gas

how to become independent from US gas

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Europe has spent more than four years trying to close a dependency that made it vulnerable. At the end of January, he finally achieved it. The Twenty Seven They approved the total ban of Russian gas imports, both by pipeline and in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG). A historic decision that becomes law a repeated political promise since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine: never again entrust European heating, industry and electricity to Moscow. But victory comes with an asterisk. While Europe manages to disassociate itself from Russian gas, a new problem emerges on the horizon: the continent has gone, almost without realizing it, from depending on Russia to increasingly depending on the United States. An accelerated replacement. According to data from the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA)imports of American LNG into the European Union quadrupled between 2021 and 2025, going from 21 billion cubic meters to around 81 billion. Last year it was confirmed that 57% of the LNG that arrived in Europe came from the United States. If all gas imports are added—both liquefied and by gas pipeline—the United States will already cover 27% of the total consumption of the European Union in 2025. And dependency threatens to increase. According to IEEFA projections, this share could approach 40% in 2030 if current contracts are maintained and plans to reduce demand do not prosper. The problem is even bigger with LNG. At this point, the United States could supply between 75% and 80% of all liquefied gas imported by the EU in 2030. This shift was not the result of a long-term strategy, but of an immediate need. After the invasion of Ukraine and the collapse of Russian flows, American gas came as a lifeline. LNG carriers leaving Texas and Louisiana helped avoid blackouts, stabilize markets and fill European storage in the most critical winters. “At the time, it seemed like a heroic solution,” summarizes Henning Gloystein, an analyst at Eurasia Group. quoted by The New York Times. “Now we are beginning to realize that we have replaced one massive dependency with another.” A very uncomfortable partner. So to speak in some way. The repeated threats of the American president about Greenland, its trade disputes with the European Union and his openly instrumental vision of energy trade They have set off alarm bells in Brussels. “The risk is not that the United States will cut off supply tomorrow,” several analysts explain. cited by The New York Times. “The risk is that it uses its dominant position to pressure, increase prices or condition.” Unlike Russia, the US gas sector is not controlled by a state monopoly, making an abrupt cut in flows less likely. But Washington could introduce export taxes, prioritize other markets or influence prices and contracts, which would have a direct impact on European consumers. Furthermore, American LNG is, according to IEEFAthe most expensive on the market for European buyers. This clashes head-on with one of the central objectives of the EU’s energy strategy: making energy cheaper to recover industrial competitiveness. Gas as a volatility factor. Increasing dependence on US LNG also exposes Europe to shocks that are completely beyond its control. In early 2026, an extreme cold wave in the United States caused a rapid rise in gas prices in the US market, where futures doubled in a matter of days. The effect was immediately transferred to Europe, where the price of gas exceeded 40 euros per megawatt hour (€/MWh). The situation is aggravated by low European storage levels, which have fallen below 45%, the lowest level for this date in five years. In key countries such as Germany, France and the Netherlands, deposits are between 30% and 45%which leaves little room for new tensions. A speech that repeats itself. Aware of the risk, European institutions insist that dependence on American gas must be temporary. “We don’t want to replace one dependency with another,” repeats Commissioner Dan Jørgensen. “Our strategy is to grow in our own energy and, in the medium term, free ourselves from gas.” The approved legislation obliges Member States to submit before March 2026 national supply diversification plans, identify bottlenecks and notify all remaining contracts with Russia. The REPowerEU plan still has three pillars: short-term supplier diversification, reduction in gas demand and accelerated deployment of renewables. The problem is the calendar and Europe still needs gas today, even as it promises to stop needing it tomorrow. The North Sea as a European powerhouse. In this scenario, the European commitment to offshore wind acquires strategic weight. At the North Sea Summit in Hamburg, nine countries – including Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Denmark – they agreed to convert this region in the great clean energy hub of the continent. The plan it’s ambitious: Achieve 300 gigawatts of offshore wind by 2050 and deploy up to 15 gigawatts per year between 2031 and 2040, with at least 100 gigawatts developed through coordinated cross-border projects. Offshore wind is no longer presented as an environmental solution, but as a matter of control. The North Sea Pact puts investments of up to one trillion euros on the table to turn this technology into the new axis of the European energy system. The industry commits to make offshore wind electricity cheaper by 30% by 2040 and to assume a central role in the European energy system. “It’s not just about the climate,” said Britain’s Ed Miliband in Hamburg. in statements reported by the Financial Times. “It’s about controlling our energy and not leaving it in the hands of dictators or petrostates.” The cracks in the system. Despite the independence speech, contradictions persist. Europe continues to sign long-term gas contracts with American suppliers, while denouncing the risks of dependency. Regasification and transportation infrastructures are at their limit in countries like the Netherlands, and interconnections remain insufficientespecially between the Iberian Peninsula and the rest of the continent. Furthermore, European unity is fragile. Hungary and Slovakia maintain their opposition to the veto … Read more

