blackout

What began as a patch after the blackout is already the new normality of Spain: more energy through gas

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After the blackout of April 28, which exposed the fragility of the electrical system at times of high renewable penetration, Red Electrica has imposed a new way of operating: A reinforcement system based on greater activation of combined gas cycles. What was born as an emergency measure has become a new normality. Spain returns to gas, not due to lack of renewables, but because – for now – it cannot only trust them. And it will stay for a while … Since the end of April, the system operator maintains a reinforced operating mode to guarantee stability. Such as has confirmed ELECTRICAL TO ELECONOMISTA.es, this measure will remain in force while the technical solutions agreed to avoid new incidents are implemented. The incident report concludes that there was a lack of dynamic control on the network, unexpected disconnections and vulnerabilities in tension regulation. The first changes are already underway: Royal Decree-Law 7/2025 He has started A battery of reforms, from the incentive of storage to the flexibility of access for hybrid facilities. However, the sector coincides: the total implementation will take time. Some urgent measures have a deadline until September, but others – as the reform of adjustment services or changes in the distribution network – will be extended until June 2026. Reinforcement, therefore, is not transitory. Renewable yes, but they are not enough. And this situation occurs in a fairly paradoxical context. Spain is producing more energy than ever: in May the lowest wholesale prices in recent history were recorded –With many hours in negative prices-, thanks to the thrust of wind, solar and hydraulic. So, the question comes back: why does it return to gas? The key is in the foul storage and demand variability. The renewable generation is abundant during the day, but it falls dramatically at dusk, just when consumption remains high by heat waves. No batteries or pumping To store the surplusThe system needs firmness. And that firmness, today, gives it the gas. They have just launched an “antiapages insurance.” The government is aware of the risk. That is why he has formally activated the implementation of capacity markets, a tool that had been studying for years and now accelerates after the blackout. It is a mechanism that remunerates for being available, not only to produce, and that seeks to keep firm technologies operational – like gas or storage – to guarantee the supply even in critical conditions. After the authorization included in Royal Decree-Law 7/2025, the Ministry for Ecological Transition You can give way to the specific resolution that sets two key parameters to activate these mechanisms: the lost load value (Voll), at € 22,879/MWh, and a reliability standard (Lole) of 1.5 hours a year. The objective of the Executive is clear: launch the first auctions before the end of 2025 and ensure that the gas plants that requested their closure (9,000 MW in total) can remain available while a structural solution arrives. And prices rise again. June closed with an important rebound in the wholesale price of electricity, after the historical minimums of April and May. The heat wave, the increase in demand and the greater participation of the combined gas cycles fired the average cost in the market to levels not seen in months. The consumers’ invoice with regulated rate has noticed it: it has been the third consecutive monthly climb, According to the official CNMC simulator data. In addition, in the free market, some marketers are transferring these cost overruns to their customers, even without a contractual clause that allows it. This has motivated A FACUA WARNINGwhich remembers that raising rates unilaterally is illegal if it is not expressly foreseen in the contract. In some cases, surcharges of up to 6 % per year have been notified under the argument of greater technical costs, which could constitute an abusive clause according to consumer defense regulations. Structural challenge. The April blackout uncovered deficiencies that were already there: an excessively centralized system, little storage, few micro -redes and little local reaction capacity to disturbances. The solution does not go through abandonable, but by complementing them. The gas, for now, plays that role. But the challenge is to do so in the future the storage, demand management and a more robust network. That requires difficult time, investment and political decisions. Image | Pexels and Pixabay Xataka | Broady in April, more expensive invoice in May: thus has affected the system reinforcement

