Russia

In 2018 Russia presented its new and revolutionary humanoid robot. The only problem is that it wasn’t a robot.

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Yeah “AI” is a trendy technological concept, the other is robotics. humanoid robotsspecifically. The United States and China have embarked on a race to see who creates humanoid consumer robotsbut when in 2018 it was only Atlas jumpingRussia already had a humanoid robot dancing and putting on a show. His name was Boris, but there was one problem: he wasn’t a robot. robotic cold war. Until the recent generation of robots, which have left laboratories and workshops to become compete even in sports eventsthe great reference in robotics was Boston Dynamics. On the one hand, with Spot, the robot dog. On the other hand, with an Atlas that did parkour and executed very fluid and calculated movements. Although owned by Hyundai, those advances came from the United States, and Russia wanted to get into the conversation. Thus, in December of 2018, something occurred on the state channel Russia-24: a robot that looked like an astronaut and named Boris came on stage. He did so in the city of Yaroslavl, where the Proyektoria Annual Science and Technology Forum had just been inaugurated, aimed at promoting robotics and technology among young people. It was an important event, since it had the support of the Ministry of Education itself and Putin had attended previous versions. The Russian prodigy. Boris was a machine, in the figurative sense. He danced, talked, had dreams and illusions, stating that he wanted to learn musical composition and draw, and it was treaty like a celebrity on the television channel. It was the most advanced example of Russian robotics and seemed finished. Atlas had cables hangingBoris a helmet, little lights and he was a movie robot. There were those who began to wonder things. Appears at the 32nd hour of this video. Suspicions. TJournal is a Russian technology website and was one of the first to question the authenticity of the robot. How to collect BBCthe questions were quite accurate: Why aren’t there any sensors? How has it appeared out of nowhere without prior leaks? Why is no one on the Internet talking about something so advanced? Why were some movements so fluid during the dance? Why was the voice so robotic? And most importantly: why was it so unnecessarily large? But the most important thing is that, beyond the official images of Russia-24, which seemed to be very concerned that the country gave the impression of having this very advanced device, there were other images. Taken by the assistants, in some of those photos from behind a human neck was perfectly visible protruding from the back of Boris’s head. Caught. Very expensive costume. There was no need to investigate much: Boris was nothing more than a suit that a worker had put on. The suit could be bought. If you had 3,600 euros, you could buy the Alyosha model from the Show Robots company, which also came with Iron Man or Robocop suits. In fact, it was a media agency founded by a rival of Putin that public some photos with the actor putting on the suit. Deception? Naaah, a joke. Imagine the embarrassment after pulling on the blanket. The video went viral and was mocked, so much so that, a few days after its publication, Russia-24 removed it from its YouTube channel. However, two days after the original broadcast, they re-uploaded it and published an interview with the journalist who had done the piece. The excuse? He was sure no one would believe it, since he was like Santa Claus: a project for children. The problem is that the journalist narrated the original report as if it were Russia’s latest technological marvel. Those responsible for Proyektoria threw up their hands and said that they had never claimed that it was a robot, that it was not their business and that those at Russia-24 did not find out about the film. The problem is that there were those who pulled the blanket and discovered that Russia-24 had already shown a fake military robot. In fact, in 2019 the play was repeated with another robot taking the kickoff in a match between FC Orenburg and CSK Moscow. It was another man in disguise and the video is brutal. The state of Russian robotics… In the international media there were those who laughed it off, like CBS affirming that “regardless of the intention, Boris will not go down in history as the most embarrassing example of Russian fake news.” And we remember this episode because, recently, Russia has presented AIdol, its first humanoid robot. Already gone… wrong. With the soundtrack of ‘Rocky’ in the background and with a face of “please, what am I doing here”, the first thing the new Russian robot did was take a couple of steps to fall on its face. The scene is high-level unintentional comedy, with the robot kicking on the floor and the employees taking it away and covering the stage with a large black cloth. At least AIdol is real. Images | ПроеКТОриЯ In Xataka | In China they are not satisfied with creating advanced robots: a company has developed a head that gestures like a human

In Ukraine, the difficult thing is not to replace a drone, but its pilot. So Russia has started the hunt with something unprecedented: Rubikon

