No, China has not turned off the tap on batteries for electric cars. The reality is much more complex

China is, to the electric car, the child who arrives with the ball after having a snack. He is, in fact, the boy who has the ball, a regulation soccer field at home and lets in whoever he wants when he wants the most. Or that’s what we might think if we take into account its leadership in the supply chain, access to rare earths and battery production. The last step is to maintain greater control over lithium and, in the future, solid-state batteries. But to what extent is it true? The latest. A few days ago, China announced important changes when it comes to its exports. Among them, he confirmed that he was going to monitor the licenses that allow the export of vehicleswhich was understood as a way to prevent manufacturers without experience or infrastructure in the destinations from selling cars that they later cannot service. In the same way, has announced restrictions to the export of rare earths. My colleague Javi Márquez explained that “the country will be able to decide what is exported, to whom and for what purposes, under national security criteria. Applications for military purposes will bein principle, denied, while those related to semiconductors or artificial intelligence will be examined on a case-by-case basis. The last movement is related to the exports of batteries for electric cars and the music points to a similar melody. Starting November 8, licenses will be issued to export lithium batteries and graphite anode material compounds. Once again, it points to issues of national security and response to protectionist policies in USA and Europe. No batteries or equipment. With these new licenses, China will control both the finished product that is intended to be exported abroad and the equipment necessary to produce these compounds outside its borders. In summary, the following is controlled: Lithium batteries, cells and battery packs with a density greater than 300 Wh/kg. The equipment and technology to produce the above items. Iron phosphate and lithium needed to produce cathode materials. Also nickel-cobalt-manganese hydroxide and nickel-cobalt-aluminum hydroxide and lithium-rich manganese-based cathode materials. The equipment to produce all these compounds. Graphite anode materials The equipment necessary to produce them. The reaction? Numerous experts They have emphasized that these new licenses have the true objective of reducing and limiting exports to stop the advance of Chinese competitors in the electric car industry. Investors have understood the same and in Reuters They reflected the consequent fall in the stock market of giant battery producers such as CATL but also of vehicle manufacturers such as BYD. In South China Morning Post They also mentioned China’s intention to maintain its leadership in the electric car market. Putting the magnifying glass. But is it true that China is doing everything it can to torpedo its rivals? According to the International Energy AgencyChina manufactures three out of every four batteries for electric cars. However, the limitation of a density greater than 300 Wh/kg is not coincidental. Walter Zhang, senior analyst at Fastmarkets, points out that batteries for electric cars are really not in danger. “The policy ensures that the export and sales of NCM (230-280 Wh per kg) and LFP (160-210 Wh per kg) batteries for electric car application are not affected,” explains in this article. And he points to another point of view: “the measures may be more aimed at restricting smaller companies from entering into technology exchange agreements with Western partners.” Module and pack production equipment is not under this new regulation either, so It won’t impact that much either. in production abroad. So? If the majority of electric car batteries are not affected, what is the point of these restrictions? Everything indicates that there are two ultimate intentions when it comes to lifting this tighter control over the batteries. The first is to increase control over the export of batteries that can be used in military vehicles. In an increasingly tense international context, the State is guaranteed to have greater knowledge of who wants and can export but also in what quantities and for whom. The second thing is that as investments in research bear fruit, the next step should be the production of denser batteries. Batteries that would store more energy in less space. And there, the solid state batteries they are projecting themselves as the great leap in quality in the electric car market. Solid State Batteries. Solid-state batteries promise to be the definitive big leap for the electric car. With them, the manufacturers claim, an electric car will be able to travel more than 1,000 kilometers between recharges. They are also more powerful, safer and will suffer less degradation caused by charging cycles. Nothing sounds bad except that producing them is, at the moment, extremely expensive. Both companies and Toyota has already been lowering its expectations pointing out that it will be a type of compound that can only be included in vehicles with a very high price range. Again, ahead. And although Toyota says it has made progress in these compounds, Nissan has been researching them for years and Mercedes says it already has one (which obviously cannot scale) it seems that Chinese manufacturers once again have the lead. MG assures be very close to mass producing them. BYD too ensures that it can put them on the market in the short term. And beyond the promises, NIO has demonstrated that its semi-solid state battery (a previous step before reaching these energy accumulators) can travel a thousand kilometers without stopping to recharge. China controls the supply chain of the materials to produce these batteries but also the equipment that can produce these compounds. It seems that the measure is aimed at putting obstacles in the way of mass production of an innovation that can change the automobile market. free way. As we have seen, control over exports opens the door to selling current batteries for electric cars outside the country. It makes sense, now that Chinese companies like CATL have reached agreements with giants like … Read more

