missiles

There has been a “flattening of the Earth” due to radars and missiles. And that makes fighters an easy target

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The technological transformation in aerial combat has reached a point where legacy tactics of the 20th century have ceased to offer minimum guarantees of survival. For decades, pilots could rely on low-flying flight to penetrate hostile defenses: the curvature of the planet, terrain shadows, and background noise hid planes speeding below the radar horizon. That world has disappeared. The end of the old certainties. They remembered in a wide report in Insider that the modernization of sensors and missiles, the proliferation of electronic scanning radars advanced technology, the expansion of beyond-line-of-sight systems and permanent aerial surveillance have created an environment where safe altitudes no longer exist. The idea that terrain protects is, for contemporary air forces, a relic. Detection distances have gone from being a tactical inconvenience to becoming a a strategic condition that can span entire regions, redefining the way a country plans its defense and offense. The British example. counted Air Vice Marshal James Beck, RAF Director of Capabilities and Programmes, who when flying the fighter jet Tornado multipurpose In the early 2000s, it was still assumed that flying at very low altitude would allow a formation to penetrate enemy territory without being detected by their integrated missile defense systems. The military delved into the same theory, that new radar and missile technologies have caused a kind of “flattening of the earth” that puts even aircraft that fly at much greater risk. very low height. The Eurofighter Typhoon with the nose fairing removed, revealing its AESA Euroradar CAPTOR radar antenna The growth of prohibited areas. At this point, the strategies of anti-access and area denialpreviously limited to defensive belts around critical points, have expanded to configure operational spaces covering entire countries and that, in a few years, could extend over entire continents. For example, the rise of OTH radars capable of “seeing” behind the Earth’s curvature, the increase in the range of surface-to-air missiles or the multiplication of air platforms that continuously patrol have created defensive bubbles which entering becomes a high risk exercise even for advanced fleets. The aerial danger. This phenomenon not only changes the way deep strikes are planned, but also the priority structure in which air powers operate. Controlling the air stops being another objective and becomes the indispensable condition so that any other operation (hitting command nodes, degrading enemy logistics or destroying missile silos) is even conceivable. In recent conflicts, especially in the ukrainian warthe inability of either side to dominate the air It has generated a battlefield frozen by dense defenses, where planes fly low to the ground only to deliver ranged weaponry, and where deep penetration has disappeared from the equation. A Tornado of German forces Sensors and vulnerability. The evolution of AESA radarscapable of detecting multiple targets at high speed and adjusting their beam with electronic precision, combined with sensor expansion land, naval, air and space, has created a network that reduces the margin of error practically to zero. Surveillance systems no longer depend on a single layer or a single type of platform: they function as an eoverlapping weavereplicates and expands, maintaining continuous surveillance with immediate response capacity. In this context, even missiles have expanded its radius of action with a speed which exceeds the modernization capacity of many air forces. The consequence is an environment in which aircraft without reduced signature, expanded connectivity, and platform-level sensor fusion simply will not survive crossing the enemy threshold. New air capabilities. In it Insider report The British military delved into an idea: the acceleration of innovation forces to reconfigure both existing systems and the future architecture of the air forces. Modernizing command and control, integrating distributed sensors across multiple domains, and expanding the reach of active and passive defenses becomes as crucial as developing new generations of aircraft. The current fifth generation platforms, like the F-35represent the minimum necessary to operate in a saturated airspace, although they are no longer sufficient on their own to guarantee that depth penetration. The fighters sixth generation should incorporate comprehensive invisibilityintelligent signal management, accompanying drone swarms (already is being tested) and autonomous capabilities selection and attack of targets located behind increasingly complex defensive networks. That is, where a pilot of the past relied on his expertise and the terrain, the pilot of the future will depend of complete ecosystems of manned and unmanned platforms, permanent connectivity and tactical analysis in real time. A basic truth. The recent experience It shows that modern war punishes those who renounce air dominance. Without going too far, in Ukraineboth sides have lost the ability to operate freely over enemy territory due to dense, mobile and highly sophisticated defenses. This aerial stalemate has prolonged the conflict, increased reliance on drones and missiles, and reduced operational mobility on the ground. The warnings from Western commanders underscore the urgency of learn from this scenariobecause the speed of change only increases. The next decade points to challenges driven by both states and non-state actors, with advanced systems becoming cheaper, more accessible and more difficult to neutralize. Image | Ministry of Defense/CPL Mike Jones, naraILA_Berlin In Xataka | The 10 Most Powerful Air Forces in the World, Compared in One Enlightening Chart In Xataka | A loaf of bread costs one euro in the supermarket. For the same price Europe just bought 18 fighter jets

Less than 150 kilometers from Taiwan, the US does not stop accumulating missiles. It’s the closest thing to preparing for war.