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For two years, Ukrainian drone operators had managed to maintain a decisive tactical advantage: the ability to detect, harass and destroy Russian positions with an agility that Moscow could not match. Pilots worked in small teams, in makeshift basements or camouflaged trenches, piloting from a distance FPV that turned the front into a transparent space where the enemy could rarely move unobserved. All that has changed with an appearance. The dark turn. Yes, that domain has been abruptly broken with the appearance Rubikona Russian unit created to track, locate and eliminate not so much drones as to those who operate them. The testimony in the financial times by Dmytro, a Ukrainian pilot and former rapper, summarizes this change of era: he went from being a hunter to being hunted in seconds when a Russian drone detected him on a reckless walk. That moment, which two years ago would have been exceptional, has become part of the daily routine on a front where the survival of the operator has become a strategic objective for Russia and a critical weak point for Ukraine. The result is a complete investment of roles: Innovators, previously almost untouchable, are now a priority target. Rubikon structure and ambition. This Russian elite corps is not simply a drone unit, but an organization of about 5,000 troops endowed with ample financial resources, tactical autonomy and a defined mission: deny Ukraine the ability to operate its drone network. Unlike the heavily bureaucratic operation that characterized the Russian army in the early stages of the war, this unit acts with speed, initiative and an approach more reminiscent of the Ukrainian groups it seeks to destroy. Their main task is not to attack the infantry on the front line, but penetrate behind the frontup to 10 kilometers in depth, to destroy logistics vehicles, ground robots and, above all, locate the operators who control the Ukrainian defensive swarms. Emblem of the elite Russian unit And much more. For Russian and Western experts, Rubikon functions as a development center of unmanned systems: trains other units, analyzes tactics, refines procedures and continually adapts its way of operating. Each technical or doctrinal improvement that emerges from Rubikon ends up radiating to the rest of the Russian army, which explains why the Ukrainians detect unexpected qualitative leaps in the performance of enemy drones. This ability fast learning It is one of the most disturbing elements, because it allows Russia to correct in months the technological gap that Ukraine built for years. The new invisible dimension. The combat is no longer limited to the visible sky, but is fought in a domain more abstract and lethal: the electromagnetic spectrum. Both Ukraine and Russia deploy electronic intelligence stations, signal guidance equipment and jamming systems capable of defeating, jamming or even hijacking adversary drones. This rivalry makes any radio broadcast a potential risk. Operators, no matter how hidden, need clear lines of sight, elevated antennas, and transmitters relatively close to the front, factors that Rubicon systematically explodes. Their teams track antennas on hills, thermal shadows in forests and emissions that reveal the presence of a pilot a few kilometers away. Andrey Belousov inspecting the Rubikon unit The signs. The inhibitorsdespite their usefulness, generate visible electrical signatures that can attract attacks. And in the midst of these maneuvers, both sides resort to signal hacking video to observe enemy cameras or locate the exact source of a remote control. Expert Tom Withington resume this complexity with a precise image: it is a game of cat and mouse where physics dictates the rules, and where each action leaves a trace that the opponent can exploit. Pressure on the pilots. Plus: unlike the Russians, Ukraine lacks the necessary troops to maintain continuous shiftswhich creates physical and psychological exhaustion that becomes as dangerous as the enemy itself. Zoommer, a Ukrainian soldier from a small drone unit, explained in the Times that Rubikon can operate without breaks because it has enough staff to rotate every few hours, while they must remain alert almost all day. The arrival of this unit to Pokrovsk area (a city that has been in a desperate defensive struggle for a year) has transformed life on the front, going from manageable days to a constant tension in which any movement can mean death. Before, says Zoommer.the area was almost “a vacation”, now it is an invisible hell where every antenna, every fleeting signal and every movement outside the trench can be a fatal mistake. This pressure has forced the Ukrainians to change routines, camouflage positions with extreme care, hide transmitters, disperse equipment and create anti-drone cells that act as a defensive mirror of Russia’s own tactics. The loss of transparency. Drones had provided Ukraine with a crucial tool: the ability to see and hit farther and faster, giving its defenders situational transparency that compensated for numerical inferiority. According to the RUSI analysisup to 80% of current casualties are attributed to drone operations, underscoring their central role in a war in which artillery and infantry depend on these mechanical eyes. What’s happening? Than Rubikon and the like have eroded that advantage in forcing Ukraine to reallocate resources from offensive missions to the protection of its own operators. The result is that, while Russia advances at an increasing pace, Ukraine devotes more efforts to stopping than hitting, losing the initiative at a critical moment in the conflict. Moscow has quickly absorbed the enemy’s lessons and turned them into doctrine, a process that would normally take years and that here has been compressed into months, tipping the balance on an increasingly dynamic front. Psychological warfare. The latest analysis show that the front is no longer defined only by the technology deployed, but by psychological pressure endured by Ukrainian operators and by the transformation of the Russian army towards a more agile structure, represented in Rubikon. The pilots, who have become priority objectives, live under constant tension that forces them to minimize any movement and operate with the permanent feeling of being watched, because … Read more

