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When Russia crossed the Ukrainian border in 2022, Europe reacted as it had not done since the end of the Cold War: massive sanctions, accelerated rearmament and a political unity forced by urgency. During these years, the European debate revolved around a seemingly simple question about kyiv’s resistance, as the conflict lengthened, became normalized, and ceased to be a “temporary” war. Now, with the front stagnant and the calendar moving forward, in the European capitals it is beginning to prevail another concern. What will Russia do when this war is no longer the center of the board? It’s not just the front. Yes, as the conflict in Ukraine approaches its fourth anniversary, it is beginning to take hold in Europe a different reading And more disturbing: Russia is not acting like a country trapped in a war of attrition, but rather like a power that uses the conflict as, perhaps, a preparatory phase. In the last few hours, a piece of information has appeared on the old continent: the massive increase in its military production suggests that Moscow is not only thinking about supporting the current front, but about setting up a later strategic scenarioin which having reserves, industrial capacity and room for maneuver will be as important as any territorial advance achieved in Ukraine. The figure that triggers the alarms. The data that most worries the European intelligence services is the Russian production of ammunition, which has exceeded the seven million projectiles annually, a figure 17 times higher to that of the first stages of the invasion. According to the Estonian intelligence service Välisluureamet, this jump is not explained by a simple intensification of combat, mainly because it makes no sense, but by the construction of new industrial plants and the will to rebuild strategic reserves in the long term. For Europe, the implicit message is clear: no one manufactures at that rate if they are only thinking about surviving the current conflict. Resist and prepare. This rearmament occurs despite the Russian economic deterioration, enormous human cost of the war and the increasing difficulties for recruit soldiersreinforcing the idea that the Kremlin prioritizes material accumulation over internal well-being. The support of North Korea, which has come to supply a substantial part of the ammunition used in Ukraine, has allowed Moscow to gain time and rebuild arsenals. For Estonia, maintaining these reserve levels is a central element of planning possible future conflictsnot simple insurance for the ongoing war. The north enters the radar. we have been counting in recent months. That fear of what comes next is not limited to the eastern flank. Now Norway has warned openly that a Russian move to protect its nuclear assets in the Arctic, concentrated on the Kola Peninsula, a short distance from its border, cannot be ruled out. This is not a classic ambition of conquest, but rather an aggressive defensive logic: ensuring the ability second nuclear attack in case of an escalation with NATO. The Ukrainian War has forced Nordic countries to plan for scenarios that a few years ago would have seemed unlikely. Tactical peace for strategy. The Guardian said this morning that, while increasing its military capacity, Russia deploys calculated diplomacy that seeks to buy time and divide the West. Estonian intelligence describes opening gestures toward the United States and negotiating rhetoric as a maneuver to reduce pressures, exploit cracks between Washington and Europe and consolidate positions without giving up the underlying objectives. In parallel, Moscow intensifies influence operations and hybrid warfareaware that the Ukrainian post-war can be as decisive as the war itself. The disturbing scene. In short, the combination of mass production of ammunition, possible nuclear planning, hybrid pressure and instrumental diplomacy seem to paint a panorama most uncomfortable for Europe: one where even when the weapons end fading in Ukraine, Russia will remain an actor ready to act. From that perspective, it is not only the end of a war that is worrying European capitals, but the beginning of a stage in which Moscow, industrially reinforced, could decide when and where to tighten the chess again. Hence, what comes after Ukraine is precisely what generates the most fear. Image | Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Vitaly V. Kuzmin In Xataka | The question is no longer whether Europe “is at war”: the question is whether it is willing to defend itself In Xataka | First it was Finland, now the US has confirmed it: when the war in Ukraine ends, Russia has a plan for Europe