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For some time now, the Taiwan position in it strategic balance global has become one of the main axes on which power competition is articulated between the United States and China. The island not only represents a point political identity for Beijing or a symbol of democratic commitment for Washington, but also a decisive geographical node in the military architecture of the Pacific. and then there is a narrow between both. The distances. Maritime access to the island, the air routes that surround it and the narrow strip of water that separates it from the Philippines and Japan define a good part of the board in which it is decided how far project Chinese strength and to what extent it can be contained from the outside. Thus, the crisis that is emerging is not made solely of declarations or doctrines: It is made up of specific islands, narrow maritime corridors, and political decisions made in small communities that suddenly become geopolitical borders. The war strait. It counted on a extensive Reuters report that the chain of continuous military exercises and the missile deployment anti-shipping in the northernmost islands of the Philippines reveal a US strategy that assumes that control of the Western Pacific straits is decisive in preventing the Chinese navy from operating freely in the open sea. And at that point, the province of Batanesuntil a few years ago a quiet territory dedicated to fishing and subsistence agriculture, has become a point of critical importance, due to its position in the extreme south from Bashi Channelthe narrow sea lane that connects the South China Sea to the western Pacific. Bashi is located between Mavulis Island and Orchid Island The arrival of an arsenal. The establishment of a rotating military presencebut practically permanent, with deployments of mobile missile systems capable of blocking the passage of surface ships, has transformed this territory into an essential component of the so-called First Island Chainthe containment line that the United States, Japan and the Philippines intend to maintain to limit China’s ability to influence beyond its coastal waters. Local populations, aware of the historical precedent from 1941live in fear of seeing how their daily lives can be suddenly interrupted by the logic of deterrence or escalation. Liaoning exercises in the Pacific The uncertainty of the Philippines. The Manila government operates in the paradox of a country that does not want to be dragged into a war, but that recognizes that geography makes inevitable any implications in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The administration of Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has unambiguously reopened military cooperation with the United States, granting expanded access to bases in Luzon and reinforcing the number and duration of joint exercises. Given the possibility of an attack or a blockade on Taiwanthe Philippines is preparing not only for defense operations, but for the forced return of tens of thousands of Filipino workers from the island. The prospect of a sudden influx of refugees, disruptions to supply routes and the need to operate under conditions of scarcity have led provincial authorities to raise contingency plans agricultural and logistical processes that return daily life to a state of cautious alert. China and reunification. For Beijing, the Taiwan question is presented as an internal matter which does not allow external negotiation. The Chinese leadership maintains that reunification is a historic address that sooner or later it will come to fruition, and that any foreign intervention constitutes an unacceptable violation of its sovereignty. Hence, the US military presence in the Philippines, the deployment of missiles and the intensification of exercises are interpreted by China not as defensive measures, but as deliberate attempts to restrict their margin of action and condition their ability to respond. The increase in Chinese naval operations through from Bashi Channelthe presence of aircraft carrier groups in the western Pacific and low-intensity pressure tactics against Philippine patrols are part of a carefully calibrated game of signals. Washington’s ambiguity. This week, Donald Trump has reiterated that Xi Jinping knows the consequences of an attack on Taiwan, while refusing to specify whether the United States would intervene militarily. This gesture of opacity, faithful to the doctrine of strategic ambiguity, seeks to simultaneously maintain deterrence against Beijing and the control over decisions of Taipei, preventing the island from declaring formal independence that could accelerate the clash. The difference with respect to the previous government’s approach is one of tone rather than substance: if Biden tended to explicitly verbalize the defense of Taiwan, Trump shifts the emphasis toward risk perception by Chinese leaders. Ambiguity not only preserves diplomatic margin; It also avoids automatically locking the United States into open war if an unexpected escalation occurs. Key islands. As it is, preparation for a possible conflict over Taiwan is not happening in abstract power centers, but in island territories where daily life depends on supply ships and where every Pacific wind brings with it the memory of past conflicts. The expansion of presence US military in the Philippines, Chinese pressure to break the limits imposed by the island chain, and Washington’s calculated ambiguity form an unstable balance that is already changing life in those communities. The future of the region will not be decided only in great summits diplomatic, but in the capacity of a few narrow territories to become a barrier, access or trigger for a greater change in the global order. Image | PiCryl, BORN, rhk111, Army Map Service In Xataka | China has asked Russia for an airborne battalion and training. That can only mean one thing: they are preparing a landing In Xataka | The US studied what would happen if it went to war with China: now it has begun a desperate race to duplicate missiles

“Guided missiles” are revolutionizing cancer treatment. And they are already giving results