send an army in front of Russia with its most advanced tanks

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Since 1945, Germany has lived cautiously everything related to the use of force beyond its borders. Even when he participated in international missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan or Mali, he always did so in a rotating, temporary format and under strict frameworks, avoiding establishing a permanent presence. The memory of the Second World Warthe initial demilitarization and the subsequent political reconstruction left a doctrine where stable deployment abroad was, more than a red line, a taboo. And then came the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The German deployment. Germany’s decision to establish its first brigade permanently deployed abroad since 1945 marks a historic turn in its defense policy and European military architecture. The creation of the 45th Armored Brigade in Lithuania, with 4,800 soldiers and civilian support personnel, responds to an increasingly clear reading of the Russian threat and the recognition that the defense of NATO’s eastern flank is, in reality, the defense of Alemani herselfto. The Chancellery in Berlin not only assumes this presence as a symbolic gesture, but as a structural pillar of a new military era, in which Europe must assume greater responsibilities strategic, reduce absolute dependence on the American umbrella and rebuild capabilities what were deliberately dismantled after the end of the Cold War. The brigade is, therefore, both a message to Moscow as an internal message: Germany is abandoning its former military prudence to occupy the role that its economic weight demands, and that its partners (and adversaries) take for granted. Kamikazes, software and more. He German rearmament It is not limited to heavy armor or territorial presence: it extends to the domain of war through saturation and accelerated adaptation, where kamikaze drones have become one of the most decisive tools of contemporary combats. The plan for acquire 12,000 drones suicide bombers, with contracts of around 300 million euros for each manufacturer, reveals a clear doctrinal change: the armed forces should no longer accumulate equipment in static arsenals, but rather maintain them in permanent update cycles, with the bulk of the arsenal under the custody of the industry itself to be modified almost in real time. The war in the background. The reference is direct: in Ukraine, innovation cycles are measured in weeksnot years. Every change in software or payload redefines the tactical value of the dronewhile traditional systems become obsolete due to the frenetic pace of electronic countermeasures. This massive purchase points to a military on the edge facing Russia that understands that the battlefield of the immediate future will be hybrid, digitalized and deeply dependent on agility to adapt to an enemy that learns as quickly as it attacks. Leopard 2A8. The deployment of the 45th Armored Brigade cannot be conceived without it Leopard 2A8the most advanced version of the German battle tank, updated based on the lessons learned from the systematic destruction of armored vehicles in Ukraine. Far from abandoning tanks, Germany has concluded that They are still essential for combined operations, but only if they adapt to an environment where the priority threat is no longer anti-tank missiles guided from hills, but cheap drones capable of descending on vulnerable domes. A tank to anticipate. Hence the integration of Trophy system active protection, early warning sensors, modular armor and electronic packages prepared to counter swarms or loitering munitions. The brigade is thus deployed not as a symbol of the European industrial past, but as a platform that attempts anticipate war to come: coordinated mobility, continuous real-time intelligence support, layered anti-drone defense, and a distributed weapons network that prevents excessive concentration of risk. The presence of the Leopard 2A8 is less a reaffirmation of the tank as an icon and more a doctrinal statement: the ground battle is still valid, but only if it is handled with precision, integration and constant adaptation. Rearm to last. On the whole, these movements They express a conclusion that is already beginning to be accepted unambiguously among European capitals: the peace of the last thirty years was a historical exception, not the norm. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has forced Europe to rebuild military industryreactivate strategic reserves, reinforce borders and recover the idea of an integrated defensesustained and modernized. Germany, which for decades was considered the “weak link” in European defense, is reconfiguring itself as the core potential continental rearmament operation. The 45th Armored Brigade in Lithuania, the 12,000 kamikaze drones and the Leopard 2A8 are not isolated pieces, but pieces of a same transition: preparation for a scenario where deterrence no longer depends solely on political will, but on technological capacity, speed of adaptation and territorial firmness. If you also want, the sign to Moscow is direct: the baltic border It is not a negotiable void, but a very clear line on which the greatest economic power in Europe now stands, permanently. And this time, with armored vehicles, drones, reactivated industry and a strategic mandate that looks decades forward. Image | nara, Boevaya mashina, 7th Army Training Command In Xataka | The most pacifist city in Germany lived off its legendary train factory. Now they will make it from a gigantic tank factory In Xataka | The “rearmament” of Europe has begun at a Volkswagen factory in Germany: instead of cars they will produce tanks

The geopolitical irony that we are experiencing in the chip war has an unexpected beneficiary: Russia

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The technological and trade war between the United States and China continues to open new fronts of debate. The last one, derived from the singular Nexperia situationis beginning to point to a future in which European decoupling from the Chinese chip industry may end up having an effect that is especially disturbing. Or dad, or mom. The strategic semiconductor sector has become the absolute focus of this trade war, and here Europe has traditionally been a security ally of Washington, but at the same time a key economic partner of Beijing. The problem is that the old continent has been forced to choose sides. US pressure for technological “decoupling”, coupled with concerns about national security, has forced the European Union to harden its stance towards Chinese investments and companies. Risk for Europe. This European effort to decouple its chip industry from China, far from shielding the continent’s security, could end up being counterproductive and self-destructive. With this decision, Europe would be assuming enormous economic and supply chain costs to align with Washington, putting at risk the future of its own industries, such as automotive or electronics, which are highly dependent on the Chinese market and production. The Nexperia case. The recent epicenter of this conflict is the aforementioned Nexperia case. In late September, the Dutch government invoked an old national security law to take effective control of Nexperia, a Dutch automotive chip company. That company is actually owned by the Chinese firm Wingtech, and the intervention marked a dangerous turning point, transforming China’s acquisition of technology from an economic issue to one of geopolitical security. Beijing’s revenge. The Chinese government did not sit idly by. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce banned the export of certain finished Nexperia components from China to Europe. Those reprisals They stopped the delivery of key partsthreatening to provoke a new chip crisis in Europe, and especially affecting to automakers in Germany and other countries that depend on that supply. Russia rubs its hands. If China’s chip industry is forced to operate under strict separation from European markets (decoupling), and Europe ceases to be a viable destination or supplier, China could find it easier to supply those chips to Russia, which desperately needs them for its weapons programs, especially in the wake of severe Western sanctions. Strategic irony. The situation is paradoxical. European “security” actions aimed at containing Chinese influence may end up resulting in a transfer of technological supply capacity to Russia. Thus they would inadvertently strengthen the war machine of what is Europe’s most immediate adversary in the Ukrainian conflict. History repeats itself. In reality, the curious thing is that it is suspected that all these events are part of a historical pattern. Europe is dragged into a conflict by the US (first Iraq, then Afghanistan, now this decoupling) only for Washington to withdraw or change focus later, leaving Europe alone to bear the impact of broken supply chains. It does not appear that there was much strategic thinking on the part of the EU and the Netherlands when making that controversial decision with Nexperia. USA also wins. This dynamic seems to further strengthen the leading role of Washington, which if it pushes Europe towards decoupling, not only restricts a rival (China) but also causes European countries to massively increase their defense spending. An expense that would obviously fall on the US military industry. a crossroads. Europe faces a colossal strategic problem. Its security depends on the US, its economy is closely linked to China, and at the same time it seeks its own autonomy. Restrictions on semiconductors put Europe at risk of sacrificing its own long-term economic prosperity in favor of a strategy that could be abandoned by its main ally. Long term consequences. If this trend that began with the Nexperia case is consolidated, European value chains dependent on Asia will be destroyed, in addition to an increase in inflation due to the cost of decoupling and a possible strengthening of relations between China and Russia. What is happening with Nexperia is no longer just a corporate dispute, but the symbol of an EU that is being governed without a clear vision of its own long-term interests. Image | Nexperia | Kremlin In Xataka | China is taking a giant step in its quest for technological self-sufficiency: its own EDA software

