target

Iran’s drones have aimed at the same target as the US. And now that they have pulverized it, they are going to unleash their most dangerous weapon

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In the Middle East there are radars capable of tracking objects thousands of kilometers and distinguish between dozens of targets in mid-flight. They are machines the size of a building, cost hundreds of millions of dollars and are part of the system that detects attacks before they even cross the atmosphere. However, in the current war they are discovering something uncomfortable: the greatest danger to these technological gems may come from weapons that cost a fraction of its price. The eyes of the shield. Since the beginning of the war, Iran has directed a very specific part of his attacks against an objective that rarely appears in the headlines but that underpins the entire defensive architecture of the United States in the Middle East: the radars that allow detecting and tracking missiles in flight. These sensors (like the AN/TPY-2 associated with the THAAD system or the gigantic AN/FPS-132 deployed in Qatar) act as the “eyes” of the regional anti-missile shield, feeding data to Patriot interceptors, THAAD or Aegis destroyers to destroy threats before they reach their objectives. However, several of these systems have been hit in the last days by Iranian attacks, some confirmed through satellite images. Among them is the strategic radar of the Al-Udeid base in Qatar, valued at nearly a billion dollars, and an AN/TPY-2 radar in Jordan directly linked to THAAD batteries. Other locations in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia or Bahrain as well have suffered impacts in facilities related to radar or communications, partially weakening the surveillance capacity of the regional defensive system. The shaheds against the most expensive system. The paradox of these attacks is that many of them have been carried out with unidirectional attack drones relatively cheap, like the Shahed, whose cost is only a fraction of the missiles and sensors they try to neutralize. While US systems were designed to intercept much more expensive and sophisticated ballistic or cruise missiles, Iran has bet for saturating or damaging them with much simpler platforms. These drones fly low and slow, which can make it difficult to detect for defenses designed for faster threats. Furthermore, the country has proven to have the capacity to produce them in large quantitiessomething that is already left patent in Ukraine with its export to Russia. In this war, that industrial advantage translates into a pretty clear strategy: launch constant waves of drones against sensors, command centers and communication systems, gradually eroding the network that allows us to detect threats in the air. An Army and Navy transportable surveillance radar (AN/TPY-2) positioned on Kwajalein Atoll during FTI-01 flight testing Blind the shield. The pattern that emerges suggests that these attacks are not simply scattered retaliation, but rather part of a much more calculated approach. Radars not only detect threats, they are the element that makes it possible to intercept them. Without them, even the most advanced anti-missile systems remain partially blind or rely on incomplete information. Hitting these sensors, therefore, has a multiplier effect– Each radar out of service increases the likelihood that future waves of attacks will penetrate defenses. In that sense, the Shahed seem to have aimed at the same target since the beginning of the conflict: the eyes of the American anti-missile shield. And the more that network is degraded, the greater the scope for other, more dangerous weapons (stored in underground silos and fortified bases) can come into play with greater chances of success. A satellite image taken on March 2, 2026 shows debris around a blackened THAAD radar at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan The problem of radars. The episode also highlights a structural weakness that analysts have long pointed out. Large early warning radars are extremely sophisticated, but also huge, expensive and largely static. Each one costs hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars and there are very few in the world, which means that replacing them can take years. At the same time, their size and fixed nature make them on relatively easy targets to locate through intelligence or commercial satellite images. Even seemingly minor damage can cause a “mission kill”that is, leaving the radar inoperative for long periods, even if the structure is still standing. In other words, a cheap drone can temporarily disable a central piece of the strategic defense of an entire region. The new logic of air war. Plus: what is happening reflects a deeper change in the way defensive systems are attacked. For decades it was assumed that destroying strategic radars required sophisticated missiles or large-scale complex attacks. The proliferation of drones has altered that equation. Today even actors with limited resources can employ cheap platforms to degrade sensors that cost hundreds of millions. This logic has already been seen in other conflictsfrom Ukrainian attacks against Russian radars to Israeli operations against Iranian air defenses. In all cases the principle is the same: “shoot the archer” before facing his arrows. If the system that detects threats disappears or is degraded, the entire shield loses effectiveness. A warning for the future. Beyond the immediate damage, these attacks have opened a broader strategic debate about resilience of American missile defense. The current architecture relies heavily on a small number of extremely valuable ground sensors. If those sensors are destroyed or neutralized, even temporarily, the defensive balance can quickly shift. That is why more and more experts advocate complementing or replacing part of these capabilities. with space sensors capable of tracking missiles from orbit, creating redundancy against ground attacks. However, these technologies, if they arrive, will take years to be fully deployed. Meanwhile, the current war has left an uncomfortable lesson: a system designed to stop the world’s most sophisticated weapons can be weakened. by swarms of drones cheap. And when the radars stop seeingthe next move on the board can be much more dangerous. Image | Google Earth, X, Missile Defense Agency, Airbus In Xataka | You’ve probably never heard of urea. The missiles in Iran are destroying their production, and that will affect your food In Xataka … Read more

Now that the most wanted cartel in Mexico has died, three disturbing possibilities open up. All with the US in the target