The silence about who really failed in the blackout

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At 12:33 of April 28, the peninsular electrical system collapsed. Zero voltage. Zero electricity. In seconds, millions of people were left without supply. The light returned in hours, but opacity continues. Who failed? Why did the power plants that charged for maintaining stability acted when they needed them most? The official report details it with technicalities. The companies involved are covered by confidentiality. But the data reveals an awkward truth: when everything went out, many were not where they should. They charge to stabilize. But nobody acts here. The issue is that the Spanish electricity market, certain conventional -nuclear, gas and coal – centrals receive additional payments for being available to stabilize tension when there are imbalances. The days of the blackout were several programs, but, According to the reportmany of them were indispensable by maintenance tasks, recharges or breakdowns, just when the system more needed them. The system warning. On April 22 and 24, anomalous oscillations were already registered in tension. On the 28th, the situation worsened: two great oscillations – a fast and one slow – destabilized the network completely. From the Electric Red Documentthe epicenter was a photovoltaic plant in Badajoz, which oscillated without control. From there, the tension collapsed in a waterfall. Some plants tried to coupled, but they did not arrive on time. The system fell in 30 seconds. In the most structural part. Each great electric has its own support strategy: Endesa is committed to nuclear, Naturgy for gas, Iberdrola for hydraulics. But all share something in common: the centrals that give stability to the system are in the hands of the same actors that dominate the traditional electricity market. The worrying thing is not that they charge to be available to act, but that, when they do not, there is no clear consequences. The official report Recognize that information It was confidential, voluntary access and that most companies did not allow disseminating their data. No responsible, without sanctions, without reform. Everyone is blamed, nobody responds. What has followed is a reproach chain: the government blames Red Eléctrica; Electric network blames electric; The electricity blames the Government and Red Eléctrica. And meanwhile, citizens still do not know which company failed to comply with one of the most critical moments for the electrical system. A pattern that is repeated. As has pointed out Eloy Sanz, the professor and researcher at the Rey Juan Carlos University, in their social networks the great electricity maximize benefits according to their technological convenience. Renewables, which should lead the transition, are subordinated or used as alibi. The result: a vulnerable system, without accountability. An inevitable conclusion. The report proposes some technical measures and recommendations to the National Security Council. But it does not demand sanctions or identify responsible. There is also no clear measure to force companies to make their failures public. There is not even a reform of confidentiality mechanisms. One thing is clear: the 28th was not just an electric blackout. It was also a responsibility blackout. Image | Pxhere Xataka | In a desperate attempt to avoid the blackout, Ree tried to start a gas center seven minutes before the disaster

In a desperate attempt to avoid the blackout, Ree tried to start a gas center seven minutes before the disaster

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The Official reports on the blackout They reveal the maneuvers to counterreloj that the network operator did to try to stabilize the system while rushing into the collapse. T-7 minutes. In the moments of maximum tension (never better) prior to the historic blackout that left the Iberian Peninsula without light on April 28, Red Electric took a desperate measure: he ordered the start of a combined gas cycle center to try to stabilize an electrical system that crumbled at times. The call to the owner of the plant, registered in official reportsthere was just seven minutes before the system collapsed completely at 12:33 at noon. However, the thermal power plant never coupled then The zero of tension It occurred first. It was not a typical morning. That April 28 were the perfect conditions to test the network: a relatively low energy demand, and a very high solar radiation that caused a massive predominance of photovoltaic generation. With a network dominated by the electronics of investors instead of the heavy turbines of the conventional generation, the tension already issued warning signals. At 11:00 in the morning, after a voltage climb, the transformers of two Adif substations in Zaragoza were fired. But the situation became critical from 12:00, with the appearance of strong frequency oscillations that put the stability of the entire network in check. The oscillations. At 12:03, a first 0.6 Hz oscillation was detected, an unusual phenomenon that lasted for almost five minutes, forcing Red Eléctrica to take emergency measures. Among them, reduce electricity exchanges with France and Portugal. It didn’t help much. At 12:19, a new 0.2 Hz oscillation shook the system. Given the seriousness of the situation and the need to “attach more conventional generation” to control the tension, Red Electrico contacted at 12:26 with the head of a combined cycle center in Andalusia to start urgently. The choice was not accidental. The group that could be attached faster in the southern zone was sought, one of the most affected by instability. The chosen central, which had decoupled at 9:00 in the morning, was “hot”, which allowed it a shorter start time: an hour and a half. The goal was to be fully operational at 2:00 p.m. Unfortunately, the system did not have that time. Just seven minutes after the starter order was given, at 12:33, a succession of waterfall generation, mainly due to surgeens, caused the total collapse of the peninsular electrical system. The measure, a last resort to avoid the greatest blackout in the recent history of Spain, “never consummated by the zero of tension.” Image | HRAD (CC by-SA 3.0) In Xataka | Many plants disconnected from the network when the blackout began. The problem is that some renewable did it before

22% of renewable plants did not meet the basic tension control criteria during the blackout. And the regulations already demanded it