China has always dreamed of a “Polar Silk Road” so that its ships reach Europe sooner. It is already a reality

Monday was an important day in Felixstoweone of the largest container ports in the United Kingdom. Towards the end of the afternoon, their workers saw the silhouette of the Istanbul Bridgea container ship loaded with lithium batteries and parts for the photovoltaic industry. In itself, the appearance of the Istambul did not represent anything new, the curious thing was where it came from or (more precisely) where it arrived: with its arrival at the docks of Felixstowe the ship completed a historic voyage of 20 days through the Arctic Ocean. Its journey to the British coast has allowed China to take a key step in achieving one of his big dreams: a ‘Polar Silk Road’ with Europe. What has happened? That China has achieved a milestone in maritime trade. Perhaps more symbolic than decisive, but still important. Late on Monday the container ship Istanbul Bridge arrived in the United Kingdom after a trip that had started 20 days before in Ningbo-Zhoushana very important port hub on the coast of the East China Sea. So far nothing strange. The key is that the Istanbul Bridge did not reach Felixtowe in the usual way, after detouring south to cross the Suez Canal and advance through the Mediterranean and the Atlantic towards Europe. No. He did it on the voyage that took the ship through northern waters, through the icy Arctic Ocean and the North Sea. AND that is relevant. Why is it important? The Istanbul, a ship with capacity for 4900 containers standard (TEU), 299 meters in length and flag of liberia (although in reality it has operated bound to the Chinese Sea Legend and Haijie Shipping) it is not the first ship that sails along what is known as the Northern Sea Route, but its voyage has had a special meaning. As remember CNNthe first ships loaded with containers began sailing through the Arctic more than a decade ago, but it is normal for them to do so on special and specific trips. The Istanbul Bridge has another approach. Since his departure from Ningbo-Zhoushan has been presented as proof that the northern route can be used as “a traditional line service”, with commercial stops. “It’s something we haven’t seen in the Arctic until now,” recognize Malte Humper, from the Arctic Institute. The ship took 20 days to complete its journey between China and the United Kingdom loaded with about 4,000 containers and its objective, beyond Felixstowe, is to unload merchandise in other ports in Germany, Poland and the Netherlands. As required According to the Chinese agency Xinhua, the ship was mainly transporting lithium-ion batteries and parts for the photovoltaic industry, goods that are sensitive to heat and in which delivery times are a strategic factor. And why this interest? Because the ultimate objective is not to stop at the feat of the Istanbul Bridge, but to promote the trade route known as “China-Europe Arctic Express”, an itinerary that connects first-class ports such as Ningbo, Shanghai, Qingdao, Dalian, Felixtowe, Rotterdam, Hamburg and Ganks. In fact even Ningbo Customs has referred to the expedition as “the official opening of the first China-Europe Arctic Express container route.” State broadcaster CCTV it is very clear in fact when referring to the voyage of the ship. In his opinion, “it represents the maiden voyage of the first Arctic express container route between China and Europe and demonstrates the commercial viability of the Northwest Passage.” High North News precise that at least for now the route will be seasonal and the shipping company Haijie Shipping plans a single sailing in 2025 (the navigation window is still limited and lasts a few months), but the company seems to have noted the interest of manufacturers and shipping platforms. e-commerce. Is it that interesting? Yes. And it is because its main advantage is speed. The container ship has taken only 20 days to complete its journey, two more than those initially planned. The reason for the delay was a storm passing through the Norwegian Sea that forced him to slow down. Despite this, it represents a notable time saving on China-Europe trips when compared to other much more established alternatives in the sector. As remember Xinhuathe China-Europe Express Railway requires 25 days of travel, transporting goods through the Suez Canal route requires 40 and doing so through the Cape of Good Hope 50. “Trade between China and the European Union has remained strong despite the volatility of the global trade landscape and having a third route, in addition to the traditional shipping corridors and the China-Europe rail service, will bring stability and inject new vitality into bilateral trade,” highlights Cui Hongjianfrom the China Institute of International Studies in Global Times. The Asian newspaper (linked to the Government) does not leave much room for doubt in its report on the Istanbul Bridge: “It represents an emerging international shipping artery of great value to optimize the global supply chain.” Why right now? For several reasons. The main one, because the Arctic of 2025 is not the same as the one of three, four or five decades ago. And it probably won’t be the same in the future either. As climate change progresses and ice fractures and melts, the Arctic is gaining interest as a navigable space. Nikkei assures that its loss has caused the number of ships accessing Arctic waters to have increased by nearly 37% while the total distance traveled has doubled. All in the last 10 years, according to the data managed by WWF. More factors come into play, the reinforced interest that the European market has gained for China in the midst of a tariff war with the United States or the challenges that maritime traffic has encountered in other latitudes, such as the Suez Canala key logistics point that has demonstrated its vulnerability. The northern route also offers extra advantages, such as considerable time savings for shipments destined for Christmas shopping in Europe and low temperatures. Are they all advantages? At all. Perhaps the Arctic has changed, … Read more

