F35

that an F-35 not only detects the enemy, but also gets rid of it on its own

by

In 1991, during the Gulf War, a good part of the air missions depended on uploaded threat maps before takeoff and analyzes that could take hours to update after each departure. In the following years, the digital revolution allowed the integration of sensors, data links and information fusion systems that forever changed situational awareness in the cockpit. But even the most advanced fighters continue to carry a legacy from the past: they react to what they already know better than to what has just appeared. Until now. From advanced sensor to autonomous hunter. For years, the F-35 has been presented as a platform able to see everything thanks to its fusion of sensors and to your powerful suite of electronic warfare, but was still dependent on pre-loaded threat libraries and updates that could take days or weeks. The appearance of unknown emissions or radars operating in unforeseen modes required identifying the signal, downloading the data after the mission and reprogramming the system before the next flight. That logic, although effective, left a dangerous margin in scenarios saturated with changing air defenses. With Project Overwatchthe United States has taken a decisive step to close that gap and transform the role of the F-35 on the battlefield. AI enters the cabin. Lockheed Martin has tried successfully in flight a model AI integrated into the system of the F-35 combat identification, one capable of resolving ambiguities between emitters and generating an independent identification that appears directly in the viewfinder of the pilot’s helmet. During testing at Nellis, the algorithm not only distinguished dubious signals, but allowed label new emissionsretrain the model in a matter of minutes and load the updated version within the same planning cycle. The information from the classic system and that from the new model coexisted on the screen, reducing latency in decision-making and relieving the pilot of part of the cognitive load in an environment where every second counts. The big problem. It happens that modern air defense systems they no longer broadcast always the same signature. They can alter radar modes, frequencies and patterns to confuse enemy electronic warfare, as seen with variants of the S-300/SA-20 that operated in unforeseen configurations and generated doubts in identification. Until now, the plane pointed out the anomaly, but the in-depth analysis depended on a subsequent human cycle. Plus: in an environment where the proliferation of AI also accelerates the evolution of defenses, that dependency could become a vulnerability. And this is where cognitive electronic warfare appears, which seeks precisely to break that bottleneck and react to unprecedented signals. without waiting to the next mission. The “holy grail” of aerial combat. If you like, Lockheed Martin has achieved the “holy grail” of combat in tests: that an F-35 not only detects the enemy, but also how to get rid of it on your own. The ultimate goal of cognitive electronic warfare is to the system is not limited not only register an unknown threat, but analyze it, determine the best response and adjust its own parameters in near real time, even in the middle of combat. This involves detecting a new release, characterizing it, deciding whether to avoid it, interfere with it, or exploit a weakness, and update the threat library without immediate external intervention. In this scenario, the plane stops being a simple executor with predefined software and becomes a platform that learns and adapts your survival on the go. Towards mid-flight updates. It will be the next step. Previous experience with rapid updates of the Aegis system on US ships and the effort to shorten F-35 reprogramming times from months to days, and eventually hours, point to an architecture where data flows almost in real time between platforms. They count at Lockheed Martin that the ambition is for the improvements derived from a mission to be quickly integrated into other aircraft or even into compatible naval systems, creating a defense ecosystem that evolves in a distributed manner. While the Block 4 package promises a new generation of electronic capabilities, Project Overwatch It already anticipates a deeper transition: that of the fighter that not only sees and shoots first, but also learns before anyone else and survives on its own. Image | RawPixel In Xataka | Europe has asked its military experts how to become independent from the US for the next war. The answer is déjà vu: the F-35 In Xataka | The Netherlands has just activated panic in Spain and the US allies: the F-35 can be “released” like an iPhone

The F-35 cannot be hacked like an iPhone. The explanation is the same why Spain and Europe cannot go to war without the US.

