enter Iran to remove a buried “treasure” of 441 kg that gives meaning to the war
Since 1921 when the Italian general Giulio Douhet argued that bombers could win wars by destroying the “vital centers” of a country, air power has fascinated strategists and politicians. However, more than a century of conflict has left a lingering paradox: even the most devastating bombing campaigns in history have, sooner or later, required something much riskier than airplanes to truly decide a war. Especially if, as in almost all wars, one seeks to give meaning to the nonsense. The historical limit. They told it this morning in a special report from the Wall Street Journal. The war started with intense bombing campaign on Iran has once again put on the table an uncomfortable lesson from military history: planes, missiles and bombs can destroy infrastructure, armies and arsenals, but they rarely bring down a regime on their own. Despite the wishes expressed in Washington to bring about political change in Tehran, the military commanders themselves have lowered expectations and they have insisted that the real objective of the campaign is to degrade Iranian offensive capabilities, whether missiles, drones or naval forces, and to wear down its nuclear program. The reason is simple. Even after weeks of attacks, the power structures of the Iranian state they are still intactbacked by military and paramilitary forces that number hundreds of thousands of troops and whose main interest is to maintain the system as it is. Nor does historical precedent help support the idea that strategic bombing alone can decide a war: neither World War II, nor Kosovo, nor Libya. they managed to change governments only from the air. In all cases there were forces on the ground, local insurgencies or invasions that ended up tipping the balance. Members of the US Army using nuclear material detection tools during an exercise No main objective. That air power limit has a immediate strategic consequence: Although the bombings may reduce Iran’s military capacity, they do not guarantee that what gave rise to the conflict will disappear, if there ever was something tangible. The central official concern remains nuclear material that the country has accumulated for years and that represents a latent option to manufacture atomic weapons in a short time. The air campaign can destroy facilities, seal access or delay the program, but it cannot guarantee anything much more complicated: locate, control and neutralize fissile material that already exists. The dilemma is especially serious if the regime survives the conflict or if the Iranian State enters a phase of internal chaos, because that scenario would open the door for some of that material to end up in the hands of regional militias, non-state actors or even black market networks. In other words, war can weaken the adversary without solving the problem that caused it. U.S. Army Soldiers with the 128th Chemical Company, 337th Engineer Battalion conduct reconnaissance in an underground tunnel during an exercise in Lithuania in 2025 The buried “treasure” that gives meaning to war. At the center of this dilemma is a specific piece of information that summarizes all the strategic tension: some 441 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, enough to produce material for various nuclear weapons if taken to levels of military purity. This material, stored mainly in underground facilities deeply protected, is the true objective that explains the military campaign. As long as it exists and remains out of control, any aerial victory will be incomplete. The paradox is that this nuclear “treasure” is designed precisely to withstand the type of war that the United States and Israel have been fighting: buried facilities, protected by layers of concrete and rock, designed to survive bombings. Destroying buildings is relatively easy, but destroying or capture nuclear material stored underground is another story entirely. The last mission: enter Iran. Thus we come to a stage which is closer than ever to the rhetoric that the United States has tried to inoculate the planet through a species trailer hollywood. Because an idea has begun to appear that until recently seemed extreme: the possibility of a ground raid of special forces to physically seize Iranian nuclear material or neutralize it in situ. The reasoning is brutally simple. If bombing cannot guarantee control of the enriched uranium, someone will have to go looking for it. They counted the TWZ analysts that, in American strategic circles, there is talk of operations in which elite commandos would penetrate facilities underground, they would secure the material and decide on the spot whether to transport it out of the country or reduce its purity to make it unusable. There is no doubt, it would be a extremely complex operationalmost movie makerwhich would combine special forces, nuclear experts and possibly specialized technical personnel, with the aim of securing material that cannot simply be destroyed with explosives without causing radiological risks. Possible, but almost suicidal. The problem is that such a mission would be one of the military operations riskiest imaginable. The material weighs hundreds of kilos and it is probably stored in armored containers, which would greatly complicate its transportation. The facilities are buried, protected and defended by forces that consider these facilities one of the country’s most important strategic assets. To access them it may be necessary open tunnels or remove tons of earth and concrete as the Iranian army tries to react. The longer the assault force remains on the ground, the more likely the Iranian forces will organize a counterattack with artillery, missiles or ground units. Added to this is the difficulty of infiltrating and extracting a relatively large contingent of operators loaded with specialized equipment in the middle of an open conflict. The logic that moves it. Despite everything, strategic logic pushes towards that direction. If nuclear material is dispersed, hidden, or moved to multiple locations, the problem will multiply and any attempt to neutralize it will be even more difficult. Furthermore, bombing convoys or depots from the air could disperse radioactive material without eliminating the threat. In that context, physically securing uranium becomes the solution to … Read more