Big tech companies are fleeing China like the plague. Their future depends on it

The growing tension between China and the United States is causing a stampede among big technology companies. Apple already made a move at the beginning of the year and now Microsoft and Amazon follow. They are not the first companies that They move from China to manufacture in other Asian countriesbut this migration is different as they are trying to eliminate China from the entire supply chain down to the smallest component level. What is happening. They count in Nikkei Asia that Microsoft wants to manufacture most of its products outside of China and has set a limit of 2026. This movement would affect the production of Microsoft Surfaces and especially data centers, since it is a much more sensitive product. In fact, they have already managed to move a large part of the production of server components because it is a more sensitive product, but their goal is for at least 80% of the components to come from outside China. They also want to move some Xbox production out of China, although in this case they are not being as strict. Why is it important. This move by Microsoft consolidates the trend of big technology companies moving towards independent supply chains from China. It is not a question of patriotism, it is an attempt to ensure their survival and minimize risks derived from the increasingly tense trade warsuch as interruptions in supply and price increases. Besides, in the middle of the AI ​​raceindependence becomes even more necessary. Something has changed. As we said, this is not the first time that technology companies have tried to become independent from China. The improvement in working conditions has made it not so cheap to produce there (although have found ways to retain manufacturing), so its status as the “factory of the world” has been lost in favor of other Southeast Asian countries. However, this time it is a broad movement that covers everything from assembly to materials and components such as PCBs, connectors, cables and fibers. The challenge. Moving the assembly is the easy part, but moving the entire production to the last component is a huge challenge. The date that Microsoft has set does not seem very realistic, especially considering that we are talking about a large production volume. According to Omdiadistribute about 4 million Surfaces per year. amazon. AWS is also moving towards ‘non-Chinese’ production for its AI data centers. They were considering reducing the presence of SYE, their printed circuit board supplier, but realized that it was not so easy to replace them. They are companies with which they have a relationship for decades and offer good prices, as well as quality and great production capacity. Google. Those in Mountain View are also embarking on a similar path. According to Nikkei, they are asking their suppliers to expand server production in Thailand. At the end of 2024 we learned that They planned to invest 1 billion dollars and it seems to have paid off because they have managed to double their production capacity with four new facilities. Image | Flickredited In Xataka | The problem is not that Europe has “expropriated” Nexperia from a Chinese company: it is that it approved its sale just a year ago