by

There was a moment, probably towards the end of the Cold War, when the concept of Western military superiority stopped being measured solely in tons of steel or number of divisions and began to depend more and more on lines of code, networks and invisible architectures. As the decades passed, that technological transformation redefined not only how war is fought, but who really has control of the tools with which war is waged. Europe is realizing that that train has missed it. The jailbreak myth. Last year we already have that the possibility of an “off” button on the American F-35 it wasn’t exactly like that. Now, the comparison launched last week by the Dutch minister when suggesting that the fighter could “break free” like an iPhone It simplifies to the absurdity what is, in reality, a combat system defined by software and armored by cryptographic architecture. The F-35 is not designed for the operator to modify its code, but only to run software authenticated by keyscontrolled supply chains and closed validation environments, which means that physically accessing the aircraft is not the same as controlling its system. It is therefore not a consumer device on which alternative applications are installed like those on a mobile phone, but rather a platform whose integrity depends on digital signaturestrusted hardware modules and a support infrastructure that validates each update before the aircraft executes it. ODIN and structural dependency. They remembered in the middle The Aviationist that the real core of the problem is not in “hacking” the plane, but in keeping it outside the American ecosystem that keeps it operational. The F-35 depends on ODINthe logistics and data network that manages maintenance, mission planning, software updates and threat files, all under the control of infrastructure and processes largely managed from the United States. Disconnecting it does not turn it off immediately, but it initiates a progressive loss of capabilities that transforms it from a fully integrated fifth-generation platform to a combat fighter that is increasingly less relevant in the face of modern threats. So yes, exactly the same as a phone that stops receiving critical patches and updates. The same European dependence. Curiously, or perhaps not so much, this logic does not end with the plane, but runs through the entire European military architecture. The Financial Times recalled this morning in a piece that tried to answer the big European questions, that the continent’s armies depend on American software, clouds and systems for secure communications, data analysis, command and control, intelligence and platform maintenance. We are talking about platforms with contracts that involve giants like Google, Microsoft or Palantir and fundamental systems such asl Lockheed Martin Aegis integrated into, for example, European ships. The European military commanders themselves they recognized in the report that an abrupt break would generate operational gaps, fragmentation and loss of effectiveness, because a good part of the digital “back-end” on which its capabilities rest is not under European sovereign control. Digital sovereignty vs reality. Now that Washington is going through a phase where the word “ally” does not fit to the profile, the political speeches that advocate accelerate technological sovereignty in defense they collide with a structural reality: replicating the entire ecosystem that supports platforms, networks, encryption, AI and cloud services is not as simple as moving servers to European soil or changing providers overnight. And it is not because data localization does not equate to real sovereignty when that same software, updates, cryptographic keys and interoperability depend on American supply chains and regulatory frameworks, and where European generals themselves warn that a hasty decoupling would put daily operations at risk. Same explanation. In the end, the F-35 can’t be hacked like an iPhone has the same explanation why Spain and Europe cannot aspire to full digital sovereignty or resort to a high-intensity war without the United States: the structural dependence of the North American technological ecosystem. In the air, that translates into a fighter whose effectiveness rests on updates, threat data and logistical support controlled from Washington. On the ground, in militaries that operate on digital infrastructures, critical software and command architectures deeply intertwined with American suppliers and standards. If you also want, it is not so much a question of political will, but rather of technical architecture: whoever controls the software, controls the capacity. Image | RawPixel In Xataka | “It’s not what we need”: Germany has just put the finishing touches on Spain’s great military dream, the European anti-F-35 is disappearing In Xataka | The Netherlands has just activated panic in Spain and the US allies: the F-35 can be “released” like an iPhone

