blackout

Half a year after the blackout, Red Eléctrica still has problems stabilizing the voltage. And there is a geographical reason

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Just six months ago, Spain was left in the dark. The “electric zero” of April 28, 2025 was the most serious warning of a system that he believed himself invulnerable. Since then, Red Eléctrica (REE) operates in “reinforced mode”with dozens of gas plants turned on every day to prevent tension from skyrocketing. But, half a year later, the problem is still there: the Spanish grid is faltering not because of a lack of energy, but because the gas is in the north and the sun is in the south. How are the measurements now? At the beginning of October, the National Markets and Competition Commission (CNMC) approved, at the request of REE, an emergency resolution to introduce exceptional measures “in the event of sudden voltage variations” detected in the system. The document details changes to several operating procedures that affect the way the electrical grid is programmed and regulated. In practice, the rules of the game were tightened for everyone: from solar producers to gas plants. Among the most significant measures is the obligation for renewable plants to carry out their power transitions in a minimum of 15 minutes, when before they did so in two. The intention, have explained from REEis to avoid sudden changes that could destabilize the system and give the thermal power plants time to react. As explained in Cinco Díasthis instruction allows gas plants to “absorb” excess renewable energy without causing power surges. But for many expertsthe underlying diagnosis is different: the problem is not speed, but geography. Two electric Spains. The country is experiencing a geographic imbalance that we already saw it coming. On the one hand, the north and the Mediterranean coast concentrate the majority of thermal power plants and combined cycle plants – the only ones capable of providing the so-called “rotating mass”, that is, inertia and reactive power that stabilize the network. On the other hand, the south of the peninsula—Andalusia, Extremadura and Castilla-La Mancha—has been filled with solar plants and domestic self-consumption, technologies based on power electronics that do not generate natural inertia. “During peak radiation hours, the south produces more electricity than it consumes, the lines are discharged and the grid becomes extremely sensitive,” explains in his column Joaquín Coronado, president of Build to Zero. Under these conditions, starting a thermal power plant in Asturias to stabilize a voltage problem in Seville is as useless as trying to put out a fire in Andalusia with water pumped from Galicia. The tension starts from the local. The error of approach is in confusing frequency with tension. The electrical frequency is a global magnitude: it is the same throughout the synchronous network. But the voltage is a local variable, which depends on the reactive power flows in each area. Coronado sums it up clearly: reactive power “does not travel well.” On 400 kV lines, its radius of action is 30 to 80 km. In 220 kV networks, from 15 to 40 km. And at 132 kV or lower, just 5 to 20 km. This means that a turbine in the north cannot stabilize the voltage in the south, no matter how much power it has. The CNMC, in its resolutionrecognizes precisely that “rapid voltage variations” appear in periods of low demand and high solar production, aggravated by the growth of self-consumption that “reduces the observability of the system” and leaves the operator without control over thousands of small installations. In summary and how we have explained in Xataka: we have more sun than cables. This shows in the pocket. REE’s response has been to maintain lit every day between 20 and 30 combined cycles to ensure stability. This “reinforced operation” has cost more than 1 billion additional euros since April and could add 3 billion more with the new measures. Adjustment services – energy that is paid outside the daily market to keep the network stable – have gone from 240 million in 2019 to 4 billion in 2025, according to Cinco Días. The result is paradoxical: Spain has one of the lowest wholesale prices in Europe, but one of the highest electricity bills. Ember’s report explains why: the market price only covers half of the bill; The other half are fixed network costs, tolls, taxes and system stability, which do not go down even if energy is cheap. Slowing down is not stabilizing. The decisions adopted by REE and temporarily endorsed by the CNMC are “a defensive strategy” for Coronado. Furthermore, he points out that instead of providing the system with rapid response capacity, it is chosen to slow it down to give time to the thermals. The result is maintaining “a 21st century system operated with a 20th century mentality.” Slowing down the renewable ramps does not provide voltage control where it is needed, because the problem occurs in seconds and in specific places, not in the 15 minutes that these ramps last. The measures, therefore, gain time, but they do not gain effectiveness: they mitigate the frequency, not the tension. Is there any future perspective? The solution is to bring the control capacity closer to where the energy is produced. In fact, we have already discussed in Xataka some of those possible solutions that agree with what Joaquín Coronado says. Grid-forming inverters in solar and wind plants, able to behave as synchronous generators and stabilize the network in milliseconds. Batteries strategically distributed in the southern nodes, which provide instantaneous active and reactive power. Devices FACTS and synchronous compensators in critical substations (Guillena, Mérida, Puertollano…) to dampen local voltage changes. Flexible demand from large industries to modulate consumption in real time. And predictive algorithms based on artificial intelligence that anticipate local instabilities. Some of these solutions are already underway. Spain prepare the installation of eight synchronous compensators and 2,600 MW of batteries, with 340 MW already approved. These devices could save 200 million euros annually by reducing the use of gas for network services. A model that is exhausted. Beyond the technique, there is a structural dilemma: how … Read more