We have returned to an era that we thought forgotten. That of the nuclear threat of the US and Russia launching their reply: Poseidon

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In recent days all roads trace a common landscape: from Moscow exhibit and test “superweapons” that defy traditional categories (autonomous nuclear torpedoes, nuclear cruise engines, and indefinite-range missiles) while in Washington the political and media reaction accentuates a dynamic action-reaction that could return the world to an (il)logic of open competition between nuclear powers. Someone should stop it. Poseidon. He Russian Poseidon has returned to the forefront as the epitome of the hybrid between a fantasy factory and a real military program: an unmanned, reactor-powered underwater vehicle, conceived to transport a nuclear warhead to coastal targets or naval groupings, operate at great depth and high speed and (according to the official Russian narrative) bypass conventional defenses. The impact figures published in Moscow (speeds between 60–100 knots, operational depth ~1,000 m, “megaton” capacity that some sources stretch up to 100 Mt) feed the symbolic dread. However, analysts remember physical limits and Soviet precedents that qualify both the real effectiveness and the plausibility of “tsunami” type effects capable of sweeping away cities. In practice. Thus, the majority agrees that Poseidon It is best described as a capability designed for political and strategic cost: suitable to reinforce a “second strike” or to be used as a system of intimidation, not necessarily as an everyday weapon in an escalated conflict. Burevestnik and a persistence. We told it last week. Along with the torpedo, Russia has shown the Burevestnik (a nuclear-powered cruise missile that promises essentially unlimited range) and other platforms that the Kremlin lumps together under the label of “invincible weapons.” These initiatives obey a logic of modernization that combines technological ambition, industrial vulnerabilities (sanctions, reliability problems) and media staging: the public demonstration of tests does not detonate charges, but announces theoretical capabilities and forces adversaries to regroup resources and doctrine. Continuity with the Soviet tradition of studying large-scale underwater effects and the historical experience with essays they show that ideas can persist even when physics and engineering limit their real usefulness. Washington’s response. The political reaction in the United States, personified by presidential statements about “restarting testing” and public instruction to military departments, has been immediate (and disorderly). The announcements arrive in a critical moment (with the New START treaty close to expiration and with China throwing uncertainties about its own nuclear growth) and can be read as strategic messages, instruments of pressure and, sometimes, as gestures directed at the internal public. One thing remains clear: Trump’s formulation was more than ambiguous and it is not clear whether it refers to nuclear detonations (critical/non-critical), increased testing of delivery systems, or increased sub-critical experiments and simulations. There is no doubt, this ambiguity is dangerous because conditions perceptions and responses international without the technical and legal scaffolding that a decision of shock would demand. Burevestnik How “nuclear” is prescribed. On TWZ Several experts consulted describe the practical path to resume nuclear detonations: The president can order actions, but execution requires the involvement of specific agencies (Department of Energy, NNSA and national laboratories), budget authorization from Congress and logistics focused on the Nevada National Security Site as the only realistic site for contained underground testing. In any case, the deadlines they are long: A “simple burst” could be organized in months, a useful instrumented test would require 18–36 months, and a new design development program would take years. Furthermore, the cost would be high and would most likely provoke retorts from Russia, China and others, reigniting a cycle of arms races that post-Cold War agreements had managed to tacitly contain. Technical dimension. The technical usefulness of returning to explosive tests to maintain the national arsenal is, obviously, discussed: US laboratories maintain that, thanks to advanced simulations, subcritical experimentation and vast historical data, the reliability of nuclear warheads can sustain without detonations. The tests would serve, in theory, to validate new designs and increase confidence in specific features. In practice, they would reopen the door to developments that amplify offensive capabilities and complicate the balance of terror, in addition to generating environmental and proliferation risks. The media theater. Plus: not everything is technology. There is a strong performative component. Putin and the Russian media apparatus have known convert essaysimages and statements in one power narrative which includes synchronies with popular culture (television series) to magnify its psychological impact. In Washington, the improvised communication from social networks it has a similar but less institutionalized effect: statements without clarifying technique or procedure can be interpreted as a political will to rupture and push allies and adversaries to take asymmetric measures. Geopolitical consequences. The costs of a back to testing are not limited to budgets: there is talk of reactivation of the nuclear race, of degradation of international trustor the erosion of regulatory regimes (the CTBT and the verification architecture), in addition to a probable expansion of arsenals by China and other actors who do not participate in treaties today. Added to this is the risk that the US internal debate (political polarization, legislative pressures and the dynamic of “showing” without a technical roadmap) will generate hasty decisions. Worse still, the media normalization of “anti-coastal weapons” or “Frankenstein” torpedoes may facilitate usage doctrines that lower the threshold for tactical uses of nuclear weapons, an especially dangerous prospect. Uncertainty. In summary, the news of the last days They are, more than anything else, a warning: we are witnessing the sum of three processes (modernization and Russian technological experimentationpoliticization and theatrics of deterrenceand American answers marked by tactical uncertainty and political haste) that, together, fuel a dangerous inertia. The question is no longer just whether Poseidon either Burevestnik are fully operational, it is whether the international community, and especially the capitals with decision-making power, will recover the technical prudence and diplomatic rigor necessary to contain the escalation. Image | US Space Force, Russian Defense Ministry, Los Alamos National Laboratory In Xataka | Last week, Russia launched its fearsome Satan II nuclear missile, Putin’s “invincible weapon.” It came out regular In Xataka | There is something more disturbing than “a Chernobyl”: it … Read more

