Russia

We have returned to an era that we thought forgotten. That of the nuclear threat of the US and Russia launching their reply: Poseidon

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In recent days all roads trace a common landscape: from Moscow exhibit and test “superweapons” that defy traditional categories (autonomous nuclear torpedoes, nuclear cruise engines, and indefinite-range missiles) while in Washington the political and media reaction accentuates a dynamic action-reaction that could return the world to an (il)logic of open competition between nuclear powers. Someone should stop it. Poseidon. He Russian Poseidon has returned to the forefront as the epitome of the hybrid between a fantasy factory and a real military program: an unmanned, reactor-powered underwater vehicle, conceived to transport a nuclear warhead to coastal targets or naval groupings, operate at great depth and high speed and (according to the official Russian narrative) bypass conventional defenses. The impact figures published in Moscow (speeds between 60–100 knots, operational depth ~1,000 m, “megaton” capacity that some sources stretch up to 100 Mt) feed the symbolic dread. However, analysts remember physical limits and Soviet precedents that qualify both the real effectiveness and the plausibility of “tsunami” type effects capable of sweeping away cities. In practice. Thus, the majority agrees that Poseidon It is best described as a capability designed for political and strategic cost: suitable to reinforce a “second strike” or to be used as a system of intimidation, not necessarily as an everyday weapon in an escalated conflict. Burevestnik and a persistence. We told it last week. Along with the torpedo, Russia has shown the Burevestnik (a nuclear-powered cruise missile that promises essentially unlimited range) and other platforms that the Kremlin lumps together under the label of “invincible weapons.” These initiatives obey a logic of modernization that combines technological ambition, industrial vulnerabilities (sanctions, reliability problems) and media staging: the public demonstration of tests does not detonate charges, but announces theoretical capabilities and forces adversaries to regroup resources and doctrine. Continuity with the Soviet tradition of studying large-scale underwater effects and the historical experience with essays they show that ideas can persist even when physics and engineering limit their real usefulness. Washington’s response. The political reaction in the United States, personified by presidential statements about “restarting testing” and public instruction to military departments, has been immediate (and disorderly). The announcements arrive in a critical moment (with the New START treaty close to expiration and with China throwing uncertainties about its own nuclear growth) and can be read as strategic messages, instruments of pressure and, sometimes, as gestures directed at the internal public. One thing remains clear: Trump’s formulation was more than ambiguous and it is not clear whether it refers to nuclear detonations (critical/non-critical), increased testing of delivery systems, or increased sub-critical experiments and simulations. There is no doubt, this ambiguity is dangerous because conditions perceptions and responses international without the technical and legal scaffolding that a decision of shock would demand. Burevestnik How “nuclear” is prescribed. On TWZ Several experts consulted describe the practical path to resume nuclear detonations: The president can order actions, but execution requires the involvement of specific agencies (Department of Energy, NNSA and national laboratories), budget authorization from Congress and logistics focused on the Nevada National Security Site as the only realistic site for contained underground testing. In any case, the deadlines they are long: A “simple burst” could be organized in months, a useful instrumented test would require 18–36 months, and a new design development program would take years. Furthermore, the cost would be high and would most likely provoke retorts from Russia, China and others, reigniting a cycle of arms races that post-Cold War agreements had managed to tacitly contain. Technical dimension. The technical usefulness of returning to explosive tests to maintain the national arsenal is, obviously, discussed: US laboratories maintain that, thanks to advanced simulations, subcritical experimentation and vast historical data, the reliability of nuclear warheads can sustain without detonations. The tests would serve, in theory, to validate new designs and increase confidence in specific features. In practice, they would reopen the door to developments that amplify offensive capabilities and complicate the balance of terror, in addition to generating environmental and proliferation risks. The media theater. Plus: not everything is technology. There is a strong performative component. Putin and the Russian media apparatus have known convert essaysimages and statements in one power narrative which includes synchronies with popular culture (television series) to magnify its psychological impact. In Washington, the improvised communication from social networks it has a similar but less institutionalized effect: statements without clarifying technique or procedure can be interpreted as a political will to rupture and push allies and adversaries to take asymmetric measures. Geopolitical consequences. The costs of a back to testing are not limited to budgets: there is talk of reactivation of the nuclear race, of degradation of international trustor the erosion of regulatory regimes (the CTBT and the verification architecture), in addition to a probable expansion of arsenals by China and other actors who do not participate in treaties today. Added to this is the risk that the US internal debate (political polarization, legislative pressures and the dynamic of “showing” without a technical roadmap) will generate hasty decisions. Worse still, the media normalization of “anti-coastal weapons” or “Frankenstein” torpedoes may facilitate usage doctrines that lower the threshold for tactical uses of nuclear weapons, an especially dangerous prospect. Uncertainty. In summary, the news of the last days They are, more than anything else, a warning: we are witnessing the sum of three processes (modernization and Russian technological experimentationpoliticization and theatrics of deterrenceand American answers marked by tactical uncertainty and political haste) that, together, fuel a dangerous inertia. The question is no longer just whether Poseidon either Burevestnik are fully operational, it is whether the international community, and especially the capitals with decision-making power, will recover the technical prudence and diplomatic rigor necessary to contain the escalation. Image | US Space Force, Russian Defense Ministry, Los Alamos National Laboratory In Xataka | Last week, Russia launched its fearsome Satan II nuclear missile, Putin’s “invincible weapon.” It came out regular In Xataka | There is something more disturbing than “a Chernobyl”: it … Read more