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Chemotherapy marked a great revolution in the treatment of different cancers despite its many problems in the nonspecificity of the ‘attack’ that caused healthy cells to also be affected by its effects. Although attempts have been made to increasingly specific chemotherapiesthe reality is that the next natural step in the evolution of the treatment It is immunotherapy, which is a field that continues to advance, giving us more and more joy in the fight against cancer. But there is a revolution that wants to go much further, and it is nothing more than taking all the good things that immunotherapy has with the high potency of chemotherapy. And this ‘cocktail’ has a name: immunoconjugates (ADC). The current problem. Traditional chemotherapies have been seen as a really aggressive treatment that generates a large number of side effects by attacking absolutely everything they encounter. This forces us to rethink the strategy. For this, it has been thought in immunotherapy Basically what it does is ‘wake up’ our natural defenses so that it can attack the tumor with its own tools. Something that It is personalized for each individual. by extracting, for example, their T lymphocytes to ‘reprogram’ them and make them fight against the tumor, which is nothing more than their own cells. But the next step requires this specificity with greater potency than the stimulated immune system can provide. And this forces us to look for new therapies that have a similar mechanism, although it goes further in the way of applying the drug to the target cells. And this is where we are in the fight against cancer. The goal of treatment. Precisely the future focuses on personalized treatments for each of the patients who have cancer in their body, without having to generalize with a drug for one type of tumor. This is achieved with treatments that are considered ‘remote-controlled missiles’ or ‘Trojan horses’ that promise greater specificity when attacking a tumor cell and leaving the body’s healthy cells ‘calm’. But always taking into account the particular characteristics of a person’s tumor. This is what is achieved with ADCs which are designed like a missile with lethal precision. Its mission is to deliver an explosive charge of chemotherapy into the tumor cell, largely ignoring healthy cells, and the results are promising in the early phases of research, demonstrating its great potential to cure more patients in the early stages. That’s how they work. The technology behind ADCs (Antibody-Drug Conjugates) is as elegant as it is powerful. It is made up of three key parts: The antibody that acts as the guidance system. A monoclonal antibody designed in a laboratory to search and fit like a key in a lock to specific proteins, a kind of “antennae” (receptors), which are found massively on the surface of tumor cells. And the point is that each tumor cell has different ‘antennas’ and that is why it is important to find the most suitable antibody. The payload, which we can assume is our ‘warhead’ which is a very powerful chemotherapy molecule and so toxic that it often cannot be administered in normal chemotherapy mode due to the large effects it has. So, here we are combining chemotherapy with immunotherapy. The linker. A mechanism that binds the antibody and the cargo so that it can travel ‘comfortably’ through the blood until it reaches its target tissue. The process is pure military strategy: the ADC travels through the body, the antibody detects its target (the cancer cell), anchors to it and the cell, deceived, absorbs it. Once inside, the linker breaks and releases the chemotherapy, annihilating the malignant cell from within and without affecting the ‘neighbors’. A before and after. At the congress of the European Society of Medical Oncology (ESMO 2025) without a doubt this treatment has been on the lips of many experts. And it is logical seeing the good results that have been reported in this regard. You just have to see a recent study published in the prestigious magazine New England Journal of Medicine that confirms that this ADC such as trastuzumab deruxtecan is more effective than conventional chemotherapy in cases of metastatic HER2+ breast cancer, showing improvements from 7 to almost 10 months without tumor progression. Another treatment, sacituzumab govitecan, also has shown important results before him triple negative breast cancerwhich is one of the most aggressive and could have the worst prognosis. The result is also very promising: an improvement in survival and quality of life. The hidden side. Like all cutting-edge technology, ADCs are not without challenges. They are not harmless. One of the geniuses behind these studies, the Spanish Javier Cortés pointed out to the side effects that could occur, mainly diarrhea and lowered defense. This made him have to point out that “in general, Trojan horses give a toxicity that, in relation to traditional chemotherapy, is usually somewhat better.” But there is also another front ahead: in some patients with this treatment the tumor continues to grow. The investigation now focuses on understanding it: The tumor cell receptors may mutate and are not the appropriate target, the chemo release mechanism within the cell may fail, or the tumor may simply be resistant to that particular chemo. The future. What is being targeted right now is the possibility of mixing ADCs with immunotherapy or even combining several ADCs with each other. But where things get more interesting is the possibility of loading these ‘Trojan horses’ with radioligands, that is, rradioactive dioisotopes to apply radiotherapy very selective on cancer cells. In this way, a wide range of possibilities open up for the treatment of cancer. Images | Angiola Harry National Cancer Institute In Xataka | Colon cancers are increasing alarmingly among young people. We have a suspect: sedentary lifestyle

Ukrainian troops need something much simpler and more urgent than Tomahawks missiles: cheap cars

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The month of October began with a trip from Ukraine to the United States and a very specific goal: Tomahawks. The request was as simple as it was dangerous: kyiv requested Washington’s long-range missile to counter Moscow’s attacks. The problem was that this implied crossing a red line that could raise the Russian war escalation. In the end there will be no Tomahawksat least for now, and the truth is that the Ukrainian army has other priorities right now. The visible and the decisive. He told in an extensive report the kyiv Independent that, in Western public debate, the war is projected around long range missileslegislative packages and iconic systemsbut at the level where the war decides the pace (the axes of infiltration, fine logistics and human replenishment) Ukraine is losing because of elementary things. Namely: cars that last only two weeks, drones that are lost faster than they are replaced, and units that are emptied of men before they are emptied of ammunition. In that tactical layer, the tomahawk It does not resolve that a company that must simultaneously transport personnel, food and ammunition has only one vehicle and must choose what to sacrifice each day. The priority: cars. The anecdote of the recruit Ihor in the middle summarized The pattern: three consecutive FPVs against the same vehicle until it is immobilized. The average life of a car in the front is about a monthsometimes two weeks, and each destruction not only takes away mobility but also room for maneuver: without redundancy, each rotation forces us to stretch positions and that exhausts men faster than the ammunition itself. That’s why what they ask they are carsas cheap as possible, but that work. Hence the heavy armor are not a solution (They become priority targets and are less agile than, for example, an old car that accelerates and disappears). In short, what is needed is not weight but number to absorb losses without collapsing the logistics cycle. Drones and sensors. Ukraine uses the order of 9,000 drones a daywith a devastating impact at low cost, but also loses at an industrial rate by electronic warfare and operational consumption. Without enough reconnaissance drones, the “line of sight” contracts to five kilometers and they are left blind to disrupting Russian flows. Some units have a surplus, but others lack the basics: the deficit is not only volume but of distributionand the structural deficiency is not being absorbed by the State but by decreasing donations and the pockets of the troops. Without spare part. The biggest deficiency is, of course, human: hardened brigades that are not refilled, rotations that do not rotate, training centers without means that even train with stones instead of real grenades. Mobilization is politically taboo. The national media recalled that 30% of those mobilized He is not fit and part of the rest are returns from absentees. Thus, even when there is a drone and platform, the pilot is missing. Russia, on the other hand, replenishes its human mass every month. Ukraine stretches the same bodies more weeks under greater drone saturation, and structural fatigue is cumulative and irreversible. System fails. If you also want, the photograph does not describe an army without technology but rather a system with “holes” in its redundancy layer: where there should be five vehicles there is oneand where there should be ten drones per section there is one too, and where there should be a wave of trained reserves arrives a tiny fraction. Plus: where the same men should be relieved every certain cycle, they are kept for months due to lack of substitutes. That is the plane where continuity is resolved: without those cars that are requested, without density of eyes in the air and without competent human replenishment, each meter becomes more expensive than each missile. Trivial lack. It ended media report emphasizing an idea. It is not that the Tomahawk don’t matter (they matter for the purposes of depth and possible future negotiation), is that its strategic effect is diluted if the lower network that supports the line is detached due to cheap shortcomings. Victory today is less like who introduces a miraculous system first than who can continue to move people, food, ammunition and sensors until the last kilometer without breaking the human machine that executes it. Therefore, for those in the trenches, the priority is not the long-range missile that will appear on the front page of all the media, but rather the unglamorous resources that keep alive the ability to continue fighting the next day. Starting with a car that simply works. Image | Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Pexels In Xataka | Russia’s biggest threat in Ukraine is not a drone or a missile. It is a film agency with 30 secret floors In Xataka | There is something more disturbing than “a Chernobyl”: it is a flying Chernobyl, it is in the hands of Russia and it is already testing it