import “capsule houses” from China

Spain needs affordable housing. A lot. Hundreds of thousands, according the estimates of the experts who have calculated the hole that the country would need to cover to get out of the housing crisis in which it has been immersed. That is why it is not surprising that solutions like the one that has just been launched a company of Pontevedra generate expectation inside and outside the sector. Their bet consists of neither more nor less than importing small “capsule houses” Chinese that can be installed in just a few months and are available for a few tens of thousands of euros. The question is… Will they help solve the problem? What has happened? That the Spanish real estate market adds a new residential solution. That is news in itself in a context marked by pronounced imbalance between supply and demand and escalation of prices. However, in this case there is another reason why the advertisement has aroused interest: what it offers Caslua Importa company located in O Grove (Galicia), is a solution that stands out for its costs and times. In fact they use a quite descriptive term. What they sell is neither more nor less than “capsule houses”. Capsule houses? Exact. To be more precise, “modular capsule houses”a term that gives a fairly precise idea of ​​what this Galician company offers. His online catalog It is divided into two categories: houses and modules. All prefabricated and with a range of sizes ranging from 5.8 meters long by 2.2 wide and 2.4 high (it even has smaller modules for offices) to structures of more than 11 meters and almost 40 m2 with a living room, bathroom, bedroom and terrace. Shapes, sizes and features change between some models and others, but philosophy is always the same: “Compact, efficient housing solutions ready to respond to the needs of housing, work or entrepreneurship.” In fact, those in charge usually emphasize two ideas: costs and times. The price range moves between 25,000 and 80,000 euros and the house would be ready in a few months. “In less than three you can have a fully assembled house to live in,” assures one of the founders of the firm, Antonio Luaña. “Manufacturing periods are around 30 days and then 60 days of transportation.” What are they like? It depends a lot on the model, but the company insist in that the capsules are modular, sustainable and can be adapted to be “self-sufficient”. After presenting its offer in media such as The Sixth, Antenna 3 either The Voice of Galiciathis week the signing showed to a hundred businessmen, politicians and neighbors a 38 m2 capsule home installed in O Grove and that includes a bathroom with a jacuzzi, a small kitchen with an oven and hob, a living room and a double bed. “It is around 85,000 euros. If you take away things from what it has, it can be around 73,000. Prices vary, but the structure is the same,” Luaña points out. Who makes capsule houses? The news shared by Caslúa assure that these are homes manufactured in China and that the Galician firm is dedicated to marketing them in Spain and Portugal. “When I went to China and saw them, I thought: How is this not in Spain? We have to take it,” Antonio tells. A quick search shows that in the Asian giant they work this type of small format residential solutions. Glamini includes different modelsalthough it is also dedicated to the manufacture of floating houses or cabins. Is it something new? Yes. And no. To start the concept of “capsule house” can be traced in foreign markets and in recent months there has been talk about them in other regions of Spain, such as Navarre. In China it is also possible to find several manufacturers. Even AliExpress they have launched its marketing. The undeniable thing is that the concept has aroused interest and joins a wave that goes beyond the “livable capsule” concept: that of the search for new forms of construction that make it possible to meet the high demand for housing. In recent years it has been gaining strength, for example prefabricated housingindustrialized and modular, which speeds up construction times without the owner having to give up configuring his residence. It is no longer just a matter of individuals betting on that formula. In recent months in Spain we have also seen businessmen resorting to that same solution to raise a multi-story hotel (it happened in Zaragoza) or even to institutions getting interested for her. Are they all advantages? The important thing is to know the characteristics of each option. And assess issues such as costs. For example, if we talk about a 38 m2 capsule that costs 73,000 euros, the square meter costs 1,900 euros, which (even assuming that this price includes the equipment) is noticeably above of the prices that are handled in some markets in Spain. Not to mention that to install a capsule it is necessary to have land that meets all urban planning requirements. The TVG network remember For example, even though they are modular houses, they cannot be installed on rustic land, unless they are linked to an agricultural operation. Images | Caslua Import In Xataka | Prefabricated houses have always been substandard housing. Now many governments are promoting them in the face of the crisis

Europe approved the sale of Nexperia to China in 2024 after “assessing risks.” Someone miscalculated

Less than two years ago, European authorities assessed the risks of China controlling Nexperia through Wingtech and gave the green light. This week, The Netherlands has used a 1952 emergency law to confiscate that same company claiming that it is strategic for European security. Why is it important. Worse than being too rigorous or too lax is lurching. Europe has proven to lack a consistent criterion on what is strategic and what is not. This inconsistency comes at an enormous cost: any company that wants to invest in technology sectors in Europe now knows that the rules can change retroactively, without prior notice, under external pressure. And that scares away investments. The contradiction: If Nexperia was so strategic for Europe, why was it allowed to be sold to a consortium backed by the Chinese government in 2017? If it wasn’t then, what has changed now to justify a seizure using a law created for supply crises? The only possible answer is that someone miscalculated very, very badly. Between the lines. He editorial of Financial Times He puts it bluntly: Holland made a mistake in approving the sale, and is now trying to correct it. The problem is that this lurch sets a toxic precedent. You can pass all the regulatory filters, invest billions, operate for years under European supervision and suddenly the State decides that it was wrong. When Wingtech bought Nexperia in 2019European regulators had plenty of time to block the operation. They didn’t do it. For years, Nexperia has operated in the Netherlands, manufacturing millions of components annually for the European automotive and consumer electronics industry. Everything legal, everything supervised, everything approved. turning point. What has changed is not Nexperia’s technological capabilities or its strategic importance. What has changed is the geopolitical pressure: The United States blacklisted Wingtech in 2024. In September 2025, the US government extended restrictions to all subsidiaries of sanctioned companies. Court documents in the case suggest that the Netherlands acted under American pressure, not because of its own risk assessment. Yes, but. Wingtech is right about one thing: this is “excessive interference driven by geopolitical bias rather than fact-based risk assessment.” It’s the exact opposite of what regulators did when they approved the sale. So they did evaluate risks with facts. Now they confiscate for geopolitics. The money trail. Nexperia invested in its European facilities under Zhang Xuezheng. The company kept production in Holland, created jobs, paid taxes. He did exactly what an investor is supposed to do. The reward has been a confiscation by a 1952 law and a CEO suspended without formal accusations of mismanagement until it was convenient to find them. The case has an additional twist that is dangerously reminiscent of Huawei in 2018-19: First come Western restrictions for national security. Then the Chinese countermeasures. Days after the Dutch intervention, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce has banned Nexperia from exporting certain components from its Guangdong plant. The company is now caught between two countries that do not speak to each other. Huawei was gigantic and could hold its own. Nexperia is medium and we’ll see what happens with it. At stake. There is… 12,500 employees without knowing what will happen to their jobs. A CEO suspended in Amsterdam. An export veto from China. European automobile customers dependent on their chips. All this because less than two years ago someone approved a sale after “evaluating risks” and now it turns out that those risks were unacceptable. If Europe wants to attract technological investment, it needs clear and stable criteria on which sectors are strategic. What it cannot do is approve operations for years and then seize companies when the geopolitical wind changes. That is not protecting technological sovereignty, it is improvisation disguised as national security. Featured image | Nexperia In Xataka | China is taking a giant step in its quest for technological self-sufficiency: its own EDA software