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For more than four decades, the relationship between Mexico and the United States has been marked by a shared war and asymmetric against drug traffickinga fight that has oscillated between open confrontation, silent cooperation and the reproaches mutual while criminal networks adapted, fragmented and strengthened in the heat of the demand for drugs north of the border and violence to the south. In this permanent pulse, each hit against a boss has not only been an operational successbut also the beginning of a new disturbing phase. The biggest blow in a decade. The death of Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, known as “El Mencho”undisputed leader of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, represents the most important blow against organized crime in Mexico since fall of “El Chapo”. It is, not only because of the dejected figure, but because structural weight of the organization he directed, which became one of the most expansive, violent and with the greatest international capacity in the country. We are talking about an organization with presence in dozens of nations and a central role in the trafficking of methamphetamine and fentanyl into the United States. The definitive breakup. From the political side, the operation confirms the breakup with the stage of “hugs, not bullets” and consolidates a strategy based on intelligence, coordination and direct action against criminal leaders. In fact, the administration of Claudia Sheinbaum has multiplied arrests, seizures and deployments on the northern border. The internal message is crystal clear: the State seeks regain the initiative in the face of organizations that took advantage of years of limited containment to expand and professionalize. Immediate response that has paralyzed regions. There is no doubt, in an operation of this caliber, the reaction of the cartel has been lightning and coordinatedwith blockades, vehicle fires, attacks on infrastructure and suspension of activities in several states. Cities like Guadalajara and Puerto Vallarta are experiencing panic scenes that are reminiscent of previous crises in Sinaloa after the capture of other leaders such as that of “El Mayo”. And, as almost always, the deployment of federal forces and the alerts to foreign citizens show a reality most uncomfortable: The group’s operational capacity does not disappear with the death of its leader. The great unknown and a risk. This being the case, and with the natural heir imprisoned in the United States, the replacement of the next great drug trafficker open a fight potential between regional commanders and key operators. They remembered in the New York Times that, if the chain of command is not imposed quickly, it is very possible that internal disputes will begin to arise that fragment or weaken the organization. The Mexican experience shows that these transitions usually translate in prolonged violence and territorial fights that affect entire communities. The first possibility looking at Washington. With this scenario, what happens in the coming weeks can greatly alter the security architecture not only of the United States, but from all over North America opening before him three most disturbing scenarios. First of all, a more than possible internal war due to the succession within the CJNG that destabilizes the organization and multiplies all types of sources of regional violence, generating in turn displacement, migratory pressure and greater disorderly flow of weapons and drugs towards the north of the continent. And the remaining two. Secondly, the equally plausible possibility opens up: that of a rival cartels offensive to dispute territories and the most strategic routes, a situation that could trigger a prolonged national conflict similar to the one that occurred in Sinaloaaffecting logistics chains, investment and, in general, border stability. Finally, the third way is that of rapid consolidation under a new leadershipone that, far from weakening the business, makes it more opaque and decentralized, maintaining or even sophisticating fentanyl trafficking to the United States and beyond, which would force Washington to rethink its cooperation, its political pressure and even the debate on direct interventions, with profound implications for Mexican sovereignty and regional integration. In short, with consequences for the entire North American security architecture. A turning point in relationships. The last thing that we have known of the operation has been that it was carried out by Mexican forces together with US intelligence, all in a context political pressure from the White House and millionaire rewards offered by the DEA, along with the review of commercial and security commitments. Plus: arrives after months of extraditionsconvictions and mass arrests linked to the capo’s entourage, suggesting that the operation has been a sustained strategy and not an isolated hit. Tactical success obviously reinforces cooperation, but it will also very likely raise expectations and scrutiny over actual results. If violence expands or the criminal business adapts and diversifies without losing any capacity, such as it has already happened In the past, the region could enter a highest voltage phase strategic that redefines the way in which both countries manage their border, their trade and their shared security. Image | Knight Foundation In Xataka | The cartels have a vehicle that looks like something out of Mad Max: it is called a “narcotanque” and it is a nightmare in Mexico In Xataka | There is a “cocaine of the sea” that is breaking the Chinese market. And that is a huge problem for Mexico.

Russia’s ghost fleet has changed its business model. Oil has given way to a much bigger target: Europe