a tunnel between Russia and Alaska

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The United States and Russia are separated by the Bering Strait. Barely 80 kilometers of sea divide the two nations, but in the winter months, something curious happens: it is possible to go from the United States to Russia by walking on the waters. In the middle of the strait are the Diomedes Islands, and each one belongs to a country. When the sea freezes, the four kilometers between islands become a corridor what is illegal travel. Now, however, Russia and the United States are approaching positions to create a corridor between the two countries. A tunnel between Alaska and Chukotka in Russia. In short. US President Donald Trump has emerged as a key actor in two of the most important and media conflicts of recent times: the Israeli intervention in Palestine and the war between Russia and Ukraine. Whether it was a campaign to get the long-awaited Nobel Peace Prize or not, the truth is that Trump has convertedand has turned the United States, in a considerable entity in both conflicts. Maintains constant calls with Zelensky and Putinand after one with the Russian president, the idea of ​​physically connecting the United States and Russia has returned. After one of those calls, Kirill Dmitriev, director of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and the Kremlin’s special representative for international economic cooperation, launched the proposal in Twitter X: a 112-kilometer railway tunnel between both countries, in the Bering Strait and under the Diomedes. Dmitriev’s decision was not spontaneous and, according to him, the RDIF has been carrying out a feasibility study of the project for months based on previous experience connecting Russia and China over the Amur River. 150 years of projects. The idea is not new either. In fact, Dmitriev himself alluded days before ‘World Peace Bridge‘that was created in the Cold warduring the Kennedy-Khrushchev era, but the truth is that plans to connect both territories have been on the table since the 19th century. In 1890, an American governor proposed a railroad that would link the world and pass through the Bering Strait. Two years later, the designer of the golden gate He presented his idea, although the Russians rejected it. In 1904, American railroad entrepreneurs they returned to the charge with the idea, the tsar Nicholas II gave the go-ahead and then came the Russian Revolution and the World War I. He later explored the possibility of the connection again, but 150 years later, Russia and the United States still do not have their tunnel. The letter from “the boring company”. What could be the key now to undertake the works? Beyond the geopolitical card, the costs. In his proposal, Dmitriev outlined some of the results of that feasibility plan, stating that a tunnel in the Bering Strait would cost more than $65 billion if traditional methods are used, but (and here comes the “but”), another entity could lower the total cost of the project to less than $8 billion. Who? Elon Musk and his company The Boring Companionand. The Russian representative claims that the technology from Musk’s tunneling company (which built the The Loop tunnel in Las Vegasin addition to starring in several controversies for their projects) would allow not only to turn the project into reality with a low budget, but to do so in less than eight years. frozen enemy. The problem, if all parties agree, is that the soil in Las Vegas is not the same as that in the Bering Strait. At 112 kilometers in length, the tunnel would be twice as long as the Eurotunnel between France and England and, furthermore, it would have to be excavated in very complex terrain. To begin with, the region is located in the Pacific Ring of Firean area with moderate seismic activity, but where earthquakes of magnitude seven can occur. In addition, it would have to be excavated 45 meters below the seabed to protect from currents and, most importantly, the entrances to the tunnel would be in permanently frozen ground. If everything remained unchanged, it wouldn’t be much of a problem, but Alaska has experienced a increase in average temperature during recent yearssomething that is expected to continue due to climate change, and melting ice would complicate maintenance of these parts of the tunnel. In fact, it’s already happened on the Trans-Alaska pipeline. We will see if this project comes to fruition or if it ends up on the list of “we should make a tunnel”, but the truth is that there are too many against it, starting with issues of national security, geopolitics, the terrain itself, the extreme geological conditions and even the train connections that would have to be made through Alaska and Russia for the tunnel to be of any use. In Xataka | In June, a resident of a tiny island in Alaska saw a rat. Since then there are 400 people looking for her like crazy

