a navy that, although still inferior in number to the eleven American supercarriers, closes the gap with a unprecedented speed. China and the new balance. In summary, Type 004 symbolizes a decisive strategic shift: China is no longer just modernizing its fleet, but aspires to equal the autonomy, technological capability and global reach of US aircraft carriers by combining nuclear poweredelectromagnetic weapons, high energy lasers and a new generation embarked aviation. The visible integration of the reactor module in Dalian confirm that Beijing seeks to operate a type of super aircraft carrier capable of sustaining prolonged ocean missions and powering futuristic systems that could redefine naval warfare. At the same time, the parallel development of another conventional model demonstrates a dual strategy that seeks volume and sophistication at the same time, quickly reducing the gap with the US Navy. In other words, China is moving towards a maritime architecture based on abundant energy and dominion of the electromagnetic spectrum, a change that forces us to completely rethink the global competition for control of the seas. Image | x, x In Xataka | The Fujian is officially China’s largest power catapult: Beijing already has a button to challenge the US Navy In Xataka | China has just tested the … Read more

The war in Ukraine has crossed a red line in Europe. They are no longer drones violating airspace, they are nuclear plants

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Ukraine has once again placed the nuclear alarm at the center of the European conflict after denouncing that Russia is deliberately attacking the electrical substations that feed the Khmelnitsky and Rivne power plants. According to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha, drone attacks are not isolated incidents, but planned operations to endanger continental nuclear security. It happens that drones are reaching European power plants. The drone offensive. Over the past weekend, Moscow launched more than 450 drones and 45 missiles against various regions of Ukraine, causing at least seven dead and damage to critical infrastructure. In Dnipro, a drone hit a residential building, killing three people, while other attacks occurred in Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia. kyiv accuses Russia of instrumentalizing the atomic risk as a psychological weapon and trying to cause an accident in plants that still depend on external electricity supply to avoid a collapse of the cooling system. Nuclear risk. In parallel, Moscow is advancing with its own nuclear agenda: the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, confirmed that the Kremlin is working on proposals for a possible nuclear test on the direct order of Vladimir Putin, a response to US President Donald Trump’s recent statement that Washington could resume their own tests. The atomic stress between both powers, exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, has plunged Europe into a scenario of unprecedented vulnerability since the Cold War. The epicenter of the threat: Belgium. While Ukraine try to contain the Russian offensive on its own territory, Western Europe has begun to feel the echoes of a hybrid war that expands beyond the front. In Belgium, one of the countries with the highest density of critical infrastructure on the continent, there has been a wave of raids of drones over strategic installations. The most alarming took place at the Doel nuclear power plant, located next to the port of Antwerp, when three drones were initially detected at dusk on November 9, which were later confirmed as five different devices flying over the complex for almost an hour. The energy company Engie, which manages the plant, assured that operations were not affected, but authorities activated the National Crisis Center and reinforced security in the area. Belgium nuclear plant near Doel And more. Hours before, air traffic at Liège airport was had suspended briefly after multiple reports of drones, and in the previous days both Brussels airport and the Kleine Brogel air base (where NATO nuclear weapons are stored) had been targeted of similar sightings. Research points to a coordinated pattern affecting several northern European countries, including Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, where unidentified aerial intrusions have also been reported. Suspicions of espionage. Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken has linked sightings with possible foreign espionage operations and pointed to Russia as the most plausible suspect, although without conclusive evidence. The country’s intelligence services consider that drones could be part of a recognition strategy aimed at evaluating the European response capacity to combined attacks on critical infrastructure. The accumulation of incidents led the Belgian government to convene a National Security Council, after which the Minister of the Interior, Bernard Quintin, assured that the situation was “under control”although he recognized the seriousness of the incursions. The United Kingdom, France and Germany announced sending specialized personnel and equipment to assist Belgium in the detection and neutralization of hostile drones, a gesture that underlines the shared fear that the border between visible war and covert war is becoming dangerously blurred. Technological epicenter. Faced with this new dimension of the conflict, Ukraine has positioned itself as a key actor in the technological response. President Volodymyr Zelensky advertisement the upcoming opening of defense production offices in Berlin and Copenhagen before the end of the year, with the aim of strengthening industrial cooperation on drones and electronic weapons. These “export capitals”, according to his wordsthey will finance the domestic production of scarce equipment and help European allies build their own defensive systems. kyiv, which has made the use of drones one of the pillars of its military strategy, now offers your experience to countries that are beginning to suffer firsthand the effects of the Russian hybrid war. Ukraine as a test. In parallel, Ukrainian creativity in the improvised field of defense is reflected even in unusual solutions: old fishing nets French drones, made from horse hair, are being reused to create tunnels where the propellers of Russian drones become trapped. In contemporary warfare, technology intersects with craftsmanship, and ingenuity has become a form of national survival. Nuclear vulnerability. The incidents in Belgium and Ukraine reveal the same constant: the European nuclear infrastructure (plant, wiring, energy, logistics) has become a target symbolic and strategic. The attacks on Ukrainian substations that feed power plants and the drones that fly over Belgian reactors expose the fragility of a continent that depends on complex systems where any sabotage can multiply its effects. The threat no longer comes only from missiles, but from invisible swarms of drones, of disinformation, of political and technological engineering that undermines stability from within. Russia, faced with isolation and with a still powerful military industry, seems willing to use this asymmetry as an instrument of prolonged pressure. The European responsestill fragmentary, is beginning to be articulated between military cooperation, technological innovation and civil defense. Plus: the lesson left by this sequence of attacks and suspicions seems clear. In the Europe of 2025, the border between energy security and military security has fadedand the future of continental stability could depend less on the size of armies than on how quickly a drone is detected on radar before reaching a nuclear power plant. Image | Trougnouf, Wwuyts In Xataka | The latest tactic of the Russians in Ukraine breaks with the previous one: they have gone from appearing “out of nowhere” to directly disappearing In Xataka | Orion was the Russian version of the US’s most lethal drone. Ukraine can’t believe it when it opens: it’s not a version, it’s the work of the US