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Almost two months after the blackout that disconnected Spain and Portugal, the government has released the technical report That analyzes what happened. The document, prepared after checking hundreds of data gigabytes, discards any external attack and points to a chain of technical errors. The decisive factor, according to the document: A network without sufficient capacity To control tension at critical moments, especially in renewable parks. A critical fact. During the blackout, different plants were disconnected preventively when detecting overtheions. The problem is that, According to the reportseveral of these disconnections occurred before even the maximum voltage thresholds allowed by the regulations will be reached. In other words, they did not respond properly to the network conditions. As has pointed out The energy expert, Javier Blas, 22% of the renewable plants did not comply with the criteria required by current regulations. I already demanded it. This is not a case of legal lagoon or regulatory vacuum. The report itself He has made clear that the technical demands for response to surge were already in force. European regulations –Regulation (EU) 2016/631also known as “requirements for generators” (RFG) – establishes behavior requirements for generating plants connected to the network. By the Electric Red Operation Proceduresespecially PO 12.3 (on technical requirements of generation facilities) and PO 9 (on supply quality and safety), already included the obligation to maintain the connection against voltage variations within defined margins. Not adapted to your own transition. The report too He has pointed out to a structural problem: the electricity grid has not evolved at the same pace than the massive renewable deployment. At the time of the blackout, 82% of the generation in operation was renewable. However, the number of synchronous centrals – fundamental to stabilize the network – was the lowest of the year. In this way, the network faced an explosive cocktail: a lot of distributed generation, little centralized control and little response capacity against critical events. A domino effect that, in just 12 seconds, led to the total disconnection of the Iberian system of the rest of Europe. The solutions on the table. The document proposes a package of ambitious measures. Among which we find to strengthen supervision to ensure normative compliance, immediately implement a specific technical service so that renewables actively participate in the voltage control and Increase electrical interconnection with France. Purifying responsibilities. The Government has pointed out both Electric and Electric Companies and possible responsible. From RedeiaBeatriz Corredor has responded ensures that they have not provided all the necessary information, and that the received did not have the desirable quality to clarify what happened. In addition, Corridor recalled that Red Electrica does not manage private networks or distributed control centers, and that its role is limited to guaranteeing the physical compatibility of the system with the programs that result from the electricity market. Image | Pexels Xataka | 49 days after the blackout, the government has published the official report. Against all prognosis, he points to a culprit

The light of the light has risen a lot and the electric ones blame it for the blackout. Facua has something to say about it

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May 2025 promised to be the cheapest month thanks to the renewable generation in spring. However, consumers They have ended up paying more In the light of the light for the blackout of April 28, since they have had to activate emergency mechanisms or reinforcement systems. Now it seems that that should not have been so high. Short. Facua-Consumnadores in Action has warned the electricity marketers of the free market, In a press releasethat they cannot raise their rates unilaterally for the blackout of April 28 if that change is not provided for in the contract. A specific case. The association has loaded directly against Energía, a commercialization of the Repsol Group that has notified a 6% surcharge (about 73 euros per year), alleging an “increase in technical costs of the system” for the electricity network reinforcement system. However, like He recalled Facuaadjustment services are not part of the regulated costs (such as tolls and charges) and, therefore, do not justify a rise in the price agreed in free market contracts. The law is clear. According to the Civil Code, contracts must be fulfilled as agreed and cannot be modified according to the will of a single part (Arts. 1256 and 1258). Exceptions would only be accepted if the contract explicitly includes a clause that allows the marketer to apply these increases by extraordinary situations such as the lived. From the other part. The employer who brings together Iberdrola, Endesa and EDP, AELEC, is pressing to distribute or contain the overrages derived from the blackout. Its proposal is to transfer these extraordinary expenses – given to operate the system in “reinforced mode” to avoid new blackouts – to other concepts of the invoice, such as regulated charges, where costs by renewable or extrapeninsular are also included, according to Finch access has had access. There are more. The employer has calculated that the reinforced security strategy has meant an extra cost of 200 million euros in just one month and requires that there be an extraordinary regulatory response, so that neither consumers nor marketers assume that impact alone. As has detailed Fifodies, are in search of a “transient and exceptional” measure that relies on operation procedures 8.2 and 14.4, already provided for in the current regulatory framework. So is it valid? Legally, the key point is the type of contract that each consumer has. In free market contracts, prices are agreed for a year and cannot be modified unless the contract expressly allows. If there is no clear and specific enabling clause, the climb would be illegal, and it could be considered an abusive clause, even if there is a notice. From Facua they support this thesis in the Civil Code and in Article 65 of Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 on consumer defense, which establishes that contracts must be interpreted in favor of the user and according to the objective good faith. That is, although the company affirms that the surcharge is justified, if you did not sign it and is not in transparent conditions, it cannot impose it. Any forecast? Today, neither Red Eléctrica nor the Ministry for Ecological Transition have clarified how much this reinforced security operation will last, nor how its costs will be distributed. From AELEC and other associations, an intervention of the regulator or the Ministry to temporarily redesign the cost distribution is expected. The objective: avoid an irreversible impact on the electrical marketing market and contain the price escalation. Image | Seoane Prado Xataka | Broady in April, more expensive invoice in May: thus has affected the system reinforcement