Producing them emits hundreds of times less than coal and gas

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All energy sources have their dark side and solar is no exception. Without going any further, we are creating huge mountains of garbage thanks to (or because of) the solar panels cheap. Now, as in any other decision-making, it is time to weigh the pros and cons and compare them with alternatives to have some perspective and here, solar energy does not fare so badly. Damn (blessed) cheap solar panels. The generation of waste from solar panels is a reality that goes hand in hand with the deployment of solar energy. Between 2020 and 2024 the number of solar panels that have gone to waste has multiplied by four according to IRENA reports: from 220,000 to 900,000 tons and be careful because by 2050 have already estimated that the figure will be 250 million tons. The reason? Although their useful life is 25 – 30 years, they are replaced before the end due to incidents such as storm damage or manufacturing defects. In short: replacing is cheaper than repairing. In perspective. But the moment of truth comes from an estimate: the actual waste per megawatt hour of electricity generated. A current standard solar panel weighs about 20 kg and over its 25-year lifespan in moderate sunshine generates about 10 megawatt hours of electricity. The calculation is simple: it is equivalent to 2 kilograms of waste per megawatt hour and is similar to that offered by recent research published in Nature Physicswhich aimed at 1.7 kg/megawatt hour. And now let’s face it against two energy rivals: coal and gas, two fossil fuels that continue to be behind the planet’s electricity generation. coal plants generate between 80 – 100 kg per megawatt hour. And that’s not to mention the 950 kg of carbon dioxide per megawatt hour emitted in combustion. Gas is slightly better: emits 450 kg of CO₂ per megawatt hour generated and no ash generated. But the difference is abysmal compared to the waste from solar panels. In a table on energy generation it is better seen, as this one from Clean Technica: solar panels Coal NATURAL GAS Solid waste (kg/megawatt hour) 2 80 – 100 0 CO₂ emissions (kg/ Megawatt HOUR) 0 950 (per ton) 450 Other emissions No SO₂, NOₓ, particles, mercury… NOx emissions An abysmal difference. That is to say, we are talking about that considering the megawatt hour of electricity generated, a solar panel produces 2 kg of solid waste for about 90 kg of ashes that lead to an emission of 950 kg of CO₂ under the arm for coal and for gas, about 450 kg of CO₂ emitted. Electricity generation plants based on fossil fuels generate continuous and massive atmospheric pollution compared to 0 from solar panels and if we talk about solid waste, coal substantially surpasses it. Not only the quantity, but also the quality. It has already been made clear that the amount of waste is substantially lower, but it is also worth mentioning how harmful this waste is and its consequences. To the remove a solar panel We find a frame made of aluminum, silicon, glass and some plastic, which although technically can be mostly recycled, in practice they are not recycled circularly. It is true that there are panels with traces of heavy metals such as lead (solders) or cadmium in thin film panels, but also that the EU counts with management programs for this waste. And the solar panels do not emit pollutants while they are operational. Coal ashes have a list of traces fearsome: in addition to lead and cadmium there is arsenic, mercury, selenium, uranium or thorium. This cocktail is a risk to health and the environment due to inadequate management or spills. There is no need to talk too much about carbon dioxide emissions: they are behind the global warming. Coal combustion alone generated 15 gigatonnes of CO₂ between 2020 and 2024, according to analysis by the Global Carbon Project. This another study from the British Medical Journal relates air pollution from fossil fuels to some five million premature deaths last year, mainly respiratory diseases, cardiovascular diseases, and strokes. Solar energy waste is not the problem. Clean energies are not perfect and their operation involves a series of challenges. As we have seen, in the EU in fact recycling infrastructure already exists which currently manages to recover up to 95% of these (the WEEE directive establishes a minimum recycling of 85% of the modules) in consolidated, scalable processes and result in small, manageable and moderately harmless final waste. With the data in hand, it is substantially clear that yes, waste from solar energy exists, but viewed from the perspective of current energy needs and the sources that provide it, they are not the problem at all. In Xataka | The dark side of solar energy: we are creating a 250 million ton mountain of garbage In Xataka | Europe produces more clean electricity than fossil electricity for the first time. The hard part starts now Cover | Anders J

