blackout

The price of electricity, the cold and the fear of a blackout have brought a 19th century job back to London: chimney sweeps

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When you hear about chimney sweeps, the image that comes to mind is that of men (or boys) from the late 19th century with smudged faces, shirts full of soot and a large broom on their shoulders. That’s the topic. The photographs that Google shows when we search for the word and the one it illustrates your entry on Wikipedia. Today the reality is very different. In the middle of 2026, not only are there still professionals dedicated to the trade, but they use cutting-edge technology and in cities like London they are experimenting a resurgence thanks to the price of energy. His appearance is nothing like that of the famous Bert de ‘Mary Poppins’but they continue to play a key role… and above all they are in demand. Chimney sweeps in 2026? Exact. And at least in London they are not an extemporaneous and decadent group, the memory of a bygone era. On the contrary. As I counted a few days ago The New York Times The profession is still very much alive there, it has been able to adapt to the needs (and resources) of the 21st century and above all it is experiencing a resurgence thanks to the cost of energy. The clearest proof is left by National Chimney Sweeps Association (NACS, for its acronym in English): in 2021 it had 590 members, today its membership base is already around 750. The union includes dozens of women and some businesses claim that in winter they receive between 70 and 80 calls a day. What do they do? Essentially the same as its predecessors from the 19th and 20th centuries, although in a very different context and with very different resources. To remove soot from chimneys they still use brushes that Bert from ‘Mary Popins’ would perfectly recognize, but that is only part of an arsenal that also includes digital cameras, industrial vacuum cleaners and smoke detection equipment. “Almost like chimney technicians,” points out Martin Glynnfrom NACS. Companies are even using drones to scan rooftops. Nothing to do with the habits that once made the profession infamous, such as employing orphans to climb chimneys and clean ducts. It sounds like terrifying science fiction, but this practice was common in the 18th and 19th centuries. In fact in 1875 the death of a child that got stuck in Fulbourn generated such a stir that the Government approved a law that banned “climbing children.” Are there still chimneys? Yes. British chimney sweeps were not immune to key changes, such as the popularization of central heating in the second half of the 20th century or the Clean Air Act (‘Clean Air Act‘) of 1956, but the union has been able to endure and today lives in a much kinder time, even one of vindication. I told it just a year ago in The Telegraph Steven Pearce, descendant of a long line of chimney sweeps who started in the trade decades ago, convinced that the profession’s days were numbered. “At first I only accepted it as a weekend job because we thought the trade would disappear with the 1956 law, when the Government gave local authorities the power to control the burning of coal and boiler fumes,” Pearce relates. “But that didn’t happen, in fact the last five years have been better than ever in business. It’s the busiest time I’ve seen in 45 years.” He is not the only one which confirms the rebirth of the profession. What is the reason? In 2026 English homes may not rely on coal and wood for heat, but they will still light their fireplaces. And not only because of the popularization of stoves. NACS itself admits that demand for its services has been driven by two factors: the increase in energy prices of recent years and a turbulent international context, in which the electricity supply seems a vulnerable flank to enemy attacks. The group also remembers that people simply “like to sit in front of a fireplace” to read, have a glass of wine, watch a movie and unwind. As if that were not enough, a good fire also helps reduce dependence and expense on central heating. What does the regulations say? Of course there are restrictions on the domestic use of coal, but The New York Times remember that even in areas like London the burning of authorized fuels They emit very little visible smoke. What they do generate is soot, which explains why the Government advises that chimneys be cleaned every year with professional help. “People think: ‘We’re going to have a plan B, a fireplace, a stove in case the power goes out,’” Glynn adds.president of NACS. “If you have the option of burning wood or smokeless fuel you can still cook and have some heating. There is a big increase in demand, people are lighting fireplaces again.” How does the future look? Steven Pearce assures that his clients continue buying stoves and admits that it is difficult for him to believe that people are going to do without the installations, even if they are prohibited. “I can’t imagine those who have spent £3,000 to £5,000 installing them not using them.” In fact, he maintains that in recent years he has seen “a great resurgence in the purchase of multi-fuel fireplaces and stoves, which burn wood, charcoal and smokeless materials.” It’s not all advantages: your ‘bill’ is PM2.5 emissionparticles invisible to the naked eye but which do represent a harmful “air pollutant”. Images | Wikipedia, Jorbasa Fotografie (Flickr) and NACS In Xataka | While the whole world looks at oil, Venezuela’s true treasure is hidden in the basements of London: its gold

