drones

China studied the secret of falcons to hunt their prey. Now your drones only need 5 seconds against their targets

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Throughout history, armies have always observed nature to learn to hunt, defend themselves and coordinate better, from way to attack in group to the selection of the weakest enemy. Today, that old military tradition makes sense again in a radically different context, one marked by algorithmsautonomous machines and a new technological race that is reminiscent of other great military leaps of the past. AI as the axis of combat. In this scenario it appears China, which is systematically promoting the use of artificial intelligence in the military sphere, especially in swarms of drones and autonomous systems capable of operating with little or almost no no human intervention. counted the wall street journal this week that they are in possession of patents, academic papers and procurement documents showing that the People’s Liberation Army sees future warfare as an environment dominated by algorithms, where swarms replace individual platforms and the mass of cheap systems can overwhelm defenses, attack targets and resist electronic warfare. The Ukrainian experience reinforces this vision by demonstrating that drones are already decisive and that autonomy becomes increasingly valuable when human control degrades. Learn about animals. To solve how to coordinate swarms in real time, Chinese researchers are modeling algorithms inspired in animal behavior. For example, in an experiment developed at Beihang University, defensive drones trained as “hawks” They learned to identify and destroy the most vulnerable targets, while attacking drones imitated “pigeons” to avoid threats. In a five-on-five simulation, the defenders They eliminated all the attackers in just 5.3 seconds. Beyond the success of the results, the interest was in the method: adapt hunting, escape and animal cooperation rules to realistic combat scenarios, where drones fly, maneuver and make decisions under pressure. Mass production. The Chinese bet combines these algorithmic advances with a clear industrial advantage: factories capable of producing hundreds of thousands or millions of cheap drones per year. This allows us to think of swarms as a main weapon and not as a complement, something much more difficult for, for example, the United States, which produce fewer drones and at a much higher cost. Systems such as mobile launchers of dozens of drones, mother models capable of releasing swarms in flight or even “robot wolves” Armed forces show a doctrine oriented towards coordinated quantity, not individual technological excellence. Centralized control. The appeal of autonomy also reflects a structural distrust in the capabilities of Chinese middle managers, a recognized problem for years by the political and military leadership itself. The swarms controlled by algorithms They fit better with a centralized command culture, where decisions are designed from the top and executed without improvisation. For Beijing, AI offers a way to compensate for the lack of real combat experience and reduce reliance on human commanders in chaotic situations. One soldier, 200 drones. Added to this line of development is the massive deployment capacity that the People’s Liberation Army has begun to publicly display, with tests in which a single operator is capable of supervising swarms of more than 200 drones released in a very short time. In images and data released According to Chinese state television, the drones, trained through simulations and real flights, are capable of flying in precise formations, dividing reconnaissance, distraction and attack tasks, and changing functions on the fly thanks to autonomous algorithms that allow them “negotiate” among themselves without constant human orders. The implicit message is clear: China is not only investigating how to make swarms more intelligent, but how to put them in the air on a large scale with very few personnel, a force multiplier that reinforces its commitment to coordinated quantity as a central feature of its future doctrine. In the background, Taiwan. Of course, the approach is not without risks: Systems can fail under real conditions, be neutralized by countermeasures or, at the opposite extreme, make lethal decisions that are difficult to explain or control. Even so, the WSJ reported that the documents and analysis suggest that one of the most likely scenarios for the use of those chinese swarms It would be a conflict around Taiwan, where they could be used to saturate air defenses, locate targets and facilitate subsequent attacks. The result is a dangerous race, in which China seems to advance rapidly despite the uncertainties, bringing closer a type of war that until recently seemed pure science fiction. Image | USFWS Mountain-Prairie日本防衛省・統合幕僚監部 In Xataka | China’s new futuristic drone is already flying alongside the J-20 fighters. And Beijing has shown it without saying a word In Xataka | China has just crossed the same red line as Russia: for the first time, a military drone has invaded Taiwan’s airspace

Ukraine sensed that there was a superpower behind Russia’s kamikaze drones. The surprise is that there are actually two

