war

that the war in Ukraine has reached the Mediterranean

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For months, the so-called “tanker war” between Ukraine and Russia had remained contained in a relatively limited space: the Black Sea and its immediate accesses. There, attacks with naval and aerial drones against ships linked to Moscow had become a logical extension of the conflict, an indirect but effective way to hit Russian energy revenues without directly confronting its war fleet. Until now. An invisible line. Everything has taken a 180 degree turn with the attack against the oil tanker Qendil in the Mediterranean, which represents an unprecedented qualitative leap. Not only because of the distance (more than 2,000 kilometers from Ukrainian territory), but because it shows that kyiv is willing to carry out this campaign much further of the traditional theater of operations, calling into question the idea that European sea routes were safe from war. The fleet in the shadows. He Qendilan Oman-flagged crude oil tanker built in 2006, was not chosen at random. Before heading to India it had departed from the Russian port of Novorossiysk, one of the key outlets for Russian oil to the global market. Both the European Union and the United Kingdom consider it part of the called “shadow fleet”the network of ships that Russia uses to avoid sanctions through flag changes, opaque ownership structures and routes designed to dilute legal responsibilities. For Ukraine, these ships are not simple commercial assets, but a direct extension of the Russian war efforta source of income that fuels the war. Hence, the Security Service of Ukraine has defended the attack as a legitimate objective under the law of armed conflict. A surgical operation. According to SBU sourcesthe attack was an “unprecedented special operation”, carried out by its Alpha Special Group using bomber-type aerial drones. The broadcast images They show munitions falling onto the ship’s deck from a hexacopter, pointing to a short-range attack launched from a nearby platform, probably a ship. Tracking data indicate that the tanker was sailing between Malta and Crete when it made a sharp turn and changed course towards Port Said, Egypt, a move that reinforces the idea that something abnormal happened at that point in the journey. Although the ship was empty at the time of the attack (reducing the environmental risk), the SBU holds which suffered critical damage that leaves it unusable for its original function. The message. Beyond the physical damage, the blow has enormous symbolic and strategic value. It comes on the same day that Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that it would cut off Ukraine’s access to the sea in retaliation for the attacks on the shadow fleet. kyiv’s response seems clear: if Russia can finance its war by exporting oil along increasingly distant routes, those routes too can become a battlefield. The SBU statement That Ukraine “will strike the enemy anywhere in the world” is not just rhetoric, it is a signal to shipowners, insurers and governments that the conflict is no longer limited to a specific sea. Echoes of other wars. This type of attack is reminiscent of the covert war that for years Iran and Israel have fought against merchant ships in the Middle East, a campaign of targeted sabotage designed to send political messages without escalating into open conflict. Everything indicates that Ukraine has studied that model and it is adapting it to its own war, using relatively cheap drones to impose disproportionate costs on the adversary. The possibility of using drones in the future of greater scopeeven with satellite links like Starlink, suggests that the radius of action could be expanded even further. Maritime consequences. He attack on Qendil introduces a new factor of uncertainty in the Mediterranean. Although the target was directly linked to Russia, the simple fact that armed drones can operate against merchant ships in such busy waters forces the maritime sector to rethink security measures, routes and insurance. For Moscow, the message is disturbing: its floats in the shadowestimated at more than a thousand ships and essential to sustain its crude oil exports, is no longer protected by geographical distance. For Europe, it is an uncomfortable reminder that a war that began on land and in the Black Sea is beginning to cast its shadow over one of the planet’s main trade corridors. A conflict that expands. Plus: the attack against the Qendil is not just a tactical action, but an implicit statement that the maritime war is entering a new phase. Ukraine demonstrates that it can bring economic and military pressure to spaces that until now They were considered peripheralwhile Russia threatens to respond without making clear how. Between them, the Mediterranean appears suddenly as a potential scenario of a confrontation that no one has formally declared, but that is already beginning to be felt in commercial navigation. As so many other times After this war, the border between the military and the civil becomes more blurred, and the feeling that there are no completely safe areas begins to extend far beyond the front. Image | x In Xataka | Baba Yaga is a Slavic mythological witch who devours skulls at night. And Ukraine has decided to make it a reality In Xataka | Ukraine has asked Russia if it is going to stop the war for Christmas. Russia has responded bluntly

Ukraine has asked Russia if they stop for Christmas like in the First World War. The answer could not have been more Russian

