iPhone

There was a moment, probably towards the end of the Cold War, when the concept of Western military superiority stopped being measured solely in tons of steel or number of divisions and began to depend more and more on lines of code, networks and invisible architectures. As the decades passed, that technological transformation redefined not only how war is fought, but who really has control of the tools with which war is waged. Europe is realizing that that train has missed it. The jailbreak myth. Last year we already have that the possibility of an “off” button on the American F-35 it wasn’t exactly like that. Now, the comparison launched last week by the Dutch minister when suggesting that the fighter could “break free” like an iPhone It simplifies to the absurdity what is, in reality, a combat system defined by software and armored by cryptographic architecture. The F-35 is not designed for the operator to modify its code, but only to run software authenticated by keyscontrolled supply chains and closed validation environments, which means that physically accessing the aircraft is not the same as controlling its system. It is therefore not a consumer device on which alternative applications are installed like those on a mobile phone, but rather a platform whose integrity depends on digital signaturestrusted hardware modules and a support infrastructure that validates each update before the aircraft executes it. ODIN and structural dependency. They remembered in the middle The Aviationist that the real core of the problem is not in “hacking” the plane, but in keeping it outside the American ecosystem that keeps it operational. The F-35 depends on ODINthe logistics and data network that manages maintenance, mission planning, software updates and threat files, all under the control of infrastructure and processes largely managed from the United States. Disconnecting it does not turn it off immediately, but it initiates a progressive loss of capabilities that transforms it from a fully integrated fifth-generation platform to a combat fighter that is increasingly less relevant in the face of modern threats. So yes, exactly the same as a phone that stops receiving critical patches and updates. The same European dependence. Curiously, or perhaps not so much, this logic does not end with the plane, but runs through the entire European military architecture. The Financial Times recalled this morning in a piece that tried to answer the big European questions, that the continent’s armies depend on American software, clouds and systems for secure communications, data analysis, command and control, intelligence and platform maintenance. We are talking about platforms with contracts that involve giants like Google, Microsoft or Palantir and fundamental systems such asl Lockheed Martin Aegis integrated into, for example, European ships. The European military commanders themselves they recognized in the report that an abrupt break would generate operational gaps, fragmentation and loss of effectiveness, because a good part of the digital “back-end” on which its capabilities rest is not under European sovereign control. Digital sovereignty vs reality. Now that Washington is going through a phase where the word “ally” does not fit to the profile, the political speeches that advocate accelerate technological sovereignty in defense they collide with a structural reality: replicating the entire ecosystem that supports platforms, networks, encryption, AI and cloud services is not as simple as moving servers to European soil or changing providers overnight. And it is not because data localization does not equate to real sovereignty when that same software, updates, cryptographic keys and interoperability depend on American supply chains and regulatory frameworks, and where European generals themselves warn that a hasty decoupling would put daily operations at risk. Same explanation. In the end, the F-35 can’t be hacked like an iPhone has the same explanation why Spain and Europe cannot aspire to full digital sovereignty or resort to a high-intensity war without the United States: the structural dependence of the North American technological ecosystem. In the air, that translates into a fighter whose effectiveness rests on updates, threat data and logistical support controlled from Washington. On the ground, in militaries that operate on digital infrastructures, critical software and command architectures deeply intertwined with American suppliers and standards. If you also want, it is not so much a question of political will, but rather of technical architecture: whoever controls the software, controls the capacity. Image | RawPixel In Xataka | “It’s not what we need”: Germany has just put the finishing touches on Spain’s great military dream, the European anti-F-35 is disappearing In Xataka | The Netherlands has just activated panic in Spain and the US allies: the F-35 can be “released” like an iPhone