the Franco-Italian commitment to automated nuclear energy

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The growth of artificial intelligence has skyrocketed global electricity consumption and put governments before an urgent question: where will the energy come from to sustain it? In an unorthodox alliance, France and Italy believe they have part of the answer with automated nuclear microreactors. Slow down. At first it sounds very grandiose, but here we are going to unpack it. The French startup NAAREA has announced a strategic partnership with the Italian company Fluid Wire Robotics (FWR), specialized in robotics for extreme environments. The agreement seeks to integrate FWR’s robotic systems in the handling, maintenance and dismantling operations of the XAMR microreactors, that NAAREA has been developing since 2020. According to the official statementthe XAMR is a fourth-generation fast neutron and molten salt reactor, capable of producing 40 megawatts of electricity and 80 megawatts of thermal power. Its particularity is that it works by “burning long-term nuclear waste” from spent fuel from other plants, transforming a storage problem into an energy source. The answer lies in robotics. Fluid Wire has designed a system that allows robotic arms to operate without vulnerable electronic components within radioactive zones. The motors and sensors are located in a remote, armored unit, from where they transmit movement through a hydrostatic system. This prevents radiation from damaging the electronics and allows precise manipulation, with force feedback, even underwater or in temperatures up to 180°C. In addition, the system supports radiation levels of up to 1.5 MGy and can work both in remote mode (controlled by humans) and in automatic mode, with programmed sequences for production or maintenance. Thanks to this, NAAREA will automate key steps in fuel production, carry out robotic inspections and carry out assisted dismantling, reducing the exposure of human personnel to a minimum. One more step of automation. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been promoting the use of drones and robots to improve safety at power plants for years. According to the organizationthese technologies already contribute to reducing risks and increasing efficiency, even in operating plants. The agency has highlighted the development of walking, flying and even aquatic robots that are already used for inspections, emergency response and post-incident evaluation. robotics, experts sayis ceasing to be a promise and becoming an everyday tool in nuclear energy. Japan: an extreme example. Last year, the Telesco robot went in to recover molten fuel from Fukushima reactor 2 for the first time. The operation, directed by TEPCOoffers unprecedented information on the degradation of materials after thirteen years of radiation and residual heat, and confirms the essential role of robotics in environments impossible for humans. Energy for a world hungry for chips. The NAAREA-FWR alliance is also part of an underlying energy crisis. The growth of artificial intelligence and data centers has skyrocketed global electricity consumption. As my colleague’s article warnedgenerative AI systems and training large models require amounts of energy that are already straining power grids in several countries. In this context, nuclear microreactors like those from NAAREA can offer a stable, clean and localized supply alternative, especially for industries with high energy demand – such as data centers or semiconductor production. In fact, in another reportwe detail how companies like Google and Microsoft are exploring agreements with nuclear energy companies to power their AI infrastructures. Atomic energy, previously associated only with giant and military reactors, is being rediscovered as a strategic engine for the new digital revolution. Robots at the service of the atom. For NAAREA, the collaboration with FWR represents a step towards a replicable and safe nuclear industrialization model. The robotic arms designed in Pisa and the microreactors assembled in France could become a symbol of a new era: miniature, autonomous plants, connected to industries or data centers, and maintained by robots that operate where no human could. In a world where artificial intelligence needs more energy than ever — and where humans seek to reduce risks and emissions — the atom is once again the protagonist, but this time with mechanical help. Image | FreePik Xataka | When we thought we had seen all kinds of rehearsals for an invasion, China makes science fiction: robots taking over an island