a tunnel between Russia and Alaska

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The United States and Russia are separated by the Bering Strait. Barely 80 kilometers of sea divide the two nations, but in the winter months, something curious happens: it is possible to go from the United States to Russia by walking on the waters. In the middle of the strait are the Diomedes Islands, and each one belongs to a country. When the sea freezes, the four kilometers between islands become a corridor what is illegal travel. Now, however, Russia and the United States are approaching positions to create a corridor between the two countries. A tunnel between Alaska and Chukotka in Russia. In short. US President Donald Trump has emerged as a key actor in two of the most important and media conflicts of recent times: the Israeli intervention in Palestine and the war between Russia and Ukraine. Whether it was a campaign to get the long-awaited Nobel Peace Prize or not, the truth is that Trump has convertedand has turned the United States, in a considerable entity in both conflicts. Maintains constant calls with Zelensky and Putinand after one with the Russian president, the idea of ​​physically connecting the United States and Russia has returned. After one of those calls, Kirill Dmitriev, director of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and the Kremlin’s special representative for international economic cooperation, launched the proposal in Twitter X: a 112-kilometer railway tunnel between both countries, in the Bering Strait and under the Diomedes. Dmitriev’s decision was not spontaneous and, according to him, the RDIF has been carrying out a feasibility study of the project for months based on previous experience connecting Russia and China over the Amur River. 150 years of projects. The idea is not new either. In fact, Dmitriev himself alluded days before ‘World Peace Bridge‘that was created in the Cold warduring the Kennedy-Khrushchev era, but the truth is that plans to connect both territories have been on the table since the 19th century. In 1890, an American governor proposed a railroad that would link the world and pass through the Bering Strait. Two years later, the designer of the golden gate He presented his idea, although the Russians rejected it. In 1904, American railroad entrepreneurs they returned to the charge with the idea, the tsar Nicholas II gave the go-ahead and then came the Russian Revolution and the World War I. He later explored the possibility of the connection again, but 150 years later, Russia and the United States still do not have their tunnel. The letter from “the boring company”. What could be the key now to undertake the works? Beyond the geopolitical card, the costs. In his proposal, Dmitriev outlined some of the results of that feasibility plan, stating that a tunnel in the Bering Strait would cost more than $65 billion if traditional methods are used, but (and here comes the “but”), another entity could lower the total cost of the project to less than $8 billion. Who? Elon Musk and his company The Boring Companionand. The Russian representative claims that the technology from Musk’s tunneling company (which built the The Loop tunnel in Las Vegasin addition to starring in several controversies for their projects) would allow not only to turn the project into reality with a low budget, but to do so in less than eight years. frozen enemy. The problem, if all parties agree, is that the soil in Las Vegas is not the same as that in the Bering Strait. At 112 kilometers in length, the tunnel would be twice as long as the Eurotunnel between France and England and, furthermore, it would have to be excavated in very complex terrain. To begin with, the region is located in the Pacific Ring of Firean area with moderate seismic activity, but where earthquakes of magnitude seven can occur. In addition, it would have to be excavated 45 meters below the seabed to protect from currents and, most importantly, the entrances to the tunnel would be in permanently frozen ground. If everything remained unchanged, it wouldn’t be much of a problem, but Alaska has experienced a increase in average temperature during recent yearssomething that is expected to continue due to climate change, and melting ice would complicate maintenance of these parts of the tunnel. In fact, it’s already happened on the Trans-Alaska pipeline. We will see if this project comes to fruition or if it ends up on the list of “we should make a tunnel”, but the truth is that there are too many against it, starting with issues of national security, geopolitics, the terrain itself, the extreme geological conditions and even the train connections that would have to be made through Alaska and Russia for the tunnel to be of any use. In Xataka | In June, a resident of a tiny island in Alaska saw a rat. Since then there are 400 people looking for her like crazy

Ukraine and Russia are not only fighting a drone war, but also deception

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The phrase was literal from a Ukrainian high command. The war they have been fighting since the Russian invasion in 2022 is currently the closest thing to a cat and mouse hunt. In the current asymmetric conflict between Russia and Ukraine, where every night a kind of war is fought over energy infrastructurewhat has put both commands on alert is not only the destructive effect of armed drones, but the massive expansion of cheap decoys that force defenses to be spent. Curiously, Russia and Ukraine have resorted to the same thing: Second World War. Alarm. While the Russian Shahed cause blackouts and the Ukrainian Lyutyi and FP-1 they light refineriesboth parties they use decoys whose objective is to saturate, deceive and exhaust the enemy interception layer, and it is precisely this logic of multiplication (the effectiveness not only of the direct impact but also of the distraction) that turns these decoys (decoys) into a strategic multiplier capable of amplifying an already harmful campaign. The historical precedent. The tactic it’s not new: modern military history contains paradigmatic examplesfrom the shadow analemmas to the jet-decoys of the 20th century. And, of all, the case of the ADM-20 Quail illustrates better than any the conversion of vulnerability into advantage through transient imitators that consume defender resources. The Quail, small and cheap compared to the bomber it simulated, carried reflectors and simple patterns of flight to deceive radars and force the expense of expensive interceptors. Today that principle applies miniature and industrial scale with easily manufactured platforms that, although lacking lethal capacity, force the adversary to decide whether to fire a missile worth hundreds of thousands of dollars or take the risk of missing what could be the real target. A B-52 launching a Quail decoy The Russian range and its role. Moscow, which in 2024 industrialized the shahed of Iranian origin to saturate defensesalso produces lures like the Gerbera and the simple Parodiya; some are volumetric replicas with lower mass and range, others incorporate equipment electronic warfare to scout and mark radar locations, and some even carry small explosives to wound recovery teams. This variety pursues three purposes: inflict material wear on missile and air-to-air missile reserves, reveal defense positions, and complicate radar discrimination with reflectors Luneburg type that make targets the size of larger vehicles appear on the screens. The practical result is an increase in false positives that degrades the efficiency of the defense chain. An Lyutyi The Ukrainian range. Ukraine, later to scale its drone campaign, has combined attack vehicles such as the FP-1 either the Lyutyand with low-cost devices designed in local workshops (plastic tubes, wooden frames, metal foil to increase radar section) to explore corridors and distract responses while the units that cause real damage take another route. When working as “pathfinders”these devices allow Ukrainian planners to plot and verify secure routes, test defense sectors and create temporary penetration windows. In other words, its appeal lies in the reduced cost and ease of production, which makes the lure a repeatable tactical capital. Ukrainian decoy Cost asymmetry. The economy of confrontation is brutally simple: a Shahed of a few tens of thousands of dollars can force a response with air-to-air or surface-to-air missiles whose unit price can multiply to those of the target by factors of tens or hundreds. It we have counted: recent examples, like Sidewinders or similar missiles, reach prices that make them strategically scarce. That cost-benefit ratio tilts tactical and political decisions: waste a critical capability on potential decoys or hold on to it and accept the damage? Its proliferation makes the first option a safe way towards the depletion of stocks and the second in a bet for local resilience and operational trickery. Gerbera Lures Defensive capabilities. Although Ukraine has developed anti-aircraft artillery units and interceptor drones that have proven effective, comprehensive defense continues to depend on missiles and systems that are finite. Electronics, spectrum warfare and mobile units provide mitigation, but the physics of aerial combat continues to offer opportunities to those who have the volume and creativity to saturate. The introduction of decoys with EW components or communications relays adds another layer: they not only distract, but can map defenses, degrade chains and amplify subsequent attacks with greater precision. Foreseeable evolution. The scenario drawn by the combination of attack drones and lures is dynamic: iterative improvement of decoys (more realisticwith greater electronic signatures, with active deception capabilities) will match the technical challenge with costly countermeasures (better discrimination, multisensory sensors, finer intelligence). At a strategic level, the proliferation of these tactics erodes sustainability from the intensive use of conventional interceptors and pressures nations to invest in alternatives: low-cost missiles for home defense, AI-directed interceptors, mobile deployments, and greater reliance on offensive electronic warfare. Meanwhile, in the short term, the Ukrainian tactic of using lures as a multiplier It increases the likelihood of real material damage to critical Russian systems and highlights a legitimate fear in Moscow: that its defenses will be exhausted before the real threat is neutralized. So? If you like, the decoys work like power amplifiers: not only for what they destroy, but for what they force the adversary to burn, reveal or reconfigure. The lesson historic quail applied to mini-UAVs provokes a contemporary dilemma where economics, logistics and homemade innovation can tip the tactical balance. For Russia, the proliferation of Ukrainian decoys represents a operational and symbolic threat: The erosion of advantage in expensive systems and the realization that modern warfare rewards not just direct explosion but the ability to manipulate enemy perception and expenditure, transforming false targets into a strategic weapon in their own right. Image | StahlkocherGASTELLO DESIGN BUREAU, In Xataka | Ukraine accelerates the assault on Russia with an unprecedented army of robots: they are aquatic, carry rocket launchers and are lethal if stopped In Xataka | Ukraine cannot believe what it found inside Russia’s ballistic missiles: déjà vu