Ukraine has opened Russia’s cruise and ballistic missiles. War is impossible if your allies make weapons for you

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He fed up with Ukraine with the hole that exists around international sanctions it is palpable and numeric. kyiv intelligence has hundreds of reports in your possession that reveal that Russian drones have passed those sanctions for the lining. And not just drones, even in the tanks. The latest: Ukraine has begun analyzing parts of Moscow’s latest cruise and ballistic missiles. And what they found is a deja vu. Clandestine circuit. Three and a half years after the start of the invasion, Ukraine continues to dismantle the last Russian missiles and drones and find tens of thousands of parts inside made in the westthe majority of his “allies” (microcontrollers, sensors, connectors, converters) from countries that have theoretically embargoed the supply: United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan. Of course also, Moscow’s allies like china. In fact, Zelensky put in more than 100,000 the foreign components found only among 550 vectors used in a single recent bombing, confirming that the sanctions have not turned off the tap: if anything they have made it more expensive and slowed down, but not dried up. The escape mechanism. It we have counted before. The mode of entry does not require sophisticated espionage, but rather exploiting loopholes in global trade: pieces “dual use” sold to civil actors who then they deviatecomponents placed on the market before sanctions, networks of shell companies and brokers in lax jurisdictions, and triangulated purchases via third countries that do not apply or execute controls. The sanctions gave the West three years to close the gaps, but they also gave Russia (and those who traffic for it) the same time to learn to get around them. In practice, it is a market: if you pay more, there is always someone willing to move the merchandise with layers of opacity sufficient to break traceability. Iran and North Korea. Moscow relies on two veterans of the sanctioning regime: Iran (which has spent decades refining the engineering of commercial border hopping) and North Korea (capable of moving components and complete systems despite being formally embargoed). Cooperation with both not only transfers material: it transfers method. Both logistical routes and corporate and financial camouflage techniques now migrate to the Russian military supply chain. What is possible and what is not. They remembered on Insider that the West hardens the perimeter: compliance guides for companies, “catch-all” to block sensitive exports (even if they are not listed), border inspections, criminal threat to repeat offenders, closures of loopholes when Ukraine identifies specific pieces. But even so, the regime is not airtight: global trade in components is massive, triangulation via third countries It is structural and already exists “pirate” production replacement that replicates or falsifies sanctioned parts. By design, control is reactive: it is as if each new closure encourages Moscow to seek an alternative route. Partial effectiveness. Plus: just because embargoes haven’t cut off the flow doesn’t mean they’re irrelevant. London estimates that the sanctions have deprived Russia of at least 450,000 million of dollars and have multiplied by up to six the price of dual pieces, draining war liquidity and adding temporary friction to the Russian military chain. This, a priori, penalizes rhythms, quality, scaling and maintenance, even if it does not prevent the material from arriving. The structural limit. If you want, the export control It is an instrument of soft power: its real power depends on what the rest of the world is willing to do and tolerate. It can raise the cost, strangle necks, penalize intensities, but it can hardly seal an economy-state Russian size connected to global intermediaries willing to charge for the risk. The result is an industrial war where the blockade is never binary (flows / does not flow), but rather marginal: raising the cost per Russian shot, reducing the cadence, pushing failures due to logistical stress and buy time, but hardly prevent a chip made for a laptop I ended up controlling the guidance of a kamikaze drone over a Ukrainian city. Image | Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation In Xataka | After Cubans and North Koreans fighting alongside Russian troops, new guests have appeared in Ukraine: Chinese In Xataka | In 2023, a pilot from Ukraine had an idea for Star Wars. Not only did it go well: his kamikaze plan has rewritten the war manual

Ukraine has returned from the US with two bad news, and the least of it is the Tomahawk missiles