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Many phases have passed since the Russian invasion in 2022 until today, but if one thing has become crystal clear, it is that the war in Ukraine has become a brutal laboratory where drones are the most decisive and fastest weapon to improve, to the point of concentrating a huge part of the recent losses and setting the pace of the war of attrition. In this scenario, Ukraine has been asking itself the same question for some time: how does Russia get so many drones? An industrial war. In the current scenario, the front is not only in Donetsk or Kharkiv, but also in industrial parks from Guangdong and Shenzhenwhere processors, cameras, motors, sensors and controllers are made that determine how much a drone flies, what it sees and how accurately it hits. The most disturbing thing here is not only the technological dependence, but the fact that this dependence is shared by both sideswhich turns the supply of parts into a kind of undercurrent that sustains the conflict even when sanctions seek to cut it off. The Geran-5. Now, Ukraine claims have identified a new Russian attack drone, the Geran-5which breaks with the classic “delta wing” type profile associated with the Iranian Shahed and adopts a shape more similar to a conventional aircraft, visually linking it Iranian Karrar and, by extension, to older designs inspired by American systems. The key is that it would be a more powerful and faster jet model, with an estimated speed up to 600 km/hand with tactical ambitions that go beyond the simple cheap “kamikaze drone”: it is attributed a range of about 900 km and an approximate war load of 90 kilos. Ukraine affirms that Russia is studying launching it from Su-25 aircraft to expand your radius of action, as well as explore configurations that include R-73 air-to-air missiles to complicate life for Ukrainian aviation. In other words, Russia is not only multiplying quantity, it is also testing a ladder of sophistication that mixes loitering munitions with concepts closer to a combat UAV. Geran-5 He Deja Vú. The central element, and the most politically controversial, is the list of foreign components that Ukraine claims to have found in the wreckage of the new Geran-5, including more than a dozen western and chinese electronic partswith at least nine attributed to American manufacturers and one identified like german. are mentioned critical components for navigation, communications and control, such as signal processors, clock generators and transceivers, that is, the type of electronics that does not “explode” by itself, but that turns a drone into a reliable, stable and reproducible system. For kyiv, this shows that Russia continues to avoid sanctions structurally, relying on gray markets and supply chains where real traceability is dissolved, and which has a huge machinery behind it headed by two superpowers (China and the US), along with the rest of Western “allies”. The underlying message is simple: modern war is not only won by manufacturing metal and explosives, also getting chipssensors and modules that are cheap, easy to transport and difficult to block without paralyzing global trade. Image provided by GUR showing the partial remains of a Geran-5 China as epicenter. The Financial Times said an almost absurd scene: Ukrainian businessmen visiting Chinese factories with schedules calculated to the second so as not to coincide with Russian buyers, entering through side doors and waiting in corridors, as if the conflict was managed with hotel logistics. The reason is that both armies they need the same parts and they go after the same suppliers because China dominates the material base of the commercial drone: not only does it produce a large part of the drones on the market, it also controls key elements such as cameras, sensors, controllers and propulsion, with costs much lower than Western equivalents. The result is that innovation leaks on both sides almost at the same time: if Ukraine sees a new transmitter on Russian drones, it locates the Chinese manufacturer and tries to buy it. If Ukraine asks for a specific upgrade, you may find that a week later that same supplier offers it to Russia as well. The war thus becomes a race of “components” more than doctrines, and China goes from being a “neutral” country to being the place where it is decided how quickly the conflict evolves. The supply chain. Beijing maintains the public line of neutrality and affirms that it does not supply lethal weapons, that it strictly controls dual-use goods and that its position is “objective and fair.” However, as we have said, the reality It’s different: Even if controls are in place, the system is filled with middlemen, shell companies, opaque routes and deliberate ambiguity about the end user. A market where some exhibitors show platforms with simulated weaponswhere military buyers mix with civilian fairs. In parallel, there is an imbalance of power: Russia, with more resources and priority state, can pay more, buy earlier and secure quotas, leaving Ukraine waiting or forcing it to improvise at the front due to lack of parts. Neutrality, in practice, is not just about prohibiting, but about who can best circumvent the restrictions. How to avoid restrictions. The real circumvention ecosystem works with shipments via indirect routestransportation through third countries, trucks crossing Central Asia with limited controls, and a logistics market specialized in “sensitive merchandise” that continues to operate because the economic incentive is enormous. Plus: the role of regional financial clearing platforms, which facilitate payments for sanctioned productsand the ability to create intermediate entities even in European countries to disguise operations. If you like, sanctions, as they work, introduce friction, but not rupture: they make it more expensive, slow down, force people to hide better, but they do not cut off the flow of chips, motors or cameras. And in a war where an FPV drone can be as decisive as an armoredthat logistical continuity is equivalent to operational continuity on the battlefield. Ukrainian dependency. Ukraine has made a lot of progress in … Read more