the greenhouse gas that warms the planet faster than CO₂

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In November 1776, while traveling on horseback between Italy and Switzerland, Carlo Giuseppe Campi saw bubbles in the marshes surrounding Lake Maggiore. He approached them and decided to investigate them. Almost by accident he discovered that they were flammable and He told it to his friend Alessandro Volta. Years later, Volta discovered that this gas was methane. Since then we have not stopped having problems with him. Colorless, odorless and highly flammable, methane (CH₄) It is a gas composed of one carbon atom and four hydrogen atoms. It is the simplest hydrocarbon and, in fact, is the fundamental component of natural gas (and therefore a key fuel for boilers, power plants and part of industry). In addition to the energy context, methane also appears in biological and geological processes: it is a chemical compound that arises, naturally, in the processes of anaerobic decomposition of organic matter. That is, in wetlands, in landfills, in the digestive system of ruminants or in large bags under the ground. Otherwise, methane is used for many other things. Not in vain, it is a raw material for the chemical industry and is an essential part of the production of hydrogen, ammonia or methanol. But the global conversation is not has been talking about methane for decades for none of that. Because, curiously, the big problem with methane is that it is a much more powerful greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide. After all, from what we know, its molecules capture between about 82 times hotter than CO2 (taking a period of 20 years as a reference). If we broaden the focus and use the 100-year term, its global warming potential is 29.88 times greater than that of CO₂. The only good thing, so as not to paint a picture that is too gloomy or malicious, is that it has an atmospheric half-life (11.8 years on average) compared to a much longer average. This explains why, despite collecting much more heat than the other, the long-term impact of methane is not so great. So? Well, it is an “accelerator” of short-term warming and, in that sense, it is a first-order problem for us. Not only because we are not moving forward; but because if we manage to reduce it, it can provide relatively rapid climate benefits. The problem is that it is not an easy thing to solve. On a planetary scale, annual methane emissions are around hundreds of millions of tons and 40% of them are due to natural sources that we cannot directly control. The other 60% is due, generally speaking, to human sources. According to the Global Methane Budget, there are three main causes: agriculture and rice, fossil fuels and waste. Agrolivestock Monika Kubala For years, experts have discussed the impact of livestock farming (especially ruminants such as cows and sheep). The calculation, in any case, is complex: not only is it difficult to estimate methane production from enteric fermentation (due to digestion), but things as ‘simple’ as manure management suffered from an “information blackout” that makes them very difficult to evaluate. In addition to this (and it is important), you must add the rice. Every year they consume more than 500 million metric tons of rice. That’s a lot of rice (it’s the main source of calories for 3 billion people), but it’s also a lot of methane: because, favored by floods that leave wide plains without oxygen, our gas rises to the surface. Fossil fuels Methane leaking throughout the oil, gas and coal chain is also difficult to measure, but less so. After all, leaks in wells and equipment, ventsinefficient flaring, outdated compressors, plumbing or storage are money wasted. And if we know how to measure something, it is money. The International Energy Agency esteem that the production and use of fossil fuels generated about 120 million tons of methane emissions in 2023. Waste, landfills and wastewater This case is the simplest and the one that most clearly shows that the methane problem really does not matter much to us: landfills, wastewater and other types of waste accumulation areas are areas especially conducive to the generation of methane (due to pure anaerobic activity) and since we do not capture it, it is released into the atmosphere. Thus, the atmospheric concentration of methane remains high and increasing. To give an example, NOAA estimated which, between 2023 and 2024, went from 1915.73 ppb to 1921.79 ppb on average. And, as I say, it is a shame because methane is surely one of the fastest routes: according to UNEP/CCAC, a strong reduction in human emissions (up to 45% this decade, with available measures) “could avoid almost 0.3 ºC of warming by 2045.” Biomethane (also called “renewable natural gas“) is the term that we have coined to refer to a methane of biological origin that is obtained, above all, by improving biogas: the CO₂ and other contaminants in it are eliminated until a gas rich in CH₄ is ​​achieved and comparable, in almost all aspects, to natural gas. As a result of this process, a fuel is obtained that can be injected into the gas network. That is, it is an efficient way to take advantage of (and make the capture and processing economically interesting) a whole series of waste: from manure and sewage sludge to municipal waste or agro-industrial remains. Obviously, “green methane” does not automatically mean that it has “zero environmental impact.” Only that it has a biological origin and can be used like natural gas. For its environmental impact to be low, other things are required such as control of leaks, the origin of the waste or its impact on the network as a whole. Image | Katie Rodriguez In Xataka | The importance of the colors of hydrogen and what it means if it is green, brown, blue or turquoise

Europe believes it has won the gas war against Russia, but it has forgotten one small detail: infrastructure