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The inevitable reference when talking about a Christmas break in the middle of a conflict is the spontaneous truce December 1914in the first months of the First World War. On several sectors of the Western Front, British and German soldiers left the trenches, exchanged cigarettes, sang Christmas carols and even played football in no man’s land. Ukraine has remembered it, but it is going to be complicated. The first time. On that occasion of the First World War, the truce was not ordered by the commanders nor was it part of a political negotiation: came from belowof human exhaustion in the face of a war that had not yet shown all its industrial brutality. Precisely for this reason it was never repeated. The high command considered it dangerous, subversive and incompatible with a modern total war. Since then, Christmas has been used many times as a rhetorical symbol of peace, but almost never as an actual interruption of fighting. The Ukrainian proposal. In this historical context full of symbolism, Ukraine has raised the possibility of a ceasefire during Christmas, an idea carefully formulated so as not to appear as a disguised surrender. Zelensky has spoken of a specific pauseespecially linked to attacks against energy infrastructure, at a critical time of winter and with the civilian population as the main collateral victim. At the same time, kyiv is preparing a new package of peace proposals backed by European partners and channeled through the United States, with the expectation that Washington will offer top-level security guarantees if Moscow rejects the plan. Zelensky, however, has shown caution and has lowered any expectations of a quick deal, publicly assuming that Russia may choose to continue the war and that, in that case, Ukraine will ask for more sanctions and more weapons. Officers and men of the 26th Division Ammunition Train playing football at Salonica, Greece, on Christmas Day 1915 The Russian response. The Kremlin’s reaction to the “Christmas break” has been immediate and bluntalmost ritual in its formulation. Dmitri Peskov has discarded any temporary ceasefire, including a Christmas truce, with an argument that Moscow has been repeating for months: a pause would only serve for Ukraine to regroup, rearm and prolong the conflict. In official Russian language, the word “truce” is presented like a trapwhile the word “peace” is reserved for a scenario in which Russia has achieved all your strategic objectives. According to Peskov, Moscow is not ready to replace a comprehensive negotiation (in their own terms) for “momentary and non-viable” solutions. The logic is clear and brutal: either the Russian framework of political and territorial victory is accepted, or the war continues without sentimental interruptions. Territory, guarantees and red lines. Behind the exchange of statements lies the real core of the conflict. Russia demands that Ukraine rspread to wide areas of its territory, accept permanent limits on its armed forces and rule out any future accession to NATO. Ukraine, for its part, rejects hand over the Donbaseven under ambiguous formulas such as a supposed demilitarized “free economic zone,” and remembers that it was already betrayed once when it renounced its nuclear arsenal in 1994 in exchange for security guarantees that did not prevent the invasion. Polls show that a clear majority of Ukrainian society opposes withdrawing from the east and is willing to continue fighting, a domestic factor that greatly limits Zelensky’s political margin even as international pressure increases. Christmas without miracles. The proposal for a Christmas break actually exposes the abysmal distance between the war that we evoke in historical memory and the war that is being fought today. In 1914an improvised truce was possible because the soldiers still saw each other as human beings confronted by accident. In 2025, the war in Ukraine is a conflict of objectives strategic, existential red lines and cold calculation of power, where each day of pause is measured in kilometers of front, ammunition reserves and operational advantages. The Russian response dry and distrustfulis not only “very Russian”: it is confirmation that, in this war, Christmas has no capacity to suspend the logic of the conflict. Unlike more than a century agothere is no room for carols between the trenches, only for official statements that remind that, for Moscow, peace does not begin with a truce, but with the political defeat of the adversary. Image | RawPixel, WikiCommons, Ariel Varges In Xataka | 24 hours later, satellite images leave no doubt: a Ukrainian underwater drone has changed the future of wars In Xataka | Drums of peace sound in Ukraine. And that should be a good thing for Europe… unless Finland is right

The United States has turned Trinidad and Tobago into the war container it was missing. Venezuela has responded like Russia: an invisible fleet

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The conflict between the United States and Venezuela has entered a phase in which the silent accumulation media outweighs official statements. If you will, the Caribbean once again functions as a strategic belt from which Washington projects pressure without the need to declare an open war. Under the formal argument of the fight against drug trafficking, the White House has been weaving a support network logistics, radars, airstrips, ports and resupply spaces in an arc at a time bigger of “allies”. The Venezuela’s response We already saw it in Russia. The map of countries. That “arc” of allies Washington runs from the Dominican Republic to Trinidad and Tobago, passing through Aruba, Curaçao, Bonaire, Grenada, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The deployment includes destroyers, nuclear submarines, amphibious ships, aircraft carriers, state-of-the-art fighters, drones and thousands of troops, not enough for a land invasion, but enough to control air and maritime space, monitor critical routes and sustain missile attacks if it is decided to escalate. It is a prepositioning strategy classic: being everywhere without publicly assuming that something else is in the works. Trinidad and Tobago, the most sensitive link. Within that architecture, Trinidad and Tobago emerges as the most delicate piece of the board. Its extreme proximity to the Venezuelan coast turns any gesture into a political and military message. The new government has authorized the use of its airports by US military aircraft, has received warships and marine units, has allowed joint exercises and has accepted the installation of an AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR radar capable of detecting aircraft, drones and missiles. Everything is presented as logistical and defensive cooperationbut it fits almost literally with the US National Security Strategy of 2025, which calls for a toughened version of the Monroe Doctrine to reaffirm the preeminence of the United States in the Western Hemisphere and prevent external actors from controlling strategic assets. Trinidad and Tobago insist in that it will not be a platform for offensive attacks except direct aggression, but its role as node of surveillance, resupply and intelligence places it at the center of any scenario of sustained pressure on Caracas. A blockage that is not. The announced threat by Trump of a “total and complete” interdiction of sanctioned oil tankers entering or leaving Venezuela fits into that model of gradual pressure. It is not about closing ports with a formal declaration of war, but about taking advantage of naval and air superiority, supported by friendly infrastructure, to intercept, seize or deter the ships that support the main source of income for the Nicolás Maduro regime. The recent seizure of an oil tanker loaded with nearly two million barrels and the warning that further action could follow shows the extent to which Washington is willing to take pressure beyond the symbolic, taking the risk of controlled incidents in international waters. The Venezuelan response. Faced with this siege, Caracas has reacted by raising the profile of its challenge. The order to escort ships that transport oil products and derivatives to Asia is a calculated move: it seeks to demonstrate that the Venezuelan State does not renounce its right to free navigation and that it is willing to involve to his Navy to keep exports open. It is also a response that increases the risk of confrontationbut that sends an internal and external message of resistance. Oil continues to be the financial pillar of the regime, and losing it would be equivalent to accepting total economic asphyxiation. The ghost fleets. Beyond the visible escort, the true backbone of the Venezuelan strategy is the ghost fleeta tactic practically copied from the used by Russia after Western sanctions. Old oil tankers, many with more than twenty or thirty years of service, change name and flagsteal the identities of already dismantled ships, sail under flags of convenience, turn off or manipulate their identification systems and carry out crude oil transfers on the high seas to hide the origin of the cargo. The result is an opaque trade that allows you to sell oil with large discounts to buyers willing to take risks, while the traceability required by sanctions is diluted. It is not a marginal phenomenon: a significant part of the world’s oil tanker fleet already operates in this gray ecosystem, transporting Venezuelan, Russian or Iranian crude. Sanctions that do not suffocate, they deform. The BBC reported that the data show that, although far from the historical levels of the end of the 20th century, Venezuelan exports have recovered notably compared to the collapse of 2019. This indicates that the sanctions have not paralyzed the flow, but rather have displaced it towards more opaque and risky circuits. As in the Russian caseeconomic punishment does not eliminate trade, it makes it more expensive, makes it less transparent and reinforces dependence on informal networks and actors willing to move illegally. The Caribbean as a conflict. With US aircraft carriers patrolling the Caribbean, radars deployed in islands near Venezuela and escorted or invisible tankers sailing to Asiathe conflict is located in a dangerous intermediate zone between economic pressure and military confrontation. The United States bets on the ccontrol of space and logistics regional via of discreet allieswhile Venezuela responds with the same manual that has allowed other sanctioned countries to survive: ghost fleets, aggressive discounts and specific shows of force. The Caribbean, for decades associated with tourism and trade, is thus once again a scene of high geopolitical tension where each radar installed and each oil tanker intercepted brings the risk of a clash that no one admits they want, but for which both sides seem to prepare, a little closer. Image: US Navy In Xataka | The situation between the US and Venezuela only needs one incident to escalate into something more: that incident is already here In Xataka | In full tension with the US, Venezuela has presented its drone simulator: it is equal to a three-euro Steam game