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Last Friday it was supposed to take place a nuclear meeting for the future of war in ukraine. However, what happened in the White House ended up being less a diplomatic exercise than a scene of head-on collision: a president demanding territorial capitulation from an invaded country, a president refusing to give up what he still defends under fire, and a third absent actor marking the remote script of what Trump repeated with a literality that blurred any pretense of mediation. Concessions and threats. He had exclusive the financial times that Trump discarded the maps of the front, repeated that the war was not such but a “special operation” in Putin’s words, and urged Zelensky to accept the loss of Donetsk and the entire Donbas as the price of peace, warning that “If Putin wants, he will destroy you.” The conversation degeneratedapparently in shouts and ultimatum language, with the Ukrainian delegation attempting achieve Tomahawks (denied) while listening to arguments identical to those from Moscow put forward one day before to Trump himself. The American president even verbalized in public, already on Air Force One, the solution of freezing the war “where the lines are,” leaving negotiations on territory “for later.” The Russian proposal. Putin, in his previous call, demanded total surrender of Donetsk (a military objective that Moscow has failed to achieve in eleven years of combined war) offering as a counterpart only parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia that it currently controls precariously. For Ukraine, surrender the eastern bastion without combat (key to containing a penetration towards the Dnieper and kyiv) it is unacceptable because it would be equivalent to dynamiting the strategic defense of the entire country and, in psychological and political terms, to legitimizing a violent annexation project active since 2014. Trump and the European reading. trump had hinted Weeks ago that Ukraine could recover “everything and more,” and that Russia was a “paper tiger,” he now maintains that Moscow “has gained property” and should be given some credit. The literal echo of Putin’s points in Trump’s words dissipated among allies the hope of reopening the arms route and revealed that the matrix of the negotiation that Washington is pushing is no longer symmetrical but asymmetrical: downward pressure on the invaded and assumption of the invader’s premise. Russian internal calculation. For Ukrainian analysts, Donetsk’s demand does not so much seek to maximize territorial gain as to induce a sociopolitical fracture within Ukraine: forcing the leadership to consider what society will not tolerate to open an axis of internal delegitimization. Putin, in fact, already knows the social impossibility of barter, and that is why he insists: the desired cost is the erosion of cohesion rather than the line on the map. The Ukrainian position. Zelenskiy confirmed after the meeting that I would agree to freeze the front in its current location as a condition for entering talks, but stressed that there will not be additional delivery of territory. Considers that any negotiation must start with an immediate cessation on the line of contact, not with prior territorial modifications in favor of the aggressor. Trump’s public statements and the prospect of a Trump-Putin meeting in Budapest They do not alter that principle: without prior freezing and without forced concession, there is no viable dialogue. Tactical horizon. Ukraine enters winter under massive attacks on your energy infrastructure while responding by hitting Russian refineries. The lack of long range missiles from Washington after the call with Putin limits its capacity for deep counter-escalation just when Moscow is looking for time, social fatigue and diplomatic fracture. kyiv, in the absence of immediate alternatives, indicates that a ceasefire on current lines would be acceptable as a table key, but not the surrender of Donetsk as an entry passport. Peace on demand. If you will, the scheme that has emerged from this sequence (Putin-Trump call, Trump-Zelensky meeting, territorial barter proposal and appeal to the “agreement” freezing positions) places Ukraine before a conditional peace that recognizes the violence of annexation as a fait accompli and requires the invaded to formalize it. The ukrainian reaction (freeze, negotiate, but not give in) is the last dam between an end to the fire and an end to the State in the political-strategic sense. The meeting did not bring closer an equitable end to the war: it clarified the type of end that certain architecture is willing to accept, even if it does not say it out loud. Image | Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, NARA In Xataka | The factories of deep America have reopened. And they all make the same “toy”: an army of combat drones In Xataka | The crazy number of drones has turned the Ukrainian sky into the M-30 at rush hour. Identifying the enemy is a danger

has bought more missiles from the US in just two years than in the entire last century