How a decision in France and a connection in southern Spain caused the blackout

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Huenaja, a small Granada town of just 1,100 inhabitants and with more than 700 megawatts installed of solar energy, It was the zero zone of the blackout of April 28. In seven seconds, everything It was plunged into a total collapse. Now the expert committee of the European Network of Transmission Systems Operators (Entso-E) has identified Two questions. The investigation. For more than six weeks, this European agency has worked to find the causes of the blackout, apart from the Electricity of Spain and its Portuguese homologous, Ren. According to the reporthalf an hour before collapse, two episodes of power and frequency oscillations were recorded in the European continental network. The Iberian Peninsula, connected to the continent mainly through lines with France, began to lose synchronism. A new detail. The ETSO-E has pointed out that at 12:16 and 12:22, there was a change in interconnection with France: a system with dynamic control (hiking of direct current) was passed to a fixed export mode of 1,000 MW to the Gallic country. According to the experts consulted, this decision left the Spanish system without support for synchronous power, which reduced its margin of action before oscillations. As a piece of dominoes. Almost in parallel, Ree made an internal connection of lines in southern Spain, which, According to Entso-ewould have caused surge located in areas such as Huenaja (Granada), Valdecaballeros (Badajoz) and Don Rodrigo (Seville). Several electrical plants then activated their automatic protections, disconnecting to avoid damage. This further aggravated the tension in the network, triggering a chain reaction: generation falls, frequency loss and total disconnection of the Iberian system of the rest of Europe. Was any system activated? System defense plans, automatic mechanisms designed to stop these processes, were activated, according to has confirmed The report. However, they were not able to contain the fall due to the speed and intensity of the event. At 12:18:47, the interconnection lines between Spain and France were disconnected by protection against the loss of synchronism. At that moment, the peninsula was isolated and collapsed completely. A major debate. This crisis has uncovered a great conflict at the technical and political level, while responsibilities They pass like a hot potato. The debate is intensified around the backup systems and the penetration of renewable energy. On the one hand, nuclear plants They were criticized For disconnecting, but three were in scheduled stop, and the others operated normally until the system collapsed, activating protection protocols. On the other hand, the lack of inertia of the system has been stated again. Not synchronous renewable energies, such as solar and wind, They do not contribute inertia to the electrical systemwhich makes it difficult to stop sudden frequency falls. However, blaming renewables would be to simplify excessively. However, the technical report is clear: it was not exclusive fault of renewables, but a systemic failure, aggravated by operational decisions and structural limitations such as low international interconnection. An interconnection problem. The blackout has evidence They have demanded France that is committed to concrete deadlines and binding actions to advance in electrical interconnection corridors. What comes now. The Entso-E expert panel continues their research and have created A web page for this. Now they will meet on June 23 and will be delivered to the European Commission. Meanwhile, the event leaves an awkward lesson: in an increasingly renewable and decentralized electrical system, technical coordination, The operational resilience and cross -border planning They are more crucial than ever. Image | Unspash Xataka | Spain and Portugal are tired of promises: they ask France to leave the electric alley