military drones with Turgis Gallard

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It is not every day that a car manufacturer steps back into arms production. And even less so when that manufacturer is Renault. The military drone project that is beginning to take shape in France It is not understood as a simple industrial diversification, but as a response to a strategic environment that has changed radically. The war has brought back prominence to mass production, cost reduction and the ability to scale quickly, just the areas where European automotive knows how to navigate. Renault’s turn has a name. The project, known internally as Chorus, aims at a military drone designed for long-distance attack, observation and reconnaissance missions, with a logic of intensive use and contained costs. According to information published by L’Usine Nouvellethe initiative is piloted by the Directorate générale de l’armement (DGA) and seeks to provide France with teleoperated ammunition comparable in concept to the Shahid used by Russia. This approach connects with what the French public debate itself has been assuming since Ukraine: war penalizes those who cannot produce quickly and in volume. An industrial alliance. Chorus is not a solo development nor an industry-driven initiative. The aforementioned medium points out that the technical base of the drone comes from Turgis Gaillardbut it is the DGA that takes control of the program by identifying an operational deficiency and commissioning Renault to provide industrialization capacity. The DGA acts here as client and architect of the project, combining the agility of a defense SME with the scale, costs and processes of a large automobile manufacturer. A key point is that the project is part of the Pacte Drones, a State initiative to boost the military drone industry and better align needs and industrial capacity. What can Renault contribute to the project? Renault’s added value in Chorus is less in the concept of the drone than in how to manufacture it. Sources consulted by L’Usine Nouvelle say that the manufacturer redesigned the device with a dedicated team to eliminate complexities and adapt it to mature industrial processes, with materials derived from automobiles and common assembly line techniques, such as self-piercing riveting. In this same framework, the medium provides the first technical data of the system, a drone of around 10 meters long by 8 meters in wingspan, with a speed of up to 400 km/h and a flight ceiling of 5,000 meters. A historic plant. The Le Mans plant will become the main assembly point for the Chorus drone, although without altering its main automotive activity. Assembly of the drone structure should begin in spring 2025 and will be done on a dedicated chain within the facility. That line would not work permanently, it would only be activated when there are orders, depending on what the DGA requests. The project plans to involve between 100 and 200 employees out of a workforce of around 1,800 people. Even with this flexible scheme, the theoretical capacity could reach 600 drones per month if demand demanded it. The conditions of the contract. The project schedule is marked by a validation phase prior to any large-scale commitment. A first dozen drones are expected to be delivered to the DGA before the summer of 2026 to evaluate the concept in real conditions and the project would be financed mainly with public funds. Only if this phase is satisfactory would the door be opened to a long-term agreement, with an estimated duration of ten years and a volume close to 1,000 million euros, always in potential terms and subject to official confirmation. The decision to accelerate with Chorus comes after realizing that modern warfare penalizes those who cannot produce quickly and in volume. France has assumed that It was behind in consumable drones, just when these systems concentrate a good part of the destruction on the Ukrainian front. The Minister of the Armed Forces, Sébastien Lecornu, spoke in LCI of unprecedented alliances between automotive and defense to correct this gap, and the same article recalls an explicit political recognition of the delay. a few days ago, Emmanuel Macron summed it up like this:“Let’s be clear, we are late.” When Renault already made history. The most direct precedent for Chorus dates back to the First World War, when Renault became one of the protagonists of the FT tank. The Tank Museum remembers that the FT introduced elements that marked modern armored warfare and that the program was stressed by scale, industrial problems and bureaucratic frictions. The museum estimates that 3,177 tanks were produced until the Armistice, after orders that skyrocketed. So Renault’s move with Chorus leaves an open question that goes beyond the drone itself. Whether this orientation towards defense responds to an exceptional situation or marks the beginning of a new stage for the European automotive industry remains to be seen. Images | Xataka with Gemini 3 Pro In Xataka | The “rearmament” of Europe has begun at a Volkswagen factory in Germany: instead of cars they will produce tanks

drones converted into Uber of combat robots

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In Ukraine, the war is transforming at brutal speed due to the massive irruption of drones and robotsmachines and devices that have ceased to be a complement to central part of the fight. Every week they appear new shapes to use them to reconnoitre, attack, evacuate or move supplies without exposing soldiersand that is forcing us to adapt tactics almost in real time. What we did not imagine was to what extent. Cross a line. In Ukraine, this “machine war” has entered a phase as delusional as it is logicalone in which a drone is no longer just a weapon or an eye in the sky, but a means of transportation: Ukrainian soldiers have started using aerial drones as if they were improvised Ubers for combat robots, loading small ground vehicles and dropping them near Russian positions to save time and, above all, blood. The image was described by military commanders to the Insider mediumwhen the soldiers at the front saw with stupefaction and surprise the almost absurd scene (a flying platform carrying another armed platform), but which summarizes better than anything the technological moment of the front: the continuous impossible combinations that are born from a simple and brutal need, to put capabilities on the ground without exposing a human even a second more than is essential. The trick. Here is a company that we have talked before. Ark Roboticswhich supplies autonomous robots to more than 20 brigades, says that this tactic has even surprised its own CEO, Achi, who speaks on Insider under a pseudonym for safety and that when he saw it he reacted with a mixture of disbelief and alarm, before admitting that it made all the sense in the world. A large drone transports a small ground robot forward and “drops” it to deploy it directly where it matters, avoiding the most vulnerable part of the trip, that slow advance over land that exposes the UGV to mines, direct fire, mud, craters and detection. The idea is so simple that it is scary: it is not about inventing a marvel, but about skipping the route that produces casualties, and converting the deployment into something fast and safe for the human operator. Why does it make sense? The reason this madness works is that air and ground combat complement each other in modern warfare: aerial drones are numerous, can cover distances quickly and cross dangerous areas more easily, but they are noisy, visible and need to stay close to observe or attack. Terrestrial robots, on the other hand, they are slow to arrivebut when they are already in position they can do things that cannot be done in the same way from the air: get into trenches, enter shelters, approach without announcing their presence, place explosives, collect intelligence, shoot with more stability and remain hidden next to an enemy point as if they were part of the landscape. That species drone-Uber It precisely solves the bottleneck: it does not improve the robot itself, it improves “how you take it” to the place where it starts to be really dangerous. Ukrainian land robot Crazy innovation… with logic. This type of hybrid shows to what extent the war in Ukraine has become in a laboratory that no longer differentiates between classic categories, because everything is mixed in order to gain seconds and reduce casualties. It’s not just creativity: it’s creativity for survival, squeezing out any tool until you get uses from it that weren’t in the plans. Other manufacturers as Milrem Robotics They have also recognized that the Ukrainians have used their robots in unexpected waysand that pressure from the front is rewriting the design of systems in real time, in cycles of change so rapid that they seem impossible in traditional industry. The cost of speed. The problem for companies like Ark is that this “insane phase” of machine warfare forces them to innovate with a speed that can turn against: If you change too much, you no longer mass produce, and if you produce without changing, you fall behind. Achi describe an almost inhuman pace of iteration, with multiple modifications in weeks, and the permanent risk of following wrong trends that compromise reliability and volume. In practice, war requires them to do two incompatible things at once: experiment as an improvised workshop and manufacture as a real industry. The future that looms. Although hethe terrestrial robots are still a minority in the face of the torrent of aerial drones, the scene with Ark robots makes it clear that it is an expanding sector and that the front is pushing towards a model in which the front line is increasingly supported by machines. The company develops a system called Frontier to coordinate thousands of drones and robots with minimal human intervention, and the idea that floats above everything is as disturbing as it is coherent: if moving people near the front is increasingly absurd, war will tend to move machines, and Ukraine this exploiting that logic in a big way. Image | Ministry of Defense of Ukraine In Xataka | The drone war in Ukraine is scary for a reason: It’s called Sirius-82 and it has turned rivers into modern minefields In Xataka | Ukraine has called in a group of hunters for an unprecedented mission: to prevent Russian missiles from freezing it