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For months, Washington made Spain his example of disobedience within NATO. Trump came to threaten with punishment trade due to the “low” military spending, while Brussels and La Moncloa they defended their own pace of investment and warned that public accounts could not sustain an uncontrolled escalation. But behind that diplomatic struggle and there was something more to the reproaches exchanged. A “bill” that belittles both, and that reveals a very different story about how far Spain went to appease its most powerful ally. The tariff threat. It all started with an angry warning from the White House: Donald Trump, irritated for the rejection of Pedro Sánchez to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP, publicly stated “punish” Spain with tariffs. The threat, which occurred after a summit with Javier Milei in Washington, marked a new level of political pressure on a historic ally. The American president accused Madrid of “taking advantage” of NATO protection without contributing enough and, in a mix of bravado and electoral calculation, he hinted that he could turn the budget dispute into a commercial front. Behind the rhetoric there was an intention deeper: force Europe to finance the containment of Russia with its own resources and, in the process, prop up the military industry United States. The answer. Neither the European Commission nor the Spanish Government took long to respond. Brussels remembered that trade policy is the exclusive competence of the Union and that any attempt to penalize a Member State would have consequences. Madrid, for its part, took pains to emphasize that its military spending had grown more than double in just seven years (from 0.98% of GDP in 2017 to 2% in 2025) and that the debate was not about spending more as a slogan, but about doing it with a strategic sense and within the real capabilities of the country. At the same time, Spain insisted that it contributes to collective deterrence and that its budget increase, although more gradual than that desired by Washington, is part of a structural modernization of its Armed Forces. However, between the lines, the tension reflected something further: the fear that North American demands would end up conditioning the industrial and technological orientation of European defense. The silent turn. And neither one thing nor the other. The diary El País has published figures that confirm what until recently was just intuition: Spain has purchased more American weapons in the last two years than in almost a century. Between 2023 and 2024, the Spanish Government ordered military material for more than 4,500 millions of euros to the United States, a quarter of everything acquired since 1950. The contracts include Patriot systems, MH-60R helicopters and auxiliary equipment that represents the largest volume of expenditure with a single supplier in the recent history of Spanish defense. According to the DSCA (Defense Security Cooperation Agency), sales to Spain reached 2,907 million of dollars in 2024 and 1,682 million the previous year. In other words: while Washington was publicly denouncing the lack of commitment, Madrid was carrying out one of the largest purchasing operations in its history, channeling billions into the US military industry. The geopolitical context. The rebound coincides with the new cycle of European rearmament after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the same one has shot the military budgets of all of NATO. In this context, Spain has accelerated the modernization of its forces with additional spending of 10,471 million of euros in 2025, advancing the goal of 2% of GDP by four years. To finance it, the Executive has resorted to zero interest loans, industrial modernization programs and R&D items, a financial framework that allows keep spending without reform general budgets. However, this expansion has a reverse: the strengthening of technological dependence on the United States, which is consolidating itself as the main supplier of critical systems and reducing the room for maneuver to advance European strategic autonomy. Budget pragmatism. If you also want, the contrast between the Trump threats and the flow contract record with American companies illustrates the balance that Spain has tried to maintain: resisting the public discourse of punishment while, in practice, meeting Washington’s strategic demands and covering its own operational shortcomings. The result could not be more paradoxical. In the eyes of NATO, Madrid meets faster than expected, and in the eyes of its European partners, it risks weakening efforts to consolidate a common industrial base. The movement also redefines the bilateral relationship with Washington, which goes from rhetoric of reproach to the pragmatism of the transaction: while the North American president shows political muscleyour industry reaps the benefits. A lesson. The truth is that the history of these two years reveals how defense decisions, beyond percentages and headlines, are a geopolitical currency. Spain has demonstrated the ability to respond to external pressures without breaking its internal narrative, but the long-term cost (dependency, industrial coherence and technological autonomy) has yet to be measured. Thus, in essence, the question is once again the same as always: whether Europe can rearm itself without falling back into the old pattern of industrial subordination that for decades fueled the transatlantic divide. Spain, with its purchasing record to the American “friend” and his sovereignty speechembodies that contradiction today: that of a continent that seeks independence, but keep buying their safety on the other side of the Atlantic. Image | Kelly Michaels, BORN In Xataka | The US no longer has to worry about Spain or the rearmament bill in Europe. Germany had a plan B In Xataka | Spain committed to investing 2% of GDP in Defense but is not looking for soldiers: it needs 96,000 qualified employees

The US studied what would happen if it enters war with China. Now he has started a career desperate to double missiles

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When China raised the curtain of your military parade staged much more than arms power which has. It was a clear and direct message that had its reaction a few days later, when the United States moved its new platform from missiles to Japan. It was then discovered that, if missiles, there are 3,500 pointing In the same direction. Since then, the United States has started a desperate race: to double its own missile manufacturing for what may happen. The strategic awakening. I told it in an exclusive The Wall Street Journal. The Pentagon has turned on all alarms in the face of the evidence that its missile arsenals would not reach to sustain a prolonged conflict With China. Russian Ukraine invasion and mass consumption of interceptors In Europe the fragility of the American industrial base had already made clear. However, He counted the medium What was the twelve between Israel and Iran, in which Washington launched Hundreds of high -end missiles to support their ally, which finished emptying the deposits and precipitated a shock plan. The message that circulates in the pentagon’s offices is clear: the current arsenal is not enough to defend Taiwan or the allied bases in the Pacific if a direct confrontation with Beijing explodes. The new creation. To face that reality, the Department of Defense has created an extraordinary body, the Munits Acceleration Councilpersonally directed by Deputy Secretary Steve Feinberg, who calls the main executives of the industry every week to demand immediate increases. The strategy seeks to duplicate, and even quadruplethe production of the twelve missiles considered critical: from the Patriot interceptorsto him Standard Missile-6the Long Range Anti-Ship Missilesthe Precision Strike and the Joint Air-Surface Standoff Missiles. The Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegesh, and the Chief of the General Staff, General Dan Caine, They have presided Meetings with giants such as Lockheed Martin, Raytheon or Boeing, but also with new actors such as Anduril Industries and with key component suppliers, from solid propellants to batteries. The destroyer of guided missiles USS John Paul Jones (DDG-53) of the United States Navy launches an RIM-174 Standard Eram (Standard Missile-6, SM-6) The industrial bottleneck. The challenge is monumental. The complete manufacture of a missile can take up to two years. The production lines have cooled after decades of divestment, secondary suppliers have disappeared and critical pieces such as Boeing front search engines have become true bottlenecks. Expanding shifts, add square meters and form specialized personnel require billions of investment and firm purchase commitments. As Experts remembercompanies do not produce without contract: they need guarantees that the pentagon will not withdraw financing in the middle of the effort. Even so, some suppliers have taken steps in advance. Northrop Grumman, for example, has invested More than 1 billion in expanding its rocket engines capacity, with the expectation of doubling production in four years. Patriot Priority: Patriot. The most urgent case is the Patriot PAC-3whose global demand has shot himself. In September, the army gave Lockheed a contract of almost 10,000 million of dollars to manufacture 2,000 missiles in three years, but the objective of the pentagon is to reach that same figure Every twelve monthswhich means quadruple the current rhythm. To do this, Boeing has been seen forced to expand Thousands of square meters of its plant to assemble more search engines, while Lockheed studies new investments in assembly lines. The spokesmen insist that they can deliver above their declared capacity, but all claim more money and multiannual commitments that give stability to the productive jump. Precision Strike Missile New acquisition model. The pressure is such that The army announces “Massively substantive changes” in the way of buying weapons. Formulas such as licenseing technologies to third parties are explored, attract private capital or guarantee registration programs to give demand visibility to the entire supply chain. Trump administration already It allocated 25,000 million extra in five years through Big, Beautiful Billbut analysts agree that it will be necessary to multiply For several orders that figure to meet the objectives. The effort, in addition, is part of a greater debate: how to maintain an industrial base capable of sustaining high intensity wars in a world where arsenals are consumed in weeks. Background: China. The ultimate reason for this acceleration is the perspective of a War in the Pacific. A confrontation By Taiwan I would demand simultaneously American and Allied Bases, guarantee maritime runners and face a Chinese Navy increasingly equipped with hypersonic missiles and drons swarms. American superiority will depend not only on the quality of its systems, but on their ability to replace them quickly in case of prolonged conflict. Pentagon fears Discover too late that does not have the necessary volume to hold the pulse. Hence the race against clock to turn the industry into a large -scale war arsenal. The risk of the gap. The acceleration effort reveals the structural contradiction of the West: weapons every time more sophisticated and faces which are consumed at an industrial rate, in front of adversaries willing to flood the battlefield with solutions of low cost and mass production. In that sense, Ukraine’s lesson seems clear: millions of millions of dollars They can be exhausted In a matter of months, and rebuild reserves it has been. If the United States wants to maintain its deterrence against China, it must demonstrate that it can sustain not only technological innovation, but also the mass production on which the survival of its network of alliances depends. Image | Lockheed Martin, Mapn, Us Navy In Xataka | Satellite images have revealed that China has turned its oriental coast into a war zone: 3,500 missiles point to Taiwan In Xataka | After the demonstration of China’s force, the US moves a card sending its new missile platform to Japan