Ukraine has a weapon against Russia that we had only seen in James Bond. Her name is Sea Baby and when she finishes her work she blows herself up.

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At the end of September Ukraine sent a message: It was already the largest drone laboratory on the planet, but with its latest 12-meter “monster” it wanted to do the same under the sea. This is how the family of Toloka underwater dronesa technological leap that redefined naval warfare in the Black Sea. That effort now has its continuation in a drone that until recently we had only seen in James Bond movies and the like. Technological evolution. Ukraine has taken its “Sea Baby” naval drones from being disposable explosive boats to becoming attack and multiple mission platforms capable of operating at more than 1,500 kilometers, transporting up to 2,000 kilos and mount heavy telecontrolled weaponry (multiple rocket launchers, stabilized turrets, secondary drone launch) while incorporating self-destruct systems to avoid capture and AI-assisted functions to reduce identification errors. This step not only adds firepower and range, but turns a low-cost means into a sustained system that can penetrate, hit, return and remain available (or self-destruct), something that repositions the naval drone from immediate consumption to renewable operating capital. The Black Sea. Successive waves of drones have forced Russia to withdraw most of its fleet from Sevastopol to Novorossiyska change in posture that does not respond to a specific defeat but to that persistent risk that makes it unfeasible to sustain an advanced presence without assuming continuous losses. The “Sea Baby” have been attributed by the SBU to eleven attacks against shipsas well as repeated blows against the Crimean bridge and other logistics facilities, producing a chain effect: Moscow has had to redirect its military transport to land and more distant ports, making each kilometer of support more expensive and reducing its ability to condition Ukrainian trade routes to Europe. Doctrinal change. What once required steel fleets, shipyards and squadrons can now be inflicted with platforms cheap, reproducible and guided at a distance, which modifies the unspoken rule that the maritime domain belongs to the one who owns tonnage: here control emanates from who can inflict repeated damage at a lower cost than that imposed on the defender. The Ukrainian case surpasses precedents such as the coastal missiles of the Lebanon in 2006 because it not only denies a coastline, but forces a structural reconfiguration of an entire squadron and its main base, demonstrating that an entire naval theater can be altered without having a conventional navy. Industry and allies. kyiv claims to produce around 4,000 naval drones and needing only half for his own defense, opening the door to sell the surplus to partner countries while NATO observes and adjusts doctrine after verifying that these systems have changed the cost/effect relationship at sea. Public financing via United24 and coordination with political and military command make the program an example of how a country at war can generate dual technology with external projection, replicating what happened with aerial UAVs: first combat effectiveness, then international adoption and doctrinal adjustment by third parties. Consequences and cycles. There is no doubt, offensive success is strong now defensive investment: floating barriers, sensors, redundant electronic warfare and point defense layers in ports and terminals to prevent innovation that has worked externally from reversing its own infrastructure. Russia tries to copy these platforms and use them againwhat chains a cycle of innovation in the face of interference that pushes both sides to adapt communications, navigation and mission architecture to overcome the electronic blockade. The result: a loop of accelerated evolution in which the advantage is no longer in possessing an isolated weapon, but in the ability to continually improve it before the opponent degrades its effect. Strategic conclusion. The Ukrainian naval drones have shown that sea power can be eroded without a conventional fleet through cheap mass, strategic reach and sustained pressure on valuable nodes, altering the adversary’s posture and reallocating its resources on the defensive. The displacement of the Russian fleet, the logistical impact and the international adoption as a reference point to a change of era: the sea ceases to be a domain secured by the capital spent on steel and becomes a space where the advantage belongs to whoever controls the marginal cost of the next impactnot the size of the hulls it anchors. Image | Security Service of Ukraine In Xataka | Ukraine cannot believe what it found inside Russia’s ballistic missiles: déjà vu In Xataka | After Cubans and North Koreans fighting alongside Russian troops, new guests have appeared in Ukraine: Chinese