Five months later we continue to discover things about the blackout in Spain. And every time they are worse news for Europe

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Five months later of the great blackout of April 28a preliminary report from the Technological Research Institute (IIT) of the Pontifical University Comillas has put the focus in an insufficient synchronous generation program in the peninsular south as a “fundamental cause” of the electric zero. The document, commissioned by Endesa and Iberdrola and sent to Entso-E, also questions operational maneuvers of Electrica de España (REE). A “collapse due to overtension.” The report introduces this unpublished concept in Europe. A phenomenon in which the tension rises uncontrollably by disconnecting renewable generation that operates with constant power factor. According to IIT calculationsthe safety margin available on the 220 kV network was 1,019 MW, but the disconnections exceeded 1,600 MW. Take into practice it would be when a renewable plant is disconnected, the tension rises. That increase causes new disconnections, which makes the tension rise more, in a vicious circle that ends in the collapse.As details the quotation note of Comillasthat cascade reaction is not precedents in the continent and shows that the simple verification that the tension is within the “is not enough” range to guarantee stability. A fragile and little inertia network. The debate is not “renewable yes or no”, but how to adapt the network and how it operates in high renewable penetration scenarios. The Iit Identify four critical points: Little programmed synchronous generation: in Andalusia there was alone A combined cycle group On the way, when the usual were several. Weak Network: At 9:00 in the morning, 35% of the 400 kV network was disconnected in the central and south areas. Dopsy inertia: In Andalusia it fell to 1.3 seconds, 35% less than the 2 seconds recommended by Entso-e. Risky maneuvers: between 12:00 and 12:30, Ree He connected eleven lines additional to try to cushion the oscillations, but those operations further reduced the safety margin. The chronology of a collapse announced. The government report had already described one morning with “Atypical volatility”. At 12:03 there was a first 0.6 Hz oscillation; At 12:19, another of 0.2 Hz but with a three -time amplitude. To stabilize, Ree reduced exports and connected lines that were disconnected. Far from improving the situation, the system tension increased. At 12:26, ​​the operator reached order the start From a combined cycle center in Andalusia, but the coupling time was more than an hour and a half: there was no room. From 12:32 The chain reaction began. At 12:33:19, the Peninsula It was completely dark. Shock of stories. Here it opens The crack between reports. The Government pointed to Ree in June for poor programming and a “insufficiency of dynamic tensions control capabilities.” Ree, in his own document, replied that there were several power plants that did not fulfill their obligation to absorb reactive energy, which aggravated the crisis. The electrical companies, meanwhile, denied any ruling and accused the government and ree of “opacity.” The new IIT report adds to debate Reinforcing the thesis that a scheduled synchronous generation was missing and questioning the operational maneuvers of the system operator, although it emphasizes that the analysis has the endorsement of international experts such as Goran Anderson and Pier Luigi Mancarella. And now what? The IIT recommends reviewing synchronous generation programming, strengthening tension control, using more predictive metrics and better coordinating all agents. The Government tried in July to approve A decree “antiapages” with sanctions, greater public control and more prominence for self -consumption, but the text shipwrecked in Congress. In addition, the Iberian Peninsula remains an “energy island”, with only 3% interconnection with France, which amplifies any operational error. Therefore, Spain and Portugal They have pressured To Paris to accelerate interconnection runners, “fed up with promises without calendar.” Closer and closer. Next Thursday, the European Network of Transmission Systems Operators (ENTSO-E) will publish your factual report with detailed chronology and the final technical data of the 28th. That document will be the basis on which Brussels and Member States discuss responsibilities and measures. The story of the 28th is not yet closed. And the Comillas report has just reopened it with a clear message: the energy transition does not fail to be fast, but for do not reinforce the network and the rules at the same pace. Image | Freepik Xataka | Selling smoke is now a business in Soria: it purifies it and sells it as CO2 to make soft drinks