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Europe has made a historic decision: 2027 will be the year in which the last trace of Russian gas disappear from the energy system of the continent. However, between the offices in Brussels and the reality of homes there is a chasm that is not measured in cubic meters, but in months of construction. The continent’s security no longer depends on diplomacy with the Kremlin, but on the speed at which terminals can be erected, tubes connected and ships deployed. The new European sovereignty is in the hands of the engineers. A system to build. As analyst Giacomo Prandelli explainsthe focus of the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) market has been on the price, but the real crisis is infrastructure. Europe is in a frantic race to replace Russian gas, but much of the necessary capacity is still under construction or in the planning phase. This has created a golden opportunity for a very select group of companies that own the physical assets. According to Prandelli, there are vital European companies that still go unnoticed. He gives as an example a firm valued at 662 million euros that operates “at a bargain price”: Their profits are very high compared to their stock market value and, most importantly, they already have government contracts secured until 2030. They are, basically, the owners of the “plugs” that Europe is forced to go through. The reasons for structural change. The reason for this urgency is an irreversible “divorce”. According to data collected by OilPriceRussian exports by gas pipeline to Europe have fallen by 44% in 2025, reaching lows in the 1970s. The definitive closure of the Ukrainian route this December leaves the continent without its historic arteries. The reasons for this new reality are three: US dependence: US gas It already represents 56% of LNG imports in Europe. The July 2025 agreementby which the EU will buy 750 billion dollars in energy from the US, has reconfigured the global board. The physical rigidity of the system: Although there is plenty of gas in the global market, European regasification plants (especially in the Netherlands) have operated at the limit of their technical capacity. Spain has the gas, but cannot send it to the rest of Europe: its pipelines with France they only allow export 8,500 million m³ per year. The problem is not the lack of fuel, it is the “funnel” of the pipes. Gas as an eternal backup: A report from McKinsey & Company issues an uncomfortable warning: Gas demand will grow by 26% until 2050. Europe needs gas to stabilize its electricity grid when renewables fail. The energy transition, far from eliminating gas, has turned it into a “permanent strategic pillar.” The Black Sea axis and the ghost fleet. However, the European wall has cracks. Hungary and Slovakia they keep injecting money to the Kremlin via the Druzhba pipeline and the TurkStream route. While Brussels asks for disconnection, Budapest and Bratislava build new connections towards the Black Sea, claiming that the cut would be “economic suicide.” Added to this is the fear of the “ghost fleet.” Brussels fears that Russian gas will repeat the oil scriptan opaque market of ships that change flag and documentation to hide the origin of the gas. To avoid this, the EU has imposed fines of up to 3.5% of global turnover and certificate of origin systems, but the crude oil precedent shows that, when Europe closes a door, the market usually opens a clandestine window. Europe’s floating lifebuoy. Given the slowness of concrete, a technical solution arises. According to Professor Alexandre Munspoints towards FSRUs (Floating Storage and Regasification Units). These ships are mobile regasification plants that use the heat of the sea to process the gas. According to Muns, their advantages are the speed of deployment and the cost since they can be rented for about $155,000 per day. Giants such as Excelerate Energy or Höegh LNG are those that today allow the EU to keep the pulse. Without these ships, the gas crossing the Atlantic simply would have nowhere to enter the continent. The tyranny of the calendar. Europe closes 2025 with deceptive calm. As reported by El Economistaprices have fallen to four-year lows (€27/MWh) thanks to a mild winter and the constant flow of ships. But, as the president of Sedigas, Joan Batalla, warns, this stability is “conditional.” Any extreme cold snap or technical failure in a saturated terminal could skyrocket prices again, because the network operates without margin for error. Europe’s autonomy is no longer negotiated in Moscow; It is built in the ports of Germany, in the interconnections of the Pyrenees and in the FSRU shipyards. The success of the 2027 plan will not depend on politicians’ promises, but on cranes and welders finishing their work before the climate changes the rules of the game. Image | freepik Xataka | The European Union has finally made the decision that has terrified it for so many years: stop importing Russian gas