The real threat from US warships off Venezuela is supersonic. It is called Kh-31 and it is Made In Russia

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The satellite images left no room for doubt: the United States has been adding pieces in the southern Caribbean until it forms the closest thing to a military army prepared for an attack against Venezuela, it remains to be seen on what scale and if that is really Washington’s idea. And in the face of this artillery, the greatest threat to American warships lies in the Venezuelan Air Force. To be more exact, in one of their fighters and their missile. Supersonic capability. The presence of Russian supersonic anti-ship missiles Kh-31A in the hands of Venezuela, integrated into their Soviet fighters Su-30MK2V of the Bolivarian Military Aviation, turns the Venezuelan coast into a high-risk environment for US ships that today operate at very short distances. The missile, conceived by the USSR to pierce Western air defenses and later adapted to anti-ship penetration rolescombines low flight over the sea, active tracking guidance before or after launch, terminal maneuvers of up to 15 G and a penetration warhead that detonates after passing through the side of the hull, making it difficult to intercept when the ship is within its short warning zone. The very fact that the US Navy purchased units to convert them into targets MA-31 to test its defenses illustrates that, although it is not cutting-edge technology, it is a system whose lethality is taken very seriously. Launching platform. Venezuela has of 21 fighters Su-30 Flanker in service, has advertised early warning exercises with Kh-31 off the coast and has spread images of armed flights with the clear intention of signaling their denial capacity to Washington. Although it is not certain that the Kh-31P anti-radiation variant will be available in significant quantities, it could be used de facto against naval radars. Close-range encounters (even with Venezuelan F-16s approaching to US ships) show that, in an improvised incident, fighters could be placed within the launch envelope before being detected or deterred. Promotional image of a Kh 31 Physics, distance and reaction. The profile of Kh-31A missile (initial acceleration by rocket to Mach 1.8 and transition to Mach 3.5 at high altitude or Mach 1.8 at sea level) drastically reduces the defense reaction time, especially when the ship is close to the coast, with a shortened radar horizon and degraded early warning. The employment envelope (the three-dimensional zone in which the missile can be launched, fly and reach its target, encompassing variables such as range, altitude and speed), means that an approaching armed aircraft without being ejected from the zone can place missiles in flight before the ship completes its defense cycle. Comparison of arsenals. They counted the TWZ analysts than the rest of the Venezuelan anti-ship arsenal (Otomat Mk 2 on a frigate Marshal Sucreaged versions in Constitution boatsmissiles Sea Killer in helicopters and Iranian CM-90s) is sub-sonic, of doubtful availability and much inferior in penetration and probability of impact compared to modern defenses. In practice, the only vector that alters the American calculation is that Su-30/Kh-31 pairing: is sufficiently fast, sufficiently provided, and sufficiently close to impose significant risk. Missile infographic United States position. It we counted yesterday. The American deployment (ARG/MEU Iwo Jima, Arleigh Burke destroyersa cruise Ticonderoga and the special operations ship Ocean Trader) is in itself a coercive message designed to project the capacity for punishment or specific assault from international waters. However, this same deployment creates specific vulnerabilities: the Ocean Trader lacks organic defense and has operated very close to the coast. A successful attack, even isolated, would have far-reaching strategic and political consequences, turning a limited clash into cause for war. The Pentagon has reinforced kinetic and electronic warfare subsystems (including Burkes ahead of Rota to operate under threat of cruise missiles), but the speed and proximity of the theater mean that the risk is far from theoretical. The logic of last resort. While a direct Venezuelan attack would almost certainly amount to an open war with the United States, the variables that could make it imaginable exist: a regime collapse scenario, an outbreak of operational error in a close air encounter, or a misattributed US covert operation could precipitate “last resort” decisions from Caracas. Precisely because the probability of something like this happening is low but the expected damage if it occurs is extreme, the US Navy treats the Kh-31 as a priority threat of active management, not as technological waste. Implications. The mere presence of a supersonic missile of denial in the hands of a sanctioned State amplifies political pressure: it forces the United States to assume more heavy (cruises as escort, separation cordons, additional ISR), makes persistent operations more expensive and raises the threshold for intervention. The tactical result (a reaction window of seconds) translates into a strategic effect: Venezuela has a de facto veto on the degree of safe intrusion of American ships, if you will, a kind of chip of negotiation that Caracas has already turned into a public message with its armed flights at short distance. Image | NavyRosoboronexport, Boeing In Xataka | Satellite images leave no doubt: there are 10,000 soldiers and unusual artillery pointing at the same place in the Caribbean In Xataka | A disturbing idea is gaining strength: that what the US wants is not drugs, and that is why it is targeting Venezuela

Russia has found a key advantage to multiply the range of its most lethal weapon in Ukraine: Chinese factories