Atomic clocks seemed untouchable. A blackout caused a difference in the official US time

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To think that the official time of a country could fail is, at first, almost impossible. We are not talking about a domestic clock or just any server, but about the system that sets the pace of networks, satellites and critical services. That is why it is surprising to discover what happened recently in the United States. A power outage in Colorado was enough to remind us that extreme precision is not isolated from the physical world that sustains it. According to CBS, Xcel Energy applied a preventive shutdown to reduce the risk of fires due to very strong gusts of wind, and the NIST complex in Boulder was affected on Wednesday of last week. The power outage was followed by a backup generator in the institute’s laboratory. In that sequence, and according to information confirmed by NIST, the country’s time reference was slightly off for a brief interval, until part of the supply could be restored. Put a tiny deviation into context. The figure that came out of the NIST systems was 4.8 microseconds, that is, just a few millionths of a second different from what was expected. To get an idea of ​​that magnitude, NIST itself explained that A human blink lasts around 350,000 microseconds, a very different scale from the recorded mismatch. The variation is so small that for the vast majority of everyday uses it is irrelevant, but it serves to illustrate the extent to which even a minor deviation is measured, recorded and taken seriously in temporal reference systems. To understand why this offset is considered relevant, it is worth clarifying what exactly the official time of the United States is. The country is not governed directly by UTC, the coordinated international standard to which multiple nations contribute, but by a national implementation known as NISTUTC. Since 2007, that reference is established under the supervision of the Secretary of Commerce and the US Navy, and is adjusted to stay aligned with global coordinated timing. NIST-F4 Cesium Source Atomic Clock NIST calculates the official time from a weighted average of sixteen clocks spread across its campus, including hydrogen masers and cesium beam clocks, each with different functions and strengths. This approach allows us to gain stability and resilience, since the final signal is not conditioned by the behavior of a single instrument. Therefore, even when one of the elements of the system is affected, the whole continues to offer an extremely precise reference. What broke was not the watch. During the blackout, the atomic clocks continued to run thanks to their battery systems, as explained by NIST. The problem occurred in the connection between some of those clocks and the measurement and distribution systems that consolidate the final signal. When that communication was lost for an interval and one of the planned backups failed, the resulting time reference slowed down slightly. Technical personnel who remained at the facilities later activated a reserve diesel generator, which allowed part of the operation to be recovered and the system to be stabilized. NIST page The institute stressed that this gap has no appreciable effects on daily life. The nuance appears when looking at certain technical sectors, where extreme synchronization is an operational requirement. Critical infrastructures, telecommunications networks, positioning systems or some scientific environments work with such tight margins that even a minimal deviation deserves to be recorded and reported. The next step was to return to operational normality. NIST indicated that the correction of the gap will be carried out when all systems are fully powered and can be recalibrated with guarantees. Xcel Energy announced yesterday Monday that it was completing the restoration of service after the storm and the preventive cuts applied due to fire risk. Meanwhile, the institute began an internal review to evaluate the impact of the blackout and verify that redundancies and protocols responded as planned. Images | NIST In Xataka | China says it has detected an NSA operation against its most sensitive infrastructure: the center that controls the time

