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In February, one of the most rocambolesque stories was known around Doge, the Government Efficiency Department led by Elon Musk to essence, cut where he can in the administration of the United States Government. Apparently, they fired 350 officials who had to Readmit rapidly. The reason: they were the specialists in the assembly of nuclear eyelets. The story has now taken a more dangerous turn. The access they should never have. I told it a few hours ago exclusively NPR through confidential information access. Apparently, it was revealed that two young employees of that government efficiency department (Doge) created under the orders of Elon Musk, obtained accounts in classified networks With nuclear information highly sensitive. What’s doubt, the news has unleashed a political storm and national security in the United States. Luke Farritor, a former 23 -year -old Spacex fellow, and Adam Ramada, a Angel Investor Without previous experience in armament or intelligence, they appeared for at least two weeks in the directories of the reserved systems of the National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) and the Department of Defense, according to sources with direct access to the networks. From denial to confirmation. The media counted that, although the energy department first denied any link, later admitted that the accounts Yes they were createdalthough they insisted that never They were activated nor used. So, the medium NPR remembers that the mere existence of these accounts, in maximum security environments that normally require a “Q” accreditation (The highest level of authorization of the DOE), has aroused alarm among experts, who interpret it as a sign of the growing and worrying doge penetration in critical areas of the state apparatus. All nuclear information. To understand the importance of the network to which they have had access, let’s think that the systems accessed by these employees are not mere confidential data repositories: these are networks that store and transmit plans for nuclear weapons design, special materials for their manufacture and strategic communications between laboratories, production centers and the pentagon. The first one, the NNSA Enterprise Secure Networkserves to share Restricted data between key actors of nuclear arsenal. The second, Siprnetallows the flow of information classified between the Department of Energy and Defense, including operations that could compromise national security if they were disclosed. Although it appears in the access directories does not equals to directly see classified documents (by the policy of “Need To Know”), experts Consulted by NPR They emphasize that it is the technical “head” that could provide future applications or expand the scope of influence within those platforms. Shadows on transparency. Plus: the incident adds to a series of controversial episodes starred By Doge In other federal agencies. As we count in February, a purge in the NSA directed by Doge (reviring only partially after public pressure) caused the dismissal of dozens of nuclear area employees. Shortly after, an informant denounced that Doge members had accessed internal systems of the National Board of Labor Relations (NLRB), requesting that They will not register their activities and deactivating monitoring tools, in addition to delete access traces. Not just that. One of the income attempts was made from an IP address located in Russia Using credentials created by Doge, which unleashed new suspicions and ignited cybersecurity alerts in several sectors of the government. These movements, added to the recent scandal by the use of signal application On the part of the Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth to discuss sensitive military operations, they delineate a dangerous informality pattern and reckless management of critical information of the nation. The Doge experiment. Thus, the very existence of Doge, an entity born to “modernize the State” under the tutelage of Musk, begins to be questioned even between related sectorsgiven its opaque growth and the lack of accountability. His model (which combines entrepreneurs, technologists and actors outside the public administration) was sold as a response to the traditional bureaucracy, but it is generating fissures in institutional security and control systems. The case of Farritor and Ramadapeople without experience in intelligence or defense, shows the risks of introducing private operators in the ultrasecreta spheres of the State without proper safeguards. While the Department of Energy avoids giving explanations about why these accounts were created, analysts such as Hans Kristensen, of the Nuclear Information Projectthey warn that even unlacified budgets require delicate technical referencesand that any “ajar door” can have unpredictable consequences. A parallel state. The truth is that, far from being an isolated incident, Doge insertion into nuclear networks reveals a broader and more dangerous trend: the emergence of a administrative power not electedwith access to privileged information, but without clear legal mandate or sufficient democratic supervision. If you want also, it implies that the logic of “technocratic” access overlaps institutional logic, and in that scenario the state becomes a testing ground for Operators with own agendas. The consequences of this reconfiguration are still in development (even overlaps Musk’s output), but the scandal leaves a warning meridianly clear: when the obsession with efficiency eliminates controls, which is gained at speed can cost very expensive, at least, In security. Image | Gage Skidmore In Xataka | Elon Musk fired hundreds of employees and now he has to hire them again: they were experts in nuclear weapons In Xataka | Elon Musk fired 6,000 employees two weeks ago. Now the US faces the massive entry of invasive species