It is the fourth blackout in just over a month

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The palm has run out of light. The entire island went to energy zero on Tuesday at 17:32. Two hours later, 50,289 users still without electricity supply because of a breakdown. Energy zero. The origin of the total black in La Palma this June 10 was the “shot of a generation turbine” at the Central de los Guinchos, in Breña Alta, according to an Endesa statement. The failure caused the complete collapse of the system, which as we all know since the end of April It is known as an “energy zero”. The island still had no supply two hours later, according to The breakdown map of the distributor. Red Electric is Informing live of the advances in the replacement of the supply: 6.2 megawatts of the demand had been replaced at 20:10. Emergency Plan. Since there could be people trapped in elevators and others who depend on electricity, the Canary Islands government has activated The “Emergency Plan of the Canary Islands” (Platca) in alert situation. Meanwhile, technicians work at the start of the generation, still without a clear forecast for the complete restoration of the service. Fourth blackout. While it is the first that affects the more than 50,000 palm supplies, this is the fourth big blackout suffered by the island in just over a month. The most popular until now occurred on May 8, when a ruling in a substation of the same central of the Guinchos left 19,526 customers without light for almost two hours. Without light on the beautiful island. Insular electrical systems such as Palma are more vulnerable because they are not interconnected with large continental networks, so a serious failure in a main generation plant, as has happened today in the Guinchos, can more easily cause the collapse of the entire network. But with the energy zero as a drop that fills the glass, the situation has revealed the fragility of the island’s electrical infrastructure. After four blackouts, the question is what structural measures to take to guarantee the stability of the service. Image | E-Distribution In Xataka | Spain has flooded its territory of solar panels. It is a perfect recipe for an old dream: reindustrialization

A month after the blackout in Spain, we continue to drag the same problem that led us to him: electric networks

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The energy transition progresses strongly, but does so on a fragile base. According to the International Energy Agency, In your latest reportthis year 3.3 billion dollars in energy will be invested and only 12% will go to the networks. The imbalance is evident. And also worrying. A worrying imbalance. According to the IEAfor every dollar destined to produce electricity, just 40 cents are invested in transport networks. There are even more, the transformers can take up to four years to be available. To that is added a worrying increase. Since 2018, the prices of cables and transformers have doubled, making the expansion of infrastructure that support the system even more difficult and expensive. Is there a risk of blackout? The IEA has made it clear: “Entrepreneurship safety requires a rapid increase in networks.” A warning that resonates strongly on the Iberian Peninsula, which the report mentions as a case study after The April 2025 blackout. As for the blackout, and even without definitive official causes, everything indicates that it was not caused solely by the low inertia of the system, as initially suggested, but by a chain of chained technical failures. However, what this incident illustrates a structural problem: Investment in infrastructure and support technologies, such as MicroRedes either storage. Without a reinforced and prepared network to manage an increasingly complex electrical system, you can suffer interruptions. A bottleneck. There is even more, because a human capital challenge is added to investment problems. IEA has estimated that by 2030 there will be a deficit of 1.5 million workers qualified in electrical networks. This shortage affects key tasks such as the installation of transformers, digital systems or advanced control. In addition, planning and permits are slow processes. Networks require more than cables: they need intelligence, distributed control and resilience against failures. Are there solutions on the horizon? IEA has proposed Two clear lines: on the one hand, long -term network plans (minimum 10 years) such as those already applied India, Brazil or South Africa; And on the other, bet on digitalizationwhich already represents 25% of the global investment in electrical networks. The urgency of reinforcement. The final warning of the report does not leave interpretations: “Without action, the electrical networks will be the bottleneck of the energy transition” without a modern, robust and prepared network to manage variable clean energy, the green transition will not only be inefficient: it can become insecure. Renewable growth cannot be sustained on infrastructure of the twentieth century. So here a fairly clear question underlies: are we reinforcing our electrical networks with the same ambition with which we install renewables, or are we building on unstable terrain? Image | Miguel Á. Padriñán Xataka | In Elche a solar macroproject threatens a protected place. It is only the tip of the iceberg of a problem throughout Spain

There is already an autonomous community taking note of the blackout and putting measures to avoid it: Catalonia