China is taking a giant step in its quest for technological self-sufficiency: its own EDA software

A company called Qiyunfang just done a unique presentation at the Bay Area Semiconductor Expo held in Shenzhen, China. In it he has presented two EDA platforms. And with them it has opened the door to something in which the Asian giant totally depended on the US: designing your own chips. What is EDA. Electronic Design Automation (EDA) software is the fundamental tool and the gateway to be able to design chips and printed circuit boards (PCBs). Historically, this segment has always been dominated by American companies: Synopsys, Cadence and Mentor Graphics / Siemens EDA were the absolute references. They “translate” the ideas of the engineers who design the chips, and convert them into functional plans that manufacturers such as TSMC or SMIC can manufacture. Who is Qiyunfang. This company, founded in 2023, is not just any one: it is SiCarrier subsidiarywhich in turn collaborates with Huawei Technologies. As if that were not enough, SiCarrier is a semiconductor manufacturer that has financial support from the Shenzhen government. The US had China tied. In May of this year, China began to block the export of its rare earths, and the United States responded with a blockade that was equally harmful to China: the aforementioned American companies They could no longer sell their services and their EDA software to its Chinese partners. It was one of the most effective ways to “strangle” the Chinese semiconductor industry: if you can’t design the chip, it doesn’t matter if you have factories to produce it. SMIC, for example, it’s been 20 years using Synopsys EDA design suites. With the veto he was left unable to use them. China once again opts for self-sufficiency. The solutions presented by Qiyunfang theoretically allow for domestic solutions for EDA software for both schematic designs (conceptual design) and PCB (physical design of the board). Not only that: these platforms run on a completely Chinese software stack—operating system, database, middleware. Qiyunfang is not a product, it is a break with dependency in two of the crucial stages of chip design. The key is technological independence. If these platforms comply, China will have a solution immune to sanctions, also integrated into the Chinese national technological ecosystem. The trade and technology war that the country maintains with the United States has encouraged both parties to seek precisely to avoid dependence among themselves and also with other countries. It’s the “I’ll stew it, I’ll eat it” taken to the maximum extreme. The other challenge: advanced chips. Even having its own EDA software, China still has a colossal challenge with advanced chips that use 3 and 5 nm photolithography and that take advantage of UVE technologies. They continue working on these types of systems, but until they have them, Qiyunfang’s software platforms are a fantastic option for developing more “mature” but equally important chips such as those for the automotive sector or industrial applications. China continues to move key chips. This news confirms the trajectory that Xi Jingping established with its famous “Made in China 2025” plan. It seeks to conquer the key technologies of the future: AI, robotics, automotive and of course the manufacturing of semiconductors without external dependencies are little by little a reality in the Asian giant, and this new milestone of this Chinese company seems to demonstrate it. In Xataka | Before the tariffs, China bought most of its beef from the US. After the tariffs another country has won

China has not stood idly by in the face of the Dutch offensive against Nexperia. The pulse with Europe intensifies