Ukraine and Russia are not only fighting a drone war, but also deception

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The phrase was literal from a Ukrainian high command. The war they have been fighting since the Russian invasion in 2022 is currently the closest thing to a cat and mouse hunt. In the current asymmetric conflict between Russia and Ukraine, where every night a kind of war is fought over energy infrastructurewhat has put both commands on alert is not only the destructive effect of armed drones, but the massive expansion of cheap decoys that force defenses to be spent. Curiously, Russia and Ukraine have resorted to the same thing: Second World War. Alarm. While the Russian Shahed cause blackouts and the Ukrainian Lyutyi and FP-1 they light refineriesboth parties they use decoys whose objective is to saturate, deceive and exhaust the enemy interception layer, and it is precisely this logic of multiplication (the effectiveness not only of the direct impact but also of the distraction) that turns these decoys (decoys) into a strategic multiplier capable of amplifying an already harmful campaign. The historical precedent. The tactic it’s not new: modern military history contains paradigmatic examplesfrom the shadow analemmas to the jet-decoys of the 20th century. And, of all, the case of the ADM-20 Quail illustrates better than any the conversion of vulnerability into advantage through transient imitators that consume defender resources. The Quail, small and cheap compared to the bomber it simulated, carried reflectors and simple patterns of flight to deceive radars and force the expense of expensive interceptors. Today that principle applies miniature and industrial scale with easily manufactured platforms that, although lacking lethal capacity, force the adversary to decide whether to fire a missile worth hundreds of thousands of dollars or take the risk of missing what could be the real target. A B-52 launching a Quail decoy The Russian range and its role. Moscow, which in 2024 industrialized the shahed of Iranian origin to saturate defensesalso produces lures like the Gerbera and the simple Parodiya; some are volumetric replicas with lower mass and range, others incorporate equipment electronic warfare to scout and mark radar locations, and some even carry small explosives to wound recovery teams. This variety pursues three purposes: inflict material wear on missile and air-to-air missile reserves, reveal defense positions, and complicate radar discrimination with reflectors Luneburg type that make targets the size of larger vehicles appear on the screens. The practical result is an increase in false positives that degrades the efficiency of the defense chain. An Lyutyi The Ukrainian range. Ukraine, later to scale its drone campaign, has combined attack vehicles such as the FP-1 either the Lyutyand with low-cost devices designed in local workshops (plastic tubes, wooden frames, metal foil to increase radar section) to explore corridors and distract responses while the units that cause real damage take another route. When working as “pathfinders”these devices allow Ukrainian planners to plot and verify secure routes, test defense sectors and create temporary penetration windows. In other words, its appeal lies in the reduced cost and ease of production, which makes the lure a repeatable tactical capital. Ukrainian decoy Cost asymmetry. The economy of confrontation is brutally simple: a Shahed of a few tens of thousands of dollars can force a response with air-to-air or surface-to-air missiles whose unit price can multiply to those of the target by factors of tens or hundreds. It we have counted: recent examples, like Sidewinders or similar missiles, reach prices that make them strategically scarce. That cost-benefit ratio tilts tactical and political decisions: waste a critical capability on potential decoys or hold on to it and accept the damage? Its proliferation makes the first option a safe way towards the depletion of stocks and the second in a bet for local resilience and operational trickery. Gerbera Lures Defensive capabilities. Although Ukraine has developed anti-aircraft artillery units and interceptor drones that have proven effective, comprehensive defense continues to depend on missiles and systems that are finite. Electronics, spectrum warfare and mobile units provide mitigation, but the physics of aerial combat continues to offer opportunities to those who have the volume and creativity to saturate. The introduction of decoys with EW components or communications relays adds another layer: they not only distract, but can map defenses, degrade chains and amplify subsequent attacks with greater precision. Foreseeable evolution. The scenario drawn by the combination of attack drones and lures is dynamic: iterative improvement of decoys (more realisticwith greater electronic signatures, with active deception capabilities) will match the technical challenge with costly countermeasures (better discrimination, multisensory sensors, finer intelligence). At a strategic level, the proliferation of these tactics erodes sustainability from the intensive use of conventional interceptors and pressures nations to invest in alternatives: low-cost missiles for home defense, AI-directed interceptors, mobile deployments, and greater reliance on offensive electronic warfare. Meanwhile, in the short term, the Ukrainian tactic of using lures as a multiplier It increases the likelihood of real material damage to critical Russian systems and highlights a legitimate fear in Moscow: that its defenses will be exhausted before the real threat is neutralized. So? If you like, the decoys work like power amplifiers: not only for what they destroy, but for what they force the adversary to burn, reveal or reconfigure. The lesson historic quail applied to mini-UAVs provokes a contemporary dilemma where economics, logistics and homemade innovation can tip the tactical balance. For Russia, the proliferation of Ukrainian decoys represents a operational and symbolic threat: The erosion of advantage in expensive systems and the realization that modern warfare rewards not just direct explosion but the ability to manipulate enemy perception and expenditure, transforming false targets into a strategic weapon in their own right. Image | StahlkocherGASTELLO DESIGN BUREAU, In Xataka | Ukraine accelerates the assault on Russia with an unprecedented army of robots: they are aquatic, carry rocket launchers and are lethal if stopped In Xataka | Ukraine cannot believe what it found inside Russia’s ballistic missiles: déjà vu

Ukraine has a weapon against Russia that we had only seen in James Bond. Her name is Sea Baby and when she finishes her work she blows herself up.

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At the end of September Ukraine sent a message: It was already the largest drone laboratory on the planet, but with its latest 12-meter “monster” it wanted to do the same under the sea. This is how the family of Toloka underwater dronesa technological leap that redefined naval warfare in the Black Sea. That effort now has its continuation in a drone that until recently we had only seen in James Bond movies and the like. Technological evolution. Ukraine has taken its “Sea Baby” naval drones from being disposable explosive boats to becoming attack and multiple mission platforms capable of operating at more than 1,500 kilometers, transporting up to 2,000 kilos and mount heavy telecontrolled weaponry (multiple rocket launchers, stabilized turrets, secondary drone launch) while incorporating self-destruct systems to avoid capture and AI-assisted functions to reduce identification errors. This step not only adds firepower and range, but turns a low-cost means into a sustained system that can penetrate, hit, return and remain available (or self-destruct), something that repositions the naval drone from immediate consumption to renewable operating capital. The Black Sea. Successive waves of drones have forced Russia to withdraw most of its fleet from Sevastopol to Novorossiyska change in posture that does not respond to a specific defeat but to that persistent risk that makes it unfeasible to sustain an advanced presence without assuming continuous losses. The “Sea Baby” have been attributed by the SBU to eleven attacks against shipsas well as repeated blows against the Crimean bridge and other logistics facilities, producing a chain effect: Moscow has had to redirect its military transport to land and more distant ports, making each kilometer of support more expensive and reducing its ability to condition Ukrainian trade routes to Europe. Doctrinal change. What once required steel fleets, shipyards and squadrons can now be inflicted with platforms cheap, reproducible and guided at a distance, which modifies the unspoken rule that the maritime domain belongs to the one who owns tonnage: here control emanates from who can inflict repeated damage at a lower cost than that imposed on the defender. The Ukrainian case surpasses precedents such as the coastal missiles of the Lebanon in 2006 because it not only denies a coastline, but forces a structural reconfiguration of an entire squadron and its main base, demonstrating that an entire naval theater can be altered without having a conventional navy. Industry and allies. kyiv claims to produce around 4,000 naval drones and needing only half for his own defense, opening the door to sell the surplus to partner countries while NATO observes and adjusts doctrine after verifying that these systems have changed the cost/effect relationship at sea. Public financing via United24 and coordination with political and military command make the program an example of how a country at war can generate dual technology with external projection, replicating what happened with aerial UAVs: first combat effectiveness, then international adoption and doctrinal adjustment by third parties. Consequences and cycles. There is no doubt, offensive success is strong now defensive investment: floating barriers, sensors, redundant electronic warfare and point defense layers in ports and terminals to prevent innovation that has worked externally from reversing its own infrastructure. Russia tries to copy these platforms and use them againwhat chains a cycle of innovation in the face of interference that pushes both sides to adapt communications, navigation and mission architecture to overcome the electronic blockade. The result: a loop of accelerated evolution in which the advantage is no longer in possessing an isolated weapon, but in the ability to continually improve it before the opponent degrades its effect. Strategic conclusion. The Ukrainian naval drones have shown that sea power can be eroded without a conventional fleet through cheap mass, strategic reach and sustained pressure on valuable nodes, altering the adversary’s posture and reallocating its resources on the defensive. The displacement of the Russian fleet, the logistical impact and the international adoption as a reference point to a change of era: the sea ceases to be a domain secured by the capital spent on steel and becomes a space where the advantage belongs to whoever controls the marginal cost of the next impactnot the size of the hulls it anchors. Image | Security Service of Ukraine In Xataka | Ukraine cannot believe what it found inside Russia’s ballistic missiles: déjà vu In Xataka | After Cubans and North Koreans fighting alongside Russian troops, new guests have appeared in Ukraine: Chinese