A blackout has reminded Waymo where its limits are

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More than 10 years ago, a user named karmafrappuccino posted a meme that would go down in the history of memes (if there is any history of memes) with the name confused Travolta. Since then, the image of Vincent Vega with a coat in his hand and looking from one side to the other completely clueless in Mia Wallace’s living room has been used countless times. Last weekend, the Waymo of San Francisco experienced their own Confused Travolta. Detained. That’s how the Waymo cars ended up last weekend in San Francisco. Stopped, without reacting and with the emergency lights on. The service of autonomous driverless cars that circulate through the American city completely collapsed after a blackout left the traffic lights in part of the city without service. In images like the ones in this video Up to five Waymo cars can be seen completely stopped at an intersection haphazardly. Three of them are on the right side, with the emergency lights active, but another two have stopped completely in the middle of an intersection, making life difficult for the rest of the drivers. For hours. In The New York Times They report that tow truck employees spent hours picking up Waymo cars scattered around the city. The blackout, which had affected some 130,000 residents of the city, ended up causing chaos in the streets after Waymo cars will block intersections and streets. The company confirmed that it ended up stopping the service. They point out in the newspaper that they contacted the company from the city to demand that they stop the service since it was creating even more problems in traffic. Social networks show videos and photographs of Completely collapsed intersections or streets for Waymo’s self-driving cars. Click on the image to go to the original tweet Click on the image to go to the original tweet But why? Well, that’s the big doubt. Because experts consulted by The New York Times They point out that cars should be prepared to save situations like this. In fact, they clarify that it is not unusual for San Francisco traffic lights to have poor visibility or for GPS signals to be lost and cars to work correctly. The company has clarified that if a traffic light is off, the car understands it as a Stop with exit in four directions. That is, the car should have continued moving forward when the conditions of the intersection permitted it. Something that, We refer to the videosit didn’t happen. The problem is that cars seem to be trained to deal with turning off a traffic light but not all traffic lights. They explain in The Verge that the car sends a video and images to a human when it finds itself in an exceptional situation that it does not know how to deal with and it shows it the way. The problem is that, in the event of a blackout, it is difficult for the available bandwidth to allow this data to be sent. Click on the image to go to the original tweet The Tesla case. Given the chaos caused by Waymo’s robotaxis, Elon Musk did not take long to score the goal. The reason is that the autonomous driving system has been built on neural networks that They use the data of millions of drivers to show the car how it should behave. In fact, the company itself, in one of the updates to the FSD, its most advanced driving assistance package, removed 300,000 lines of code in which he explicitly explained to the car how it should behave. Instead, it is the images and data captured by the millions of cars on the road that show each unit what it should do. This has its drawbacks, such as a car decelerates without reason when encountering a police vehiclebut it has many advantages when it comes to smoother driving. In addition, it is easier to face unforeseen events because with so many cars on the streets it is relatively easy for someone to have faced an unexpected situation, whatever it may be. Unforeseen. Currently, the biggest enemy of autonomous driving is precisely this: face the unexpected. And it is not the first time that autonomous cars cause images in which streets or intersections collapse due to communication failures or misinterpreting signs and warnings. For example, one of the cars Cruise ended up running from the police because he didn’t know how he should act when faced with the emergency lights of the car that was chasing him. The car, on that occasion, had to be turned off remotely. And widespread discontent. Although robotaxis have ended up becoming another part of the San Francisco landscape, to the point of being a tourist attraction, since these services were launched they have provoked all kinds of protests and actions by neighbors against them. Some as simple as putting a cone on the hood. And autonomous cars have crossed the line of what city residents are willing to suffer. The crossings collapsed due to a blackout have been the latest case but only a few weeks ago a Waymo car ran over a well-known cat in one of the neighborhoods in which they operate. Reactions to the case showed that, although a self-driving car is involved in fewer accidents, we are more critical of the system than when the car is operated by a human. Not to mention the Cruise case, which ended up losing his license (although he later recovered it before abandon permanently) for being involved, among others, in an incident in which a neighbor was run over and the car instead of stopping He drove over her and parked on her. It was also the case that the failure in one of their cars caused the delay of emergency services in a fire where one person lost their life. Photo | Waymo and Georg Eiermann In Xataka | I have tried a fully autonomous taxi. This is what it’s like to … Read more

The patch to avoid another massive blackout is going to cost us 731 million euros. Iberdrola has already begun to collect it