stop importing Russian gas

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Brussels has announced a ban on importing Russian gas at the end of 2027. This is what They confirmed at a press conference the president of the European Commission, Ursula Von der Leyen, and the Commissioner for Energy, Dan Jørgensen. But, beyond the statements, there is an elephant in the room: the European Union has just promised something that it does not know if it will be able to fulfill. A “permanent” veto. According to the official statement of the European Commissionthe Parliament and Council have reached a political agreement to permanently stop imports of Russian gas – not only by gas pipeline, but also liquefied natural gas – and with a very specific timetable: LNG in short-term contracts: prohibited from April 25, 2026. Gas through pipeline in the short term: prohibited from June 17, 2026. LNG in long-term contracts: January 1, 2027. Long-term gas via pipeline: September 30, 2027 (or November 1 with extension if the storage level is not reached). Furthermore, the EU plans to stop importing Russian oil in 2027, something that confirms the Financial Times and that would complete the partial embargo in force since 2022. Even so, Hungary and Slovakia will continue to receive crude oil from the Druzhba pipelinerecently bombed— while their legal exceptions remain in effect. The political message is clear. The reality, less so. On paper, it is the final slam on Russian gas. Von der Leyen celebrated that the veto will allow “deplete Putin’s war chest”, while Jørgensen proclaimed that “blackmail and manipulation are over.” The political message is clear: Europe wants to show that it no longer depends on Moscow to get through the winter. However, consensus is fragile within the EU. The gas veto is official, but not unanimous. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary published on his social networks which is already preparing an appeal to the Court of Justice of the EU to overturn the ban, while Slovakia asks to extend deadlines and protect its exceptions. The political agreement exists, but the operational unity is fragile: without real coordination between partners, an energy veto can become a simple declarative gesture. The actual reading is less triumphant. According to DWthe Moscow government accused the EU of precipitating “its own economic decline” by forcing the bloc to turn to more expensive alternatives and a global LNG market where already competes with Asia for each shipment. Brussels, aware of oil precedenthas shielded the veto with a much more severe legal framework. As explained by the Financial Timescompanies that try to circumvent the ban will face fines of up to 3.5% of their global turnover, fixed penalties that can reach 40 million euros and a mandatory system of certificates of origin to prevent Russian gas sneaks in disguise in the form of opaque mixtures, triangulations or indirect re-exports. The truth is even more uncomfortable. Europe still need gas to stabilize its electrical grid and cover demand peaks when the wind does not blow or the sun disappears. According to a report by McKinsey & CompanyEurope would need 75% more flexibility before 2030 to function without that fossil support, while global gas consumption will grow by 26% until 2050, just when it should fall by 75% to comply with the Paris Agreement. Added to this is the structural stress of the European gas system. The main Dutch regasification plants—Gate and Eemshaven— operate at 90–100% capacityjust when Europe faces winter with reserves at 83%, the lowest level since 2022. Spain, despite its large regasification capacity, can barely send 7,000–8,500 million m³ per year to France: the bottleneck is in the interconnections. And a cold wave is enough to destabilize prices, as Bloomberg warns. An accelerated roadmap. Brussels insists that this time there is a plan. Each Member State must be submitted before March 2026 a national diversification plan that details how it will replace the 35 billion m³ of Russian gas that was still entering the EU last year: new suppliers, new infrastructure and new LNG routes. On paper it makes sense. In practice, it means rebuilding in two years an energy system that took four decades to build. Meanwhile, Europe is held together by an unexpected lifeline: the United States. According to Bloombergthe continent has endured in recent months thanks to a boom in American LNG, with exports at record levels. This winter Europe “will probably be fine,” but real abundance will not arrive until the second half of 2026. Any unforeseen event—extreme cold, a rebound in Chinese demand, a technical failure—could strain the system again. And meanwhile, China plays another game. Europe looks at its deposits. China dig deeper. The Asian giant increased its domestic gas production by 5.8% in the first half of 2025, has had 20 years of almost uninterrupted growth, reduced its LNG imports by 22% and is moving forward with the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, capable of absorbing 50 billion Russian m³ per year. The consequence is inevitable: if Europe stops buying, Russia you have someone to sell to. The precedent that worries Brussels. Here is the main fear: oil sanctions showed that when Europe closes a door, the market opens a window. As we have told in XatakaAfter the partial embargo, a phantom fleet of oil tankers emerged, European traders moved operations to Dubai, crude oil was mixed to hide its origin, and shell companies appeared in the Emirates that operated outside of European jurisdiction. The result was evident: Russian oil never stopped flowing, it simply changed flag, route and documentation. And that precedent is precisely what they now fear in Brussels: that gas will follow the same logic of opacity, triangulations and parallel markets. Europe promises to turn off Russian gas. On paper, it is a historic decision. By 2027, Europe says there will be no trace of Russian gas left in its energy system. In practice, the road is full of cracks: saturated infrastructure, porous sanctions, hesitant allies, a potentially cold winter and an energy transition that advances … Read more

Everyone agrees that we have to stop using gas. But Europe does not take any notice

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Europe is preparing for another winter by looking askance at the gas tanks and the thermometer. The heating they start to light up and the alarms, again, too. According to a report by McKinsey & Companyglobal gas demand will increase by 26% by 2050. The figure clashes with the scenario necessary to limit global warming to 1.5 °C, which would require reducing consumption by more than 75%. The bridge fuel. In theory, Europe had learned the lesson after the energy crisis of 2022. But three winters later, the board still showing cracks. The main regasification plants in the Netherlands – Gate and Eemshaven – operate at 90% or 100% of their capacity, and their saturation “is the prelude to higher prices.” They are the gateway for liquefied natural gas (LNG) for Germany and a good part of the European industry. Meanwhile, Spain boasts of having the largest regasification capacity in the EU, with six active terminals, but it can provide little relief to the rest of the continent: interconnections with France barely allow the export of between 7,000 and 8,500 million cubic meters per year. The bottleneck it’s clear: the dependence is no longer on Russia, but on a few port infrastructures that operate at their limits. The result feels on the bill: The regulated gas rate in Spain rose up to 20% in October, but international gas became slightly cheaper, regulated tolls and the increase in winter demand drove up costs. Europe facing winter. The European Union enters winter with gas reserves at 83%the lowest level since the beginning of the energy crisis and ten points below the historical average. The European Commission had set a target of 90%which has not been fulfilled. Meteorologists, in addition, warn of a colder winter than the previous three, which could trigger consumption. Despite this, Brussels does not speak of panic but of caution. ENTSOG—the body that brings together gas system operators— estimates that even In a high demand scenario, no country would have to cut supply. However, he warns of a real risk: “A cold wave in autumn could increase pressure on prices,” especially as Europe compete with Asia for the available LNG. A future that does not deviate from gas. The panorama drawn by the consulting firm McKinsey it’s clear: Global energy consumption will continue to grow by 10% to 15% until 2050. Fossil fuels, despite the rise of renewables, will continue to represent between 41% and 55% of the world’s energy mix. And natural gas, far from disappearing, will remain the pillar of the electrical system and the chemical industryespecially in Asia and the Middle East. The energy transition, the consultancy warns, has lost speed. The priority is no longer decarbonization, but safety and affordability. Or, as the report summarizes: “The gas doesn’t go down, it just moves.” As the electrification of industry and transportation advances, gas demand remains a backup for the system, exacerbating the paradox: each installed renewable megawatt still needs gas behind it. Even in its intermediate scenario, McKinsey estimates a global temperature rise of 2.3°C, well above the Paris Agreement target. The way out: the flexibility that is missing. The consulting firm points to a structural solution: flexibility. Europe will need 75% more flexibility mechanisms before 2030 to integrate renewables without depending on gas. This study estimates that European companies They could capture up to 8 billion euros annually if they invest in demand-side response (DSR) solutions: systems capable of adjusting industrial electricity consumption based on renewable production. In other words, moving demand instead of turning on gas when there is no sun or wind. Several examples from the report show how this new flexibility works: a French paper company managed to multiply its reaction capacity by electrifying its boilers and using thermal storage. In the Netherlands, a greenhouse combines solar energy, batteries and electric boilers to make better use of its production and earn about 300,000 euros per year. And in the United Kingdom, a supermarket chain can reduce its consumption at times of high demand without interrupting its activity. Together, these solutions – batteries, digital control and intelligent systems – allow the electrical grid to adapt instantly, without depending on gas. Between two models. Europe has the generation of the future, but it continues to operate with the rules of the past. The electrical grid still depends on gas to stay on its feet, and transition plans are running slower than the thermometer. McKinsey warns that gas will grow by 26% until 2050, just when it should fall by 75%. It is the portrait of a contradiction: while science asks to slow down, the system steps on the accelerator. The coming winter will once again measure us, not only in degrees or reserves, but in political will. Because energy stability and climate stability, today, are already the same thing. Image | Unsplash Xataka | Europe has been working for three years to isolate itself from Russian gas. Two countries have decided to build a direct gas pipeline to Russia