3,500 missiles point to Taiwan

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In the month of July he gave himself A situation which could pass perfectly through the stage of the filming of an action movie. In the early hours of a Monday, the stations of one meter began to fill, but instead of passengers loaded with wallets and suitcases, military, soldiers and more soldiers armed with anti -tanks. The place gave us an idea that this was not a movie, it was a simulation for what can happen: Taiwan. In fact, that possibility seems closer than ever from space. A huge display. I told this week The New York Times. Satellite images show that China is transforming its coast against Taiwan into a vast missile launch platform that constitutes the cornerstone of Xi Jinping strategy to force reunification and, at the same time, challenge US military power in Asia. He Pentagon estimates that the arsenal of the missile force, responsible for nuclear and conventional vectors, has increased by 50% in just four years until reaching about 3,500 units. Although the exact number of missiles located directly in front of the Strait is not known, the images leave no doubt: expanded bases, with tens of additional launch ramps and new facilities in key provinces such as Anhui or Jiangxi. New generation missiles. Among the displayed systems are the Dongfeng-17a hypersonic missile with great maneuvering capacity and difficult to interceptand the Dongfeng-26, known as The “Guam Express” due to its reach to US bases in the Pacific. These missiles can carry both conventional and nuclear heads and are transportable by road, which increases their mobility and complicates their tracking by enemy intelligence. The pentagon calculates that Beijing already has half a thousand df-26which makes this weapon a pillar of its strategy of denial of access against US forces in Guam, Japan or aircraft carrier deployed in the region. Exercises, deployments and messages. Practices on the Oriental China Coast They include simulated releases From agricultural fields, hidden or esplanade valleys next to highwayswhich demonstrates an effort to integrate missiles into the field in a flexible and dispersed way. The Times told that maneuvers have a double function: operational preparation and political signal. For Taiwan, the message is that resisting would be useless before an overwhelming arsenal; For Washington, that intervening would be too expensive. It is not, therefore, only military capacity: missiles They are the starting point of any Chinese coercion strategy and, in peace times, function as an instrument of intimidation through parades, tests and public exhibitions, such as The recent in Beijing in which missiles were Hypersonic and new ICBM. Expansion of Brigades 611 and 616. Brigade 611, in Anhui, ha Duplicate its size With training facilities, simulated tunnels and up to three dozen launch ramps, an unusually dense concentration that underlines the importance of the enclave. There, Xi Jinping It appeared Personally in 2024 to encourage troops to maintain a “crisis and combat mentality.” Further south, in Jiangxi, Brigade 616 is He has prepared To receive to DF-17with Adapted hangars to the dimensions of the new hypersonic missile. These deployments show how the Chinese oriental coast becomes a network of offensive nodes designed to saturate Taiwanese defenses and threaten United States facilities in minutes. Nuclear dimension and risks. The DF-26 Encarna the strategic ambiguity of Beijin, being able to equip yourself indistinctly With nuclear eyelets or conventional. Although American satellites could detect the transfer of nuclear heads from central deposits to these brigades, experts warn that the process It is not infallible And leave a very dangerous margin of uncertainty. A conflict around Taiwan would have, from the first moment, a Latent nuclear dimension. This ambiguity increases the risk of calculation errors and rapid climbing, especially if Washington decides to attack mobile pitchers in Chinese continental territory, which would mean a serious political and military decision. Drills and objectives. The Desert construction West of China of models of US warships and warships, some mounted on rails To simulate movement, confirms that Chinese missiles are not prepared only for static scenarios on land, but also to beat the US Navy In open sea. Chinese military plans plan to disperse mobile pitchers in caves and camouflaged locations, shoot and retreat, in a wear set to saturate and exhaust enemy antimisile defenses. Recent studies They conclude that the US air bases in Asia, many without sufficient reinforced shelters could be devastated in the first bars of a contest. Limits and vulnerabilities. The brilliant increase in capacities has not been exempt from problems. Scandals of corruption and purges internal have splashed to the missile force, and the Pentagon reports They alert that the quality of some nuclear infrastructure could be compromised. In addition, despite advances in radars and satellites, doubts persist about the efficacy of missiles in real combat conditions, especially against moving ships, where tactical uncertainty is much greater than against fixed objectives on land. The missile as a nucleus of power. If you want also, the accumulation of thousands of missiles on the coast Oriental reflects the conviction of Xi Jinping that the future of the Taiwanese issue goes through the coercion and threat of force use. That so -called as missile strength It is, in words of analyststhe “Crown Jewel” of the Popular Liberation Army: an instrument that expands the Chinese projection to the entire Western Pacific complicates any calculation of US intervention and places Taiwan under constant pressure. The “but” is that, the same strategy that seeks to ensure success, also contains the risk of a calculation error by precipitating a escalation nuclear unprecedented from the Cold War. Image | Maxar Technologies, Nara In Xataka | Taiwan has had an idea if Beijing invades her: surprise China underground In Xataka | While China debate about Taiwan, Europe does not waste time. Its greatest port has left a hole for war