What began as a patch after the blackout is already the new normality of Spain: more energy through gas

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After the blackout of April 28, which exposed the fragility of the electrical system at times of high renewable penetration, Red Electrica has imposed a new way of operating: A reinforcement system based on greater activation of combined gas cycles. What was born as an emergency measure has become a new normality. Spain returns to gas, not due to lack of renewables, but because – for now – it cannot only trust them. And it will stay for a while … Since the end of April, the system operator maintains a reinforced operating mode to guarantee stability. Such as has confirmed ELECTRICAL TO ELECONOMISTA.es, this measure will remain in force while the technical solutions agreed to avoid new incidents are implemented. The incident report concludes that there was a lack of dynamic control on the network, unexpected disconnections and vulnerabilities in tension regulation. The first changes are already underway: Royal Decree-Law 7/2025 He has started A battery of reforms, from the incentive of storage to the flexibility of access for hybrid facilities. However, the sector coincides: the total implementation will take time. Some urgent measures have a deadline until September, but others – as the reform of adjustment services or changes in the distribution network – will be extended until June 2026. Reinforcement, therefore, is not transitory. Renewable yes, but they are not enough. And this situation occurs in a fairly paradoxical context. Spain is producing more energy than ever: in May the lowest wholesale prices in recent history were recorded –With many hours in negative prices-, thanks to the thrust of wind, solar and hydraulic. So, the question comes back: why does it return to gas? The key is in the foul storage and demand variability. The renewable generation is abundant during the day, but it falls dramatically at dusk, just when consumption remains high by heat waves. No batteries or pumping To store the surplusThe system needs firmness. And that firmness, today, gives it the gas. They have just launched an “antiapages insurance.” The government is aware of the risk. That is why he has formally activated the implementation of capacity markets, a tool that had been studying for years and now accelerates after the blackout. It is a mechanism that remunerates for being available, not only to produce, and that seeks to keep firm technologies operational – like gas or storage – to guarantee the supply even in critical conditions. After the authorization included in Royal Decree-Law 7/2025, the Ministry for Ecological Transition You can give way to the specific resolution that sets two key parameters to activate these mechanisms: the lost load value (Voll), at € 22,879/MWh, and a reliability standard (Lole) of 1.5 hours a year. The objective of the Executive is clear: launch the first auctions before the end of 2025 and ensure that the gas plants that requested their closure (9,000 MW in total) can remain available while a structural solution arrives. And prices rise again. June closed with an important rebound in the wholesale price of electricity, after the historical minimums of April and May. The heat wave, the increase in demand and the greater participation of the combined gas cycles fired the average cost in the market to levels not seen in months. The consumers’ invoice with regulated rate has noticed it: it has been the third consecutive monthly climb, According to the official CNMC simulator data. In addition, in the free market, some marketers are transferring these cost overruns to their customers, even without a contractual clause that allows it. This has motivated A FACUA WARNINGwhich remembers that raising rates unilaterally is illegal if it is not expressly foreseen in the contract. In some cases, surcharges of up to 6 % per year have been notified under the argument of greater technical costs, which could constitute an abusive clause according to consumer defense regulations. Structural challenge. The April blackout uncovered deficiencies that were already there: an excessively centralized system, little storage, few micro -redes and little local reaction capacity to disturbances. The solution does not go through abandonable, but by complementing them. The gas, for now, plays that role. But the challenge is to do so in the future the storage, demand management and a more robust network. That requires difficult time, investment and political decisions. Image | Pexels and Pixabay Xataka | Broady in April, more expensive invoice in May: thus has affected the system reinforcement