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Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has not only built a vast fleet of tankers to avoid Western sanctions and continue exporting crude oil from the Baltic and the Black Sea, but has turned that logistical infrastructure into something much more ambitious. How much? The size of an old continent. The fleet in the shadows. According to Western and Ukrainian intelligence sources cited by CNN, Part of this so-called shadow fleet is being used as a covert platform for espionage and hybrid operations in European waters. We are talking about hundreds of ships that routinely sail near the coasts of EU and NATO countries, generating income of hundreds of millions of dollars for Moscow while, at the same time, expanding the radius of action of its security services away from Russian territory. “Civilian” crews with a detail. The pattern detected by the intelligence services is revealing. Many of these tankers, registered under flags of convenience and with mostly Asian or African crews, incorporate just before setting sail to one or two Russian citizens additional. The crew lists show as simple “technicians”but his background tells another story: former police officers, members of special units of the Ministry of the Interior, veterans of the Russian army or former mercenaries linked to Wagner. They are often the only Russians on board and, according to testimonies of Danish maritime pilots and European observers, exercise an authority that goes beyond the civilian chain of command, even imposing itself over the ship’s captain. Moran Security and privatization. Many of these men would be linked to Moran Security Groupa private Russian company with deep ties to the FSB, GRU, and the Kremlin’s military contractor ecosystem. Moran was sanctioned by the United States Treasury in 2024 for providing armed security services to Russian state companies, and his history connects directly with Wagner and with operations in scenarios such as Syria or Somalia. Its corporate structure (with registrations in Moscow and in opaque jurisdictions such as Belize) and its professional profile, explicitly oriented to recruit veterans of special forces, fit perfectly into the logic of hybrid warfare: formally private actors that allow the Russian state to operate with a high degree of plausible deniability. Espionage and internal control. The functions of these “technicians” would not be limited to protecting the cargo. Ukrainian and Western sources maintain that also supervise captains non-Russian vessels to ensure that the ships are acting in the interests of the Kremlin and that, in at least one documented case, took photographs of European military installations from one of these tankers. Furthermore, although details are scarce, intelligence services suggest that some of these men have participated in acts of sabotage. These would not be direct confrontations, but rather low-profile actions designed to collect information, generate uncertainty and strain the limits of the Western response. The Boracay case. He Boracay tanker illustrates this dynamic well. Sanctioned, with frequent changes of name and flag, two Russian citizens embarked in September in the port of Primorsk, near Saint Petersburg. Both were listed as technicians and were the only Russians among a crew of Chinese, Burmese and Bangladeshis. Coincidence or not, his crossing through Danish waters overlapped with a wave of sightings of drones near the Copenhagen airport and Danish military bases. Days later, the ship was boarded by the French navy against Brittany for irregularities in their documentation. No drones were found on board, but the presence of the two Russians came to light and they were discreetly questioned. For some analyststemporal correlation proves nothing, but for others It fits too well with the pattern of trial and error in the “gray zone.” Drones, sensors and something new. Beyond Boracay, Swedish and Danish authorities have detected on other ships in the shadow fleet antennas and masts not usually found on civilian merchant ships, as well as hostile behavior towards inspectors and an obsession with photographing critical infrastructure. In an environment like the Baltic, a strategic bottleneck surrounded by NATO countries, any anomalous activity becomes a disproportionate weight. For European security services, these ships are ideal mobile platforms: seemingly legal, difficult to intercept without diplomatic escalation and capable of approaching ports, cables, bases and airports without raising immediate alarms. Hybrid warfare at sea. All this fits with a broader strategy that senior intelligence officials, such as the new head of British MI6describe as constant testing “below the threshold of war.” Drones near airports, aggressive activity at sea, discreet sabotage and covert espionage are part of the same repertoire. The shadow fleet is not only an economic instrument to circumvent sanctions, but an extension of the Russian security apparatus, capable of operating in a space where Western legal and military responses are slow and politically sensitive. The European dilemma. Europe thus faces an uncomfortable decision. Intercepting ships without insurance, with dubious documentation or with armed personnel on board could stop these practices, but it also carries the risk of a direct russian reaction. As summarized on CNN a veteran Danish maritime pilot, no small country wants to be the first to make the move. The answer, if it comes, will have to be collective. Meanwhile, the shadow fleet continues growing and sailingdemonstrating that for the Kremlin the war is not only being fought in Ukraine, but also in the seas surrounding Europe, silently and in civilian uniform. Image | kees torn, Greg Bishop In Xataka | For years Europe has wondered how to stop the Russian ghost fleet. Ukraine just showed you the way: with AI In Xataka | A ghost fleet has mapped the entire underwater structure of the EU. The question is what Moscow is going to do with that information.