Nexperia probably doesn’t sound familiar to us. It does not manufacture phones or computers, but its small chips are present in a good part of devices. For years, it was a discreet company based in the Netherlands and owned by the Chinese company Wingtech, far from the media spotlight. Everything changed this fall, when the Dutch Government took temporary control of its management citing reasons of economic securityand a few days later China banned its subsidiary from exporting part of its products. In just one week, an invisible company became the epicenter of the new technological pulse between Europe and Beijing. The Dutch Government’s measure was not an expropriation, but it was an unprecedented move. The Ministry of Economic Affairs invoked the Asset Availability Lawa 1952 law created to ensure the supply of essential goods. With it, he assumed veto power over strategic decisions. In parallel, The Amsterdam Business Chamber appointed an independent administrator and reorganized voting rights to ensure oversight. According to the Executive, it was about ensuring that the company maintained its production in Europe and avoiding any transfer of sensitive knowledge outside the continent. Dutch control over Nexperia has a very specific scope. The State does not own the company, but it can veto strategic decisions, changes in management or movements that modify its structure in Europe. Through the independent administrator appointed by a court, the Government has a direct say in the management and can stop any decision that it considers a risk to supply or technological security. Supervision has been established for an initial period of one year, although it is not clear whether monitoring could be extended beyond that period. Export veto. A few days after the Dutch decision, China reacted with a measure that directly hits the Asian subsidiary of Nexperia. The Ministry of Commerce vetoed the export of certain “finished components and subassemblies” manufactured in Chinese territory, both by the company itself and by its suppliers. The blockade does not affect its internal market, but limits part of the trade routes to Europe and America. The company has confirmed that it is seeking an agreement with the Chinese authorities to reverse the veto. Impact on the supply chain. Nexperia’s Guangdong plant is one of its largest centers, with a capacity of tens of billions of parts per year. The Chinese order affects precisely that facility and its local suppliers, which restricts international shipments. Nexperia keeps its factories active in Europe and Southeast Asia, which could help mitigate the effects of the blockade. For now, the company assures that European production and orders continue as normal. Official responses: Following the Dutch Government’s decision, Nexperia announced that it will fully cooperate with the authorities and implement the management changes ordered by the court. Wingtech, its Chinese parent company, talks about “an excessive intervention based on geopolitical bias rather than a fact-based risk assessment” by the Netherlands. From Beijing, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs denounced the politicization of the issue and discriminatory practices against Chinese companies Chronology to understand the case at a glance. In just two weeks, the Nexperia case went from being an administrative decision to becoming a diplomatic fight between Europe and China. September 30, 2025: The Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands invokes for the first time the Goods Availability Act to apply supervisory measures over Nexperia. October 4, 2025: China’s Ministry of Commerce prohibits Nexperia China and its subcontractors from exporting certain “finished components and subassemblies” manufactured in the country. October 7, 2025: The Amsterdam Business Chamber suspends CEO Zhang Xuezheng and appoints an independent administrator with decision-making power over the company. October 12, 2025: The Dutch Government officially announces the activation of the law and the control framework over Nexperia. October 14, 2025: Nexperia recognizes the veto imposed by Beijing and affirms that it is holding talks with the Chinese authorities to resolve the blockade. ⠀ The episode leaves more questions open than answers. China has not published a detailed list of affected products, and the available information comes from Nexperia’s statement on October 14. It is also not known whether Dutch supervision will end within the announced deadline or whether it could be extended. Ultimately, the company operates between two opposing regulations, with no clear margin for stable normality. A conflict, opposing views. The Netherlands maintains that it acts for economic security and to protect technological capabilities considered strategic. China, on the other hand, interprets the measure as a form of discrimination that seeks to slow its industrial advance. Between both positions, the company tries to maintain balance on a board that has become as political as it is technological. What is at stake is not only the future of Nexperia, but the role that Europe wants to play in the new geography of technology. Nexperia is not a minor player. From its headquarters in the Netherlands coordinates a global network of more than 12,500 employees and manufactures billions of components each year for industries ranging from automobiles to consumer electronics. Their chips, invisible to most, are part of the technical fabric that supports much of the digital economy. That scale explains why what began as a national measure has ended up resonating in a global debate about control, dependence and technological power. Images | Nexperia (1, 2, 3) In Xataka | Before the tariffs, China bought most of its beef from the US. After the tariffs another country has won

US soybean silos are bursting because China no longer buys them. The threat to the US is used oil