The lack of additives at low-cost gas stations does not keep drivers up at night. That’s why Moeve wants to be more Ballenoil

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Moeve has changed its strategy and has done so in a big way. In just 12 months, the company has converted 50 of its service stations traditional to Ballenoil, its low-cost brand. And since this type of gas stations began to become popular, the ‘lack’ of additives It has not been a concern for consumers who, above all, prioritize their pockets. The transformation has been especially intense since this summer, when the oil company decided to accelerate the process of further prioritizing its low-cost brand in strategic points throughout the Peninsula. Transformation. The old one Cepsa bought Ballenoil in November 2023 with a clear objective: to challenge Repsol for the crown, which maintains the largest share of the Spanish market. But it is not only about growing the number of gas stations. And it seems that Moeve has understood that the future involves being present in two worlds: the premium, where it maintains its traditional brand, and the low cost, where the customer seeks to fill the tank at a lower cost. From Moeve confirm to the Vozpópuli medium that “both premium and low cost are important to respond to the expectations of our customers.” The perfect timing. Although fuel prices have fallen since all-time highs which they reached after the Russian invasion of Ukraine (when they exceeded two euros per liter), continue to remain at high levels. The liter of 95 octane gasoline exceeds 1.45 euros on average and diesel is close to 1.40 euros, according to data from CincoDías. Logically, given the rise in fuel prices, many drivers are looking for specifically economical gas stations, and that is where the low-cost ones come in. All in a context in which traditional oil companies focus on attracting customers through their promises of premium fuel and additives. Figures. The integration of Ballenoil has made Moeve exceed 2,000 service stations in the Iberian Peninsula for the first time, reaching 2,040 gas stations, according to 2024 financial data. The figure is expected to increase before the end of the year. The pace of transformation accelerated in June, when 16 stations changed their image in a single month. Just like affirms In the middle, during September and October the conversions continued, prioritizing territories where the company already has a greater presence. Madrid leads this transformation with nine gas stations that become Ballenoil, followed by Barcelona, ​​Navarra, Albacete, Ciudad Real, Granada, Seville and Badajoz. The Ballenoil network has also allowed Moeve to penetrate areas where it did not previously have a presence, especially in Catalonia, the Valencian Community, Andalusia and several regions of Castile. The rise of low cost. Low cost gas stations already represent 20% of all stations in Spain, according to inform the EconomíaDigital medium, with more than 2,400 installations spread throughout the country. As the media explains, the savings for the driver can exceed 0.18 euros per liter compared to traditional brands, a difference that ends up being noticed with each refueling. And the forecasts point high, which could mean a major structural change in the national oil panorama. Ballenoil, Plenergy and Petroprix are leading this transformation, betting on automated systems and simplified infrastructure that allow them to reduce costs. Manuel Sáez, CEO of Ballenoil, declared to CincoDías that the objective is to “exceed 380 operational service stations” in the second half of the year and “reach 500 throughout 2027.” Competence. Ballenoil has reached 350 service stations in Spain, becoming the leader in number of points of sale within the low cost segment. Plenergy follows closely, with 340 gas stations (331 in Spain and 9 in Portugal) and plans to reach 370 this year. However, Plenergy leads in business volume: closed 2024 with 1,385 million liters sold, a growth of 43% compared to the previous year. For its part, Petroprix, with 165 stations in Spain, has opted for a different strategy, prioritizing international expansion in markets such as Portugal, Chile, Panama and Poland. Cover image | engin akyurt In Xataka | Catalonia wants to make variable speed limits a reality. And he is already experimenting to improve the sleep of his neighbors