that China loses the AI ​​race, but wins the economic war by bleeding them dry

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The AI ​​race has two main players, but their bets are very different. While the United States has already spent $350 billion in AI (and plan to spend much more), China has only invested 100,000 million. Silicon Valley optimists start from the belief that AI will radically change the world and whoever masters AI will dominate the future. And if not? As they say in financial times, The United States could win this battle, but lose the economic war. USA. You have put all your eggs in the same basket. Exorbitant investments are guided by the belief that AI will change the world as we know it, that AGI will make humans finally stop working. It is an epic speech in which AI is presented to us as a kind of messiah that will save the world, one that completely ignores the alternative: that AI is a great technological leap, yes, but neither so revolutionary nor, above all, such a great business. And it’s not just a technology thing, investors are absorbed in the same obsession. China. In 2017, China announced the “Development Plan for a New Generation of Artificial Intelligence” in which they defined AI as a strategic technology. For China, AI is a national priority, but its approach is more pragmatic and much less speculative. You just have to look at their AI models, like DeepSeek, effective but very far from the very expensive ‘frontier models’ in which the US is investing. His vision for AI is not so much to transform the world, but rather to function as a tool to be even more efficient in different processes. a few months ago They announced the “AI+” planwhere they detailed the deployment of AI in six sectors: scientific and technological development, industrial applications, consumer services, public welfare, governance and security, and international collaborations. The AI ​​war. We always hear the idea of ​​this stark battle to dominate AI from the American side. In many cases, the AI ​​war, like AGI, is another point of pressure for Silicon Valley to justify the tremendous expense or achieve its objectives. We have seen it recently with Jensen Huang pushing for the government to let him sell his chips in China and his argument revolved around the idea that China will achieve technological independence and then win the AI ​​war. The paradox for the United States is that its own invention is benefiting its enemy. The AI ​​war also functions as a pressure point for China: forcing the US to mortgage its economy to the technology they consider the future, while they overtake them in everything else. The economic war. The United States is betting everything on a single winning horse, while China has not stopped investing to ensure its dominance in other key sectors, such as electric cars, batteries, robotics and, above all, renewable energy. For China there are many futures, for the US only one. The commitment to diversification is going well. In 2024 China already manufactured 76% of electric cars sold worldwide and 80% of all lithium batteries. They are also the country with more industrial robot installationswhich gives them an advantage to continue being the factory of the world. There is much more, they are also undisputed leaders in other sectors such as the manufacture of drones, solar panels, high-speed trains and graphene. China’s AI is energy. China carries years investing in clean energy. According to Carbon Brief reportIn 2024 alone, China invested $940 billion, and it is not the year it spent the most. The curious thing is that energy is key for many sectors, especially AI. The United States knows this well and has already encountered a wall: They don’t have power for so many chips. Not only is China producing more energy, it is also is subsidizing it. Jensen Huang warned about this situation, ensuring that “China is going to win the AI ​​race” thanks to the government’s energy aid. Trump, for his part, has discouraged renewable energies and the electric car industry. In the end it will turn out that, for the United States, it is AI to win or nothing to win. Image | Gemini In Xataka | China already has an army of 5.8 million engineers. His new plan involves accelerating doctorates

The drone war in Ukraine is advancing at the speed of light: what was useful two weeks ago is a death trap today