the F-35 can be “unlocked” like an iPhone

by

Since the Cold War, the United States has not only exported weapons, but also forms of control over how, when and what they are used for. For decades, that oversight was exercised through licensing, maintenance and parts supply. Today, in the era of software and network warfare, that logic has changed scale: control is no longer just in the hangar or in the contract, but embedded in the system itself. With the F-35, for the first time, that old question is no longer theoretical. The controversy. Just like has stated the Dutch defense minister, the F-35’s “computing brain,” including its cloud components, can be hacked to accept third-party software updates, much like jailbreaking an iPhone. “If, despite everything, you still want to update, I’m going to say something that I should never say, but I’ll do it anyway: you can jailbreak an F-35 like you would jailbreak an iPhone,” Gijs Tuinman said verbatim during an episode from the podcast “Boekestijn en de Wijk” by BNR Nieuwsradio. A fighter and more things. The statement by the Dutch Defense Minister that the F-35 can be “released” as a rover does not reveal so much a technical secret as a strategic discomfort that has been latent for years among the allies. The airplane is not just an aerial platform, but a deeply integrated system in a digital, logistical and doctrinal architecture designed in the United States, where software, mission data, maintenance and spare parts supply form an inseparable whole. In this context, talking about “jailbreak” does not describe a real solution, but rather the expression of a limit: the recognition that operational sovereignty over the F-35 is conditioned from its design and that any attempt to break that dependency is, in itself, a sign of political crisis more than a viable technical option. Why “releasing” an F-35 is a fear. For Washington’s allies, the fear is not that the fighter cannot be released, but rather that it could be. If it is accepted that the software can be broken, it is assumed that American control over the system is not only contractual, but structuraland that maintaining it depends on political trust between allies. The F-35 lives connected to networks as ALIS and his successor ODINwhich not only update the aircraft, but also load the mission data packages that make its combat survival possible: calculated routes, enemy defense bubbles, sensor fusion and shared tactics. “Releasing” the plane would mean cut that central arterybut also lose what makes it a decisive tool. The dilemma. For Washington, the mere possibility of an ally operating the system outside of that ecosystem poses risks of technological security and use not aligned with its interests. For their part, for the allies, the dilemma is even more uncomfortable: either they accept a permanent dependency, or they risk being left with a technically advanced fighter, but operationally amputated, without data, without support and without a future. A member of the US Air Force uses a laptop to review ALIS system maintenance data The Israeli exception. Israel is the anomaly which confirms the rule. It is the only operator that has negotiated integrate own softwareoperate largely outside of ALIS/ODIN and maintain their F-35s with industrial autonomy. This exception is not replicable for the rest because it responds to a unique strategic relationship, built over decades and based on a level of trust and alignment that does not exist with other partners. For European countries like the Netherlands, any real “liberation” would imply not only enormous technical capabilities, but assuming a head-on crash with the manufacturer and the US Government, with immediate consequences in spare parts, maintenance and logistical support. The result would be paradoxical: a freed F-35 that would quickly end up immobilized, not by a digital blockade, but by the suffocation of its supply chain. The myth of the button and the reason of Spain. This is where, indirectly, the controversy ends up agreeing with Spain in his historical skepticism about the famous off “button”. No secret switch or hidden kill switch is needed to neutralize an F-35 in the hands of an ally with whom relations are broken. Control is not in remote command, but in everyday dependence on validated software, mission data, certified maintenance and critical parts. Spain always maintained that the problem was not a magic button, but something more deep and less visible: the dependency architecture. The Dutch statements They reinforce that idea, because they implicitly admit that, although the plane can continue flying, its real military value quickly degrades if it is disconnected from the ecosystem that feeds it. A symptom of a relationship that is strained. Ultimately, talking about “jailbreak” is talking about directly from distrust. As far as is known, no country is seriously considering releasing an F-35 while the relationship with Washington works, because the system is designed to operate in a network, not in isolation. But the fact that this debate resurfaces now does not seem trivial, and reflects a geopolitical context rougherwith allies who are beginning to wonder what happens if the political umbrella folds. The F-35 remains, as even its critics acknowledge, an extraordinary fighter in its current state. But it is also proof that modern technological superiority is not bought with airplanes alone, but with a tacit acceptance of strategic dependence. And when that dependency begins to bother, the problem is no longer (only) technical: It’s political. Image | Robert SullivanUSAF In Xataka | Spain agreed with Germany and France to bypass the US. And it will end with a fleet of F-35s because of a French name In Xataka | France and Germany have agreed to give Spain the worst news: one in which the F-35 and its “button” are the winners