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The electrical invoice It has risen After the blackout for the reinforcement system, but the real challenge is not only in reinforcing the system, but in transforming it. Catalonia has understood and got to work. Short. The Government of Catalonia has approved by urgent a new decree-law with the aim of increasing the resilience of the electrical system. The standard introduces reforms both in energy legislation and urban regulations to facilitate energy transition. Specifically, it modifies Decree Law 16/2019, oriented to climate emergency, and adapts the regulatory framework to accommodate energy storage through batteries. A double purpose. On the one hand, it streamlines the administrative process of renewable energy projects. On the other hand, and pioneer, regulates the installation of high -power batteries, both independent (Stand Alone) as hybridized with solar and wind farms. In addition, the Catalan Government has decided to grant these infrastructure the condition of higher public interest, which allows them to be installed even on non -urbanizable land, by legally equating them with technical services of public utility. This measure responds to an old demand for the energy storage sector in Spain, As it took place in the AEPIBAL Day. Treading the accelerator. The Generalitat has processed 94 Energy storage projects through batteries. Of these, 87 are independent and add up to 920 MW, while the other 7 are hybridized with renewable facilities and provide additional 22 MW. Catalonia thus becomes one of the first communities to create a specific regulatory framework for these technologies. The rest trapped in an obsolete framework. As experts in the energy sector pointed out To Xatakathe storage problem is not only technical, but also regulatory and economic. Today, batteries that are not linked to self -consumption cannot participate in balance markets, which hinders their profitability and slows its mass implementation. However, beyond the regulations, the future of storage will also depend on technological and economic evolution. Technologies like him Grid formingwhich allows batteries to stabilize the network imitating the inertia of traditional centrals, or the development of local micro -redes Able to operate autonomously, they are already being successfully tested. Criticisms have jumped. Battery deployment has also aroused social and critical resistance resistance. According to publicsome groups have warned of the risk that the energy transition becomes a new form of extractivism, without rethinking the consumption model. Specifically they have accused the project of the Korean company Lotte in Mont-Roig of the Camp. In addition, organizations such as the Observatori del Deute in Globalització (ODG) have remembered the same medium as the extraction of materials such as lithium, tungsten or sodium depends on mines in countries such as Chile or Australia, which reinforces the dependence of external resources and raises environmental and geopolitical dilemmas. A map yet to define. Catalonia wanted to advance with a strategy that seeks to combine energy resilience, administrative agility and technological impulse. Storage by batteries is not just a technical solution: it is an essential piece to balance an increasingly decentralized, renewable and exposed crisis system. The road is drawn. The question is whether the rest of Spain will know – and want – follow it on time. Image | Unspash and Unienergy technologies Xataka | The surprising thing is that the light is still on 99% of the time: the blackouts of Spain and London are a good example

The place where the blackout began

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Huéneja, a small Granada municipality of approximately one thousand inhabitants, has become an epicenter of the eyes after the blackout that left the Iberian Peninsula on April 28. First substation to fall. With a powerful renewable energy concentration, Huéneja’s electrical substation was, according to The Energy Newspaperthe first great disconnection in the chain of events that caused the energy zero a month ago. Here, Red Eléctrica has been operating for more than a decade a 400 kV substation designed to evacuate the growing production of renewable energies in the area. Huéneja’s substation recorded the first generation drop in the moments before the great blackout. A renewable hub. Huéneja’s electrical substation is connected window, photovoltaic and thermosoles. In total, about 668 MW of installed power pour their energy into this knot: 376 MW windings, 142 MW photovoltaic and 150 MW Termosoles. That fateful day, all this connected generation was suddenly disconnected. From what we know, the protections jumped when detecting an over -the higher than the permitted limits, from outside the substation. A late expansion. On May 5, just a week after the blackout and while the causes were still investigated, the Government of Spain authorized Red Electric to expand the huéneja substation. This action, published in the BOE of May 21It has a budget of 7.5 million euros aimed at feeding the electrical train network. Bruno Vuan, connoisseur of the sector, I already pointed to Huéneja As a candidate for the start of the blackout, highlighting her concentration of power and questioning the tension control capacity for that generation. But Huéneja was not the cause of the blackout, but the first big piece of dominoes to fall. The origin is not the cause. Paraphrasing the expert Fernando Rodríguezthat Huéneja’s substation was the origin of the blackout does not mean that it was the cause. The failure of a substation does not grave the entire system, designed to withstand this type of oscillations. There were moments later other two disconnections to the southwest of the peninsula. The “causes” interacted with each other, and also with their effects, touring the system as a zipper that dulls Spain and Portugal. The complete schedule. After the incident in Huéneja at 12:32:57, two other important generation losses occurred in Badajoz and Seville in just twenty seconds, adding a total of 2.2 Gigaveatians disconnected. Luis Badesa, professor at the Polytechnic University of Madrid, had already signed over overthes as suspects. According to its analysis, the point of no return arrived at 12:33:20, when the Iberian Peninsula lost the connection with France, becoming an “electric island.” What failed then? According to Redeia, the Electric Red Matrix was not the energy mix, It was not the lack of inertiaThey were not the renewables. In an interview with The avant -gardehis president Beatriz Corredor said: “There was no transport network and the operation of the system was correct.” Corridor points to “some conventional generators” that had that day “some voltage control parameters below those established by the regulations.” The president of Redeia has put the focus on conventional energies, which did not control the tension correctly. Image | Voltae In Xataka | The other uncomfortable truth of the blackout: Spain does not yet have enough batteries for its renewable boom

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