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Last July Reuters was made with some documents that proved the scope of the help from Beijing to Moscow with the war in Ukraine as a backdrop. The proliferation of Russian drones was possible thanks to a system labeling called “industrial refrigeration units” during transportation, one that allowed sanctions imposed by the West to be bypassed through fictitious companies. Now we know something else: that there are entire factories dedicated to collaboration. The invisible industrial alliance. The war in Ukraine has entered a new phase in which Russia’s technological advantage on the battlefield increasingly depends on a network of factories and chinese suppliers. Although Beijing proclaims neutrality, the official customs data show a spectacular increase in exports of critical components (especially fiber optic cables and batteries lithium-ion) that have allowed Moscow to mass-build the wired drones that are transforming the balance of power on the front. These aircraft, operated through ultra-fine glass threads that unwind in flight up to more than twenty kilometers, They are almost immune to electronic warfare and have managed to breach Ukrainian defenses with an efficiency reminiscent of a silent industrial evolution. The Chinese quantitative leap. How much? counted the Washington Post that between May and August, Chinese exports of fiber optic cables to Russia multiplied tenfold, reaching 528,000 kilometers per month, while shipments of lithium-ion batteries climbed to $54 million. In contrast, Ukraine barely received a few tens of km of cable and a testimonial volume of batteries. For analysts, this asymmetry it is not coincidental: China has restricted the transfer of technologies to kyiv and its allies, but has opened the floodgates of the flow towards Moscowtransforming what were simple commercial components into decisive pieces of the Russian war machine. The combination of low cost, high production capacity and speed in developing prototypes makes Chinese factories a material extension of the Kremlin’s war effort, a “precision rearguard” capable of sustaining the offensive even under Western sanctions. The weapon against electronic chaos. we have been counting. Faced with Ukrainian dominance in FPV drones, Russia has found fiber optic models a devastating tool. As they do not depend on radio frequencies, these devices are impossible to block through interference, and their wiring guarantees total control even in environments saturated with electronic warfare. Moscow uses them to destroy logistics lines, command centers and jamming equipment before launching offensives terrestrial. Its scope (coinciding with the advances measured “by sections of cable”) illustrates how this technology defines the very geometry of the front. Since the Ukrainian withdrawal in the Kursk region, wired drones have been the protagonists of precision attacks, such as the registered in Kramatorsk on October 5, cementing a pattern of warfare in which electronic resistance has become useless. The new factories of conflict. After the withdrawal of the giant DJI of the Russian market in 2022, a constellation of minor Chinese manufacturers has taken up its space. Companies like Shenzhen Huaxin Energy either Nasmin Technologyofficially dedicated to civil products, have become major suppliers of batteries and motors for Russian assemblers. The signature Rustakt LLCone of the largest in the Russian military sector, imported from China more than 577 million dollars in pieces between July 2023 and December of the same year, a volume that reveals the scale of covert industrial support. In turn, Russian manufacturers as ASFPV or Stribog exhibit on their websites production lines located in Chinese territorywith personnel, machinery and labels in Mandarin, manufacturing ultralight coils 0.28 mm and 20 km range designed by Chinese engineers. It is a transnational industrial network that no contracts needed formal military to nourish the Russian war effort: the flow of trade is its camouflage. The dilemma of the West. We have also been counting. Despite the sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union, the majority of these shipments are protected by the ambiguity of the products “dual use”whose civil application allows controls to be avoided. For NATO, China has become a “decisive facilitator” of Putin’s war, Brussels accuses it of selectively applying its own export rules and to tolerate traffic of components that supports the Russian military industry. Beijing, meanwhile, continues to proclaim its neutrality, while its industrial system benefits economically from the prolongation of the conflict. Its strategy is subtle but effective: it does not supply weapons, but the infrastructure that makes them possible. A strategic advantage. Taken together, the convergence between Russian ingenuity and Chinese manufacturing capacity has created a war ecosystem that combines improvisation with industrial efficiency. The fiber drones optics symbolize that symbiosis: cheap, adaptable and difficult to counter. By providing Russia with technological independence from sanctions and tactical superiority on the battlefield, China not only strengthens its strategic partner, but also redefines global balance of power around a new form of hybrid warfare, where factories and cables count as much as missiles. The result is a cumulative advantage that, in the long term, threatens to turn the Ukrainian front into a manufactured warfare laboratorysupported not so much by soldiers, but by production lines on the other side of the world. Image | Ukraine Mod, Ministry of Defense Ukraine In Xataka | Europe has found the antidote to Russian drones. So demand for a 100-year-old gun has skyrocketed In Xataka | Europe has been working for three years to isolate itself from Russian gas. Two countries have decided to build a direct gas pipeline to Russia