the target is on the ground

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The tensions between Venezuela and the United States have entered a acceleration phase which reminds, by its form and its atmosphere, of something very different from any other operation against drug trafficking and more so in the moments prior to a major crisis. Certainly not an ordinary diplomatic dispute. An oil tanker and the arrival of a battalion predict a scenario of conflict. Venezuela, the US and a shadow. The tanker seizure off the Venezuelan coast (justified from Washington as a legal act against sanctioned crude oil trafficking and denounced by Caracas as “international piracy”) has functioned as a starting shot for a spiral that had been brewing since months ago. That said, the real turning point, the one that marks a qualitative leap in the US position, is the arrival in Puerto Rico of a contingent almost complete EA-18G Growlersairplanes electronic warfare without equivalents in the region and whose presence is rarely associated with simple training or routine deterrence missions. Venezuela, going through its own political earthquakes following the disputed 2024 election and domestic and international pressure against Maduro, now finds itself staring at a board on which American moves, for the first time since the 1962 crisis, suggest something more than a message: suggest preparation. The Growler as an omen. They were counting this morning on TWZ that the EA-18G Growler deployed in the reactivated base of Roosevelt Roads, in Puerto Rico, are a first-order technical and doctrinal indicator. They are not planes of symbolic presence nor devices suitable for anti-drug patrols. Its mission is different: penetrate the enemy electromagnetic spectrum, suppress air defenses, blind radars, cut communications and open corridors for deeper operations. In an environment like Venezuela, where Russian defense systems of different origin (including Buk-M2, Pechora-2M and S-300VM) make up a complex network, the presence of Growlers is the logical prelude to any action that seeks neutralize anti-aircraft capabilities and prepare the space for precision attacks, insertion of special forces or rescues in hostile territory. And much more. The analysts also recalled that the mixture of ALQ-99 pods and the new NGJ-MBcapable of updating software and modulating AESA antennas to counter evolving threats, indicates that what is deployed in the Caribbean is not an improvised reinforcement, but rather a specialized cell in modern electronic warfare. The region, accustomed to sporadic naval deployments or exercises, had not seen such an unequivocal sign of operational readiness since the most tense years of the Cold War. The hit of the tanker. The boarding operation of the oil tanker Skipper (with Navy helicopters dropping equipment on its deck, official footage released almost in real time and Trump statements qualifying it as the largest seizure ever made) is not an isolated event. It is a global political message that combines judicial pressure with military demonstration. Venezuela interprets it as a direct attack and a violation of its sovereignty, and Washington exposes it as part of a international sanctions network against Venezuelan and Iranian oil. In both cases, the effect is clear: the tacit containment threshold that existed until now has been broken. For Maduro, who urges the population to become “warriors”, the episode serves as a narrative tool to reinforce its internal legitimacy and denounce the American desire to appropriate the country’s resources. For the United States, the message is the opposite: the era of tolerance for sanctioned oil networks is over, and any maritime intermediation will be treated as a legitimate objective. In other words, the clash is frontal, symbolic and strategic. Aerial choreography. The recent flights of F/A-18 Super Hornets and EA-18G Growlers circling over the Gulf of Venezuela complete the new military landscape. They were not timid raids or simple patrols: they reached less than 20 nautical miles from the coast and acted with flight patterns designed to test, provoke and record reactions. The F/A-18 operated with the RHINO callsignwhile the Growler, under the name GRIZZLY2carried out loops aimed at capturing signals, searching for active radars and mapping possible defense nodes. They told the BBC experts like Greg Bagwell, which is a classic intelligence operation prior to an intervention scenario or, at the very least, a warning that the United States can degrade Venezuelan defenses at will. Venezuela, aware that every electronic emission, every activated radar and every radio response can be recorded, analyzed and exploited, faces simultaneous psychological and technical pressure: any movement reveals useful information for an adversary that dominates the electromagnetic spectrum. Massive deployment. Plus: presence in the Caribbean from USS Gerald R. Fordthe largest aircraft carrier in the world, along with B-52 and B-1 strategic bombers that they have skirted the coast Venezuela in recent months, composes a military device that cannot be interpreted as mere symbolic deterrence. As we countthe reactivation of Roosevelt Roads (closed since 2004) and its use for F-35 operations confirms that the American return to the Caribbean responds to a longer-term strategic design. with some 15,000 troops deployedspecial forces in rotation, ships of various types and capacities and a constant flow of tactical aircraft, the US military structure in the region increasingly resembles a prepared platform for multiple options: from specific attacks to prolonged pressure operations, including the total interdiction of Venezuelan oil trade. The political factor. There is no doubt, military tension is intertwined with a internal political crisis in Venezuela that has further eroded the legitimacy of the regime. While Maduro denounces attacks and invoke resistancethe awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to María Corina Machado It symbolizes the international recognition of the Venezuelan opposition and its demand for democratic transition. The United States, for its part, maintains a reward on Maduro 50 million dollarshas intensified accusations of links with the Cartel de los Soles and has multiplied lethal operations against vessels supposedly linked to drug trafficking. In this climate, any additional steps (such as a total oil blockadedescribed by analysts as an act of war) could precipitate an unexpected reconfiguration of the internal and regional balance. A game where the United States affirms that … Read more

A silent operation has compromised thousands of ASUS routers. Investigators target groups linked to China

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Few devices are as stable and discreet as the router. We barely think about them, we rarely review their configuration, and we rarely consider them part of the security debate. They are just there, connecting. This condition makes them ideal terrain for those seeking to go unnoticed. A recent investigation has revealed that ASUS routers are being used as part of a remote operating structure. They don’t cause problems, but they are no longer just an internet access point. According to SecurityScorecardthe signal reveals the existence of something more than a specific failure. The researchers observed that a significant volume of ASUS routers exhibited the same TLS certificatewith a validity of one hundred years, which does not fall within the usual parameters of this type of equipment. This coincidence made it possible to identify a structured campaign, called WrtHug, and conclude that the devices had been altered in a coordinated manner to remain connected and operational without alerting their owners. How WrtHug works. According to the analysis, the campaign is based on vulnerabilities present in ASUS routers and in the service AICloudwhich allows remote access to files and connected devices from outside the home network. By leveraging that channel, attackers can execute system-level commands and modify settings without requiring user intervention. The presence of the shared TLS certificate acts as a sign of this alteration and shows how the routers become part of an intermediary infrastructure, useful to hide the real origin of the activity. AiCloud is a function integrated into ASUS routers that allows you to access files stored on USB drives connected to the router or in shared folders on a computer from outside the home. It can be used from a browser or through a mobile application, making it easy to view documents, photos or videos without being physically on the local network. That legitimate remote connection capability, intended for convenience, also means that any alteration to the system has broader consequences if an external actor comes to control it. Which models are at risk. SecurityScorecard identifies several affected ASUS models, many of them old or end-of-life. Among those registered are: 4G-AC55U 4G-AC860U DSL-AC68U GT-AC5300 GT-AX11000 RT-AC1200HP RT-AC1300GPLUS RT-AC1300UHP Some are still used in homes, but others are installed in small offices or businesses that have never renewed the equipment. It should be noted that although ASUS has published security patches and the vulnerabilities are officially corrected, research indicates that the majority of compromised devices are EoL (end of life) or outdated models. This combination of lack of support and obsolete equipment multiplies the risk that the problem persists over time. Where the operation has been detected. The researchers observed that the compromised routers are concentrated in Asia-Pacific, with an especially high presence in Taiwan and other countries in the region such as South Korea, Japan and Hong Kong. Active devices were also registered in Russia, the United States and several Central European countries. A map with the concentration of infected devices | Image: A notable element of the report is that no cases were identified in mainland China, which analysts interpret as a contextual clue, although not proof of authorship. The geographical scope confirms that this is not a local phenomenon, but rather a distributed infrastructure. What researchers say about China. SecurityScorecard does not definitively attribute the campaign, but notes that the behavior observed on the routers coincides with tactics previously used by actors associated with China. Researchers speak of “low-moderate confidence” that WrtHug is an ORB facilitation campaign operated by a pro-China actor, that is, a network of compromised devices that act as intermediate nodes to conceal the real origin of future operations. Among the technical parallels, analysts highlight similarities with a campaign called AyySSHush and the use of vulnerability CVE-2023-39780. What to do if I have an ASUS router. Detecting if a device is compromised is not easy, because the changes introduced by WrtHug do not affect its operation. The first thing is to check if the model is among those that have stopped receiving support and install, if it exists, the latest version of firmware available from the ASUS website, following the recommendations of its security notices. As additional measures, it is advisable to disable remote services that are not used, such as AiCloud, review possible unauthorized access and consider replacing the equipment if it is already at the end of its life. WrtHug shows that home routers are no longer a neutral element. They are devices always on, connected and with sufficient capacity to sustain discrete operations without altering their operation. This combination makes them useful pieces within a digital dashboard that previously seemed reserved for more complex systems. Images | ASUS | SecurityScorecard In Xataka | Correos and the DGT are already widely seen, so the scammers have changed their objective: an app to pay for parking