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Since the first months of the Russian invasion, Ukraine has converted the use of drones in one of the central pillars of its defense, and has done so to the point of transforming a conventional conflict into a permanent laboratory unmanned combat. In this environment of constant adaptation, drones have not only redefined the way we fight on the front, but have imposed an unprecedented pace of technological change that forces armies, industries and training centers to update almost in real time to avoid becoming obsolete. Classrooms at war. The Ukrainian drone schools have become one of the most extreme laboratories of military learning in the world, forced to rewrite their training programs at a dizzying pace that in some cases reaches the two weeks. In a conflict where drones have become the main instrument of attack, reconnaissance and attrition, the distance between an obsolete lesson and a lethal decision can be measured in days. For these centers, adapting is not an academic question, but rather a direct line between survival and death on the front, in an environment where technology, countermeasures and tactics change constantly and rapidly. In Xataka We had seen everything in Ukraine, but this is new: drones are disguising themselves as Russian soldiers, and it is working Synergy. To stay relevant, instructors are not limited to manuals or simulators. They regularly visit the battle lines, maintain permanent contact with alumni deployed and testing new technologies before incorporating them into their courses. In schools like Dronarium, with offices in kyiv and Lviv, its R&D manager, the veteran known as “Ruda”, explains that technological evolution on the front is so rapid that it requires almost immediate adaptability. There is no two equal classes: Each lesson incorporates small adjustments resulting from what happened days before in real combat. More than 16,000 students have passed through this center, and their experiences are directly integrated into the curriculum, turning training into a living system that feeds back on the war. Two-way learning. One of the pillars of this model is communication direct and permanent with the combatants. Messaging groups connect deployed instructors and operators, allowing soldiers to share new enemy tactics, technical problems or improvised solutions, while receiving advice in near real time from the rear. In centers like Karlsson, Karas & Associates or Kruk Drones, this relationship does not end at the end of the course: it is maintained throughout the operator’s operational life. The instruction is clear: nothing is taught that is not strictly necessary in combat, and what is no longer useful is unceremoniously discarded, no matter how recent it may be. A war that reinvents itself. The central weight of drones on the battlefield explains this urgency. The majority of frontline impacts and casualties already depend on unmanned systems, requiring continuous modification of both platforms and employment tactics. New models appear, others are neutralized by countermeasures, and the rules of the game are constantly rewritten. This speed has set off alarm bells in the West: military officials such as British Minister Luke Pollard warn that NATO forces run the risk of becoming obsolete, trapped in acquisition cycles that last years in the face of a war that repeats every two or three weeks. {“videoId”:”x8j6422″,”autoplay”:false,”title”:”Declassified video of the clash between Russian fighters and the American drone”, “tag”:”united states”, “duration”:”42″} The industry learns from Ukraine. The schools they are not alone in this race. Defense companies that observe the conflict have begun to copy this model of direct interaction with the front, shortening your cycles developmental. Manufacturers of anti-drone systems and UAV platforms visit the battlefield, chat with operators and fine-tune designs in a matter of weeks, not years. Some executives recognize that the ways in which Ukrainians use technology have surprised them, forcing them to rethink basic assumptions. At the same time, the soldiers themselves benefit from this exchange, providing constant feedback and receiving improvements, spare parts and solutions adapted to their real needs. In Genbeta According to psychology, those who grew up in the 1960s and 1970s developed mental strengths that are being lost today Schools under fire. There is no doubt, this permanent adaptation has a cost. Drone schools are not only competing against the technological clock, they are operating under the direct threat from Russian attacks and with limited financial resources, often depending on donations to continue functioning. In this context, their fight is not only to stay updated, but to survive. Even so, their role has become central in modern warfare: they are the link that connects innovation, industry and real combat, and the best example of how Ukraine has turned the urgency of conflict into a flexible and brutally efficient national military learning system. Image | Heute, RawPixel In Xataka | The new episode of terror in Ukraine does not involve missiles or drones: it involves leaving a city without cell phones In Xataka | Europe faces a question it can no longer avoid: how to respond to a war that is rarely declared (function() { window._JS_MODULES = window._JS_MODULES || {}; var headElement = document.getElementsByTagName(‘head’)(0); if (_JS_MODULES.instagram) { var instagramScript = document.createElement(‘script’); instagramScript.src=”https://platform.instagram.com/en_US/embeds.js”; instagramScript.async = true; instagramScript.defer = true; headElement.appendChild(instagramScript); – The news The drone war in Ukraine is advancing at the speed of light: what was useful two weeks ago is a death trap today was originally published in Xataka by Miguel Jorge .