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The blackout on April 28 did not come free, and we consumers are going to pay for it. Iberdrola has confirmed that the extra cost caused by the “reinforced mode” that was activated after the massive blackout. And everything indicates that the rest of the electric companies will follow in their footsteps. what has happened. They tell it in The World. Until now, the impact of the blackout on the bill had been limited because the CNMC intervened so that the electricity companies could not modify the price for customers who have contracted fixed rates. FACUA also issued a statement warning that rates could not be raised if it did not appear in the contract. The blackout was more than six months ago, more than enough time for many free market contracts to have been renewed. This has given Iberdrola the opportunity to introduce clauses that allow them to pass the cost on to customers. Reinforced mode After the blackout, the so-called “reinforced mode” was activated. This adjustment involves intervening in the market to incorporate more conventional energy (gas, hydroelectric and nuclear) and limiting the entry of renewables with the aim of avoiding voltage failures. And of course, these energies are more expensive, in addition to requiring more auxiliary services to stabilize the network. The problem is that this It started as a patch after the blackout, but it has become the new normal which remains half a year later. The cost. It covers from the blackout until September and amounts to 210 million euros distributed between Spain and Portugal. Of this sum, Spain assumes the majority, with 180 million euros. Iberdrola regrets that the change in the system by Red Eléctrica is entailing an extra cost that “affects our results” and they hope to transfer 70% of this amount to their clients before the end of the year. Not just Iberdrola. Nothing prevents the rest of the electricity marketers from following in Iberdrola’s footsteps. According to El Mundo, the total cost of the reinforced mode in these six months amounts to 731 million euros and it looks like it will remain active for longer, so this amount will increase. The CNMC warns that any change in contract prices must be communicated transparently. From one pocket to another. In the Iberian Peninsula there are five nuclear power plants, 1,300 hydroelectric plants and some 200 gas plants. These conventional (non-renewable) energy plants are providing more energy as long as the boosted mode remains active and they are receiving more income for it. What is striking is that they mostly belong to private companies such as Iberdrola, Naturgy either Endesawho are the ones who will end up increasing the price of the invoice. Images | Wikipedia In Xataka | Five months later we continue to discover things about the blackout in Spain. And the news is getting worse for Europe

Half a year after the blackout, Red Eléctrica still has problems stabilizing the voltage. And there is a geographical reason

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Just six months ago, Spain was left in the dark. The “electric zero” of April 28, 2025 was the most serious warning of a system that he believed himself invulnerable. Since then, Red Eléctrica (REE) operates in “reinforced mode”with dozens of gas plants turned on every day to prevent tension from skyrocketing. But, half a year later, the problem is still there: the Spanish grid is faltering not because of a lack of energy, but because the gas is in the north and the sun is in the south. How are the measurements now? At the beginning of October, the National Markets and Competition Commission (CNMC) approved, at the request of REE, an emergency resolution to introduce exceptional measures “in the event of sudden voltage variations” detected in the system. The document details changes to several operating procedures that affect the way the electrical grid is programmed and regulated. In practice, the rules of the game were tightened for everyone: from solar producers to gas plants. Among the most significant measures is the obligation for renewable plants to carry out their power transitions in a minimum of 15 minutes, when before they did so in two. The intention, have explained from REEis to avoid sudden changes that could destabilize the system and give the thermal power plants time to react. As explained in Cinco Díasthis instruction allows gas plants to “absorb” excess renewable energy without causing power surges. But for many expertsthe underlying diagnosis is different: the problem is not speed, but geography. Two electric Spains. The country is experiencing a geographic imbalance that we already saw it coming. On the one hand, the north and the Mediterranean coast concentrate the majority of thermal power plants and combined cycle plants – the only ones capable of providing the so-called “rotating mass”, that is, inertia and reactive power that stabilize the network. On the other hand, the south of the peninsula—Andalusia, Extremadura and Castilla-La Mancha—has been filled with solar plants and domestic self-consumption, technologies based on power electronics that do not generate natural inertia. “During peak radiation hours, the south produces more electricity than it consumes, the lines are discharged and the grid becomes extremely sensitive,” explains in his column Joaquín Coronado, president of Build to Zero. Under these conditions, starting a thermal power plant in Asturias to stabilize a voltage problem in Seville is as useless as trying to put out a fire in Andalusia with water pumped from Galicia. The tension starts from the local. The error of approach is in confusing frequency with tension. The electrical frequency is a global magnitude: it is the same throughout the synchronous network. But the voltage is a local variable, which depends on the reactive power flows in each area. Coronado sums it up clearly: reactive power “does not travel well.” On 400 kV lines, its radius of action is 30 to 80 km. In 220 kV networks, from 15 to 40 km. And at 132 kV or lower, just 5 to 20 km. This means that a turbine in the north cannot stabilize the voltage in the south, no matter how much power it has. The CNMC, in its resolutionrecognizes precisely that “rapid voltage variations” appear in periods of low demand and high solar production, aggravated by the growth of self-consumption that “reduces the observability of the system” and leaves the operator without control over thousands of small installations. In summary and how we have explained in Xataka: we have more sun than cables. This shows in the pocket. REE’s response has been to maintain lit every day between 20 and 30 combined cycles to ensure stability. This “reinforced operation” has cost more than 1 billion additional euros since April and could add 3 billion more with the new measures. Adjustment services – energy that is paid outside the daily market to keep the network stable – have gone from 240 million in 2019 to 4 billion in 2025, according to Cinco Días. The result is paradoxical: Spain has one of the lowest wholesale prices in Europe, but one of the highest electricity bills. Ember’s report explains why: the market price only covers half of the bill; The other half are fixed network costs, tolls, taxes and system stability, which do not go down even if energy is cheap. Slowing down is not stabilizing. The decisions adopted by REE and temporarily endorsed by the CNMC are “a defensive strategy” for Coronado. Furthermore, he points out that instead of providing the system with rapid response capacity, it is chosen to slow it down to give time to the thermals. The result is maintaining “a 21st century system operated with a 20th century mentality.” Slowing down the renewable ramps does not provide voltage control where it is needed, because the problem occurs in seconds and in specific places, not in the 15 minutes that these ramps last. The measures, therefore, gain time, but they do not gain effectiveness: they mitigate the frequency, not the tension. Is there any future perspective? The solution is to bring the control capacity closer to where the energy is produced. In fact, we have already discussed in Xataka some of those possible solutions that agree with what Joaquín Coronado says. Grid-forming inverters in solar and wind plants, able to behave as synchronous generators and stabilize the network in milliseconds. Batteries strategically distributed in the southern nodes, which provide instantaneous active and reactive power. Devices FACTS and synchronous compensators in critical substations (Guillena, Mérida, Puertollano…) to dampen local voltage changes. Flexible demand from large industries to modulate consumption in real time. And predictive algorithms based on artificial intelligence that anticipate local instabilities. Some of these solutions are already underway. Spain prepare the installation of eight synchronous compensators and 2,600 MW of batteries, with 340 MW already approved. These devices could save 200 million euros annually by reducing the use of gas for network services. A model that is exhausted. Beyond the technique, there is a structural dilemma: how … Read more