The real threat from US warships off Venezuela is supersonic. It is called Kh-31 and it is Made In Russia

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The satellite images left no room for doubt: the United States has been adding pieces in the southern Caribbean until it forms the closest thing to a military army prepared for an attack against Venezuela, it remains to be seen on what scale and if that is really Washington’s idea. And in the face of this artillery, the greatest threat to American warships lies in the Venezuelan Air Force. To be more exact, in one of their fighters and their missile. Supersonic capability. The presence of Russian supersonic anti-ship missiles Kh-31A in the hands of Venezuela, integrated into their Soviet fighters Su-30MK2V of the Bolivarian Military Aviation, turns the Venezuelan coast into a high-risk environment for US ships that today operate at very short distances. The missile, conceived by the USSR to pierce Western air defenses and later adapted to anti-ship penetration rolescombines low flight over the sea, active tracking guidance before or after launch, terminal maneuvers of up to 15 G and a penetration warhead that detonates after passing through the side of the hull, making it difficult to intercept when the ship is within its short warning zone. The very fact that the US Navy purchased units to convert them into targets MA-31 to test its defenses illustrates that, although it is not cutting-edge technology, it is a system whose lethality is taken very seriously. Launching platform. Venezuela has of 21 fighters Su-30 Flanker in service, has advertised early warning exercises with Kh-31 off the coast and has spread images of armed flights with the clear intention of signaling their denial capacity to Washington. Although it is not certain that the Kh-31P anti-radiation variant will be available in significant quantities, it could be used de facto against naval radars. Close-range encounters (even with Venezuelan F-16s approaching to US ships) show that, in an improvised incident, fighters could be placed within the launch envelope before being detected or deterred. Promotional image of a Kh 31 Physics, distance and reaction. The profile of Kh-31A missile (initial acceleration by rocket to Mach 1.8 and transition to Mach 3.5 at high altitude or Mach 1.8 at sea level) drastically reduces the defense reaction time, especially when the ship is close to the coast, with a shortened radar horizon and degraded early warning. The employment envelope (the three-dimensional zone in which the missile can be launched, fly and reach its target, encompassing variables such as range, altitude and speed), means that an approaching armed aircraft without being ejected from the zone can place missiles in flight before the ship completes its defense cycle. Comparison of arsenals. They counted the TWZ analysts than the rest of the Venezuelan anti-ship arsenal (Otomat Mk 2 on a frigate Marshal Sucreaged versions in Constitution boatsmissiles Sea Killer in helicopters and Iranian CM-90s) is sub-sonic, of doubtful availability and much inferior in penetration and probability of impact compared to modern defenses. In practice, the only vector that alters the American calculation is that Su-30/Kh-31 pairing: is sufficiently fast, sufficiently provided, and sufficiently close to impose significant risk. Missile infographic United States position. It we counted yesterday. The American deployment (ARG/MEU Iwo Jima, Arleigh Burke destroyersa cruise Ticonderoga and the special operations ship Ocean Trader) is in itself a coercive message designed to project the capacity for punishment or specific assault from international waters. However, this same deployment creates specific vulnerabilities: the Ocean Trader lacks organic defense and has operated very close to the coast. A successful attack, even isolated, would have far-reaching strategic and political consequences, turning a limited clash into cause for war. The Pentagon has reinforced kinetic and electronic warfare subsystems (including Burkes ahead of Rota to operate under threat of cruise missiles), but the speed and proximity of the theater mean that the risk is far from theoretical. The logic of last resort. While a direct Venezuelan attack would almost certainly amount to an open war with the United States, the variables that could make it imaginable exist: a regime collapse scenario, an outbreak of operational error in a close air encounter, or a misattributed US covert operation could precipitate “last resort” decisions from Caracas. Precisely because the probability of something like this happening is low but the expected damage if it occurs is extreme, the US Navy treats the Kh-31 as a priority threat of active management, not as technological waste. Implications. The mere presence of a supersonic missile of denial in the hands of a sanctioned State amplifies political pressure: it forces the United States to assume more heavy (cruises as escort, separation cordons, additional ISR), makes persistent operations more expensive and raises the threshold for intervention. The tactical result (a reaction window of seconds) translates into a strategic effect: Venezuela has a de facto veto on the degree of safe intrusion of American ships, if you will, a kind of chip of negotiation that Caracas has already turned into a public message with its armed flights at short distance. Image | NavyRosoboronexport, Boeing In Xataka | Satellite images leave no doubt: there are 10,000 soldiers and unusual artillery pointing at the same place in the Caribbean In Xataka | A disturbing idea is gaining strength: that what the US wants is not drugs, and that is why it is targeting Venezuela