The trade war and the exchange of tariffs between the US and China is having repercussions at many levels and agriculture is one of the sectors that is suffering the most from the consequences. Due to its size, China is one of the main importers of food products and is using this advantage to punish its rival. They are doing it with beef and also with soybeans. Now Trump has a threat to China. What has happened? China was the main US customer in the soybean business, but the trade war is reconfiguring the game board and soybeans are being one of China’s main weapons in this tug of war. The decision to stop buying soy is wreaking havoc in the US and now Trump pushes to stop buying another product from them: used cooking oil. The president has used your social network Thruth to describe China’s move with soybeans as “an act of economic hostility” and has assured that “we can easily produce cooking oil ourselves, we do not need to buy it from China.” Why it is important. The used cooking oil market moved 6.9 billion dollars in 2024. This oil is used to create biofuels, and with increased recycling and sustainability initiatives, the figure is expected to double by 2032. The United States is the world’s largest buyer of used oil and China is its largest supplier. According to data from the Department of Agriculture American, in 2024 the United States bought 43% of all the used oil produced by China. The soy problem. China was the US’s main customer in the soybean business. Until not long ago, they bought 40% of all production from them, a figure that was reduced to 20% in 2024. Despite the reduction, it was still a lot: 27 million tons and a value of 12.8 billion dollars. In 2025 only about 16 million tons have been imported until July, but this was just the beginning. Currently, China has further reduced imports of US soybeans, which aim to be practically zero in the last quarter of the year. Instead, China is doing business with other countries: Brazil and Argentina. Consequences. American farmers’ silos are bursting with soybeans. They count in the New York Times that states like North Dakota sold more than 70% of their production to China and now find that their best customer no longer buys from them. It is an enormous amount to be able to place before production goes to waste. The damage to the agriculture sector is enormous, with farms projecting losses of up to $400,000 this year. Tensions. A few days ago we learned of Beijing’s decision to consolidate its dominance over rare earthsa strategic sector in which they are the key player. The United States responded with a 100% tariff which is accumulated to those already imposed previously. Trump exploded on social Thruth against the measure, but in one of his usual changes of position, days later posted another message in which he lowered his tone: “Don’t worry about China, everything will be fine. The highly respected President Xi has only had a bad time.” The threat to stop buying used oil represents a new escalation of tension, although there are voices like that of Rush Doshi, Biden’s former security adviser, They believe that it will not have great consequences and in Beijing it will be seen as a sign of weakness. Image | Pexels 1, 2In Xataka | Holland has just declared war on China in the most important battle of the century: control of semiconductors

The US attacked China with tariffs and China has counterattacked by stopping buying meat from them. The big winner has been Australia

The United States was one of the main exporters of beef to China, but the tension between both countries and the tariff war has ended this relationship. The winner of the situation is Australia, which is already the country that exports the most beef to China, but also one of the main partners of the United States. What is happening. There was no official statement from the government. Last March, China did not renew its beef export licenses with the United States and has found a new partner to meet demand: Australia. Beef exports have increased 35% in the first half of the year and the Australian livestock sector has already invoiced 6.6 billion dollars, according to Nikkei Asia. Shipments to the Chinese market have grown by 65%, but they have also increased to the United States by 48%. It’s a double victory. Why it is important. China is the largest importer of agricultural products and is using this stance to harm the United States. They already did it with their decision to stop buying soybeans from the United Stateswhich was their main supplier, and now they have done it with beef. The beef trade between the United States and China produced around 120 million dollars a month. Now that number is zero. It is another example that dismantles Trump’s storywhich defends tariffs as a beneficial measure for the United States. Skyrocketing prices. The price of meat reached its all-time high last September, according to data from United Nations. In particular, the increase in the price of beef is caused by several factors. On the one hand, the decrease in production in countries such as the United States, New Zealand and Europe. In the United States specifically, the shortage has been caused because of the drought. On the other hand, tariffs and geopolitical tensions have put pressure on international market prices. The game board has been reconfigured, with the United States and China turning primarily to Australia and Brazil to meet their demand. perfect position. At least for the moment, Australia wins because it is in a good position with the main meat importers. In China they are already the first supplier of beef, while in the United States they are the second behind Brazil. The key is that while Trump imposed 50% tariffs on Brazilin Australia they only have 10% because they mainly export minced meat for hamburgers. Australia and China. There was not always harmony between the two nations. In 2020, China suspended imports of Australian beef. The reason given was labeling problems for some products, but everything indicates that the decision had more to do with the critical stance of the Australian government about China’s handling of the coronavirus. Image | Wikipedia, PXhere In Xataka | China has just beaten the United States in the most unexpected fight: that of branded coffee shops