Five months later we continue to discover things about the blackout in Spain. And every time they are worse news for Europe

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Five months later of the great blackout of April 28a preliminary report from the Technological Research Institute (IIT) of the Pontifical University Comillas has put the focus in an insufficient synchronous generation program in the peninsular south as a “fundamental cause” of the electric zero. The document, commissioned by Endesa and Iberdrola and sent to Entso-E, also questions operational maneuvers of Electrica de España (REE). A “collapse due to overtension.” The report introduces this unpublished concept in Europe. A phenomenon in which the tension rises uncontrollably by disconnecting renewable generation that operates with constant power factor. According to IIT calculationsthe safety margin available on the 220 kV network was 1,019 MW, but the disconnections exceeded 1,600 MW. Take into practice it would be when a renewable plant is disconnected, the tension rises. That increase causes new disconnections, which makes the tension rise more, in a vicious circle that ends in the collapse.As details the quotation note of Comillasthat cascade reaction is not precedents in the continent and shows that the simple verification that the tension is within the “is not enough” range to guarantee stability. A fragile and little inertia network. The debate is not “renewable yes or no”, but how to adapt the network and how it operates in high renewable penetration scenarios. The Iit Identify four critical points: Little programmed synchronous generation: in Andalusia there was alone A combined cycle group On the way, when the usual were several. Weak Network: At 9:00 in the morning, 35% of the 400 kV network was disconnected in the central and south areas. Dopsy inertia: In Andalusia it fell to 1.3 seconds, 35% less than the 2 seconds recommended by Entso-e. Risky maneuvers: between 12:00 and 12:30, Ree He connected eleven lines additional to try to cushion the oscillations, but those operations further reduced the safety margin. The chronology of a collapse announced. The government report had already described one morning with “Atypical volatility”. At 12:03 there was a first 0.6 Hz oscillation; At 12:19, another of 0.2 Hz but with a three -time amplitude. To stabilize, Ree reduced exports and connected lines that were disconnected. Far from improving the situation, the system tension increased. At 12:26, ​​the operator reached order the start From a combined cycle center in Andalusia, but the coupling time was more than an hour and a half: there was no room. From 12:32 The chain reaction began. At 12:33:19, the Peninsula It was completely dark. Shock of stories. Here it opens The crack between reports. The Government pointed to Ree in June for poor programming and a “insufficiency of dynamic tensions control capabilities.” Ree, in his own document, replied that there were several power plants that did not fulfill their obligation to absorb reactive energy, which aggravated the crisis. The electrical companies, meanwhile, denied any ruling and accused the government and ree of “opacity.” The new IIT report adds to debate Reinforcing the thesis that a scheduled synchronous generation was missing and questioning the operational maneuvers of the system operator, although it emphasizes that the analysis has the endorsement of international experts such as Goran Anderson and Pier Luigi Mancarella. And now what? The IIT recommends reviewing synchronous generation programming, strengthening tension control, using more predictive metrics and better coordinating all agents. The Government tried in July to approve A decree “antiapages” with sanctions, greater public control and more prominence for self -consumption, but the text shipwrecked in Congress. In addition, the Iberian Peninsula remains an “energy island”, with only 3% interconnection with France, which amplifies any operational error. Therefore, Spain and Portugal They have pressured To Paris to accelerate interconnection runners, “fed up with promises without calendar.” Closer and closer. Next Thursday, the European Network of Transmission Systems Operators (ENTSO-E) will publish your factual report with detailed chronology and the final technical data of the 28th. That document will be the basis on which Brussels and Member States discuss responsibilities and measures. The story of the 28th is not yet closed. And the Comillas report has just reopened it with a clear message: the energy transition does not fail to be fast, but for do not reinforce the network and the rules at the same pace. Image | Freepik Xataka | Selling smoke is now a business in Soria: it purifies it and sells it as CO2 to make soft drinks