an F-35 squadron that does not belong to China, Russia or the United States

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In the month of January it was known America’s plan B in the Arctic once it seemed that “the Greenland thing” was not going to be so easy: a underwater cave in Norway. Two months later, eight icebreakers attested that Russia was there tooand in August, both nations looked with surprise at the arrival of five icebreakers with the flag of China. Now, at congregation a squadron of F-35s has been added… from a fourth contender. New strategic axis. we have been counting throughout the year. The Arctic has ceased to be a remote space and has become a central theater of power: a place where geography dictates the rules, meteorology sets human limits and the proximity between platforms The military turns every kilometer into a possible avenue of attack or surveillance. What was once a map and science is now state policy. From the Nunalik deck (a freighter that traveled thousands of km avoiding growlers and storms to deliver material to Canada’s northernmost intelligence network) brutal lessons emerge: presence in the north is not improvised, it is built with infrastructurespecialized logistics and sustained budgetary will. The fact that a delivery can be delayed for 48 hours because the dockworkers are closed for a weekend, or that a 2.5 ton anchor ends up dragging a 180 meter chain between icebergs, illustrates the basic arithmetic of the Arctic: distance and climate are permanent enemies of any defense project. Logistics and fragility. They remembered in The Wall Street Journal to maintain bases like Pituffik’s either Alert (the latter just 800 km from the North Pole) means dealing with very narrow seasonal windows: the sealifts (sea supply operations) are possible only four or five months a year, air transport must cover the invisible, and a single missing part can delay crucial work a whole year. Inuit communities, icy runways that require constant maintenance, satellite platforms and underwater cables make up a network in which any weak link puts the whole at risk. Thus, if creatures such as musk ox and polar bears are found on the coast, behind the tracks and radars there are also human lives that depend punctual suppliesand errors like 1991 plane crash that cost lives in the approach to the Alert base remind that Arctic logistics is not a technical variable but a matter of survival. View of Thule Air Base Russian advantage and western window. Geographically, Moscow starts with objective advantages: the Kola Peninsula is home to the Northern Fleetnuclear systems launchable by Arctic routes and a depth of deployment that the West took decades to erode. However, the weakening of part of the Russian ground forces after the war in Ukraine has opened a window for allies to rebuild capabilities in the north. The question is whether to take advantage of it quickly and consistently. Western allies face the task of recover strategic ground almost from scratch: the lessons learned in Afghanistan or the Sahel are not directly exportable to a region of polar darkness, snow storms and ice that makes even the best prepared ships creak. If these gaps are not closed, the russian advantage and/or the appearance of foreign actors They will make Western deterrence, more than a policy, an urgent technological requirement. Russian icebreaker Hypersonics, sensors and more. The challenge is not only to be present, but detect and anticipate. The hypersonic missiles (unpredictable trajectories and speeds of at least Mach 5) put traditional radar networks in check, and have pushed Ottawa to commit 6 billion of Canadian dollars (in collaboration with Australia) to far horizon radars and Washington to accelerate space sensors that track ballistic and hypersonic vectors from orbit. In other words: detection is a necessary condition to deter, and without early detection there is no response. The problem, they pointed out in the Journalis that technology is not the panacea: it requires logistics integration, data centers, resilient command posts and continuous maintenance that the polar climate makes prohibitively expensive if not planned for the long term. Denmark on the front line. And on that board where the flags of China, Russia and the United States are already found, the recent decision of Copenhagen is inscribed: 8.7 billion dollars to increase the fleet from F-35 to 43 devices and 4.2 billion expressly dedicated to reinforcing Arctic security, with a joint headquarters in Nuuk, two new ships, maritime patrol vessels, surveillance aircraft and units in the polar territory. Denmark mixes the purchase of American technology with the will to act as regional guarantordriven by both Allied pressure and the commotion caused for the idea (proclaimed by Trump in January) of “buy” Greenland. The package shows two things: the first, that European states are willing to spend considerable sums on advanced projection and detection systems. The second, that sovereignty and territorial presence have become in currency geopolitics, where the air force and naval capabilities are not only military but also diplomatic pieces. Local sovereignty and criticism. Not only that. The extension of the military presence in Greenland does not occur in a vacuum. Local voices, represented by figures such as Aleqa Hammond, former Greenlandic Prime Minister, they reproach Copenhagen to decide without sufficiently consulting the 57,000 people on the island, remembering that militarization affects ways of life and resources shared. Furthermore, the pressure on ecosystems fragile and the need to respect indigenous rights make it essential to combine security with listening and real compensation. If the Arctic is a strategic boardis also a home: decisions about bases, radars and icebreaker routes They must incorporate the social and environmental dimension or risk legitimizing internal tensions that erode any long-term military base. Costs, industries and alliances. Plus: building a presence in the north is not just about buying fighters and installing radars. I remembered the BBC which requires shipyards to manufacture icebreakers, polar cargo ships, maintenance lines for icy runways, contracts held with operators and, above all, the political will to sustain recurring spending. The NORAD modernizationcoordination between Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom … Read more

Europe has been working for three years to isolate itself from Russian gas. Two countries have decided to build a direct gas pipeline to Russia

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The European energy map is changing at a speed that few would have imagined just three years ago. The old gas pipelines that linked Siberia to the industrial heart of the EU have been sidelined, while new routes and alliances reconfigure the power table around gas. The old continent proclaims its purpose of isolating Moscow, but in the center of the continent it is drawn an exception that alters the planned script and that may change the balance of forces in the coming winters. A map in transformation. Yes, the European gas map has changed radically in a few years, to the point that this winter of 2025 is the first in decades in which Russian gas ceases to be decisive throughout the European Union. After the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the energy crisis that broke out between 2021 and 2023, Brussels urged urgently diversification of supplies, relying on imports liquefied natural gas (LNG), especially from the United States and Qatar, and in the fortress of norway as a stable partner. The great gas pipelines that for half a century linked the Siberian fields with the European industrial heart have been underutilizeddamaged or reduced to a secondary role, as energy security moves towards the global balance of the LNG market and towards the vulnerability of infrastructures increasingly exposed to cyber attacks and hybrid incidents. On this new board, each molecule counts, but not all of them weigh the same: there are some that define true European autonomy more than others. The two exceptions. Despite the EU’s declared desire to eliminate purchases from Moscow, two countries have kept the valve open: Hungary and Slovakia. In August 2025, according to the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air, both added imports of Russian crude oil and gas by more than 690 million of euros, that is, the majority of the European total. In fact, they continue to receive oil through the gigantic Druzhba pipeline, which crosses Ukraine and Belarus from Russian fields to Central Europe, and have used temporary exception granted by Brussels to landlocked countries to justify their dependence. The contrast is evident: while countries like France, the Netherlands and Belgium have limited themselves to importing residual Russian LNG, Budapest and Bratislava continue buying crude oil and gas straight from Moscow, keeping alive the energy artery that the rest of Europe has tried to close. Hungary and Slovakia are investing in gas infrastructure and creating a gas block in the heart of Europe aimed at protecting against any risks USA, Brussels and pressure. The intransigence of Viktor Orbán and Robert Fico has not gone unnoticed. At the UN, Trump accused Europe of “financing the war against itself” and pointed out with their own name to the Central European partners that do business with the Kremlin. Brussels, for its part, debate sanctions growing: the nineteenth package included a ban on Russian LNG starting in 2026 and restrictions on giants such as Rosneft or Gazprom Neft, although it avoided imposing immediate vetoes on crude oil and gas by gas pipeline, fearing a head-on crash with Budapest and Bratislava. However, the Commission is already preparing specific tariffs against imports that are still They arrive through Druzhbaand requires all Member States to submit disconnection plans before 2027the year in which the final cut is expected. The discourse of dependency. Hungary insists that its economy would fall 4% immediately if they were closed russian flowsand both Orbán and Fico speak of “economic suicide” and “ideological impositions” from Brussels. However, experts and analysts dismantle many of these arguments: geography is no excuse in an integrated European market where other equally landlocked countries, such as Austria or the Czech Republic, have reduced drastically reduce its Russian imports. Alternative infrastructures there are. The Adria pipeline, which connects to the Adriatic in Croatia, could supply enough crude oil to Hungary and Slovakia, although the reliability of its capacity tests is disputed. The Croatian oil company JANAF itself assures which can supply both refineries (Százhalombatta in Hungary and Slovnaft in Bratislava) with up to 12.9 million tons per year. In gas, the interconnections with neighboring countries and the expected abundance of LNG after 2026 suggest that the cutoff of Russian flows would be more political than technical. Politics, benefits and a shadow. Budapest’s stubbornness also has an internal political and economic dimension. The MOL company, close to the Orbán Government and owner of the Slovak refinery, has reaped huge benefits thanks to the price difference between Russian Urals crude oil and Brent, which has allowed extraordinary income for both the company and the state budget itself through taxes. In parallel, the speech of the Hungarian Executive associates the continuity of supply russian with stability of its star program of subsidies on household energy bills, despite the fact that the prices that Budapest pays for Russian gas follow the same international references as for the rest of Europe. In Slovakia, Fico also protects contracts with Gazprom valid until 2034, although the national company SPP itself has flexible agreements with large Western companies that would allow demand to be met without Moscow. The new axis of the Black Sea. Be that as it may, the most revealing element of the new energy map is that Hungary and Slovakia not only resist cutting the Russian gas pipelines inherited from the Cold War, but are betting on new connections. The route that arrives through the TurkStream and enters from Türkiye towards central Europe through the Black Sea consolidates a direct link with Moscow at the same time that Brussels seeks to isolate it. Paradoxically, the two Central European countries are becoming the main russian corridor towards the heart of the EU, a role that openly contradicts the energy autonomy strategy and reinforces the structural dependence on a partner considered hostile. Europe contradicts itself. The dilemma is obvious. The European Union proclaims its purpose to end with Russian imports in just two years, but at the same time tolerates exceptions that feed … Read more