an F-35 squadron that does not belong to China, Russia or the United States

In the month of January it was known America’s plan B in the Arctic once it seemed that “the Greenland thing” was not going to be so easy: a underwater cave in Norway. Two months later, eight icebreakers attested that Russia was there tooand in August, both nations looked with surprise at the arrival of five icebreakers with the flag of China. Now, at congregation a squadron of F-35s has been added… from a fourth contender. New strategic axis. we have been counting throughout the year. The Arctic has ceased to be a remote space and has become a central theater of power: a place where geography dictates the rules, meteorology sets human limits and the proximity between platforms The military turns every kilometer into a possible avenue of attack or surveillance. What was once a map and science is now state policy. From the Nunalik deck (a freighter that traveled thousands of km avoiding growlers and storms to deliver material to Canada’s northernmost intelligence network) brutal lessons emerge: presence in the north is not improvised, it is built with infrastructurespecialized logistics and sustained budgetary will. The fact that a delivery can be delayed for 48 hours because the dockworkers are closed for a weekend, or that a 2.5 ton anchor ends up dragging a 180 meter chain between icebergs, illustrates the basic arithmetic of the Arctic: distance and climate are permanent enemies of any defense project. Logistics and fragility. They remembered in The Wall Street Journal to maintain bases like Pituffik’s either Alert (the latter just 800 km from the North Pole) means dealing with very narrow seasonal windows: the sealifts (sea supply operations) are possible only four or five months a year, air transport must cover the invisible, and a single missing part can delay crucial work a whole year. Inuit communities, icy runways that require constant maintenance, satellite platforms and underwater cables make up a network in which any weak link puts the whole at risk. Thus, if creatures such as musk ox and polar bears are found on the coast, behind the tracks and radars there are also human lives that depend punctual suppliesand errors like 1991 plane crash that cost lives in the approach to the Alert base remind that Arctic logistics is not a technical variable but a matter of survival. View of Thule Air Base Russian advantage and western window. Geographically, Moscow starts with objective advantages: the Kola Peninsula is home to the Northern Fleetnuclear systems launchable by Arctic routes and a depth of deployment that the West took decades to erode. However, the weakening of part of the Russian ground forces after the war in Ukraine has opened a window for allies to rebuild capabilities in the north. The question is whether to take advantage of it quickly and consistently. Western allies face the task of recover strategic ground almost from scratch: the lessons learned in Afghanistan or the Sahel are not directly exportable to a region of polar darkness, snow storms and ice that makes even the best prepared ships creak. If these gaps are not closed, the russian advantage and/or the appearance of foreign actors They will make Western deterrence, more than a policy, an urgent technological requirement. Russian icebreaker Hypersonics, sensors and more. The challenge is not only to be present, but detect and anticipate. The hypersonic missiles (unpredictable trajectories and speeds of at least Mach 5) put traditional radar networks in check, and have pushed Ottawa to commit 6 billion of Canadian dollars (in collaboration with Australia) to far horizon radars and Washington to accelerate space sensors that track ballistic and hypersonic vectors from orbit. In other words: detection is a necessary condition to deter, and without early detection there is no response. The problem, they pointed out in the Journalis that technology is not the panacea: it requires logistics integration, data centers, resilient command posts and continuous maintenance that the polar climate makes prohibitively expensive if not planned for the long term. Denmark on the front line. And on that board where the flags of China, Russia and the United States are already found, the recent decision of Copenhagen is inscribed: 8.7 billion dollars to increase the fleet from F-35 to 43 devices and 4.2 billion expressly dedicated to reinforcing Arctic security, with a joint headquarters in Nuuk, two new ships, maritime patrol vessels, surveillance aircraft and units in the polar territory. Denmark mixes the purchase of American technology with the will to act as regional guarantordriven by both Allied pressure and the commotion caused for the idea (proclaimed by Trump in January) of “buy” Greenland. The package shows two things: the first, that European states are willing to spend considerable sums on advanced projection and detection systems. The second, that sovereignty and territorial presence have become in currency geopolitics, where the air force and naval capabilities are not only military but also diplomatic pieces. Local sovereignty and criticism. Not only that. The extension of the military presence in Greenland does not occur in a vacuum. Local voices, represented by figures such as Aleqa Hammond, former Greenlandic Prime Minister, they reproach Copenhagen to decide without sufficiently consulting the 57,000 people on the island, remembering that militarization affects ways of life and resources shared. Furthermore, the pressure on ecosystems fragile and the need to respect indigenous rights make it essential to combine security with listening and real compensation. If the Arctic is a strategic boardis also a home: decisions about bases, radars and icebreaker routes They must incorporate the social and environmental dimension or risk legitimizing internal tensions that erode any long-term military base. Costs, industries and alliances. Plus: building a presence in the north is not just about buying fighters and installing radars. I remembered the BBC which requires shipyards to manufacture icebreakers, polar cargo ships, maintenance lines for icy runways, contracts held with operators and, above all, the political will to sustain recurring spending. The NORAD modernizationcoordination between Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom … Read more

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