What began as a patch after the blackout is already the new normality of Spain: more energy through gas

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After the blackout of April 28, which exposed the fragility of the electrical system at times of high renewable penetration, Red Electrica has imposed a new way of operating: A reinforcement system based on greater activation of combined gas cycles. What was born as an emergency measure has become a new normality. Spain returns to gas, not due to lack of renewables, but because – for now – it cannot only trust them. And it will stay for a while … Since the end of April, the system operator maintains a reinforced operating mode to guarantee stability. Such as has confirmed ELECTRICAL TO ELECONOMISTA.es, this measure will remain in force while the technical solutions agreed to avoid new incidents are implemented. The incident report concludes that there was a lack of dynamic control on the network, unexpected disconnections and vulnerabilities in tension regulation. The first changes are already underway: Royal Decree-Law 7/2025 He has started A battery of reforms, from the incentive of storage to the flexibility of access for hybrid facilities. However, the sector coincides: the total implementation will take time. Some urgent measures have a deadline until September, but others – as the reform of adjustment services or changes in the distribution network – will be extended until June 2026. Reinforcement, therefore, is not transitory. Renewable yes, but they are not enough. And this situation occurs in a fairly paradoxical context. Spain is producing more energy than ever: in May the lowest wholesale prices in recent history were recorded –With many hours in negative prices-, thanks to the thrust of wind, solar and hydraulic. So, the question comes back: why does it return to gas? The key is in the foul storage and demand variability. The renewable generation is abundant during the day, but it falls dramatically at dusk, just when consumption remains high by heat waves. No batteries or pumping To store the surplusThe system needs firmness. And that firmness, today, gives it the gas. They have just launched an “antiapages insurance.” The government is aware of the risk. That is why he has formally activated the implementation of capacity markets, a tool that had been studying for years and now accelerates after the blackout. It is a mechanism that remunerates for being available, not only to produce, and that seeks to keep firm technologies operational – like gas or storage – to guarantee the supply even in critical conditions. After the authorization included in Royal Decree-Law 7/2025, the Ministry for Ecological Transition You can give way to the specific resolution that sets two key parameters to activate these mechanisms: the lost load value (Voll), at € 22,879/MWh, and a reliability standard (Lole) of 1.5 hours a year. The objective of the Executive is clear: launch the first auctions before the end of 2025 and ensure that the gas plants that requested their closure (9,000 MW in total) can remain available while a structural solution arrives. And prices rise again. June closed with an important rebound in the wholesale price of electricity, after the historical minimums of April and May. The heat wave, the increase in demand and the greater participation of the combined gas cycles fired the average cost in the market to levels not seen in months. The consumers’ invoice with regulated rate has noticed it: it has been the third consecutive monthly climb, According to the official CNMC simulator data. In addition, in the free market, some marketers are transferring these cost overruns to their customers, even without a contractual clause that allows it. This has motivated A FACUA WARNINGwhich remembers that raising rates unilaterally is illegal if it is not expressly foreseen in the contract. In some cases, surcharges of up to 6 % per year have been notified under the argument of greater technical costs, which could constitute an abusive clause according to consumer defense regulations. Structural challenge. The April blackout uncovered deficiencies that were already there: an excessively centralized system, little storage, few micro -redes and little local reaction capacity to disturbances. The solution does not go through abandonable, but by complementing them. The gas, for now, plays that role. But the challenge is to do so in the future the storage, demand management and a more robust network. That requires difficult time, investment and political decisions. Image | Pexels and Pixabay Xataka | Broady in April, more expensive invoice in May: thus has affected the system reinforcement