How to use Ruta-E, the government app to find cheap gas stations and charging points in your city or your route

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We are going to tell you how to use Route-Ethe new application of the Ministry for Digital Transformation and Public Service, creators of My Citizen Folder among many other apps. It is an application that seeks to help you find the cheapest gas stations and electric charging points. It is a simple but versatile application. You can choose between gasoline or electric chargers, and then you have the options of exploring on the map or trace a route and see all the gas stations or charging points along with the price of fuel, so you know which one allows you to save a little money on your trips. Look at the price of gasoline with Ruta-E The first thing you have to do is download the Ruta-E application, available on Google Play for Android and in the App Store of iPhones. Once inside you will have a map, and at the top right you will have a filter in which you can choose fuel type for which you want to find a gas station or charging station. When you choose the type of fuel, you will see information about all the pumps in your city. But you can navigate the map to explore the entire country in case you want to look at those of some place you are going to visit. In the gasoline pump preview you will see the price of the fuel you have chosen. The app also has an option to trace the route of a trip what you want to do, with origin and destination point. When you do, you will see all the gas stations you have along the route along with the prices of the type of fuel you have chosen, and also the charging points. When you press at a gas stationyou will be able to see their hours and prices, and thus compare the cheapest ones or those that are open. And if you click on a charging point you will not see the price, but you will see the types of plugs available. In Xataka Basics | Gasoline price on Google Maps: how to see nearby gas stations and their prices on Android or iOS

Red Eléctrica asked for calm. Immediately afterwards, thousands of Spaniards flocked to buy generators and camping gas.

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“The ghost of the great blackout has once again haunted Spain,” This is how my partner summed it up after learning that Red Eléctrica Española had detected new “sudden voltage variations” in the peninsular network. The news was enough to reactivate a recent fear: being left in the dark again. And with that fear, the fever for forecasts also ignited. In search of forecasts. Demand for products related to energy supply and survival has increased by 76%, according to data from the European price comparator Idealo. Among which stand out stoves and camping gas, with an increase of 253%, followed by power stations at 87%, radios at 56% and portable batteries at 49%. Interest in products such as water purification tablets has also skyrocketed by 20% and flashlights by 14%. An alert that set off the alarms. The alert issued by Red Eléctrica Española October 7 was enough to put the population on guard. Although the company assured that the voltage fluctuations “do not pose an imminent risk of a blackout,” the population reacted quickly. Many households, still with fresh memories of the April 28 blackout, began to reinforce their domestic emergency kits, as recommended the European Commission at the beginning of the year. The great precedent. The current prudence is not accidental. Half a year ago, the peninsula suffered a blackout that left the entire country without power for more than twelve hours. During that day, the chaos moved to the stores: endless lines and empty shelves in hardware stores and large stores. Servimedia data they confirm it: The demand for electric generators shot up by 639% and that for gas camping stoves by 547% in just 24 hours. Mass hysteria or rational prevention? The figures may suggest an emotional reaction, but the data rather points to a new culture of foresight. Before the blackout, only 5% of Spaniards had an emergency kit prepared. After the event, the figure doubled to 10%, and the intention to prepare for it went from 32% to 58%. as detailed on YouGov. The CIS adds that 78% of citizens did not feel afraid during the blackout, although 53.5% acknowledged that they remembered the kit recommended by the EU. Furthermore, 88.2% positively valued the civic and supportive behavior of their neighbors during those hours of darkness. The phenomenon has revived the debate: are we facing a “collective energy hysteria” or a modern form of domestic resilience? The business of self-supply. In a matter of months, concern about a possible power outage has created a new market niche: that of energy self-sufficiency. Sales of generators, solar panels and stoves they multiplied by five after the blackout in April. Large chains such as Leroy Merlin or Decathlon sold out their stocks in hours, while neighborhood hardware stores had their own special August selling flashlights, radios and batteries. The trend has not stopped. From Idealo confirm that the searches of these products continue to rise. In parallel, interest has grown in so-called portable power stations, small devices capable of charging everything from mobile phones to basic appliances, and which are already among the most consulted articles on the internet. “Prepper” culture is normalized. Added to this fever of prevention is the rise of the so-called prepperspeople who prepare for emergencies. In fact, two of them described how the blackout tested their preparedness: Their kits allowed them to cook and stay informed when most people lost power. A phenomenon that, far from eccentricity, reflects a growing search for domestic autonomy. A new energy consciousness? Electrical Network insists that “There is no imminent risk of a blackout,” but citizens—and the market—think differently. The culture of self-sufficiency is no longer a rarity and has become established in the collective mentality. There is no blackout in sight, but there is a change: many prefer to rely on their generator before the electrical system. In times of uncertainty, energy is no longer only measured in kilowatts, but also in peace of mind. Image | FreePik and FreePik Xataka | A ghost haunts Spain: the ghost of another massive blackout caused by network tension problems