The silence about who really failed in the blackout

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At 12:33 of April 28, the peninsular electrical system collapsed. Zero voltage. Zero electricity. In seconds, millions of people were left without supply. The light returned in hours, but opacity continues. Who failed? Why did the power plants that charged for maintaining stability acted when they needed them most? The official report details it with technicalities. The companies involved are covered by confidentiality. But the data reveals an awkward truth: when everything went out, many were not where they should. They charge to stabilize. But nobody acts here. The issue is that the Spanish electricity market, certain conventional -nuclear, gas and coal – centrals receive additional payments for being available to stabilize tension when there are imbalances. The days of the blackout were several programs, but, According to the reportmany of them were indispensable by maintenance tasks, recharges or breakdowns, just when the system more needed them. The system warning. On April 22 and 24, anomalous oscillations were already registered in tension. On the 28th, the situation worsened: two great oscillations – a fast and one slow – destabilized the network completely. From the Electric Red Documentthe epicenter was a photovoltaic plant in Badajoz, which oscillated without control. From there, the tension collapsed in a waterfall. Some plants tried to coupled, but they did not arrive on time. The system fell in 30 seconds. In the most structural part. Each great electric has its own support strategy: Endesa is committed to nuclear, Naturgy for gas, Iberdrola for hydraulics. But all share something in common: the centrals that give stability to the system are in the hands of the same actors that dominate the traditional electricity market. The worrying thing is not that they charge to be available to act, but that, when they do not, there is no clear consequences. The official report Recognize that information It was confidential, voluntary access and that most companies did not allow disseminating their data. No responsible, without sanctions, without reform. Everyone is blamed, nobody responds. What has followed is a reproach chain: the government blames Red Eléctrica; Electric network blames electric; The electricity blames the Government and Red Eléctrica. And meanwhile, citizens still do not know which company failed to comply with one of the most critical moments for the electrical system. A pattern that is repeated. As has pointed out Eloy Sanz, the professor and researcher at the Rey Juan Carlos University, in their social networks the great electricity maximize benefits according to their technological convenience. Renewables, which should lead the transition, are subordinated or used as alibi. The result: a vulnerable system, without accountability. An inevitable conclusion. The report proposes some technical measures and recommendations to the National Security Council. But it does not demand sanctions or identify responsible. There is also no clear measure to force companies to make their failures public. There is not even a reform of confidentiality mechanisms. One thing is clear: the 28th was not just an electric blackout. It was also a responsibility blackout. Image | Pxhere Xataka | In a desperate attempt to avoid the blackout, Ree tried to start a gas center seven minutes before the disaster

In a desperate attempt to avoid the blackout, Ree tried to start a gas center seven minutes before the disaster

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The Official reports on the blackout They reveal the maneuvers to counterreloj that the network operator did to try to stabilize the system while rushing into the collapse. T-7 minutes. In the moments of maximum tension (never better) prior to the historic blackout that left the Iberian Peninsula without light on April 28, Red Electric took a desperate measure: he ordered the start of a combined gas cycle center to try to stabilize an electrical system that crumbled at times. The call to the owner of the plant, registered in official reportsthere was just seven minutes before the system collapsed completely at 12:33 at noon. However, the thermal power plant never coupled then The zero of tension It occurred first. It was not a typical morning. That April 28 were the perfect conditions to test the network: a relatively low energy demand, and a very high solar radiation that caused a massive predominance of photovoltaic generation. With a network dominated by the electronics of investors instead of the heavy turbines of the conventional generation, the tension already issued warning signals. At 11:00 in the morning, after a voltage climb, the transformers of two Adif substations in Zaragoza were fired. But the situation became critical from 12:00, with the appearance of strong frequency oscillations that put the stability of the entire network in check. The oscillations. At 12:03, a first 0.6 Hz oscillation was detected, an unusual phenomenon that lasted for almost five minutes, forcing Red Eléctrica to take emergency measures. Among them, reduce electricity exchanges with France and Portugal. It didn’t help much. At 12:19, a new 0.2 Hz oscillation shook the system. Given the seriousness of the situation and the need to “attach more conventional generation” to control the tension, Red Electrico contacted at 12:26 with the head of a combined cycle center in Andalusia to start urgently. The choice was not accidental. The group that could be attached faster in the southern zone was sought, one of the most affected by instability. The chosen central, which had decoupled at 9:00 in the morning, was “hot”, which allowed it a shorter start time: an hour and a half. The goal was to be fully operational at 2:00 p.m. Unfortunately, the system did not have that time. Just seven minutes after the starter order was given, at 12:33, a succession of waterfall generation, mainly due to surgeens, caused the total collapse of the peninsular electrical system. The measure, a last resort to avoid the greatest blackout in the recent history of Spain, “never consummated by the zero of tension.” Image | HRAD (CC by-SA 3.0) In Xataka | Many plants disconnected from the network when the blackout began. The problem is that some renewable did it before