that the Russian hypersonic missiles do not reach the target believing that they are in Peru

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He Kinzhalpresented by the Kremlin as a hypersonic missile “invincible” capable of overcoming any Western defense, has experienced a series of technical improvements designed to further increase their lethality and reduce the possibilities of interception. In fact, until three months ago it was a real toothache for Ukrainian defenses. Until they have come up with an idea… and a song. Evolution of a missile. Derived from Iskander-M and launched from aerial platforms such as MiG-31K or the Tu-22M3the missile combines speeds that can approach Mach 10 with a deeply maneuvered terminal profile, capable of executing abrupt descents, sudden lateral changes and trajectories designed to break the radar lock of Ukrainian Patriots. Its ability to hide within mixed salvos, blending in with slower missiles, has drastically reduced interception rates: from 37% in August to just one 6% in September. This has made, in theory, previously interceptable missiles become threats that are very difficult to stop, especially when they are used in massive attacks that combine hundreds of drones and dozens of ballistic or cruise missiles. The hidden weakness. However, despite its speed and maneuverability, the Kinzhal has a technical Achilles’ heel: it depends on the navigation system. GLONASS satellite to correct the natural errors of the inertial system, whose precision tends to degrade over time. TO INS differencethe satellite link can be manipulatedinterfered with or supplanted. And here lies the Ukrainian advance. Although the missile incorporates controlled pattern receiving antennas (taking their number from 4 to 8, 12 and now 16 elements in a Russian attempt to counter interference), these electronic defenses have proven to be insufficient against systems designed specifically for front-line conditions. Ukrainian unity Night Watch has shown that, despite Russian improvements, the Kometa receivers They are still based on technology inherited from the Soviet era, unable to resist a spoofing well executed. This combination of high kinematic complexity and electronic vulnerability creates a tactical paradox: Russia’s fastest and theoretically most advanced missile can be diverted by manipulated digital signals if they manage to infiltrate its navigation cycle. A kind of electronic optical illusion. Music as a weapon of precision. Before the fall of the Patriot effectivenessUkraine has opted for a completely different weapon: Lima, a electronic warfare system which not only blocks the Kinzhal’s satellite communications, but also replaces its navigation stream with false data. This system creates a large zone of electronic denial in which missiles lose their spatial reference, but does so with sufficient precision to induce highly controlled errors. Their spoofing technique is more sophisticated than simple jamming: it does not turn off navigation, but rather manipulates it. Lima sends a signal in binary format that can include any content, but operators have chosen to embed the ukrainian anthem “Our Father Is Flag”both for technical and symbolic reasons. This deceptive signal, once accepted by the missile’s receivers, allows it to believe that it is thousands of kilometers to the west, specifically in Lima (Peru), forcing it to abruptly correct its trajectory. At speeds above Mach 5, these changes generate structural stresses that overcome the resistance of the fuselage, causing the missile to break up in flight or crash without detonating. In this way, Ukraine has managed to divert or destroy more than about twenty Kinzhales in a few weeks, a much more significant achievement given its scarcity and its cost to Russia. The controlled diversion. The results of the Lima system are visible in the impact patterns: craters that appear in dozens or even hundreds of kilometers of the planned objectives, sometimes up to 200 km off course. The change in accuracy is drastic. Although Russia claims that the Kinzhal’s CEP is around 10 meters, leaked images by military analysts show missiles falling with errors of more than 140 meters even in recent attacks. There is no doubt, when a weapon designed to penetrate underground bunkers ends up hitting an open field, the effectiveness of spoofing is demonstrated. In many cases, the missile does not even activate the explosive charge because the impact sequence depends on parameters that are altered by the confusion generated in the guidance system. Night Watch Operators they underline that Lima does not act on a single receiver, but on all of them simultaneously, which nullifies the Russian strategy of multiplying antennas to “jump” between signal sources. Each missile receiver, upon entering the affected area, interprets the false data as valid, which turns spoofing into a kind of “enveloping trap” that is impossible to avoid. A constant evolution. This confrontation between hypersonic missile and spoofing techniques illustrates the character of “cat and mouse” that defines contemporary electronic warfare. Russia adjusts software, redesigns terminal profiles and multiplies antennas, and Ukraine responds by creating systems that replace the entire satellite data constellation by a corrupt flow impossible to filter. In fact, the United States and Western companies are already working on technologies capable of detecting or neutralizing spoofing, as Russia explores more robust guidance systems. For now, however, the electronic advantage is Ukrainian: the weapon that Putin called as “invincible” and “capable of overcoming any Western defense” is falling into empty fields, breaking up in mid-flight, or drifting harmlessly away. At the same time, the technique also affects other russian missiles that transit through the interference zone, expanding the defensive range without the need to intercept one by one. The strategic lesson is clear: in a conflict where Russian industry produces only between 10 and 15 Kinzhales a month, losing them to electronic manipulation is a disproportionate blow to the Kremlin’s offensive capacity. Speed ​​vs information. In short, the confrontation between the Kinzhal and the Lima EW system is a reminder that military superiority no longer depends only on speed, armor or explosive power, but on who controls the flow of information. The missile can fly at Mach 10 and be almost impossible physically intercept, but if its guidance system interprets that it has been “teleported” to Peruall its kinetic energy turns against itself. For Ukraine, this achievement represents the opening of … Read more