Ukraine is proving that kamikaze drones are the future of warfare. And that is why Spain is going to start manufacturing them

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Europe has been talking about defense as an abstract concept for years, but the war in Ukraine turned the threat into something physical and quantifiable: drones, missiles, loitering munitions and a logistics chain under constant fire, forcing NATO to assume that the modern battlefield is a “death zone” where those who do not mass produce are at a disadvantage. And in that equation an unexpected nation has emerged: Spain. The new shield of Europe. To that strategic pressure after the invasion of Russia and the appearance of his ghost fleet An even more uncomfortable factor has been added: the political tension with the United States and the growing sense that the Western security umbrella is no longer It is not an automationbut a negotiation. In this double impulse is born the rush for a European defensive shield (perhaps that repeated drone wall), and not only in radars or interceptors, but in industry, stocks and real response capacity, where manufacturing speed matters as much as quality and where technological sovereignty becomes a survival requirement. The unexpected actor: Spain. In this scenario of rapid rearmament and need for autonomy, Spain aims to go from being a country that buys to being one who producesand also do it with a weapon that defines contemporary war: the kamikaze droneor loitering munition, which watches, waits and strikes with precision at costs much lower than manned aviation or traditional missiles. The move is ambitious because Spain does not compete from the heavy industrial tradition of other European partners, there is no doubt, but from a commitment to the most demanded segmentscalable and urgent of the moment: cheap, numerous, quickly upgradeable platforms and capable of saturating defenses. The political and military thesis seems clear: if Europe’s immediate future is decided by who can produce and replenish drones the fastest, then a country that leads that manufacturing not only wins contracts, also influence. Comparison of UAVs in the international market The Indra-Edge alliance. The core of the movement was in the news yesterday with the agreement between Indra and Emirati giant Edge to create a joint venture focused on the development, production and full lifecycle support of loitering munitions and smart weapons, with an estimated order book of about 2 billion euros annually. There is talk of manufacturing drones and sustained capacity: design, assembly line, maintenance, replacement and scaling, something essential in a type of war where systems are consumed at an industrial rate. Indra relies on experience Edge on suicide drones to accelerate the technological leap, while underlining that the real value for Europe is in pproduce in European territoryfulfilling the logic of sovereignty and reducing dependencies and deadlines in a market that is moving due to urgency and not by comfortable calendars. Castilla y León as a military-industrial hub. The bet has taken concrete form with two plants in Castilla y León: in Villadangos del Páramo (León), a production facility dedicated to drones and loitering munitions will be built, with an investment of about 20 million euros and a forecast of up to 200 jobs at full capacity. Another plant focused on micromotors will be installed in Boecillo (Valladolid), a critical component that defines autonomy, reliability and production capacity. The combination is revealing: it is not only the “final product”, also, and very important, the control of key pieces, which allows manufacture without bottlenecks and sustain a high exit rate when the strategic environment demands constant replacement. The objective is for Spain to not only be an assembler, but also part of the industrial heart that makes war with drones possible. Defense turns it into a state program. The Ministry of Defense has presented the project as part of the Industrial and Technological Plan for Security and Defense approved in May 2025, and has stated that the León factory will produce “the most advanced drones that can operate today in Europe and NATO.” Beyond the owner, what is relevant is that the new company would already be born with valued contracts around 2 billion of euros, with a workload committed to covering the needs of the Spanish Armed Forces and also other European armies, and with a performance horizon in 2026 and 2027. The implicit message is that Spain wants to be in the industrial layer that supports the European defensive shield, not as a secondary actor, but as a real supplier of a capacity that decides tactical survival on the front. Politics gets on the drone. The announcement, furthermore, is made with a staging in the Senate and in a pre-electoral context in Castilla y León, where the local impact (those 00 jobs distributed between León and Valladolid) turns the defense industry into territorial policy tool. The narrative mixes national security and reindustrialization: Small areas such as Villadangos del Páramo appear as recipients of a project of high technological value, while it is presented as a historic turn for the Spanish industrial base. At the same time, it is linked to other military initiatives in the community, emphasizing that rearmament It is not only a strategic debate, but a map of investments, works, infrastructure and employment that reorders public priorities. The real game. Finally, the movement also gives clues about the future of Europe with Ukraine as a mirror: the defensive shield It is no longer measured only in troops and doctrine, but in the ability to produce cheap, intelligent and massive systems, with short innovation cycles and controlled supply chains. Somehow, Russia has imposed the pace of the threat, and Washington has added the political pressure of not depending eternally on an external guarantor. In this scenario, Spain tries to occupy an unexpected gap: become the protagonist of the European loitering ammunition, the tool kamikaze which not only serves to attack, but also to deny space, saturate defenses and impose costs on the adversary. In a Europe that has belatedly discovered that modern war is also won in factories, Spain wants are in their territory. Image | Khamenei.ir In Xataka | Europe faces … Read more