that of World War II

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The political tension that China and Japan live has added a new chapter: the recent confrontation between boats of both nations near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands shows the extent to which the balance in East Asia has entered a phase of constant friction. China has issued a hitherto unpublished “diplomatic letter”: that of the Second World War. Sea climbing. The incident, presented in an opposite way by the coast guards of both countries, it is not an isolated episodebut the visible expression of a historical dispute that has been intensified by broader strategic factors: the Chinese military rise, growing Japanese unrest over the Taiwan security and the systemic pressure that China exerts in the region. In a space of just a handful of uninhabited islets, a decade of increased Chinese patrolling, an increase in the Japanese presence and a climate of suspicion fueled now by the more explicit tone of the new leadership in Tokyo is condensed. The chinese reactionwhich insists that its presence in the area is a way of “asserting its rights,” is combined with an internal message of firmness in the face of a Japan that, from Beijing’s point of view, is crossing red lines. The Chinese diplomatic offensive. As we said at the beginning, Beijing has accompanied its maritime deployment with a diplomatic campaign that revives episodes of World War II as a tool of political pressure. China’s appeals to the United Kingdom, France and the United States to line up against Japan reveal a tactical change: transforming a territorial and strategic dispute into a narrative battle that positions Tokyo as an actor that “reverses history” and threatens regional stability. They remembered in the NYT that the references point to revive sensitivities that condemned Japanese expansionism eight decades ago, but are now used to try to discredit a Japan that has verbalized, unusual shapethat a Chinese attack on Taiwan could force it to act militarily. The chinese answer (tourist boycotts, cancellation of imports, public singling out of Japanese politicians) combines economic pressure with nationalist rhetorica pattern Beijing has used before, although rarely with this intensity. Not only that, the campaign also aims to stop any European rapprochement with Taiwan, especially following recent political gestures in Brussels and Berlin that Beijing perceives as a normalization of European support for the island. Senkaku Japan breaks silence. We explained it last week. The words by Sanae Takaichi on the possibility that a Chinese attack or blockade of Taiwan would pose a direct threat to Japanese survival have had an immediate effect: they have publicly revealed a doctrinal line that had been quietly consolidating for years. Japan always understood that its destiny was intertwined with the stability of the Taiwan Strait, yet the clarity with which the prime minister articulated this position marked a turning point. The chinese reaction (accusations of militarism, veiled threats, economic pressures and an increase in the activities of its coast guard) reflects Beijing’s fear that the relationship between Tokyo and Washington will crystallize into a political and military bloc willing to respond in a coordinated manner to a Chinese escalation. If you will also, anxiety worsens as the Taiwanese political cycle of 2028 approaches: if the Democratic Progressive Party chains another term, the possibility of a stronger Taiwanese identity and a sustained rejection of unification would ignite all the alarms in Beijing. Therefore, any sign that Japan will no longer remain in strategic ambiguity alters the Chinese calculus. Tension and risk. The sum of these events builds a scenario in which each movement seems to have multiple layers of meaning. The Chinese pressure on Taiwan It is no longer just military or economic, it is accompanied by disinformation campaigns, naval maneuvers and calculated use of internal nationalism. Plus: the Japanese response, by making explicit that Taiwan’s security is also own securityreturns Beijing to a deeper dilemma. Admit that its pressure can provoke exactly what it wants to avoid, that is, the consolidation of an international coalition willing to consider itself an interested party in the future of the island. Uncertainty. This phenomenon creates especially volatile terrain, because any action by China around Taiwan (a partial blockade, new trade restrictions, an increase in military exercises) could be interpreted by Tokyo and Washington as a prelude to aggravated coercion. The Chinese narrative, invoke historical wounds, increases the risk that domestic public opinion will limit the Chinese leadership’s ability to back down without appearing weak. Critical point. Ultimately, the combination of hostility at seadiplomatic pressure in Europe, demonstrations of strength around Taiwan and Japan’s decision to speak clearly constitutes a decisive moment for strategic balance of the Indo-Pacific. If Japan and the United States maintain their firm stance, China will have to weigh the cost of an escalation which could lead to a confrontation that is beyond their control. If, on the other hand, either of the two actors backs down, Beijing will interpret that the pressure is working and will possibly increase its pressure against the island, reinforcing the idea that international inaction opens space for a unilateral resolution of the conflict. Image | Al Jazeera English In Xataka | China had a tank more typical of science fiction. Now he has added a hypersonic missile in a video that attacks Japan In Xataka | China is sending drones to an island 100 km from Taiwan. The problem is that Japan and the US are filling it with missiles

The round of peace meetings in Ukraine has ended. Russia says it is “ready”, but for war with Europe