The silence about who really failed in the blackout

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At 12:33 of April 28, the peninsular electrical system collapsed. Zero voltage. Zero electricity. In seconds, millions of people were left without supply. The light returned in hours, but opacity continues. Who failed? Why did the power plants that charged for maintaining stability acted when they needed them most? The official report details it with technicalities. The companies involved are covered by confidentiality. But the data reveals an awkward truth: when everything went out, many were not where they should. They charge to stabilize. But nobody acts here. The issue is that the Spanish electricity market, certain conventional -nuclear, gas and coal – centrals receive additional payments for being available to stabilize tension when there are imbalances. The days of the blackout were several programs, but, According to the reportmany of them were indispensable by maintenance tasks, recharges or breakdowns, just when the system more needed them. The system warning. On April 22 and 24, anomalous oscillations were already registered in tension. On the 28th, the situation worsened: two great oscillations – a fast and one slow – destabilized the network completely. From the Electric Red Documentthe epicenter was a photovoltaic plant in Badajoz, which oscillated without control. From there, the tension collapsed in a waterfall. Some plants tried to coupled, but they did not arrive on time. The system fell in 30 seconds. In the most structural part. Each great electric has its own support strategy: Endesa is committed to nuclear, Naturgy for gas, Iberdrola for hydraulics. But all share something in common: the centrals that give stability to the system are in the hands of the same actors that dominate the traditional electricity market. The worrying thing is not that they charge to be available to act, but that, when they do not, there is no clear consequences. The official report Recognize that information It was confidential, voluntary access and that most companies did not allow disseminating their data. No responsible, without sanctions, without reform. Everyone is blamed, nobody responds. What has followed is a reproach chain: the government blames Red Eléctrica; Electric network blames electric; The electricity blames the Government and Red Eléctrica. And meanwhile, citizens still do not know which company failed to comply with one of the most critical moments for the electrical system. A pattern that is repeated. As has pointed out Eloy Sanz, the professor and researcher at the Rey Juan Carlos University, in their social networks the great electricity maximize benefits according to their technological convenience. Renewables, which should lead the transition, are subordinated or used as alibi. The result: a vulnerable system, without accountability. An inevitable conclusion. The report proposes some technical measures and recommendations to the National Security Council. But it does not demand sanctions or identify responsible. There is also no clear measure to force companies to make their failures public. There is not even a reform of confidentiality mechanisms. One thing is clear: the 28th was not just an electric blackout. It was also a responsibility blackout. Image | Pxhere Xataka | In a desperate attempt to avoid the blackout, Ree tried to start a gas center seven minutes before the disaster

In a desperate attempt to avoid the blackout, Ree tried to start a gas center seven minutes before the disaster