There are fewer and fewer North Koreans fighting with Russia in Ukraine. An army has arrived with an irrefutable promise: Cubans

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For months, reports about foreign fighters in Ukraine indicated to North Korea as the main source of soldiers sent to support Russia. Then there was official confirmation by both nations. Quietly, however, that balance is shifting in surprising ways. On the board of the war in Eastern Europe, another country begins to displace Pyongyang in the role of largest supplier of troops to Moscow, an unexpected turn that reveals both the fragility of Russia and the depth of its authoritarian alliances. The Cuban front. What began as a regional invasion has transformed into a global war, in which Russia not only faces Ukraine and its Western allies, but also mobilize a network of regimes to sustain the war effort. Among them, Cuba emerges as an unexpected actor: according to Ukrainian estimates, up to 25,000 Cubans They could join the Russian front, becoming the largest foreign force in Ukraine, above the North Korean contingents. For the Kremlin, the usefulness of this formula it is evident: The casualties of foreign fighters do not generate internal protests, do not require compensation to Russian families and reduce the political cost of the conflict. In a country with more than one million estimated casualtiesattract soldiers overseas It is also a matter of strategic survival. A formula that is difficult to reject. The main motivation for many Cuban recruits is simple: economic. On an island mired in one of the worst crises in recent decades, where the average salary barely exceeds 20 dollars a month, the promises of charge $2,000 a month They fight any ideological objection. Some accept the contracts convinced, others are deceived with job offers in construction or factories, to discover upon arriving in Russia that their destination is the battle front. Analysts like Cristina López-Gottardi they point out that the economic attraction is irresistible, but they also highlight the political dimension: Havana obtains income from remittances from combatants and consolidates its alignment with Moscow, presenting it as a gesture of “revolutionary loyalty” and, incidentally, a symbolic challenge to Washington. Experts point out that the regime seeks reinforce your narrative anti-American, presenting participation as an act of internationalist solidarity, although in practice it is a source of foreign currency in times of hardship. Mercenaries, coercion and globality. The Cuban presence is part of a broader trend: the growing Russian dependence on foreign fighters. According to intelligence data, in 2025 almost half of the prisoners captured in Ukraine They were not Russian citizenswhen in 2022 they barely represented 1%. From Africans recruited under threats of deportation, until deceived students With false job offers in “shampoo factories”, including North Koreans sent as cannon fodder, Moscow turns to a whole mosaic of forced soldiers or mercenaries. In this sense, the Cuban contribution not only strengthens the Russian lines, but also magnify the image of a war waged by an international authoritarian axis that includes Iran, Venezuela, North Korea and now Cuba, sharing weapons, technology and experience on a battlefield converted into a laboratory for modern warfare with drones, electronic warfare and new combat tactics. Cuba as a diplomatic target. Cuban involvement in Ukraine has not gone unnoticed by the United States. The Trump administration has decided to use it as a central argument in his diplomatic offensive against Havana at the UN. An internal State Department cable, dated October 2, instructed US delegations to pressure allies to vote against the traditional annual resolution demanding an end to the US embargo on Cuba. Year after year, the measure has had overwhelming support (in 2024, 187 countries voted in favor and only the United States and Israel against), although Washington hopes to reduce that margin by presenting evidence that the Miguel Díaz-Canel regime has become in active accomplice of Russian aggression, with between 1,000 and 5,000 fighters deployed on the front. In the documents is underlined that Cuba “has failed to protect its citizens from being used as pawns” in the war, and the regime is accused of “undermining democracy” in the region, particularly through its alliance with Venezuela. The embargo and sanctions. Washington’s strategy seeks to disarm the Havana narrative, which presents the embargo as the root of all their evils. The diplomatic cable instructs to highlight the corruption and incompetence of the Cuban government, in addition to highlighting that the economic problems do not derive from the sanctions, but from its mismanagement. Trump, upon his return to the presidency, has hardened the restrictions: has reinstated Cuba to the list of countries sponsoring terrorism, has further limited financial transactions and has sanctioned third countries that collaborate with Cuban doctors abroad. Faced with this pressure, the Cuban regime accuses Washington of seeking a pretext for aggression and even instrumentalizing the anti-drug fight in the Caribbean as an excuse to increase tension. That said, the backdrop seems different: the combination internal collapse and military alliance with Moscow places Cuba at the epicenter of the geopolitical struggle between Washington and the authoritarian bloc. Military school. Beyond the diplomatic balances, what worries many analysts is that the war in Ukraine has become an involuntary academy for allied armies of Russia. Every foreign contingent that steps on the front learn first hand the techniques of the first great drone war in history: from swarm operations to electronic warfare. As warns Bill Colefounder of Peace Through Strength Institute“the real danger is not the thousands of Cubans or North Koreans sent, but what they learn and then export to other conflicts in Latin America, Africa or Asia.” This transfer of war knowledge turns war into a multiplier of global instability, with authoritarian regimes absorbing tactics and adapting them to their own scenarios. The Cuban paradox. The participation of thousands of Cubans in the Ukrainian war also reveals a paradox: while for the Havana regime it represents both a source of foreign currency and a reaffirmation of its anti-American identity, for Moscow it is a cheap solution and politically comfortable to internal wear and tear, and for Washington an opportunity to intensify diplomatic pressure … Read more

