Month: January 2026

Europe has spent more than four years trying to close a dependency that made it vulnerable. At the end of January, he finally achieved it. The Twenty Seven They approved the total ban of Russian gas imports, both by pipeline and in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG). A historic decision that becomes law a repeated political promise since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine: never again entrust European heating, industry and electricity to Moscow. But victory comes with an asterisk. While Europe manages to disassociate itself from Russian gas, a new problem emerges on the horizon: the continent has gone, almost without realizing it, from depending on Russia to increasingly depending on the United States. An accelerated replacement. According to data from the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA)imports of American LNG into the European Union quadrupled between 2021 and 2025, going from 21 billion cubic meters to around 81 billion. Last year it was confirmed that 57% of the LNG that arrived in Europe came from the United States. If all gas imports are added—both liquefied and by gas pipeline—the United States will already cover 27% of the total consumption of the European Union in 2025. And dependency threatens to increase. According to IEEFA projections, this share could approach 40% in 2030 if current contracts are maintained and plans to reduce demand do not prosper. The problem is even bigger with LNG. At this point, the United States could supply between 75% and 80% of all liquefied gas imported by the EU in 2030. This shift was not the result of a long-term strategy, but of an immediate need. After the invasion of Ukraine and the collapse of Russian flows, American gas came as a lifeline. LNG carriers leaving Texas and Louisiana helped avoid blackouts, stabilize markets and fill European storage in the most critical winters. “At the time, it seemed like a heroic solution,” summarizes Henning Gloystein, an analyst at Eurasia Group. quoted by The New York Times. “Now we are beginning to realize that we have replaced one massive dependency with another.” A very uncomfortable partner. So to speak in some way. The repeated threats of the American president about Greenland, its trade disputes with the European Union and his openly instrumental vision of energy trade They have set off alarm bells in Brussels. “The risk is not that the United States will cut off supply tomorrow,” several analysts explain. cited by The New York Times. “The risk is that it uses its dominant position to pressure, increase prices or condition.” Unlike Russia, the US gas sector is not controlled by a state monopoly, making an abrupt cut in flows less likely. But Washington could introduce export taxes, prioritize other markets or influence prices and contracts, which would have a direct impact on European consumers. Furthermore, American LNG is, according to IEEFAthe most expensive on the market for European buyers. This clashes head-on with one of the central objectives of the EU’s energy strategy: making energy cheaper to recover industrial competitiveness. Gas as a volatility factor. Increasing dependence on US LNG also exposes Europe to shocks that are completely beyond its control. In early 2026, an extreme cold wave in the United States caused a rapid rise in gas prices in the US market, where futures doubled in a matter of days. The effect was immediately transferred to Europe, where the price of gas exceeded 40 euros per megawatt hour (€/MWh). The situation is aggravated by low European storage levels, which have fallen below 45%, the lowest level for this date in five years. In key countries such as Germany, France and the Netherlands, deposits are between 30% and 45%which leaves little room for new tensions. A speech that repeats itself. Aware of the risk, European institutions insist that dependence on American gas must be temporary. “We don’t want to replace one dependency with another,” repeats Commissioner Dan Jørgensen. “Our strategy is to grow in our own energy and, in the medium term, free ourselves from gas.” The approved legislation obliges Member States to submit before March 2026 national supply diversification plans, identify bottlenecks and notify all remaining contracts with Russia. The REPowerEU plan still has three pillars: short-term supplier diversification, reduction in gas demand and accelerated deployment of renewables. The problem is the calendar and Europe still needs gas today, even as it promises to stop needing it tomorrow. The North Sea as a European powerhouse. In this scenario, the European commitment to offshore wind acquires strategic weight. At the North Sea Summit in Hamburg, nine countries – including Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Denmark – they agreed to convert this region in the great clean energy hub of the continent. The plan it’s ambitious: Achieve 300 gigawatts of offshore wind by 2050 and deploy up to 15 gigawatts per year between 2031 and 2040, with at least 100 gigawatts developed through coordinated cross-border projects. Offshore wind is no longer presented as an environmental solution, but as a matter of control. The North Sea Pact puts investments of up to one trillion euros on the table to turn this technology into the new axis of the European energy system. The industry commits to make offshore wind electricity cheaper by 30% by 2040 and to assume a central role in the European energy system. “It’s not just about the climate,” said Britain’s Ed Miliband in Hamburg. in statements reported by the Financial Times. “It’s about controlling our energy and not leaving it in the hands of dictators or petrostates.” The cracks in the system. Despite the independence speech, contradictions persist. Europe continues to sign long-term gas contracts with American suppliers, while denouncing the risks of dependency. Regasification and transportation infrastructures are at their limit in countries like the Netherlands, and interconnections remain insufficientespecially between the Iberian Peninsula and the rest of the continent. Furthermore, European unity is fragile. Hungary and Slovakia maintain their opposition to the veto … Read more