We believed that drones would dominate any war. The Arctic is proving just the opposite

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For decades, drones occupied a secondary place in armed conflicts. They existed, they were used in very specific operations and almost always under centralized control, but they did not define the rhythm of a war. That changed with Ukraine. There, unmanned systems became an everyday, cheap and ubiquitous tool.integrated into the way of fighting. That experience has reinforced the idea that modern warfare will inevitably be a drone war. The problem is that this conclusion only works in certain scenarios. And the Arctic is beginning to demonstrate, quite forcefully, that not all battlefields accept the same technological rules. The growing interest in the Arctic does not respond to a technological fad, but to a profound change in the geopolitical situation. The melting ice is opening sea routesfacilitating access to resources and altering natural barriers that for decades made it difficult to operate in that region. In that context, NATO military forces have intensified exercises and deployments in the High North, aware that Russia has a clear advantage in the region. Cold that changes everything. The extreme temperatures of the Arctic impose different rules than other military scenarios. Components designed to function normally fail when the cold changes their physical properties. Rubber loses elasticity, aluminum and other metals become more brittle, and lubricants thicken to compromise the movement of key parts. It only takes one system freeze to knock out an entire platform or immobilize a convoy. It is not a specific problem, but a chain of effects that begins with the thermometer and ends with operation. The sky also gets in the way. Added to the problems on land is another less visible, but equally decisive, factor. At extreme latitudes, magnetic storms and auroras interfere with radio signals and satellite navigation systems. It is not just about losing precision, but about seeing the positioning and synchronization data that support communications, sensors and modern weapons altered. In an environment where visual orientation is already complicated by snow and lack of landmarks, any additional distortion makes navigation an unstable task and, in some cases, directly impracticable. When they are also bothering your signal. Added to this natural degradation is an additional problem: jamming and other interferences that are not always directed at the target that ends up suffering them. In the Arctic, the planet’s own geometry works against it, since from high latitudes there are fewer satellites available as part of them are hidden by the curvature of the Earth. That makes any interference have a greater impact. In northern Norway, regulator Nkom registered six GPS failures in 2019 and 122 in 2022, and since the end of 2024 it has stopped counting them due to their frequency. These limitations are not theoretical. On a polar exercise in CanadaUS Army Arctic off-road vehicles broke down after 30 minutes because the hydraulic fluids had solidified in the cold. Under these same conditions, Swedish soldiers received night vision devices valued at $20,000 that failed because they could not withstand temperatures of -40°C. The lesson for planners is an uncomfortable one. Operating in the High North requires assuming sudden failures and that logistics, more than technology on paper, ends up setting the real pace of any deployment. Rethink technology and procedures. Faced with this scenario, the response is not only to manufacture more resistant equipment, but to distinguish between technological limits and operational limits, a common separation in analyzes of the use of UAS in Arctic environments. Some problems can be mitigated with redesigns, from materials and power sources to more robust navigation alternatives. Others require changes in the way we operate: planning missions assuming signal losses, reducing external dependencies and training to work with incomplete information. All of this explains why the Arctic does not support simple translations from other recent war theaters. In Ukraine, small and cheap drones, supported by constant digital linkshave shown their usefulness in an environment with infrastructure, human density and many more references. In the High North, that ecosystem does not exist. According to the approach included in the tests described, the drones there would have to incorporate de-icing systems, a more robust propulsion for the wind and operate with another type of fuel. Far from being a perfect laboratory for digital warfare, the Arctic is forcing us to rediscover physical limits that are not negotiated. Images | Xataka with Gemini 3 Pro | US Navy In Xataka | Satellite images have revealed that China has gathered its most important aircraft carriers. And that can only mean one thing

The US bans Chinese drones and turns DJI into the new Huawei. It’s an absolutely crazy idea.