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The Official reports on the blackout They reveal the maneuvers to counterreloj that the network operator did to try to stabilize the system while rushing into the collapse. T-7 minutes. In the moments of maximum tension (never better) prior to the historic blackout that left the Iberian Peninsula without light on April 28, Red Electric took a desperate measure: he ordered the start of a combined gas cycle center to try to stabilize an electrical system that crumbled at times. The call to the owner of the plant, registered in official reportsthere was just seven minutes before the system collapsed completely at 12:33 at noon. However, the thermal power plant never coupled then The zero of tension It occurred first. It was not a typical morning. That April 28 were the perfect conditions to test the network: a relatively low energy demand, and a very high solar radiation that caused a massive predominance of photovoltaic generation. With a network dominated by the electronics of investors instead of the heavy turbines of the conventional generation, the tension already issued warning signals. At 11:00 in the morning, after a voltage climb, the transformers of two Adif substations in Zaragoza were fired. But the situation became critical from 12:00, with the appearance of strong frequency oscillations that put the stability of the entire network in check. The oscillations. At 12:03, a first 0.6 Hz oscillation was detected, an unusual phenomenon that lasted for almost five minutes, forcing Red Eléctrica to take emergency measures. Among them, reduce electricity exchanges with France and Portugal. It didn’t help much. At 12:19, a new 0.2 Hz oscillation shook the system. Given the seriousness of the situation and the need to “attach more conventional generation” to control the tension, Red Electrico contacted at 12:26 with the head of a combined cycle center in Andalusia to start urgently. The choice was not accidental. The group that could be attached faster in the southern zone was sought, one of the most affected by instability. The chosen central, which had decoupled at 9:00 in the morning, was “hot”, which allowed it a shorter start time: an hour and a half. The goal was to be fully operational at 2:00 p.m. Unfortunately, the system did not have that time. Just seven minutes after the starter order was given, at 12:33, a succession of waterfall generation, mainly due to surgeens, caused the total collapse of the peninsular electrical system. The measure, a last resort to avoid the greatest blackout in the recent history of Spain, “never consummated by the zero of tension.” Image | HRAD (CC by-SA 3.0) In Xataka | Many plants disconnected from the network when the blackout began. The problem is that some renewable did it before

22% of renewable plants did not meet the basic tension control criteria during the blackout. And the regulations already demanded it

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Almost two months after the blackout that disconnected Spain and Portugal, the government has released the technical report That analyzes what happened. The document, prepared after checking hundreds of data gigabytes, discards any external attack and points to a chain of technical errors. The decisive factor, according to the document: A network without sufficient capacity To control tension at critical moments, especially in renewable parks. A critical fact. During the blackout, different plants were disconnected preventively when detecting overtheions. The problem is that, According to the reportseveral of these disconnections occurred before even the maximum voltage thresholds allowed by the regulations will be reached. In other words, they did not respond properly to the network conditions. As has pointed out The energy expert, Javier Blas, 22% of the renewable plants did not comply with the criteria required by current regulations. I already demanded it. This is not a case of legal lagoon or regulatory vacuum. The report itself He has made clear that the technical demands for response to surge were already in force. European regulations –Regulation (EU) 2016/631also known as “requirements for generators” (RFG) – establishes behavior requirements for generating plants connected to the network. By the Electric Red Operation Proceduresespecially PO 12.3 (on technical requirements of generation facilities) and PO 9 (on supply quality and safety), already included the obligation to maintain the connection against voltage variations within defined margins. Not adapted to your own transition. The report too He has pointed out to a structural problem: the electricity grid has not evolved at the same pace than the massive renewable deployment. At the time of the blackout, 82% of the generation in operation was renewable. However, the number of synchronous centrals – fundamental to stabilize the network – was the lowest of the year. In this way, the network faced an explosive cocktail: a lot of distributed generation, little centralized control and little response capacity against critical events. A domino effect that, in just 12 seconds, led to the total disconnection of the Iberian system of the rest of Europe. The solutions on the table. The document proposes a package of ambitious measures. Among which we find to strengthen supervision to ensure normative compliance, immediately implement a specific technical service so that renewables actively participate in the voltage control and Increase electrical interconnection with France. Purifying responsibilities. The Government has pointed out both Electric and Electric Companies and possible responsible. From RedeiaBeatriz Corredor has responded ensures that they have not provided all the necessary information, and that the received did not have the desirable quality to clarify what happened. In addition, Corridor recalled that Red Electrica does not manage private networks or distributed control centers, and that its role is limited to guaranteeing the physical compatibility of the system with the programs that result from the electricity market. Image | Pexels Xataka | 49 days after the blackout, the government has published the official report. Against all prognosis, he points to a culprit

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