There has been a “flattening of the Earth” due to radars and missiles. And that makes fighters an easy target

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The technological transformation in aerial combat has reached a point where legacy tactics of the 20th century have ceased to offer minimum guarantees of survival. For decades, pilots could rely on low-flying flight to penetrate hostile defenses: the curvature of the planet, terrain shadows, and background noise hid planes speeding below the radar horizon. That world has disappeared. The end of the old certainties. They remembered in a wide report in Insider that the modernization of sensors and missiles, the proliferation of electronic scanning radars advanced technology, the expansion of beyond-line-of-sight systems and permanent aerial surveillance have created an environment where safe altitudes no longer exist. The idea that terrain protects is, for contemporary air forces, a relic. Detection distances have gone from being a tactical inconvenience to becoming a a strategic condition that can span entire regions, redefining the way a country plans its defense and offense. The British example. counted Air Vice Marshal James Beck, RAF Director of Capabilities and Programmes, who when flying the fighter jet Tornado multipurpose In the early 2000s, it was still assumed that flying at very low altitude would allow a formation to penetrate enemy territory without being detected by their integrated missile defense systems. The military delved into the same theory, that new radar and missile technologies have caused a kind of “flattening of the earth” that puts even aircraft that fly at much greater risk. very low height. The Eurofighter Typhoon with the nose fairing removed, revealing its AESA Euroradar CAPTOR radar antenna The growth of prohibited areas. At this point, the strategies of anti-access and area denialpreviously limited to defensive belts around critical points, have expanded to configure operational spaces covering entire countries and that, in a few years, could extend over entire continents. For example, the rise of OTH radars capable of “seeing” behind the Earth’s curvature, the increase in the range of surface-to-air missiles or the multiplication of air platforms that continuously patrol have created defensive bubbles which entering becomes a high risk exercise even for advanced fleets. The aerial danger. This phenomenon not only changes the way deep strikes are planned, but also the priority structure in which air powers operate. Controlling the air stops being another objective and becomes the indispensable condition so that any other operation (hitting command nodes, degrading enemy logistics or destroying missile silos) is even conceivable. In recent conflicts, especially in the ukrainian warthe inability of either side to dominate the air It has generated a battlefield frozen by dense defenses, where planes fly low to the ground only to deliver ranged weaponry, and where deep penetration has disappeared from the equation. A Tornado of German forces Sensors and vulnerability. The evolution of AESA radarscapable of detecting multiple targets at high speed and adjusting their beam with electronic precision, combined with sensor expansion land, naval, air and space, has created a network that reduces the margin of error practically to zero. Surveillance systems no longer depend on a single layer or a single type of platform: they function as an eoverlapping weavereplicates and expands, maintaining continuous surveillance with immediate response capacity. In this context, even missiles have expanded its radius of action with a speed which exceeds the modernization capacity of many air forces. The consequence is an environment in which aircraft without reduced signature, expanded connectivity, and platform-level sensor fusion simply will not survive crossing the enemy threshold. New air capabilities. In it Insider report The British military delved into an idea: the acceleration of innovation forces to reconfigure both existing systems and the future architecture of the air forces. Modernizing command and control, integrating distributed sensors across multiple domains, and expanding the reach of active and passive defenses becomes as crucial as developing new generations of aircraft. The current fifth generation platforms, like the F-35represent the minimum necessary to operate in a saturated airspace, although they are no longer sufficient on their own to guarantee that depth penetration. The fighters sixth generation should incorporate comprehensive invisibilityintelligent signal management, accompanying drone swarms (already is being tested) and autonomous capabilities selection and attack of targets located behind increasingly complex defensive networks. That is, where a pilot of the past relied on his expertise and the terrain, the pilot of the future will depend of complete ecosystems of manned and unmanned platforms, permanent connectivity and tactical analysis in real time. A basic truth. The recent experience It shows that modern war punishes those who renounce air dominance. Without going too far, in Ukraineboth sides have lost the ability to operate freely over enemy territory due to dense, mobile and highly sophisticated defenses. This aerial stalemate has prolonged the conflict, increased reliance on drones and missiles, and reduced operational mobility on the ground. The warnings from Western commanders underscore the urgency of learn from this scenariobecause the speed of change only increases. The next decade points to challenges driven by both states and non-state actors, with advanced systems becoming cheaper, more accessible and more difficult to neutralize. Image | Ministry of Defense/CPL Mike Jones, naraILA_Berlin In Xataka | The 10 Most Powerful Air Forces in the World, Compared in One Enlightening Chart In Xataka | A loaf of bread costs one euro in the supermarket. For the same price Europe just bought 18 fighter jets