In 1980 Europe manufactured 700 aircraft to fumigate crops. Now they carry guided air-air missiles to “fumigate” Russian drones

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After more than three years since the Russian invasion in Ukraine, the war has transformed many of the conceptions that had modern battles. We do not speak just about technological advanceswhere The drones and the AI They have become fundamental pieces that the rest of the powers will apply to their defenses, but also from that artillery mixture of the past where The ingenuity (Due to lack of resources) it has been equally key. The latestfarm planes. Another improvised defense. Yes, Ukraine has incorporated a new piece into its arsenal of improvised solutions against drones: an agricultural plane ZLIN Z-137 AGRO TURBO MODIFIED To carry missiles Aire-Aire R-73one under each wing. This apparatus, normally used for crop fumigation, retains its civil aircraft silhouette, but It has been repainted With a military gray scheme and white stripes in the rear fuselage to reduce the risk of friendly fire. The video which shows its flush flight over a Ukrainian cornless does not require date or place, but confirms that the country continues to take advantage of resources available to reinforce its air defense. Designed in Czechoslovakia as a turboproproproprobous evolution of the Z-37 čmelák, the Z-137 entered into service in the 1980s and were manufactured More than 700 unitswidely used in the eastern block. The exact amount that could be available for Ukraine is uncertain, as well as the operational state of this armed specimen. The R-73 missile and its role in hybrid systems. He R-73called AA-11 Archer by NATO, is a short-range missile with high maneuverability infrared search engine and ability to hook whites up to 75 ° outside the front axle with the help of hull viewers. His Maximum range It is about 30 km against front and 14 km targets against whites in pursuit. Ukraine has reused him in multiple improvised platforms known Like Frankensamincluding land systems such as The serioushawkvehicles Osa antiacera Modified and Naval Drones Be dragon. The integration in the Z-137 seems to use APU-73, although no external sensors are observed, which suggests that the pilot would have to maneuver to place the objective within the field of vision of the missile, or that the installation of a flir system for day and night operations is contemplated. The connection of the plane to the National Surveillance Network, with radars, observers and acoustic sensors, would allow to receive Radio or Digital Link data For interception. Additional loads and future adaptations. In addition to missiles, the device shows cylindrical deposits or containers In internal supports whose function is not clear. They could be remains of their agricultural function, supplementary fuel tanks, weapons pods or auxiliary equipment. Its structure could adapt to other missiles already delivered to Ukraine, such as British Asraam, Sidewinder Americans or even AIM-9X latest generation. This versatility makes it a test bench to integrate weapons into platforms not originally designed for air combat, maintaining a low cost and a quick deployment. Tactical function and limitations. A plane of this type, although much slower than a hunt or an attack helicopter, could serve as “air picket” In specific areas, patrolling sectors where drone activity is foreseen and reacting to low -cost incursions for the enemy. Its limited speed reduces the ability to intercept multiple objectives at a great distance, but in delimited areas its presence It could be decisive. Operations of this type would be complemented with other media, from mobile equipment with machine guns and spotlights to complexes Patriot systemsusing each resource according to the threat detected. Strategic context and value in the wear war. Plus: the adaptation of Z-137 reflects the constant pressure that Ukraine suffers to defend against a high volume of Russian drones, especially The Shahedand the need to allocate the most advanced anti -aircraft systems to threats of greater entity. Faced with the shortage of modern batteries, these improvised solutions serve as a containment force, maintaining a balance between cost and effectiveness. The ability to build civil platforms with military missiles demonstrates a high degree of operational and technical flexibility, and emphasizes that in a prolonged war the war Inventiveness and speed of adaptation can be as decisive as technological sophistication. International precedents and parallels. Finally, we must remember that the use of agricultural aircraft for military functions is not exclusive to Ukraine. The United States Air Force recently introduced The OA-1K Skyraider IIa militarized version of Air Tractor at-802although with a different role and even in definition. Both in this case and in the Z-137 Ukrainianthe central idea is to take advantage of simple and resistant platforms as armament vectors, something that Russia has also tested with rudimentary solutions such as fixed weapons under slow aircraft wings. A trend that reflects A global pattern: In a scenario where drone threats proliferate, even aircraft designed for agricultural tasks can become armed hunters. Image | X, VITALY V. KUZMIN In Xataka | Russia has had an idea to make your kamikaze drones more lethal: launch them on Ukraine at 500 km/h In Xataka | Russia’s most advanced nuclear submarine was a secret. Until Ukraine has revealed everything, even his failures

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