The electronic war is lying the technologies in Ukraine. So Russia has returned to World War II: horse soldiers

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In the month of June Some images They highlighted a dangerous evolution of assault tactics, one where the Russian army began to Use motorcycles as a main tool to move towards the Ukrainian lines, in an attempt to avoid the destruction of their armored Modern to the power of drones. Now, the electronic war in Ukraine has turned each technological innovation into a weapon with the days counted. Solution? The return of the cavalry. A symbolic return. Yes, the war in Ukraine, characterized by a massive deployment of drones, precision artillery and electronic war, has led the Russian army to explore solutions of archaic appearance: the Reintroduction of horses On the battlefield. What began as improvisations With donkeys and horses To transport supplies in the front, it has evolved towards formal training units mounted, according to The Kommersant newspaper. The idea greatly reflects the point of the dead to which modern technologies have reached a saturated front of electronic interference, where even the most sophisticated systems have been limited, forcing resort to basic methods that evoke the wars of the past. Training and tactics. In the Donetsk region, the commander of the “Storm” unit of the 9th Brigade has organized Horse training for assault troops. Exercises, video recorded and released in pro -government channels Like “Wargonzo”show soldiers galloping through open fields, some sharing a mount: one controls the animal and the other prepares to open fire. The approach is that, once the objective is achieved, both combatants dismantle and advance on foot against the enemy position. The tests also seek that horses get used to noise of shooting and explosions, minimizing the risk of being scared in combat. Its alleged advantages include the ability to move at night, accelerate without roads and, according to Russian controls, guide themselves by instinct to avoid mines. Limitations and symbolism. Despite these virtues, the use of horses raises important inconveniences: their weight can detonate antipersonnel mines, require constant food and care, and have a load capacity much lower than that of armored vehicles. Therefore, even Kommersant emphasizes that the cavalry will hardly be deployed on a large scale and that the measure is, above all, a symbolic gesture in a conflict that, despite being the scene of leading technologies, has forced the parties to also resort to rudimentary solutionsfrom analog telephone lines to cargo animals. The stamp of Russian soldiers on horseback contrasts with the official story of technological innovation and highlights the material and tactical wear of the campaign. Cavalry Brigade of the SS in Russia, 1941 The vintage resource. The resource for horses is not the first Russian attempt to use unconventional alternatives in the front. It We have counted before: units have been documented in motorcycles, quads, and even E-SCOOTERS AND MONOCICLOS electric, with unequal results. In particular, motorcyclist brigades destined to evade Ukrainian drones have suffered Massive casualties: The open field exposure and the absence of coverage made them easy blank, with most bikers eliminated before achieving their goals. The commitment to cavalry reflects the same logic: Quick and low -cost solutions to an enemy with technological advantage, although without guarantees of real effectiveness in combat. Military stagnation The context of this equine return is the stagnation of the Russian offensive. Between September 20 and 30, Moscow only achieved advance 29 square kmand although in the whole of the month he added 447, most of the profits occurred in little disputed rural areas. In Donetsk, where the “Storm” unit is concentrated, Russia barely He won 181 square kilometersone of its lowest records in a year. The front has been practically frozen for weeks, which has forced the Kremlin to resort to propaganda measures To show dynamism, while Ukraine recognizes difficulties, but maintains resistance in key nuclei such as Pokrovsk and Dobropillia. Echoes of the twentieth century. The return of horses to the battlefield is not an exclusive phenomenon of war in Ukraine. During World War II, both Germany and the Soviet Union They used cavalry In patrol operations and logistics support, while Poland was hard stigmatized by the famous riders of riders against tanks in 1939a partially exaggerated myth but showed the obsolescence of classical cavalry against mechanization. In the Soviet Union, however, mounted units are They used effectively In wooded environments and in the antipartisan struggle, where their mobility offered advantages that vehicles could not match. In subsequent conflicts, horses They reappeared in low intensity wars or in difficult access scenarios. Afghan resistance against Soviet invasion in the 1980s depended largely of horses and mules to transport weapons in mountainous terrain. Paradoxically, after 11-S, the US special forces deployed in Afghanistan They turned to horses To move with its local allies, an image that became a symbol of the clash between the technological war of the 21st century and the indomitable geography of the Hindu Kush. The paradox. The image of Russian soldiers galloping Between drones and artillery summarizes the paradox of the war in Ukraine: in a conflict turned into a showcase of military innovations (Drones swarms, artificial intelligence applied to combat, Hypersonic weapons and Electronic War), the fatigue of materials and the tactical blockade have returned to the battlefield tools typical of another era. While it is unlikely that modern cavalry changes the course of the contest, His mere reappearance It is a powerful symbol of to what extent the war in Ukraine has stressed the limits of technology and has forced to reimagine, even with primitive means, the way of fighting. Image | Wargonzo In Xataka | An AIM-9X missile cost a million dollars to tear down a Russian drone. Ukraine has found the solution for 2,000 dollars In Xataka | In a crucial Ukraine agreement he has given the US his best weapon. In return he has received something unpublished: a map to knock Russia

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