its new rare earth rules target the United States

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China has just moved a piece that can alter the global board of strategic minerals. Beijing has approvedtwo official announcements that establish a new regime of control over the rare earth and technologies linked to its extraction, processing and manufacturing of magnets. The change is not minor: any product manufactured outside the country that contains just 0.1% of materials of Chinese origin will need a license to be exported. It is China’s most ambitious response in an area that it has been using for years as an economic and political lever. This movement does not come from nowhere. The Asian giant has been weaving a strategy for months to strengthen its control over the materials that feed the global technology industry. In April it already restricted the export of metals such as gallium and germanium, essential for the manufacture of chips, and weeks later expanded the list with scandium and dysprosium. Later this year we explain how This offensive is based on a solid base: 39 university programs specialized in rare earths that ensure the knowledge and manpower that today support its leadership. How the Asian giant transfers its power over minerals to the rest of the world With the new provisions of the Ministry of Commerce, Beijing introduces extraterritorial control over strategic minerals for the first time. It not only regulates what leaves its territory, it also what other countries produce with materials or technologies of Chinese origin. The country will be able to decide what is exported, to whom and for what purposes, under national security criteria. Applications for military purposes will bein principle, denied, while those related to semiconductors or artificial intelligence will be examined on a case-by-case basis. The second standard approved on the same day goes one step further: it is not limited to materials, but it protects the technical knowledge that makes them possible. The Asian country prohibits the transfer without permission of its extraction, refining, metallurgy or magnet manufacturing technologies, as well as any type of technical assistance linked to them. The definition of “export” is broad and includes activities such as consulting, training or collaboration in research projects. With this measure, Beijing shields its industrial experience and restricts the dissemination of its know-how outside its borders. The application schedule is staggered. Part of the new framework takes effect immediately, while the rest will take effect on December 1. At the same time, the Ministry of Commerce expands its scope of action with an additional package that add new items to the checklistincluding graphite anodes, certain lithium-ion batteries, synthetic diamonds, and various rare earths that were not listed in the previous restrictions. The expansion directly targets industries with high technological value and reinforces the Asian giant’s ability to set the pace of the global supply chain. The new rules could disrupt the pace of entire sectors. Magnets and alloys derived from rare earths are present in electric motors, wind turbines, medical equipment and consumer electronics. Under the new licensing system, every component that uses Chinese materials or technologies will have to go through an additional layer of oversight. The most exposed companies are those that depend on intermediate suppliers, especially in the automotive and energy sectors. For many, this move confirms that Beijing’s industrial control is no longer limited to its borders. Applications subject to increased scrutiny include advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence. The Ministry of Commerce has established a procedure case-by-case review for exports related to chips 14 nanometers or smaller and high-density memories. In the case of AI, supervision extends to projects with military or defense potential. This is not a general veto, but rather a system of selective licenses that allows Beijing to adjust its response depending on the context and the country of destination. The application of the new framework will require a high degree of coordination between companies and authorities. Exporters must apply for licenses through the Ministry of Commerce system and submit documentation in Chinese. In addition, they must issue compliance notices to the following links in the chain and report each approved shipment. The ministry has also enabled a consultation channel for doubtful cases, which reflects the complexity of the process. Even in Beijing they admit that effectiveness will depend on the supervision capacity that it manages to build in the coming months. Exporters must apply for licenses through the Ministry of Commerce system and present documentation in Chinese The moment is not coincidental. Beijing announces these measures just before the meeting between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump planned in South Koreain an attempt to strengthen their negotiating position. For months, rare earths have been at the center of trade talks between the two countries, and the new regulations add pressure on Washington. The strategy is clear: demonstrate that the Asian giant retains decisive levers in sectors that the United States considers strategic, from semiconductors to the materials that support its military industry. With these regulations, Beijing closes a circle that it had been drawing for years: it controls access to materials, the technologies that transform them and the knowledge that makes them possible. The Asian country converts strategic minerals into an instrument of economic and diplomatic power, reinforcing its weight in the negotiation with Washington. For the United States and its allies, the new situation represents an uncomfortable reminder: while they seek to reduce their dependence, the Asian giant continues to set the pace for the resources that sustain the global technological economy. Images | wirestock | ArthurHidden | aboodi vesakaran In Xataka | In 1978 Chinese engineers visited two key US companies. Upon his return, an empire began: rare earths

The drones of the greatest attack against Russia lost the signal before reaching the target. Ukraine had an ace in the manga

