A report has set off alarm bells in Europe. Russia’s shell production is meaningless for a single war

When Russia crossed the Ukrainian border in 2022, Europe reacted as it had not done since the end of the Cold War: massive sanctions, accelerated rearmament and a political unity forced by urgency. During these years, the European debate revolved around a seemingly simple question about kyiv’s resistance, as the conflict lengthened, became normalized, and ceased to be a “temporary” war. Now, with the front stagnant and the calendar moving forward, in the European capitals it is beginning to prevail another concern. What will Russia do when this war is no longer the center of the board? It’s not just the front. Yes, as the conflict in Ukraine approaches its fourth anniversary, it is beginning to take hold in Europe a different reading And more disturbing: Russia is not acting like a country trapped in a war of attrition, but rather like a power that uses the conflict as, perhaps, a preparatory phase. In the last few hours, a piece of information has appeared on the old continent: the massive increase in its military production suggests that Moscow is not only thinking about supporting the current front, but about setting up a later strategic scenarioin which having reserves, industrial capacity and room for maneuver will be as important as any territorial advance achieved in Ukraine. The figure that triggers the alarms. The data that most worries the European intelligence services is the Russian production of ammunition, which has exceeded the seven million projectiles annually, a figure 17 times higher to that of the first stages of the invasion. According to the Estonian intelligence service Välisluureamet, this jump is not explained by a simple intensification of combat, mainly because it makes no sense, but by the construction of new industrial plants and the will to rebuild strategic reserves in the long term. For Europe, the implicit message is clear: no one manufactures at that rate if they are only thinking about surviving the current conflict. Resist and prepare. This rearmament occurs despite the Russian economic deterioration, enormous human cost of the war and the increasing difficulties for recruit soldiersreinforcing the idea that the Kremlin prioritizes material accumulation over internal well-being. The support of North Korea, which has come to supply a substantial part of the ammunition used in Ukraine, has allowed Moscow to gain time and rebuild arsenals. For Estonia, maintaining these reserve levels is a central element of planning possible future conflictsnot simple insurance for the ongoing war. The north enters the radar. we have been counting in recent months. That fear of what comes next is not limited to the eastern flank. Now Norway has warned openly that a Russian move to protect its nuclear assets in the Arctic, concentrated on the Kola Peninsula, a short distance from its border, cannot be ruled out. This is not a classic ambition of conquest, but rather an aggressive defensive logic: ensuring the ability second nuclear attack in case of an escalation with NATO. The Ukrainian War has forced Nordic countries to plan for scenarios that a few years ago would have seemed unlikely. Tactical peace for strategy. The Guardian said this morning that, while increasing its military capacity, Russia deploys calculated diplomacy that seeks to buy time and divide the West. Estonian intelligence describes opening gestures toward the United States and negotiating rhetoric as a maneuver to reduce pressures, exploit cracks between Washington and Europe and consolidate positions without giving up the underlying objectives. In parallel, Moscow intensifies influence operations and hybrid warfareaware that the Ukrainian post-war can be as decisive as the war itself. The disturbing scene. In short, the combination of mass production of ammunition, possible nuclear planning, hybrid pressure and instrumental diplomacy seem to paint a panorama most uncomfortable for Europe: one where even when the weapons end fading in Ukraine, Russia will remain an actor ready to act. From that perspective, it is not only the end of a war that is worrying European capitals, but the beginning of a stage in which Moscow, industrially reinforced, could decide when and where to tighten the chess again. Hence, what comes after Ukraine is precisely what generates the most fear. Image | Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Vitaly V. Kuzmin In Xataka | The question is no longer whether Europe “is at war”: the question is whether it is willing to defend itself In Xataka | First it was Finland, now the US has confirmed it: when the war in Ukraine ends, Russia has a plan for Europe

The Canary Islands and Galicia have set off the Navy’s alarm bells. Russia’s ghost fleet has arrived in Spain with warships

Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and, above all, after the invasion large-scale ukrainian In 2022, Russia has been perfecting a form of confrontation that avoids direct clashes and moves in the shadows of international law: hybrid war. Sabotage, energy pressure, disinformation and opaque commercial fleets have become tools as strategic as tanks or missiles, and among them the called “ghost fleet”. Now everything indicates that they have found a new route: Spain. The “fleet” arrives from the south. At the end of January 2026, a Russian tanker sanctioned by the European Union was left adrift off the coast of Almería and was escorted by Spanish Maritime Rescue to a port in Morocco without being detained. He did it despite transporting more than 425,000 barrels of refined products of Russian origin. The episode, starring a ship integrated the ghost fleet (old ships, with frequent changes of name and flag and opaque structures of ownership) showed how Spain has become a key point of passage and incident management of a system designed to circumvent Western sanctions. Something happens. In the heart of the western Mediterranean, the Russian hybrid war was beginning to materialize not with missiles, but with timely breakdowns, gray areas of maritime law and routes connecting Russian ports with North Africa under the attentive, but limited, action of the European authorities. Morocco as a hinge, the Canary Islands as an entrance. A few days later, the arrival in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria of a oil tanker from Tangier set off alarms about a possible indirect entry of Russian fuel into Spain, using Morocco as an intermediate platform. Maritime security experts stressed that it was not an illegal operation in itself, but it was an unusual route which fits with the patterns of the ghost fleet, given that Morocco lacks sufficient refining capacity and has become a common destination for oil tankers linked to Russia. The Severomorsk Destroyer in 2023 The crux. The key, they insisted, is in the loading documentation, because the origin of the product remains Russian even if there are intermediate stops. In this context, the Canary Islands appear as a vulnerable link: a lightly guarded Exclusive Economic Zone, located in the transit axis of opaque oil tankers, which reinforces the idea that Spain offers the perfect combination of geography, infrastructure and control loopholes for this new phase of the Russian economic war. Silent pressure. Finally, and in parallel to these commercial and logistical movements, the most classic dimension of Russian naval power has ended up becoming visible in Spanish waters, forcing the Navy Spanish to intensify its surveillance operations. Within a week, Spanish units have followed the transit of several Russian vessels (including the destroyer Severomorsk and a mixed military-merchant convoy) from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Atlantic, with monitoring relays off the Galician coast and constant coordination with the command centers. Hybrid war. These missions, framed in the permanent surveillance of waters of national interest, show that the phenomenon is by no means isolated: while the ghost fleet operates on the economic and logistical level, the Russian naval presence reinforces the strategic pressure about key runners such as the Alboran Sea, Gibraltar and the Atlantic coast. Spain, the perfect route. The sum of these episodes draws a coherent pattern: the russia hybrid war has left the Baltic and the North Sea to settle in the Mediterranean and the eastern Atlantic, and Spain has become one of your most effective routes. It seems clear that all those breakdowns managed without detention, indirect discharges via Morocco, fuels of dubious traceability entering through the Canary Islands and Russian military ships crossing runners strategic are part of the same logic of attrition, ambiguity and saturation that we had already seen in other parts of Europe. And as in those cases, it is not a frontal attack, but rather a constant pressure that exploits the gray areas of trade, energy and maritime security, now placing Spain at the center of a board where war is not declared, it is navigated. Image | US Navy, Mil.ru In Xataka | Russia’s ghost fleet has changed its business model. Oil has given way to a much bigger target: Europe In Xataka | For years Europe has wondered how to stop the Russian ghost fleet. Ukraine just showed you the way: with AI

A group of Spanish pilots wait in front of Russia for an alarm that will sound 500 times in 2025. They only have 15 minutes to launch their fighters