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The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) of the United States has decided ban all drones and critical components of these vehicles that have been manufactured in foreign countries. In addition to this, he has vetoed any team of communication and video surveillance from the largest Chinese manufacturers, and there is one name above all others: DJI. It’s another shot in the foot for the Trump administration. what has happened. Does almost a decade that some government officials in the US were asking for a veto on drones manufactured by Chinese companies, and that veto is now official. The FCC decision It will prevent this body from authorizing drones or critical drone components, something that is essential to be able to import them into the United States. The measure clearly affects DJI, which becomes the new Huaweialthough there is another firm, Autel, that will also be greatly impacted by the decision. Both come to form part of the so-called “covered list”. The reason is the usual one: to protect national security. It only affects (for now) future drones. The existing drones They will not be affected for the moment by the veto and their users will be able to continue using them. Stores that had models in their inventory and warehouses will be able to sell them normally, as the FCC’s action focuses specifically on future models. Thus, the decision is not retroactive, but that could change in the future and affect many models. What DJI says. Those responsible for DJI indicate in The Wall Street Journal that the company is prepared to be audited and highlights that independent analyzes have indicated that its products are completely safe. “DJI’s data security concerns are not based on evidence and instead reflect protectionism, contrary to the principles of an open market.” Drone pilots cry out to the sky. There are nearly half a million certified drone pilots in the United States, and in this segment between 70 and 90% of commercial drones used by local governments and hobbyists come from DJI. The measure therefore has an enormous impact on this entire industry in the United States. Many of these pilots are collecting drones and components to mitigate the impact of the measure. bad future. Greg Reverdiau, co-founder of the Pilot Institute in Arizona, conducted a survey in which 8,000 pilots participated. 43% indicated that the veto would be “extremely negative” and “potentially a cause of business closure”, and nearly 85% said they could stay in business for up to two years due to the prospect of not being able to access future DJI equipment and components. As this expert said, “People don’t buy DJI drones because it’s Chinese, they buy it because it’s available, very affordable, and capable.” DJI has no competition. And less, American. Eric Ebert, owner of a construction firm and user of these drones, explained the problem. “I’m American through and through. I drive a Chebrolet truck. But American drones can’t compete.” Ebert has a team of seven drone pilots who monitor wind turbine and solar panel installations. These weeks they have not stopped hoarding DJI drones and components “knowing what was going to come our way in 2026.” Protectionism…One of the companies that will benefit from the measure is Brinc Drones, a Seattle firm that sells them to more than 700 state agencies. Blake Resnick, its founder, explained that “it is impossible to compete with DJI unless you are subsidized by the state.” …and rear doors. In November XTI Aerospace, which makes helicopters, acquired a DJI distributor called Drone Nerds and also Anzu Robotics, which makes drones by licensing technology from DJI. As part of the agreement, the drone component manufacturing firm Unusual Machines invested 25 million. Guess who is a shareholder and board member of Unusual Machines: Donald Trump Jr, President Trump’s son. Image | jonas In Xataka | China conquered us with its cheap drones. Now the price of their pieces is skyrocketing for a reason that is not coincidental.

Drones are disguising themselves as Russian soldiers, and it’s working

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More than three years after the start of the Russian invasion, the war in Ukraine has transformed into a conflict that seems have no end in sight, trapped in a logic slow wear and cumulative in which each meter gained costs weeks of combat and a constant flow of resources. In this scenario, the border between high military technology and elemental ingenuity to survive has been blurring: drones with AI coexist with improvised traps, robots armed with solutions born of scarcity, and the most advanced innovation It is mixed with the raw creativity of those who fight every day to stay alive. Thus, Ukraine has just found something: speakers. Against a higher power. The Ukrainian command assumes that the conflict has become a war of attrition in which Russia part with advantage structural by population, industry and replacement capacity, so the strategy involves maximizing enemy losses while minimizing one’s own. Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, has described recently made this approach clear: Ukraine cannot win by volume, but it can do so by constantly raising the human and material cost that Moscow must pay to advance, and to do so it has turned unmanned systems into the central axis of its way of fighting, both on a tactical and psychological level. Drones that attack the mind. One of the most striking innovations is the use of drones equipped with speakersused not to directly destroy but to deceive and wear down the enemy. These drones reproduce military vehicle sounds that simulate imminent attacks, forcing Russian units to deploy reconnaissance drones and single-use loitering munitions that cannot be recovered, also revealing their positions. The exchange is radically asymmetric: Ukraine uses a cheap and reusable system to force the adversary to waste valuable and limited resources. The voice in Russian. The most disturbing variant of this tactic takes psychological warfare to a new level, with drones that emit Russian recordings of screams for help, moans or desperate, shocking calls for help. In essence, the drones are disguising themselves as Russian recruits. In a front saturated with tension, these voices explode basic human reflexes and they push Russian soldiers to leave safe positions to check the source of the sound, at which point they are exposed to artillery or attack drones already prepared. It’s not just about killing more, it’s about inducing errors, eroding trust, and turning compassion into tactical vulnerability. The climate in favor. It we have counted before. The thick fog, the freezing rain and the wind have reduced the effectiveness of Ukrainian FPV drones in key sectors, enabling recent Russian advances, but the response has been integrate aerial drones with ground robots hidden in approach routes. These systems detect the passage of vehicles enemies and transmit precise data to operators who position attack drones at low altitudeusing the fog itself as cover and waiting in ambush until the objective enters the impact zone, a solution that has proven to be effective in stopping armor without exposing infantry. Armed robots so as not to risk. The use of armed unmanned ground vehicles illustrates the extent to which Ukraine seeks to replace soldiers with machines in lethal missions, as demonstrated by the use Droid TW 12.7equipped with a heavy machine gun M2 Browning. counted this week Insider an example. It happened in a night ambush, when this system was able to destroy a transport Russian armored vehicle MT-LBpierce its armor, incapacitate the crew and eliminate the transported infantry, showing that these UGVs are no longer experiments, but combat tools designed to take risks that previously fell on people. Extreme ingenuity where there is no margin. Constant pressure and supply shortages have reinforced a culture of improvisation in which damaged drones are reused like explosive traps, buildings they become in improvised weapons and unexploded Russian ammunition launches again against enemy trenches. This ingenuity not only maximizes resources, but also fits with the general logic of attrition: each recovered object and each improvised trick reduces logistical dependence and maintains offensive capacity even in adverse conditions. Laboratory of the future. In the end, this entire set of tactics relies on a Ukrainian industry that has accelerated the development of drones with better navigation, computer vision, artificial intelligence-assisted control and swarming capabilities, sending them quickly to the front to be tested in real combat. The result is a continuous cycle of adaptation in which technology and doctrine they evolve togetherturning the front into a test bed (it has been for virtually three years) that is not only shaping the course of the current war, but also the way future conflicts will be fought. Image | RawPixel In Xataka | The new episode of terror in Ukraine does not involve missiles or drones: it involves leaving a city without cell phones In Xataka | Shahed drones were a piece of cake for Ukraine’s helicopters. Russia has just transformed them into its biggest nightmare