They have published the plans for the future Russian nuclear bomber. And the worst thing for Moscow is that the West now knows how to deactivate it

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The last time Russia’s bombers made the news was to verify a unprecedented assault in the Ukrainian war. It happened with the Spiderweb operation that kyiv carried out in the heart of the Moscow air bases, when a swarm of more than 100 drones hidden in trucks managed to destroy an important part of the Russian fleet of strategic bombers. The truth is that Russia was developing an unprecedented bomber to renew its fleet, although there are now doubts that it could materialize. The fragility of an industry. The international intelligence network InformNapalmin cooperation with the Fenix ​​cyber center, has revealed one of the largest information blows against the Russian military-industrial complex since the start of the war in Ukraine. The data, obtained after infiltrating the internal systems of the Russian company OKBM (key supplier of components for strategic aviation and the space sector), show Russia’s deep dependence on foreign machinery and reveal classified technical information of two programs considered pillars of its new generation aviation: the stealth bomber PAK DA “Poslannik” and the Su-57 fifth-generation fighter. And more. According to InformNapalmthe stolen files were used for months for the benefit of the Ukrainian Defense Forces and allied countries, which amplifies the impact of the leak both at the operational and political levels. Between ambition and sanctions. The PAK DA, designed by Tupolev to replace veterans Tu-95 and Tu-160represents the Russian attempt to create a subsound strategic bomber flying wing with stealth capability, intercontinental autonomy and dual nuclear and conventional capability. Conceived since the early 2000s, the project has suffered chronic delaysbudget problems and a persistent inability to consolidate a national production chain. The leaked documents include coded hydraulic system specifications like 80RSh115responsible for opening the bomb bay hatches of Poslannik-1, and confirm the existence of a classified contract between Tupolev and OKBM which requires absolute confidentiality and allows it to be terminated if state secrecy is violated. Technical documentation with engineering drawings and specifications for the RSh type box used in the PAK DA bomb bay system Extra page. Not only that. Apparently, a additional annex (called Supplementary Agreement No. 7) details the scheduling of the production phases between 2024 and 2027, a calendar that is now more than compromised by the scandal and the deterrent effect of European sanctions. Technological dependence. The filtrationFurthermore, it reveals a structural contradiction: the Kremlin’s discourse on industrial sovereignty contrasts with the reality of a system that cannot sustain its own projects. no western technology. OKBM, an essential part of the gear that produces actuators and transmission systems for the Su-57 and the PAK DA, depends on CNC machinery imported from Taiwan (Hartford HCMC-1100AG and Johnford SL-50 models) and Serbia (Grindex BSD-700U grinding machine). The equipment was purchased through subsidies from the Ministry Russian Ministry of Industry and Commerce, which shows that the State itself finances the evasion of international sanctions. This framework (a mix of obsolete engineering, technological dependence and state bureaucracy) has become a strategic vulnerability that compromises Russia’s ability to sustain complex long-term programs. Supplementary agreement confirming the continuation of the contract of the PAK DA component under the revised technical code 80RSh A failed industrial pattern. The leaked internal emails They also include documentation on RSh-65 systems of hinge and transmission used in the weapons compartments of the Su-57, the fifth generation fighter that Moscow presents as a symbol of its technological autonomy. However, the materials confirm that production remains subject to the same bottlenecks than the PAK DA: lack of critical parts, dependence on foreign suppliers and delays caused by a shortage of precision tools. Despite public investment and the expansion of plants in Kazaninternal audits attribute the delays to the departure of international manufacturers from the Russian market after the invasion of Ukraine. The political coup. After the analysis of the documentsthe European Union officially included OKBM in its 19th sanctions package on October 23, 2025, recognizing its central role in Russian strategic weapons production and restriction evasion operations. This decision, directly motivated by the findings, confirms how cyber intelligence has become a battlefield expanse: a space where the exposure of industrial vulnerability can be as decisive as a physical attack. The operation, named OKBMLeaksis announced as the first chapter in a series of publications aimed at documenting the structural dependence of the Russian military sector on foreign technology and showing the erosion of its productive capacity. The Russian mirage. He OKBM case illustrates the distance between the Kremlin’s rhetoric about self-sufficiency and the material reality of an industrial complex sustained by imported parts, inherited engineering, and a network of opaque middlemen. If the PAK DA was to symbolize Russia’s entry into a new era of strategic aviation, the leak shows that the project is today a promise threatened by sanctionsproduction necks and lack of technological substitution. The vulnerability revealed transcends the technical: it reflects the accumulated cost of two decades industry dependency global and exposes the difficulty of sustaining a prolonged war without the support of a fully autonomous industrial base. In short, the scandal not only reveals aeronautical secretsbut rather it exposes the structural fragility of contemporary military Russia, whose defense apparatus seems increasingly sophisticated in its designs, but more than precarious in its actual capacity to manufacture them. Image | Russian Defense Minister, InformNapalm In Xataka | A 20-year-old technology led Ukraine to Russian bombers. Moscow’s answer comes from China: a laser cannon In Xataka | In 2024, Ukrainian trucks disguised as “home” entered Russia. Now they have dynamited their main air bases

We have returned to an era that we thought forgotten. That of the nuclear threat of the US and Russia launching their reply: Poseidon