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The last two rounds of contacts between the Kremlin and Trump’s envoys have confirmed that the peace process for Ukraine is technically alive, but politically blocked. Putin took advantage of the arrival of the emissaries to launch a verbal offensive: Accused Europe of torpedoing peace, suggested the EU “is on the side of war,” and said Russia does not want a continental conflict but that if Europe starts one, “we are ready right now.” A trapped peace process. For Moscow, the talks are “very useful” as they allow it probe the limits Washington and explore what it is willing to sacrifice in exchange for a stable ceasefire. For the United States, they are an opportunity to zoom in positions without openly acknowledging that the original plan favored Russia too much and was unacceptable to kyiv. Five hours of meeting in Moscow served to review successive versions of the US document, but not to generate a “compromise option”: Russia accepts some elements, rejects others with a “critical and even negative attitude” and, above all, keeps intact its objective of translating its military advances in territorial gains formalized on paper. Moscow red lines. At the center of the disagreement is the territorial question. Moscow insists Ukraine must resign to 20% of Donetsk which he still preserves, while boasting (not without response from kyiv) of having taken Pokrovska key logistical hub that had been in operation for more than a year trying to capture with a great cost in lives and material. This insistence is not only cartographic: is part of a maximization logicin which victories at the front are used as an argument to tighten political conditions. Added to this are other structural requirements: deep cuts in the Ukrainian armed forces, severe limits on Western military aid and a fit of Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence that would empty its formal sovereignty of content. In this context, talking about “progress” is, in reality, talk about margins: Washington explores how far it can give in without kyiv perceiving it as a capitulation, while Russia calculates how far it can stretch its demands without completely breaking the diplomatic channel that is useful to buy time and legitimize its narrative. Parallel diplomacy and mixed signals. Witkoff and Kushner’s role adds a ambiguity layer to the process. They are not classic diplomats, but political emissaries who operate in a gray zone between official diplomacy and American domestic politics. His presence in Moscow, after meeting with Ukrainians in Florida and reviewing a 28 point plan which initially tilted the board towards Moscow, sends several signals at once: kyiv is shown that Washington “listens” to its objections and tweaks the document, Moscow is made clear that the White House is willing to continue negotiating concession frameworks, and Europe is reminded that the decisive conversation remains, above all, Washington-Moscow. The Trump statement Calling the war a “mess” that is difficult to resolve fits with that approach: rather than a closed strategy, the administration seems to seek an agreement that reduces the political and economic cost of the war for the United States, although the final balance is very delicate for Ukraine. Europe as a scapegoat. The Putin’s words on Europe reveal a perfectly calculated strategy: presenting European capitals as the real obstacle to peace, accusing them of “being on the side of the war” and of preventing Washington from closing an agreement. By saying that “Europe is preventing the US administration from achieving peace in Ukraine,” the Kremlin is trying several things at the same time: put pressure on the Europeans to lower their demands, feed the fatigue of war in Western societies and drive a wedge between the United States and its allies, suggesting that Washington would be more flexible if it were not bound by “European demands.” The added threat that Russia “does not intend to fight Europe, but is ready if Europe starts” has a double effect: it works as a military warning and, at the same time, as an internal message to reinforce the idea of ​​a besieged Russia that only defends itself. The risk of being isolated. For Ukraine, cross-play is especially dangerous. Zelenskiy insists on receiving security guarantees “livable” for the future, that is, mechanisms that prevent a new Russian attack once an agreement has been signed. HE frontally opposes to any formula that forces him to give up territory that he currently controls or to reduce his army to levels that leave him defenseless. But, at the same time, it knows that a part of the European capitals and the American political class are seeking, with increasing urgency, an outcome that freezes the war and stabilizes the front, even if that enshrines a status quo very unfavorable for Ukraine. Its margin consists of supporting in the European bloc tougher (those countries that see a bad agreement as a disastrous precedent for continental security) and to remember that any credible reconstruction involves using frozen russian assets and for a framework of Western guarantees that makes another Kremlin attack politically unaffordable. Putin’s calculation of strength. The threats “cutting off Ukraine from the sea completely” and intensifying attacks on ports and ships entering them fit into a broader strategy: combine slow but steady advances in the Donbas with the ability to strangle the Ukrainian economy and make the protection of its maritime corridors more expensive. Each city taken or partially controlled serves the Kremlin as proof that time is in its favor and that it can rise the price of peace at each plan review. Editorials from related media, as Komsomolskaya Pravdareinforce this idea by presenting the negotiations as a scenario in which Russia can afford to tighten its conditions as “more and more Ukrainian territory” passes into its hands. The implicit message is clear: if the current proposals already seem harsh, the next round could be worse for kyiv if the war continues. Uncertainty. The final result is a peace process that formally remains open, but that moves on a dangerous … Read more

A new turn to end the war in Ukraine has left the final outcome in the hands of a decisive point: 900 km

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The latest diplomatic movement between the United States and Ukraine has crystallized into a peace draft reduced to 19 points which, according to both delegations, constitutes real progress with respect to the controversial document initial 28 points. That first draft, written largely with Russian participationcrossed multiple Ukrainian red lines and set off alarms throughout Europe. As things stand, the final decision is a little more 900 km. The new twist. In Geneva, after hours of tense negotiations that were on the verge of collapse, the team led by Andriy Yermak managed soften or reformulate most of the most problematic aspects. The new text, described as a “solid” body of convergence, integrates security guarantees, economic commitments and infrastructure protection in a framework that is no longer perceived like an ultimatumalthough it is far from resolving the most explosive core: the territorial question. That point (the possibility of giving up portions of the east) was explicitly “placed in brackets” for Presidents Trump and Zelensky to decide, a gesture that recognizes both the political gravity of the issue and the legal impossibility of resolving it without a national referendum in Ukraine. The revision of the draft also eliminates elements such as the limitation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to 600,000 troops or a total amnesty for war crimes, but deliberately preserves the biggest obstacle. Thus, although the White House describes the process as “optimistic,” the heart of the agreement is suspended in an uncomfortable balance: moving forward without defining the most decisive point. The air battle. In parallel to the negotiations, a strategic reflection runs through the debate: no agreement will survive if Ukraine lacks of air guarantees real. Moscow has shown that your fastest and most effective way to break a ceasefire is violate airspace with missiles, drones, bombers or fighters. Ukrainian cities have been subjected to long-range attacks and coercion from the sky for three years, and the country has only avoided total collapse thanks to a makeshift patchwork of Western anti-aircraft defenses. They remembered the analysts at Forbes that any sustainable peace requires three pillars: an integrated defense network that connects radars, Patriot batteries, NASAMS, IRIS-T and aviation in a common operational framework, a modernized, numerous Ukrainian air force capable of maintaining continuous patrols with F-16, Rafale or Gripen equipped with AESA radars, long-range missiles and advanced electronic warfare, and a visible presence of allies operating from or within Ukraine, similar to the Baltic Air Policingto deter violations and react unambiguously to any incursion. Clarity. Furthermore, it was pointed out that the rules of engagement should be explicit: immediate interception of unauthorized aircraft, shooting down any vector that poses a threat and automatic retaliation against launch points if Moscow fires missiles after an agreement. Without this aerial architecture, a peace signed on paper would become a fragile parenthesis, exposed to a Russia that historically explores every void and tests every border. The stability of the future agreement depends both on the diplomatic text and the firepower that supports its lines. The point that no one wants to write. What happened in Geneva shows that diplomacy is advancing, but also that it is doing so with a limp. counted the financial times that the meeting began almost broken: the Americans, upset by previous leaks, arrived tense, and the Ukrainians, distrustful of the pro-Russian bias of the original draft. It took a long conversation. almost therapeuticbetween Yermak and the American delegation to reduce tension. Afterwards, both sides revised the draft point by point, eliminated the troop cap, rewrote the amnesty and adjusted key definitions. The Europeans (United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and the EU) joined later to coordinate priorities and synchronize postures. Subsequent statements reflect a “constructive atmosphere,” with Washington under self-inflicted pressure to present the document to Russia as soon as possible. Be that as it may, no technical correction can resolve the essential absence: the impossibility of deciding in that room about the territory. According to the Ukrainian negotiators, they did not have a mandate to give up a single kilometer, and the Constitution requires consultation to the population. Kyslytsya himself admitted that what is pending requires “leadership decisions,” a diplomatic euphemism to admit that what is unacceptable for Ukraine has been postponed, not eliminated. The 900 km as a judge. The peace draft can have changedbut the reality on the front changes even faster. As diplomats wrote, erased and rewrote sentences in Geneva, Russia intensified its offensive in multiple sectors: advances north of Huliaipole, increasing pressure towards Siversk and a siege that could be sealed in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. The front line, about 900 kilometershas become the silent arbiter of the negotiation: the more Ukraine retreats, the more strength Russia believes it has to demand concessions, and the more it resists, the more room Kyiv has to reject any territorial concession. The American and Russian proposal filtered It started from that premise: asking Ukraine to hand over areas that it still controls before it loses them. Zelensky, however, has reiterated that Ukraine will “defend its home” and that accepting territorial amputations would undermine not only its political legitimacy, but the very possibility of lasting peace. Time trial. The problem is that time on the front is against Kyiv. Russian advances, although extremely costly in men and material, are creating pockets of vulnerability and forcing to retreat reserves to cover cracks. And what is at stake in those 900 kilometers It’s not just terrain: is Ukraine’s ability to come to the table with a negotiating position that does not amount to staged surrender. Every kilometer lost on the map alters the draft in Geneva more than any paragraph. Between paper and the battlefield. What emerges from these three fronts (diplomacy, the sky and the line of contact) is a more or less clear picture: the peace agreement is closer in form, but not in depth. He 19 point text It represents an indisputable technical advance, but it depends on enormously costly presidential decisions. Air guarantees are the indispensable condition … Read more