Drones have reached France’s nuclear submarines

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What began more or less a year ago in a hesitant way has become a certainty: Europe has entered a new phase hybrid confrontationone where traditional lines of defense become insufficient in the face of a range of tactics that combine cheap technology, covert actors and deliberate strategy to saturate to the states with ambiguous threats. The last barrier that has been jumped is, perhaps, the most dangerous. Disturbing mutation. The recent drone flyover on the nuclear submarine base of Île Longue, in France, and the immediate declaration a few hours ago of the state of emergency in Lithuania due to balloons from Belarus, these are not isolated incidents but manifestations of a growing pattern which seeks to explore vulnerabilities, overwhelm alert systems and expose the fragility of European security. Both episodes show the extent to which hybrid warfare has ceased to be an abstraction and has become an operational reality that affects civil aviation, nuclear infrastructure and political stability on the eastern border of the European Union. Drones on nuclear deterrence. That five drones of unknown origin managed to lurk over the weekend on Île Longue, the most sensitive installation of the French deterrence apparatus, marked a turning point. This base houses the four nuclear ballistic submarines of the French Navy, the core of the capability “second blow” of the country. The military response It was immediate: deployment of units, electronic counterattacks using jammers and activation of the alert protocol for strategic installations. It turns out that no drone was neutralized nor identified to its operators, which increases the feeling, once again, of a threat that operates deliberately in the dark. France had already registered similar raidsbut the temporal coincidence with others in Europe and the systematic use of drones near bases with nuclear weapons reinforce the suspicion that these maneuvers seek to test response times, map defensive patterns and, above all, generate a climate of concern both among military officials and the population. Extra ball. Although the French prosecutor’s office insists that there is no evidence of foreign interference, strategic context points to more than just random flights: from Ireland to Denmark, passing through the Netherlands and Germany, anonymous raids on airports, air bases and reinforced security zones have proliferated, many of them documented by military authorities that do not rule out the hand of Moscow. A vulnerability and pressure of airspace. He episode in Irelandwhere several military-style drones appeared in the air corridor planned for the landing of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, raised even more alarm. The reason: Ireland lacks radars operational, it does not have solid protocols to classify aerial threats and has minimal capabilities to counter drones, a strategic void that was exposed in the face of a possible operation designed to highlight national weaknesses. On a continent where drones have already forced to close airports Repeatedly, the Irish incident fits into a sequence of actions that seek to demonstrate that any country, even one that is not militarily involved in the war, can be vulnerable. Irish experts they warn that, regardless of the authorship, the confusion generated and the inability to react clearly represent a victory for any actor seeking to erode European cohesion. An official inspects a balloon used to transport cigarettes, in an undated photo released by the Lithuanian State Border Guard Service Balloons from Belarus. In parallel, a few hours ago Lithuania was forced to declare the state of emergency due to the constant arrival of weather balloons from Belarus. At first glance, these devices seem harmless, mere carriers of contraband. But in logic of hybrid warfarewhat is important is not so much the sophistication of the medium but its ability to force a disproportionate state response. The balloons have invaded Lithuanian airspace, forcing to close repeatedly Vilnius airport and have introduced concrete risks for civil aviation, forcing authorities to mobilize civil, police and military resources. A war of attrition. For Lithuania, a country bordering both Belarus and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, these incidents are not perceived as minor events, but as part of an attrition strategy intended to saturate their surveillance capacity and underline their exposure. After months of drone incursions, cyberattacks and electronic warfare, Vilnius interprets balloons as another step in a calculated escalation that uses cheap means to obtain strategic effects. Signs and a more aggressive phase. If you also want, what connects drones on French nuclear submarines, unidentified devices over Ireland and smuggling balloons that force an entire country to activate a state of emergency is its strategic role: demonstrate that Europe can be destabilized with simple tools, difficult to attribute and capable of generating considerable psychological, economic and political costs. So far, each incident individually can be minimized, but together they paint a picture. simultaneous pressure map on European airspace, on critical infrastructure and on the institutional cohesion of the EU. France already speaks openly about a “hybrid confrontation”Denmark attributes some incidents to “hybrid threats” of probable Russian origin and the Baltic countries consider each action a destabilization test. The result is a Europe that recognize the dangerbut that is still far from a unified response capable of tackling a threat that thrives precisely on ambiguity, the proliferation of small incidents and the difficulty of proving direct responsibility. An unprecedented threshold. What does seem crystal clear is that these episodes as a whole reveal that Europe is crossing a threshold where conventional security is no longer enough. Russian hybrid warfare (or, at least, the widespread perception of its advance) is now manifesting itself in ways that disrupt civil lifecompromise nuclear assets and overwhelm state apparatuses where they are most vulnerable. The presence of drones on a base that houses the french nuclear deterrent and the need for Lithuania to activate extraordinary powers to stop improvised balloons are signs of the same trend: the adversary does not need spectacular victories to cause damage because it is enough to multiply ambiguous threats until stability is eroded. Perhaps that is why the big question has been on … Read more

