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Oil and gas producers in the United States are turning to the financial magic of Wall Street to fuel their acquisitions in a frenetic race for growth. To achieve this, they are packaging thousands of pots into investment vehicles and selling stakes to American investors, replicating the exact same model that has long been used for mortgages, auto loans and other sources of securitized income. Away from the spotlight, the number of these operations has grown rapidly in recent years. Industry experts consulted by Financial Times They estimate that the total amount of debt issued through this format already ranges between 20,000 and 30,000 million dollars. It is a fundamentally opaque market, where most transactions are closed privately. Historically, independent oil and gas producers financed its operations through loans reserve-based (RBL) and high-yield debt. However, the situation has changed drastically. Some commercial banks have reduced their exposure to the extractive sector to meet their sustainability strategies under environmental, social and governance (ESG) policies, or in response to public concern over climate change. Added to this is the fear of traditional investors of “stranded assets” and the general uncertainty about the long-term viability of the sector in the midst of the energy transition. In addition, rising interest rates have raised costs, making high-yield debt too expensive or inaccessible for many producers. To survive, companies They have found an alternative way: They transfer their mature wells, known as proven, developed and producing (PDP) reserves, to a newly created Special Purpose Entity (SPE). This entity operates independently and is structured to be “bankruptcy-remote”, ensuring that the transferred assets are completely separate from the balance sheet of the producing company and safe in the event of its bankruptcy. Attracting conservative money By isolating these high-quality assets, the bonds issued by the SPE manage to achieve an “investment grade” rating. This seal of quality attracts a new class of investors who would normally avoid oil risk: pension funds, insurance companies and large asset managers looking for structured financial products with stable returns. For the oil companies, business is great. The securitization allows them to obtain advance rates (advance rates) of between 55% and 75% of the value of the reserves, figures significantly higher than those available in traditional RBL loans. To convince credit rating agencies, the secret lies in diversification and insurance. On the one hand, thousands of assets are grouped together; for example, Raisa Energy closed an operation combining more than 3,000 wells operated by more than 50 companies in more than 20 counties. On the other hand, long-term hedges are contracted to protect investors from oil fluctuations, reaching up to 85% of the entity’s production for a period of five to seven years. The “time bomb” and the cracks in private credit But financial engineering sometimes hides structural cracks. Brandon Davis, founder of energy intelligence company AFE Leaks, describes in FT These price hedges act as a “ticking time bomb” in case other production costs increase. If the price of oil rises, the company’s income is capped because the difference goes to the hedging counterparty (usually a bank). However, if at the same time there is inflation in operating costs, such as field services or water treatment, the profit margin backing the bonds could be seriously eroded. The cracks in this engineering are not an isolated case in the energy sector, but a symptom of a greater malaise in the opaque world of private credit on Wall Street, where patience (and money) is beginning to run out. This risk is framed at a time of growing tension for the entire private credit ecosystem on Wall Street. Investors are starting to demand their money back. In Cliffwater’s $33 billion fund, clients requested to withdraw 14% of their capital in a single quarter, but the firm said it only I would pay around 50% of those requests, forcing the other half to wait. If the panic spreads, traditional banks will not escape unscathed either. Lending by US banks to non-depository financial institutions, which includes private credit, reached 1.2 trillion dollars in the middle of last year, almost tripling its share compared to a decade ago. Furthermore, as with oil wells, the securitization market as a whole is extremely sensitive to external regulatory or macroeconomic shocks. A clear example occurred recently in another sector: Mpower Financing had to postpone the sale of almost $250 million in bonds backed by loans to international students. The cause was investors’ fear of the new restrictive visa policies of the Donald Trump administration. If regulatory changes or geopolitical crises hit the energy sector unexpectedly, oil securitization could face a similar collapse in demand. The danger of forgetting the nature of the business Wall Street has packaged a high-risk industry into a tame-looking product, but geology and the global market are difficult to tame. “The trick has always been to convince the rating agencies that measures have been put in place to mitigate the risk,” warns Olivier Darmounieconomist specialized in credit markets at HEC Paris. “But that’s the inherent thing about oil and gas, it’s an inherently volatile business.” Darmouni points out the ultimate risk: “If something goes wrong, the main problem will be that oil and gas will run out of capital” if producers start defaulting on bond payments. As long as the money keeps flowing, the machine will not stop. But as Laura Parrott warnshead of private fixed income at Nuveen, the market is experiencing a lot of effervescence. In scenarios of such investment fever, he concludes, “people are going to be trapped.” Image | Photo by David Vives on Unsplash Xataka | Climate change is no longer profitable: WallStreet and large investors abandon green policies