nuclear and the next war

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The recent history of the Chinese Communist Party has entered in a phase in which internal discipline, political surveillance and a certain systematic distrust are already a structural part of the system, and in which Xi Jinping has been erected in absolute protagonist not only by institutional accumulation of titles, but by incessant use of the most feared mechanism in Chinese politics: the purge. The rise of fear. Over the last long decade, coinciding with his rule, China has experienced a continuous cycle of beheadings political and military that not only have not slowed down, but have acquired a new character. What initially seemed like a mechanism of consolidation against rivals and chiefs inherited from the past has transformed into a permanent processunpredictable and increasingly deep, capable of engulfing elite figures previously considered immovable. The visible absence of dozens of senior officials at the last plenary session of the Central Committee (deliberately leaked by official cameras by showing entire rows empty) graphically condensed This new normal: Xi rules through fear, and no one, not even his own protégés, can take his position for granted. The purge as an instrument. The current cycle of purges began since Xi came to power in 2012, but has reached an unprecedented scale as of 2023. Its scope covers almost all levels of the Party and, especially, the armed forces. Of the 376 members and alternates of the Central Committee elected in 2022, about 16% was absent from the 2024 plenary session, a proportion incompatible with chance or illness. many of them They occupied key positionsincluding generals who commanded units responsible for preparing an invasion of Taiwan or managing internal troop loyalty. A mechanism that does not stop. In parallel, corruption investigations have reached neuralgic points of the military apparatus: the second officer in command of the People’s Liberation Army fell for alleged crimes of illicit enrichment and for promoting alternative loyalty networks, and others were expelled for their role in appointments that they didn’t like to the leading nucleus. Even the Minister of Defense himself and his predecessor disappeared from the scene after brief periods in office. Each outing has been accompanied by an official silence which, far from weakening Xi’s image of power, reinforces it. His message is unequivocal: no position has intrinsic value, no career offers protection, no past loyalty guarantees indulgence. Loyalty as a criterion. The official narrative presents these purges as a crusade against endemic corruption which would have weakened Chinese war preparation and reduced the effectiveness of weapons systems. It is true that there are indications real cases of irregularities: serious errors in the construction of missile silos, bribery in promotions, diversion of funds and internal patronage networks that affected the rocket forcethe most critical body of the nuclear arsenal. But even when these deviations exist, The New York Times said that Xi’s logic goes beyond exemplary punishment. For him, corruption is both a problem operational as ideological. He perceives it as a fissure through which Western values, professionalizing tendencies that separate the army from the Party or autonomous power networks can leak. obedience His obsession with the Soviet precedent (the idea that the USSR fell because the Party lost control of the Army) fuels a permanent surveillance approach. Each purged officer is presented as a reminder that loyalty, understood as total obedience to Xi’s personal leadership, is the only guarantee of political survival. Hence, after more than a decade in power, when theoretically there should no longer be organized resistance in the Army, the purges not only continue, but that increase. The earthquake in Rocket Force. The most profound shock has been that affecting China’s nuclear arm. Since 2023, the Rocket Force has lost a large part of its leadership, which has caused confusion among analysts who considered this force the best protected strategic core in the country. The corruption investigation in the construction of silos and in the management of enormous budgets has coincided with the accelerated expansion of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, which aims to double the number of warheads by 2030. For Xi, any sign of corruption in this structure, no matter how small, constitutes an existential threat: If the arsenal does not guarantee deterrent credibility, China’s own strategy against the United States is destabilized. The laboratory expands. Paradoxically, this massive purge in the nuclear force coexists with a construction program of tunnels, silos and underground chambers in Lop Nurthe historic test center, which aims for greater technical preparation for low-throughput tests. China maintains that it respects the testing moratorium, but the pace of excavation, electrical installation and deep drilling suggests it is providing capabilities for a scenario in which advanced designs need to be validated in the event of a possible reactivation of North American tests. The impact on the army. The fall of commanders at all levels it has left key vacancies in the five theaters of operations and in the command structures of the Navy, the Land Force and the internal discipline bodies. The simultaneous disappearance of so many cadres has raised doubts about the real degree of preparation for a war, especially in the Taiwan Strait. From mid-2024, Chinese military activity around the island has been reducedwith fewer planes crossing the median line of the Strait and fewer incursions close to its airspace. Some analysts interpret this as an operational weakening due to to the command vacuum. Others point to strategic changes driven by surviving generals, who prefer to focus on substantive training and longer-range maneuvers in the Pacific. Extra ball. However, everyone agrees that the climate of suspicion and fear it discourages tactical initiative, a central element of modern warfare. The risk is twofold: a less effective force and, at the same time, the possibility that new massive promotions of very young commanders, without networks or brakes, generate a more aggressive and nationalist military culture. The dimension of the purges. The Diplomat told that the purges also raise a doubt: the possibility that these are no longer solely a … Read more