22% of renewable plants did not meet the basic tension control criteria during the blackout. And the regulations already demanded it

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Almost two months after the blackout that disconnected Spain and Portugal, the government has released the technical report That analyzes what happened. The document, prepared after checking hundreds of data gigabytes, discards any external attack and points to a chain of technical errors. The decisive factor, according to the document: A network without sufficient capacity To control tension at critical moments, especially in renewable parks. A critical fact. During the blackout, different plants were disconnected preventively when detecting overtheions. The problem is that, According to the reportseveral of these disconnections occurred before even the maximum voltage thresholds allowed by the regulations will be reached. In other words, they did not respond properly to the network conditions. As has pointed out The energy expert, Javier Blas, 22% of the renewable plants did not comply with the criteria required by current regulations. I already demanded it. This is not a case of legal lagoon or regulatory vacuum. The report itself He has made clear that the technical demands for response to surge were already in force. European regulations –Regulation (EU) 2016/631also known as “requirements for generators” (RFG) – establishes behavior requirements for generating plants connected to the network. By the Electric Red Operation Proceduresespecially PO 12.3 (on technical requirements of generation facilities) and PO 9 (on supply quality and safety), already included the obligation to maintain the connection against voltage variations within defined margins. Not adapted to your own transition. The report too He has pointed out to a structural problem: the electricity grid has not evolved at the same pace than the massive renewable deployment. At the time of the blackout, 82% of the generation in operation was renewable. However, the number of synchronous centrals – fundamental to stabilize the network – was the lowest of the year. In this way, the network faced an explosive cocktail: a lot of distributed generation, little centralized control and little response capacity against critical events. A domino effect that, in just 12 seconds, led to the total disconnection of the Iberian system of the rest of Europe. The solutions on the table. The document proposes a package of ambitious measures. Among which we find to strengthen supervision to ensure normative compliance, immediately implement a specific technical service so that renewables actively participate in the voltage control and Increase electrical interconnection with France. Purifying responsibilities. The Government has pointed out both Electric and Electric Companies and possible responsible. From RedeiaBeatriz Corredor has responded ensures that they have not provided all the necessary information, and that the received did not have the desirable quality to clarify what happened. In addition, Corridor recalled that Red Electrica does not manage private networks or distributed control centers, and that its role is limited to guaranteeing the physical compatibility of the system with the programs that result from the electricity market. Image | Pexels Xataka | 49 days after the blackout, the government has published the official report. Against all prognosis, he points to a culprit

The light of the light has risen a lot and the electric ones blame it for the blackout. Facua has something to say about it

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May 2025 promised to be the cheapest month thanks to the renewable generation in spring. However, consumers They have ended up paying more In the light of the light for the blackout of April 28, since they have had to activate emergency mechanisms or reinforcement systems. Now it seems that that should not have been so high. Short. Facua-Consumnadores in Action has warned the electricity marketers of the free market, In a press releasethat they cannot raise their rates unilaterally for the blackout of April 28 if that change is not provided for in the contract. A specific case. The association has loaded directly against Energía, a commercialization of the Repsol Group that has notified a 6% surcharge (about 73 euros per year), alleging an “increase in technical costs of the system” for the electricity network reinforcement system. However, like He recalled Facuaadjustment services are not part of the regulated costs (such as tolls and charges) and, therefore, do not justify a rise in the price agreed in free market contracts. The law is clear. According to the Civil Code, contracts must be fulfilled as agreed and cannot be modified according to the will of a single part (Arts. 1256 and 1258). Exceptions would only be accepted if the contract explicitly includes a clause that allows the marketer to apply these increases by extraordinary situations such as the lived. From the other part. The employer who brings together Iberdrola, Endesa and EDP, AELEC, is pressing to distribute or contain the overrages derived from the blackout. Its proposal is to transfer these extraordinary expenses – given to operate the system in “reinforced mode” to avoid new blackouts – to other concepts of the invoice, such as regulated charges, where costs by renewable or extrapeninsular are also included, according to Finch access has had access. There are more. The employer has calculated that the reinforced security strategy has meant an extra cost of 200 million euros in just one month and requires that there be an extraordinary regulatory response, so that neither consumers nor marketers assume that impact alone. As has detailed Fifodies, are in search of a “transient and exceptional” measure that relies on operation procedures 8.2 and 14.4, already provided for in the current regulatory framework. So is it valid? Legally, the key point is the type of contract that each consumer has. In free market contracts, prices are agreed for a year and cannot be modified unless the contract expressly allows. If there is no clear and specific enabling clause, the climb would be illegal, and it could be considered an abusive clause, even if there is a notice. From Facua they support this thesis in the Civil Code and in Article 65 of Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007 on consumer defense, which establishes that contracts must be interpreted in favor of the user and according to the objective good faith. That is, although the company affirms that the surcharge is justified, if you did not sign it and is not in transparent conditions, it cannot impose it. Any forecast? Today, neither Red Eléctrica nor the Ministry for Ecological Transition have clarified how much this reinforced security operation will last, nor how its costs will be distributed. From AELEC and other associations, an intervention of the regulator or the Ministry to temporarily redesign the cost distribution is expected. The objective: avoid an irreversible impact on the electrical marketing market and contain the price escalation. Image | Seoane Prado Xataka | Broady in April, more expensive invoice in May: thus has affected the system reinforcement