Europe has been working for three years to isolate itself from Russian gas. Two countries have decided to build a direct gas pipeline to Russia

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The European energy map is changing at a speed that few would have imagined just three years ago. The old gas pipelines that linked Siberia to the industrial heart of the EU have been sidelined, while new routes and alliances reconfigure the power table around gas. The old continent proclaims its purpose of isolating Moscow, but in the center of the continent it is drawn an exception that alters the planned script and that may change the balance of forces in the coming winters. A map in transformation. Yes, the European gas map has changed radically in a few years, to the point that this winter of 2025 is the first in decades in which Russian gas ceases to be decisive throughout the European Union. After the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the energy crisis that broke out between 2021 and 2023, Brussels urged urgently diversification of supplies, relying on imports liquefied natural gas (LNG), especially from the United States and Qatar, and in the fortress of norway as a stable partner. The great gas pipelines that for half a century linked the Siberian fields with the European industrial heart have been underutilizeddamaged or reduced to a secondary role, as energy security moves towards the global balance of the LNG market and towards the vulnerability of infrastructures increasingly exposed to cyber attacks and hybrid incidents. On this new board, each molecule counts, but not all of them weigh the same: there are some that define true European autonomy more than others. The two exceptions. Despite the EU’s declared desire to eliminate purchases from Moscow, two countries have kept the valve open: Hungary and Slovakia. In August 2025, according to the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air, both added imports of Russian crude oil and gas by more than 690 million of euros, that is, the majority of the European total. In fact, they continue to receive oil through the gigantic Druzhba pipeline, which crosses Ukraine and Belarus from Russian fields to Central Europe, and have used temporary exception granted by Brussels to landlocked countries to justify their dependence. The contrast is evident: while countries like France, the Netherlands and Belgium have limited themselves to importing residual Russian LNG, Budapest and Bratislava continue buying crude oil and gas straight from Moscow, keeping alive the energy artery that the rest of Europe has tried to close. Hungary and Slovakia are investing in gas infrastructure and creating a gas block in the heart of Europe aimed at protecting against any risks USA, Brussels and pressure. The intransigence of Viktor Orbán and Robert Fico has not gone unnoticed. At the UN, Trump accused Europe of “financing the war against itself” and pointed out with their own name to the Central European partners that do business with the Kremlin. Brussels, for its part, debate sanctions growing: the nineteenth package included a ban on Russian LNG starting in 2026 and restrictions on giants such as Rosneft or Gazprom Neft, although it avoided imposing immediate vetoes on crude oil and gas by gas pipeline, fearing a head-on crash with Budapest and Bratislava. However, the Commission is already preparing specific tariffs against imports that are still They arrive through Druzhbaand requires all Member States to submit disconnection plans before 2027the year in which the final cut is expected. The discourse of dependency. Hungary insists that its economy would fall 4% immediately if they were closed russian flowsand both Orbán and Fico speak of “economic suicide” and “ideological impositions” from Brussels. However, experts and analysts dismantle many of these arguments: geography is no excuse in an integrated European market where other equally landlocked countries, such as Austria or the Czech Republic, have reduced drastically reduce its Russian imports. Alternative infrastructures there are. The Adria pipeline, which connects to the Adriatic in Croatia, could supply enough crude oil to Hungary and Slovakia, although the reliability of its capacity tests is disputed. The Croatian oil company JANAF itself assures which can supply both refineries (Százhalombatta in Hungary and Slovnaft in Bratislava) with up to 12.9 million tons per year. In gas, the interconnections with neighboring countries and the expected abundance of LNG after 2026 suggest that the cutoff of Russian flows would be more political than technical. Politics, benefits and a shadow. Budapest’s stubbornness also has an internal political and economic dimension. The MOL company, close to the Orbán Government and owner of the Slovak refinery, has reaped huge benefits thanks to the price difference between Russian Urals crude oil and Brent, which has allowed extraordinary income for both the company and the state budget itself through taxes. In parallel, the speech of the Hungarian Executive associates the continuity of supply russian with stability of its star program of subsidies on household energy bills, despite the fact that the prices that Budapest pays for Russian gas follow the same international references as for the rest of Europe. In Slovakia, Fico also protects contracts with Gazprom valid until 2034, although the national company SPP itself has flexible agreements with large Western companies that would allow demand to be met without Moscow. The new axis of the Black Sea. Be that as it may, the most revealing element of the new energy map is that Hungary and Slovakia not only resist cutting the Russian gas pipelines inherited from the Cold War, but are betting on new connections. The route that arrives through the TurkStream and enters from Türkiye towards central Europe through the Black Sea consolidates a direct link with Moscow at the same time that Brussels seeks to isolate it. Paradoxically, the two Central European countries are becoming the main russian corridor towards the heart of the EU, a role that openly contradicts the energy autonomy strategy and reinforces the structural dependence on a partner considered hostile. Europe contradicts itself. The dilemma is obvious. The European Union proclaims its purpose to end with Russian imports in just two years, but at the same time tolerates exceptions that feed … Read more

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