Drones revolutionized warfare in Ukraine, now they are going to do it all over the world with one final trick: changing shape

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If something has become clear after these years of war in Ukraine, it is that drones are no longer a mere complement from the battlefield: they have become a such transformative technology like gunpowder or the Kalashnikov, and are entering a second, even more disruptive phase, driven by artificial intelligencethe miniaturization and the accelerated production. Their next landing is planetary. The second revolution. As we said, drones have gone from being tactical support to becoming a structural factor of modern warfare. Ukraine has shown that an inferior actor in means can degrade a great power with cheap swarms air, naval and land. At the same time, insurgencies, militias and states with few resources use the same logic to compensate for conventional disadvantages. The result, as we will see below, is a global diffusion of precision capabilities at low cost that reduces own risks, complicates defense and makes conflicts more accessible and resistant to resolution. War spine. The trajectory of drones goes from radio-controlled experiments in world wars to smart cruise missiles and platforms like the predator and the reaper in the “war on terror.” The recent turning point is Nagorno-Karabakhwhere an average country combined decoys and UCAVs with artillery to neutralize anti-aircraft defenses and dominate the air without powerful traditional aviation. Since then, the central lesson is that no need be a superpower: simply integrate drones, sensors and indirect fire intelligently to alter the tactical balance. Ukraine as a laboratory. In Ukraine, the drone design, testing and tuning cycle has been compressed to weeks. kyiv has scaled from imported platforms to its own industry that produces millions of unitscombining FPV, reconnaissance, long range and fiber optic guided systems to circumvent Russian electronic warfare. The proximity between workshops and front allows for rapid iterations on sensors, frequencies and flight profiles. Russia responds with mass production and specialized units like Rubikon. The front thus becomes an environment where each innovation is copied or counteracted in a very short time. Swarm globalization. The intensive use of drones has extended to conflicts with a lower media profile. In Africa, dozens of states and non-state actors have built-in armed UAV to internal wars, with markets dominated by exporters such as Türkiye and China. In Myanmar, rebels have converted commercial drones into a substitute for artilleryforcing army withdrawals. In Gaza, Hamas used them to blind Israeli sensors before raids. This shows that technology not only balances power relations, but also increases lethality and makes subsequent stabilization difficult. AI, ammunition and fire economy. The AI integration Drones transform the economy of combat: the cost per useful impact decreases and precision increases. Now there are kits software and hardware that allow existing platforms to locate, track and attack targets with limited human supervision. The practical effect is to reduce the need for classical artillery and increase the efficiency of fire, both on land as in sea. However, this does not eliminate the value of artillery or manned platforms, but rather shifts part of the fire load to systems more fungible and scalablewith clear implications for budgets and logistics. The new unmanned spectrum. And here comes one of the big changes, possibly the least expected. The drone family is expanding and transforming, changing shape and size: from nanodevices for close reconnaissance to enormous ships and underwater vehicles autonomous. The former allow discreet exploration in urban or closed environments, and the latter expand the presence on the surface and under the sea without embarking crews or assuming their risks. Between both extremes, ukrainian naval systems, Chinese XLUUV or AUV as the Ghost Shark redefine surveillance, anti-submarine warfare and area denial operations. The common pattern is to eliminate the need to protect lives on board, making it easier to accept high-risk missions and speed up production. A new generation of contractors. Companies like AndurilAuterion or Shield AI operate with startup logic: short development cycles, strong software integration and commitment to assuming own risk before winning large contracts. Some choose to control the entire chain (hardware and software), others to offer “operating systems” applicable to multiple platforms. This puts pressure on traditional, less agile contractors, and reconfigures the industrial ecosystemwith more mid-sized players competing in specific niches (loyal squires, swarms, mission software). The result is greater speed of innovation, but also more fragmentation of solutions. China, the US and the race. China part with advantage in commercial drones and transfers that leadership to the military fieldwhile investing very heavily in countermeasures after observing the performance of cheap drones in Ukraine. The proliferation of manufacturers of anti-drone systems and directed energy weapons indicates a strategic commitment to control both attack and defense. The United States, despite the accumulated experience, appears out of date in volume and in anti-swarm systems, with dispersed programs and irregular financing, which forces to emergency measures to accelerate purchases and use dual suppliers. This anticipates a long race in which quantity, cost and active defense weigh as much as the individual sophistication of each platform. Strategic limits. This point is often not taken into account. The destructive capacity of drones can lead to overestimating their strategic impact. From there what spectacular operations against high-value infrastructure do not always translate into lasting changes in the control of territory or in the political will of the adversary. Controllers like Radakin they underline that drones and algorithms do not replace the need for a coherent strategy or forces capable of occupying and holding ground. The temptation to build campaigns based on high-visibility specific hits can generate a dangerous gap between tactical success and strategic results. The era of eternal wars. All this breeding ground leads to a final scenario: by reducing costs and risks for those who prolong the combat, drones favor conflicts. no clear outcome. Statistics show fewer decisive victories and fewer peace agreements since the 1970s, while stagnant wars increase. In this context, drones provide continuous capacity for harm to actors who would otherwise be forced to negotiate or give in. The probable result is more long wars, distributed … Read more

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