How a decision in France and a connection in southern Spain caused the blackout

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Huenaja, a small Granada town of just 1,100 inhabitants and with more than 700 megawatts installed of solar energy, It was the zero zone of the blackout of April 28. In seven seconds, everything It was plunged into a total collapse. Now the expert committee of the European Network of Transmission Systems Operators (Entso-E) has identified Two questions. The investigation. For more than six weeks, this European agency has worked to find the causes of the blackout, apart from the Electricity of Spain and its Portuguese homologous, Ren. According to the reporthalf an hour before collapse, two episodes of power and frequency oscillations were recorded in the European continental network. The Iberian Peninsula, connected to the continent mainly through lines with France, began to lose synchronism. A new detail. The ETSO-E has pointed out that at 12:16 and 12:22, there was a change in interconnection with France: a system with dynamic control (hiking of direct current) was passed to a fixed export mode of 1,000 MW to the Gallic country. According to the experts consulted, this decision left the Spanish system without support for synchronous power, which reduced its margin of action before oscillations. As a piece of dominoes. Almost in parallel, Ree made an internal connection of lines in southern Spain, which, According to Entso-ewould have caused surge located in areas such as Huenaja (Granada), Valdecaballeros (Badajoz) and Don Rodrigo (Seville). Several electrical plants then activated their automatic protections, disconnecting to avoid damage. This further aggravated the tension in the network, triggering a chain reaction: generation falls, frequency loss and total disconnection of the Iberian system of the rest of Europe. Was any system activated? System defense plans, automatic mechanisms designed to stop these processes, were activated, according to has confirmed The report. However, they were not able to contain the fall due to the speed and intensity of the event. At 12:18:47, the interconnection lines between Spain and France were disconnected by protection against the loss of synchronism. At that moment, the peninsula was isolated and collapsed completely. A major debate. This crisis has uncovered a great conflict at the technical and political level, while responsibilities They pass like a hot potato. The debate is intensified around the backup systems and the penetration of renewable energy. On the one hand, nuclear plants They were criticized For disconnecting, but three were in scheduled stop, and the others operated normally until the system collapsed, activating protection protocols. On the other hand, the lack of inertia of the system has been stated again. Not synchronous renewable energies, such as solar and wind, They do not contribute inertia to the electrical systemwhich makes it difficult to stop sudden frequency falls. However, blaming renewables would be to simplify excessively. However, the technical report is clear: it was not exclusive fault of renewables, but a systemic failure, aggravated by operational decisions and structural limitations such as low international interconnection. An interconnection problem. The blackout has evidence They have demanded France that is committed to concrete deadlines and binding actions to advance in electrical interconnection corridors. What comes now. The Entso-E expert panel continues their research and have created A web page for this. Now they will meet on June 23 and will be delivered to the European Commission. Meanwhile, the event leaves an awkward lesson: in an increasingly renewable and decentralized electrical system, technical coordination, The operational resilience and cross -border planning They are more crucial than ever. Image | Unspash Xataka | Spain and Portugal are tired of promises: they ask France to leave the electric alley