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On June 1 and the agreed time, trucks parked for weeks in several points from Russia They opened their doors. A swarm of more than 100 advanced drones thus began a mission that was destined for several air bases in Moscow. Upon reaching the designated objectives, explosive loads were automatically activated. The mission was historic for The sophistication level in the Uncianned war. In fact, the drones even lost every signal before achieving the goal. And at that time the algorithms came into play. The face that changes the war. We had slipped it weeks agobut now it has been The Financial Times The one described that AS in the Ukraine manga so that the Spiderweb operation was a success. The war in Eastern Europe has entered a new phase marked by accelerated integration of artificial intelligence In attack and defense systems, and in “Spiderweb”, where the drones successfully attacked Russian military airfields even beyond the Arctic Circle, it was key. A new generation. The operation, carried out by the Ukraine Security Service (SBU), not only evidenced Kyiv’s technical and strategic capacity for enemybut exposed the growing importance of Automation On the modern battlefield. Behind the attack was a new generation of drones designed by the First Contact companydirected by Valeriy Borovyk, whose flagship, The Osastands out for its sophistication, high -end materials and autonomous navigation capabilities resistant to adverse conditions and interference systems. These devices, five times more expensive that conventional drones were scheduled to continue their flight following pre -established routes even After losing signal and automatically detonate when reaching the goal. SBU map that illustrates drone transports in trucks from Cheliábinsk to the five target air bases Assisted autonomy. He counted the medium that the development of these drones has not been exclusive to a single company. Yaroslav Azhnyuk, creator From The Fourth LawHe explained that both Ukraine and Russia are expanding their deployment capacity of autonomous systems in early stages, although still with partial human intervention in the terminal guidance. For a year, Adehnyuk He has delivered To the lines of the Front Systems with these experimental functions, and other Ukrainian companies have followed the same path. The idea of ​​delegating final decisions to AI in environments where signals can be easily blocked by the enemy has become a tactical need rather than a technological ambition. In parallel, the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine recently announced the activation of carrying drones capable of Fly 300 kilometers and launch two free FPV, thus expanding the operational dimension of these tools in strategic depth. Invisible war. We had already talked about the term With optical fiber. In this war of wear, technology not only responds to advances but also to deficiencies. The lack of anti -aircraft missiles, artillery or ammunition has forced Ukraine to reinvent continuously. Civil foundations like The Prytula Foundationheaded by Bohdan Danyliv, they have contributed hundreds of fixed wing interceptors They have managed to demolish almost 250 Russian drones, demonstrating how improvised solutions have compensated for the shortage of traditional systems. Russia has not been left behind. He has identified Ukrainian drones and has counterattacked with improved modelsmany of them equipped with autonomous technology, optical fiber and even components from American video game consoles, According to services of Ukrainian intelligence. This evolution reveals a technological career in which the borders between civil and military are increasingly blurred. The Russian challenge. It We have explained: One of the most surprising turns has been the effectiveness of Russian drones connected by fiber optic cable, a seemingly rudimentary solution but brutally effective in front of Ukrainian interference systems. This technology, which allows operators to control drones without worrying about electronic blockages, has been decisive in the recent Russian offensive In the Kursk region, where they have made faster advances than at any other time since November. The Ukrainian reaction has been slow. Oleksandr Yakovenko, director of Taf Drones, recognized having underestimated the potential of this technique, and your company now tries to recover land by increasing production to 10,000 fiber optic drones per month, although he admits that they would need to manufacture at least 70,000 to match the Russian offensive capacity. New war balance. It seems clear that drone war It is no longer a complement to the conflict, but its central operating core. In an environment saturated with interference, scarcity of resources and geostrategic pressure, Ukraine and Russia face in a duel where innovation is not a luxury, but A vital imperative. Artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, improvised production networks and unexpected adaptations such as the use of cables or video games are redefining the limits of the possible. Seen, the question that looms over the coming months does not seem to be who has more drones, but who will adapt faster in a war where intelligence, in any of its forms, has become the decisive factor. Image | Ssu.gov.ua In Xataka | The Ukraine War is getting rid, first of all, with drones. And that is leaving an infinite fiber optic trail through the field In Xataka | We suspected that Ukraine drones attack had been destructive. Space images have revealed how much

Target will reduce its diversity and inclusion programs

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Since last week, Several US retailers and companies have announced their decision to reduce their diversity, equity and inclusion DEI programsafter conservative activists spoke out before the White House against these plans and the new administration led by Donald Trump showed its support. According to the president, these policies, which at some point were designed to represent a minority within the population, are unconstitutional. It is for that reason that On his first day as president, Trump signed an executive order proposing to end DEI programs. To date, the companies that have eliminated or reduced these programs are Walmart, McDonald’s, Ford, Harley-Davison, John Deere, Lowe’s and recently Target. Although The retailer had promoted these policies years ago with the aim of helping African-American employees with its “Belonging at the Bullseye” plan. or take the position of corporate advocate for the rights of its LGBTQ+ or even disabled employees, Target announced that it will back off with some plans. Regarding these new adjustments, Kiera Fernández, director of community impact and equity at Target, mentioned in a memo that this is just a “next chapter,” she said, as well as noting that “as a retailer that serves millions of consumers every year, days, We understand the importance of keeping up with the changing external landscape, now and in the future”. Although the company has committed in recent years to giving a voice to minorities during 2023, faced an anti-inclusion social media campaign from its consumers who mentioned that certain items sold in their stores encouraged early sexuality in children. Keep reading: –Walmart has the ideal flashlight on sale: from $189 to $19 for a limited time–5 Hidden Benefits of Sam’s Club Membership–7 Target Items You Should Buy Before Spring for Under $25

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