A few minutes from Russian airspace, a handful of Spanish pilots live in the most tense routine that exists in peacetime: be ready to take off at any moment from an icy base from the Balticone where the sky is watched as if each blip on the radar could be the start of something bigger. Fifteen minutes. At Šiauliai, a Lithuanian air base that functions as first line of surveillance over the Baltic, the routine can be broken at any second with a siren and a countdown. When the alert goes off (in 2025 alone it did so up to 500 times), the Spanish pilots of the 15th Wing They put on their equipment, get into the vans and run towards the hangars with a single objective: to be in the air in less than fifteen minutes. It is a millimetric mechanic, repeated so many times in training that becomes automaticbecause the mission does not wait for anyone and because in that area an unidentified plane, without a transponder or without communication, can be the beginning of a serious incident. The shadow of an enemy. The function of these quick exits, called “scrambles”is to intercept and escort suspicious aircraft until they leave Allied space or their intentions become clear, and in the Baltic they are almost an everyday language. The route is especially sensitive because it connects Russia with the militarized enclave of Kaliningradand there intersect fighters, surveillance planes and traffic that sometimes fly without a flight plan or without the expected signals. The result is constant tension: some days there are several outings and other weeks everything seems calm, but the feeling is always the same, that the next warning can come when you are resting or half asleep. 15th Wing Fighter Mission since 2004. NATO started this baltic air police in 2004 to protect the space of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and since then the countries have taken turns in rotation four months so that the umbrella is permanent. Over time, the deployment was expanded to other bases in the region, first after the first Russian invasion of Ukraine and later with further expansion, because the Eastern Front ceased to be a theoretical concept. In recent months, furthermore, the incursions became more disturbing due to a new detail: not only manned aircraft appeared, but also drones that crossed borders and forced us to react quickly. Spain and the fighters. The Spanish contingent arrived in December with more than 200 troops and eleven EF-18Ma modernized version of the Hornet that Spain operates and maintains ready to fly day or night. The planes are armed with air-to-air missiles and the pilots train with night vision goggles, because surveillance does not stop when the sun goes down. Behind each exit there is a system that monitors the sky relentlessly, control centers that detect traces on the radar and a decision chain that, when activated, turns the entire base into a fast, silent and perfectly rehearsed choreography. Drones change the script. The big twist is that now the problem is not only the classic military plane that approaches without identifying itself, but the emergence of cheap dronesslow, low and erratic, more difficult to classify and more complicated to stop with means designed for another era. It we have counted. In September last year, a wave of Russian drones penetrated Polish airspace during an attack on Ukraine, and then there were similar episodess that forced the activation of fighter jets in countries like Romania. In parallel, small unidentified drones began to be seen near airports, bases and sensitive facilities throughout Europe, fueling the feeling of vulnerability and suspect that someone is measuring response times and blind spots. Crow, the anti-drone. For this reason, in this deployment the 15th Wing arrived with a historical novelty for them: the Indra Crow systeman anti-drone defense that adds a different layer of protection to the base and its surroundings. Crow combines radars, cameras and sensors to detect small aircraft and, once located, attempts to take them down using signal jamming, that is, electronic warfare from fixed or mobile positions. Its range not only protects planes and runways, it also covers the nearby city, because the real goal is to shield critical infrastructure and reduce the risk of a cheap drone causing disproportionate damage. The cost dilemma. Behind this adaptation is a problem that NATO is being forced to solve at full speed: intercepting cheap drones with weapons designed to shoot down fighters is an unsustainable equation. Firing expensive missiles from a fighter jet to take down a small aircraft may work, but it turns every defense in a waste and opens the door to volume saturation. That is why procedures and tactics are being reviewed, looking for cheaper and more specific systems, and assuming that the fighter will no longer always be the best tool to put out the fire. The strategic signal. The arrival of fighters with anti-drone protection It reflects a Europe that begins to fortify the sky as if war were already knocking at the door, although it has not yet fully crossed. In the Baltic, each rotation is a political and military message: there is presence, there is a response and there is an intention to fill gaps that did not exist before. Thus, what was previously an almost routine escort and identification mission is becoming a comprehensive defense exercise against hybrid threatswhere the enemy can be a large plane, a tiny drone or a provocation designed solely to check if, when the alarm sounds, there is really someone capable of taking off in those fifteen minutes. Image | Pexels, Pavel Vanka In Xataka | There are “invisible” Russian submarines happily sailing through the Baltic and that has led Europe to unprecedented measures In Xataka | A Russian submarine has appeared off the coast of France. And Europe’s reaction has been surprising: have a laugh

The alarm signal comes for its accessibility

Félix Juárez, director of the National Institute of Cybersecurity (INCIBE), has described the Model of the Chinese Depseek as “a weapon of mass destruction” during his speech at the Tel Aviv Cybertech forum, according to The world. His statement occurs in a context of increasing concern for open source IASs that eliminate technical and economic barriers for malicious actors. Why is it important. Deepseek It represents a turning point in the democratization of advanced tools of AI. At zero cost, it offers similar to commercial models such as GPT-4but without the ethical restrictions implemented by Western companies. Its accessibility allows anyone, regardless of their resources, to train systems to generate sophisticated malware campaigns, create convincing misinformation or develop applications to destabilize critical infrastructure. The context. China has accelerated its investment in open source AI as a strategy to counteract US advantage in the sector. Deepseek, founded in 2021 by former Baidu and Google employees, represents one of the greatest successes of this policy. Unlike OpenAi or Anthropic, which operate under Western regulatory frameworks, Chinese companies work with state supervision … but without international scrutiny on privacy and security issues. Between the lines. Juarez’s statements not only reflect technical concern but also geopolitical. That a high Spanish position publicly qualifies “a weapon of mass destruction” a Chinese technology in an Israeli forum is a sample of a certain alignment with the US position in the technological war against China. It is striking that these warnings are carried out in Israel, a country with close links with the Western cybersecurity and defense industry. The answer. Juarez proposes to transform this threat into opportunity, through …: International cooperation between public and private sector. Investment in Supercomputing and Data Centers. Accelerated training of cybersecurity specialists. Impulse on initiatives such as NATO Diana Program. Deepen. The true threat is not only Deepseek as isolated technology, but what it represents: the beginning of an era where anyone with a computer and the Internet can access tools that previously required millionaire investments and specialized equipment. We are facing a democratization of capacities that, as Juarez warns, could unleash “a wave of new threats” during the next year, turning cybersecurity into the first line of defense of digital sovereignty. In Xataka | 017 has been attending cybersecurity for five years. The question is who calls and for what Outstanding image | Solen Feyissa in Unspash

Log In

Forgot password?

Forgot password?

Enter your account data and we will send you a link to reset your password.

Your password reset link appears to be invalid or expired.

Log in

Privacy Policy

Add to Collection

No Collections

Here you'll find all collections you've created before.