Russia has found a key advantage to multiply the range of its most lethal weapon in Ukraine: Chinese factories

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Last July Reuters was made with some documents that proved the scope of the help from Beijing to Moscow with the war in Ukraine as a backdrop. The proliferation of Russian drones was possible thanks to a system labeling called “industrial refrigeration units” during transportation, one that allowed sanctions imposed by the West to be bypassed through fictitious companies. Now we know something else: that there are entire factories dedicated to collaboration. The invisible industrial alliance. The war in Ukraine has entered a new phase in which Russia’s technological advantage on the battlefield increasingly depends on a network of factories and chinese suppliers. Although Beijing proclaims neutrality, the official customs data show a spectacular increase in exports of critical components (especially fiber optic cables and batteries lithium-ion) that have allowed Moscow to mass-build the wired drones that are transforming the balance of power on the front. These aircraft, operated through ultra-fine glass threads that unwind in flight up to more than twenty kilometers, They are almost immune to electronic warfare and have managed to breach Ukrainian defenses with an efficiency reminiscent of a silent industrial evolution. The Chinese quantitative leap. How much? counted the Washington Post that between May and August, Chinese exports of fiber optic cables to Russia multiplied tenfold, reaching 528,000 kilometers per month, while shipments of lithium-ion batteries climbed to $54 million. In contrast, Ukraine barely received a few tens of km of cable and a testimonial volume of batteries. For analysts, this asymmetry it is not coincidental: China has restricted the transfer of technologies to kyiv and its allies, but has opened the floodgates of the flow towards Moscowtransforming what were simple commercial components into decisive pieces of the Russian war machine. The combination of low cost, high production capacity and speed in developing prototypes makes Chinese factories a material extension of the Kremlin’s war effort, a “precision rearguard” capable of sustaining the offensive even under Western sanctions. The weapon against electronic chaos. we have been counting. Faced with Ukrainian dominance in FPV drones, Russia has found fiber optic models a devastating tool. As they do not depend on radio frequencies, these devices are impossible to block through interference, and their wiring guarantees total control even in environments saturated with electronic warfare. Moscow uses them to destroy logistics lines, command centers and jamming equipment before launching offensives terrestrial. Its scope (coinciding with the advances measured “by sections of cable”) illustrates how this technology defines the very geometry of the front. Since the Ukrainian withdrawal in the Kursk region, wired drones have been the protagonists of precision attacks, such as the registered in Kramatorsk on October 5, cementing a pattern of warfare in which electronic resistance has become useless. The new factories of conflict. After the withdrawal of the giant DJI of the Russian market in 2022, a constellation of minor Chinese manufacturers has taken up its space. Companies like Shenzhen Huaxin Energy either Nasmin Technologyofficially dedicated to civil products, have become major suppliers of batteries and motors for Russian assemblers. The signature Rustakt LLCone of the largest in the Russian military sector, imported from China more than 577 million dollars in pieces between July 2023 and December of the same year, a volume that reveals the scale of covert industrial support. In turn, Russian manufacturers as ASFPV or Stribog exhibit on their websites production lines located in Chinese territorywith personnel, machinery and labels in Mandarin, manufacturing ultralight coils 0.28 mm and 20 km range designed by Chinese engineers. It is a transnational industrial network that no contracts needed formal military to nourish the Russian war effort: the flow of trade is its camouflage. The dilemma of the West. We have also been counting. Despite the sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union, the majority of these shipments are protected by the ambiguity of the products “dual use”whose civil application allows controls to be avoided. For NATO, China has become a “decisive facilitator” of Putin’s war, Brussels accuses it of selectively applying its own export rules and to tolerate traffic of components that supports the Russian military industry. Beijing, meanwhile, continues to proclaim its neutrality, while its industrial system benefits economically from the prolongation of the conflict. Its strategy is subtle but effective: it does not supply weapons, but the infrastructure that makes them possible. A strategic advantage. Taken together, the convergence between Russian ingenuity and Chinese manufacturing capacity has created a war ecosystem that combines improvisation with industrial efficiency. The fiber drones optics symbolize that symbiosis: cheap, adaptable and difficult to counter. By providing Russia with technological independence from sanctions and tactical superiority on the battlefield, China not only strengthens its strategic partner, but also redefines global balance of power around a new form of hybrid warfare, where factories and cables count as much as missiles. The result is a cumulative advantage that, in the long term, threatens to turn the Ukrainian front into a manufactured warfare laboratorysupported not so much by soldiers, but by production lines on the other side of the world. Image | Ukraine Mod, Ministry of Defense Ukraine In Xataka | Europe has found the antidote to Russian drones. So demand for a 100-year-old gun has skyrocketed In Xataka | Europe has been working for three years to isolate itself from Russian gas. Two countries have decided to build a direct gas pipeline to Russia

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