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In recent days all roads trace a common landscape: from Moscow exhibit and test “superweapons” that defy traditional categories (autonomous nuclear torpedoes, nuclear cruise engines, and indefinite-range missiles) while in Washington the political and media reaction accentuates a dynamic action-reaction that could return the world to an (il)logic of open competition between nuclear powers. Someone should stop it. Poseidon. He Russian Poseidon has returned to the forefront as the epitome of the hybrid between a fantasy factory and a real military program: an unmanned, reactor-powered underwater vehicle, conceived to transport a nuclear warhead to coastal targets or naval groupings, operate at great depth and high speed and (according to the official Russian narrative) bypass conventional defenses. The impact figures published in Moscow (speeds between 60–100 knots, operational depth ~1,000 m, “megaton” capacity that some sources stretch up to 100 Mt) feed the symbolic dread. However, analysts remember physical limits and Soviet precedents that qualify both the real effectiveness and the plausibility of “tsunami” type effects capable of sweeping away cities. In practice. Thus, the majority agrees that Poseidon It is best described as a capability designed for political and strategic cost: suitable to reinforce a “second strike” or to be used as a system of intimidation, not necessarily as an everyday weapon in an escalated conflict. Burevestnik and a persistence. We told it last week. Along with the torpedo, Russia has shown the Burevestnik (a nuclear-powered cruise missile that promises essentially unlimited range) and other platforms that the Kremlin lumps together under the label of “invincible weapons.” These initiatives obey a logic of modernization that combines technological ambition, industrial vulnerabilities (sanctions, reliability problems) and media staging: the public demonstration of tests does not detonate charges, but announces theoretical capabilities and forces adversaries to regroup resources and doctrine. Continuity with the Soviet tradition of studying large-scale underwater effects and the historical experience with essays they show that ideas can persist even when physics and engineering limit their real usefulness. Washington’s response. The political reaction in the United States, personified by presidential statements about “restarting testing” and public instruction to military departments, has been immediate (and disorderly). The announcements arrive in a critical moment (with the New START treaty close to expiration and with China throwing uncertainties about its own nuclear growth) and can be read as strategic messages, instruments of pressure and, sometimes, as gestures directed at the internal public. One thing remains clear: Trump’s formulation was more than ambiguous and it is not clear whether it refers to nuclear detonations (critical/non-critical), increased testing of delivery systems, or increased sub-critical experiments and simulations. There is no doubt, this ambiguity is dangerous because conditions perceptions and responses international without the technical and legal scaffolding that a decision of shock would demand. Burevestnik How “nuclear” is prescribed. On TWZ Several experts consulted describe the practical path to resume nuclear detonations: The president can order actions, but execution requires the involvement of specific agencies (Department of Energy, NNSA and national laboratories), budget authorization from Congress and logistics focused on the Nevada National Security Site as the only realistic site for contained underground testing. In any case, the deadlines they are long: A “simple burst” could be organized in months, a useful instrumented test would require 18–36 months, and a new design development program would take years. Furthermore, the cost would be high and would most likely provoke retorts from Russia, China and others, reigniting a cycle of arms races that post-Cold War agreements had managed to tacitly contain. Technical dimension. The technical usefulness of returning to explosive tests to maintain the national arsenal is, obviously, discussed: US laboratories maintain that, thanks to advanced simulations, subcritical experimentation and vast historical data, the reliability of nuclear warheads can sustain without detonations. The tests would serve, in theory, to validate new designs and increase confidence in specific features. In practice, they would reopen the door to developments that amplify offensive capabilities and complicate the balance of terror, in addition to generating environmental and proliferation risks. The media theater. Plus: not everything is technology. There is a strong performative component. Putin and the Russian media apparatus have known convert essaysimages and statements in one power narrative which includes synchronies with popular culture (television series) to magnify its psychological impact. In Washington, the improvised communication from social networks it has a similar but less institutionalized effect: statements without clarifying technique or procedure can be interpreted as a political will to rupture and push allies and adversaries to take asymmetric measures. Geopolitical consequences. The costs of a back to testing are not limited to budgets: there is talk of reactivation of the nuclear race, of degradation of international trustor the erosion of regulatory regimes (the CTBT and the verification architecture), in addition to a probable expansion of arsenals by China and other actors who do not participate in treaties today. Added to this is the risk that the US internal debate (political polarization, legislative pressures and the dynamic of “showing” without a technical roadmap) will generate hasty decisions. Worse still, the media normalization of “anti-coastal weapons” or “Frankenstein” torpedoes may facilitate usage doctrines that lower the threshold for tactical uses of nuclear weapons, an especially dangerous prospect. Uncertainty. In summary, the news of the last days They are, more than anything else, a warning: we are witnessing the sum of three processes (modernization and Russian technological experimentationpoliticization and theatrics of deterrenceand American answers marked by tactical uncertainty and political haste) that, together, fuel a dangerous inertia. The question is no longer just whether Poseidon either Burevestnik are fully operational, it is whether the international community, and especially the capitals with decision-making power, will recover the technical prudence and diplomatic rigor necessary to contain the escalation. Image | US Space Force, Russian Defense Ministry, Los Alamos National Laboratory In Xataka | Last week, Russia launched its fearsome Satan II nuclear missile, Putin’s “invincible weapon.” It came out regular In Xataka | There is something more disturbing than “a Chernobyl”: it … Read more

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