It is the fourth blackout in just over a month

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The palm has run out of light. The entire island went to energy zero on Tuesday at 17:32. Two hours later, 50,289 users still without electricity supply because of a breakdown. Energy zero. The origin of the total black in La Palma this June 10 was the “shot of a generation turbine” at the Central de los Guinchos, in Breña Alta, according to an Endesa statement. The failure caused the complete collapse of the system, which as we all know since the end of April It is known as an “energy zero”. The island still had no supply two hours later, according to The breakdown map of the distributor. Red Electric is Informing live of the advances in the replacement of the supply: 6.2 megawatts of the demand had been replaced at 20:10. Emergency Plan. Since there could be people trapped in elevators and others who depend on electricity, the Canary Islands government has activated The “Emergency Plan of the Canary Islands” (Platca) in alert situation. Meanwhile, technicians work at the start of the generation, still without a clear forecast for the complete restoration of the service. Fourth blackout. While it is the first that affects the more than 50,000 palm supplies, this is the fourth big blackout suffered by the island in just over a month. The most popular until now occurred on May 8, when a ruling in a substation of the same central of the Guinchos left 19,526 customers without light for almost two hours. Without light on the beautiful island. Insular electrical systems such as Palma are more vulnerable because they are not interconnected with large continental networks, so a serious failure in a main generation plant, as has happened today in the Guinchos, can more easily cause the collapse of the entire network. But with the energy zero as a drop that fills the glass, the situation has revealed the fragility of the island’s electrical infrastructure. After four blackouts, the question is what structural measures to take to guarantee the stability of the service. Image | E-Distribution In Xataka | Spain has flooded its territory of solar panels. It is a perfect recipe for an old dream: reindustrialization

A month after the blackout in Spain, we continue to drag the same problem that led us to him: electric networks

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The energy transition progresses strongly, but does so on a fragile base. According to the International Energy Agency, In your latest reportthis year 3.3 billion dollars in energy will be invested and only 12% will go to the networks. The imbalance is evident. And also worrying. A worrying imbalance. According to the IEAfor every dollar destined to produce electricity, just 40 cents are invested in transport networks. There are even more, the transformers can take up to four years to be available. To that is added a worrying increase. Since 2018, the prices of cables and transformers have doubled, making the expansion of infrastructure that support the system even more difficult and expensive. Is there a risk of blackout? The IEA has made it clear: “Entrepreneurship safety requires a rapid increase in networks.” A warning that resonates strongly on the Iberian Peninsula, which the report mentions as a case study after The April 2025 blackout. As for the blackout, and even without definitive official causes, everything indicates that it was not caused solely by the low inertia of the system, as initially suggested, but by a chain of chained technical failures. However, what this incident illustrates a structural problem: Investment in infrastructure and support technologies, such as MicroRedes either storage. Without a reinforced and prepared network to manage an increasingly complex electrical system, you can suffer interruptions. A bottleneck. There is even more, because a human capital challenge is added to investment problems. IEA has estimated that by 2030 there will be a deficit of 1.5 million workers qualified in electrical networks. This shortage affects key tasks such as the installation of transformers, digital systems or advanced control. In addition, planning and permits are slow processes. Networks require more than cables: they need intelligence, distributed control and resilience against failures. Are there solutions on the horizon? IEA has proposed Two clear lines: on the one hand, long -term network plans (minimum 10 years) such as those already applied India, Brazil or South Africa; And on the other, bet on digitalizationwhich already represents 25% of the global investment in electrical networks. The urgency of reinforcement. The final warning of the report does not leave interpretations: “Without action, the electrical networks will be the bottleneck of the energy transition” without a modern, robust and prepared network to manage variable clean energy, the green transition will not only be inefficient: it can become insecure. Renewable growth cannot be sustained on infrastructure of the twentieth century. So here a fairly clear question underlies: are we reinforcing our electrical networks with the same ambition with which we install renewables, or are we building on unstable terrain? Image | Miguel Á. Padriñán Xataka | In Elche a solar macroproject threatens a protected place. It is only the tip of the iceberg of a problem throughout Spain

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