It is the new battlefield in the price war against Ouigo and Iryo

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Just a few days ago, Trainline confirmed what we began to suspect for a long time: trains are rising in price. According to their data, Renfe, Ouigo and Iryo have increased their rates up to 40% in some cases and are forgetting their price war. Or they seemed to be forgetting. Because Renfe has pressed the accelerator in Andalusia. The offer. From Madrid to Seville or Malaga for seven euros. It is Renfe’s temporary offer which will be active between November 14 and 18. Every day a limited number of places will leave with ridiculous prices to move through the Andalusian corridor, with stops available in Ciudad Real, Puertollano, Villanueva de Córdoba, Córdoba, Puente Genil or Antequera, in addition to the cities already mentioned. The trains, of course, are part of the AVLO offer, the service low cost of Renfe that fights with Ouigo and Iryo to attract passengers at lower prices. The difference with the AVE lies, above all, in a greater number of stops and therefore a travel time that is usually longer. Price war? In recent months we have seen how high speed prices have risen. And they have risen a lot, in some cases. The most recent data is brought and collected by Trainline, the train ticket price comparator Expansion. Trains have become more expensive by up to 40% in one year on the Madrid-Barcelona corridor. The data reflect something that Álvaro Fernández Heredia, president of Renfe, already warned. “If they raise the price, we will follow them”announced a few weeks ago in an interview with Chain Being in which he also attacked his rivals, warning that they would have to explain why they come to Spain to lose money. The data of the CNMCwhich always arrive with some delay (the latest refer to the first half of the year) also point to an increase in the price of tickets but it is Madrid-Barcelona that has concentrated this growth. In the Andalusian and Valencian corridor, prices have fallen year-on-year. The Andalusian runner. The departure of the AVLO on the Madrid-Barcelona route, which does not have a confirmed return date, confirms that this route is the most expensive in Spain because its travelers are less susceptible to price variations. In fact, it is the corridor with the highest average price for all operators and in their sum, with a cost of 63.14 euros on average for the traveler and an increase of more than 15% compared to the first half of last year. In Andalusia, however, things are very different. Madrid-Málaga has maintained its year-on-year prices despite the fact that high speed has increased in general terms (-1.2% compared to the first half of 2024). And Madrid-Sevilla has dropped by more than 8%. In the absence of new data from the CNMC, we do know that Renfe increased the prices of its AVLO compared to the previous year by 3.4% but reduced those of the AVE by 3.8%. Taking into account that the average ticket price of the latter is 55.92 euros compared to 42.44 euros for the AVLO, the reduction is more noticeable than the increase in its range low cost. Ouigo in Andalusia. It must be taken into account that Ouigo arrived in Andalusia at the beginning of 2025, which is why last year two companies (Renfe and Iryo) were competing. The French company saw clearly that it had a gap to gain in the Andalusian corridor and that it was more sensitive to price variations than Madrid-Barcelona, ​​which is why It partially removed its trains from the latter and focused them on the southern corridor. Consequently, prices fell and in the absence of the CNMC making public the report that includes the data for July, August and September, already in June we saw a substantial reduction in the price of tickets compared to 2024, with falls of more than 28% in Iryo, greater than 22% in the AVE and 26% in AVLO. On average, prices that month fell 25.4%. In recent months, the battle in the southern corridor has continued. To the Renfe offer we must add the one that promoted Ouigo just a few weeks agoconnecting Barcelona with Seville for just over 20 euros. A way to continue competing in Madrid-Barcelona while maximizing resources. direct marking. The launch of new offers shows how Ouigo and Renfe mark each other closely. The Andalusian corridor in the first half of the year has been the place where Ouigo has put the most effort and where it has differentiated its prices the most from its competitors. In Madrid-Barcelona, ​​the difference in the average price between Ouigo and Renfe remained below two euros. In Madrid-Valencia and Madrid-Alicante it was even less, just a few cents. In the Andalusian corridor, however, Ouigo tickets were sold almost five euros cheaper than AVLO tickets in Madrid-Seville and the same situation was repeated in Madrid-Málaga. Photo | Smiley.toerist on Wikimedia In Xataka | If the summer has taught us anything, it is that Spain does not need more trains. You just need them to work.

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