The Rafale takes advantage over the US F-35 and the Russian Su-57E

by

India has launched one of the most ambitious military acquisition movements in recent years, a process that, due to its economic volume and strategic dimension, clearly transcends the national sphere and fully connects with the industrial and geopolitical balances that Europe observes. Although the decision still does not amount to a signed contract nor does it close all the technical details, it points a direction within a board where several powers were competing. In that initial context, France appears well positioned to occupy a central role if the next phases of the process progress as planned by the Indian authorities. On February 12, 2026, the Defense Acquisition Council chaired by Defense Minister Rajnath Singh granted the so-called “Acceptance of necessity” to a set of acquisition proposals valued at around Rs 3.60 lakh crore, a figure roughly equivalent to €33.5 billion. In the case of the Indian Air Force, this preliminary approval includes the purchase of MRFA (Multi Role Fighter Aircraft), identified as Rafale in the statement, in addition to combat missiles and a high-altitude aerial system intended for intelligence, surveillance and persistent reconnaissance. The move that can change India’s aerial balance It is advisable to stop at this administrative nuance because it defines the real scope of the advertisement. We are not facing a contractcalendars, final prices or closed technical configurations, but before a resource that authorizes the armed forces to begin the formal acquisition process within the approved budget framework. From there, commercial phases, technical negotiations and industrial adjustments usually begin that can last for months or even years before leading to a definitive signature. Beyond what was confirmed by the Indian Government, some specialized media provide additional elements that help outline the potential scope of the program. Defense News claims that the approved proposal would include the purchase of 114 Rafale. In any case, the institutional approval occurs a few days before French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to the Indian capitala calendar that suggests the existence of political and industrial talks still developing. This possible French role cannot be understood without the competitive context in which the process has developed. The proposal linked to the Rafale coexisted with offers presented by The United States with its F-35 and Russia with the Su-57Etwo platforms that aspired to occupy the same space within the Indian aerial modernization program. To understand why this platform now occupies the center of the debate, it is worth briefly focusing on what exactly the Rafale is within the panorama of contemporary combat aviation. It is a twin-engine fighter conceived from its origin as a multirole aircraft, capable of operating from both land bases and aircraft carriers and taking on missions ranging from air superiority to reconnaissance or deep attacks. The device entered service with the French Navy in 2004 and with the Air Force in 2006, and has demonstrated its capabilities in real operations since 2007. Within this general architecture, the Rafale is not a single closed model, but a family of aircraft with a high degree of common elements and adaptations depending on the operating environment. Dassault Aviation distinguishes three configurations that share a cell and mission system, but respond to different needs for deployment, training and on-board use. Rafale C: single-seat version operated from land bases, designed for conventional combat missions within the air force. Rafale M: variant adapted to operations on aircraft carriers, with structural modifications such as reinforced landing gear and landing hook for naval use. Rafale B: two-seat configuration also based on land, used both for training and for missions that require workload sharing between two crew members. Beyond its external configuration, a good part of the Rafale’s international positioning is based on its technical capabilities. which describes its own manufacturer. Dassault Aviation maintains that the aircraft can take on a full spectrum of combat missions, from air superiority and defense to close support, reconnaissance, anti-ship strikes or nuclear deterrence, supported by a broad suite of sensors and systems such as digital flight control. fly-by-wire or the automatic terrain collision avoidance system. Specifying which aircraft the Indian Air Force would actually receive remains, for the moment, an open question. In this sense, it is necessary to point out that there is no official public detail that confirms the specific version of the Rafale or the exact set of systems and weapons that would accompany a possible order. Where there is a greater definition is in the naval field. The agreement for the Indian Navy includes 26 devices of the M variant. Another important fact is that India already operates 36 Rafales incorporated since 2020 and deployed in different bases. As we can see, the current photograph combines indications of a strategic inclination with a still open process, where the final signature and definitive configuration are still pending negotiation. Images | Dylan Agbagni (CC0 1.0 Universal) | Dassault Aviation In Xataka | A strange night noise was disturbing Alcalá de Henares’ sleep. Until the mystery was solved

one in which the F-35 and its “button” are the winners

by

Europe has been repeating the same debate for some time every time a strategic technology comes into play: to what extent can talk about sovereignty whether critical systems depend on external decisions, codes and suppliers. Under labels such as autonomy or digital sovereignty, the Union has tried build own alternatives in key areas with the promise of no longer being tied to infrastructures that it does not fully control. History now shows that the challenge has not been to imagine these tools, but to get the major European partners to accept share real power to make them possible. A project for European sovereignty. He Future Combat Air System was born as the great strategic bet of France, Germany and Spain to prevent Europe will be relegated in the 21st century air race, combining a sixth-generation fighter with swarms of drones and a combat cloud capable of integrating sensors, weapons and command in real time. Designed to replace platforms such as the Rafale and the Eurofighter and preserve industrial knowledge that Europe never developed in the fifth generation, the FCAS was presented as more than just an airplane: it was the promise of technological autonomy against the United States, its own air war architecture and the symbol that European defense could act as a coherent block. A lost decade. From its inception, the program was trapped in a head-on crash between national and industrial interests, with France defending leadership Dassault’s absolute in the manned aircraft and Germany demanding distribution real technology and knowledge through Airbus. For its part, Spain was seen as a clearly secondary partner despite its key role in sensors through Indra. The Russian invasion of Ukraine further hardened positions: Berlin, in the midst of the Zeitenwende, began to question a project that did not guarantee its own capabilities. Paris, reinforced by the Rafale export successbecame even more reluctant to give up control. The result was a prolonged paralysisdeadlines that moved towards 2045 and the idea, increasingly less hidden, that the fighter could disappear leaving only remains of the original project. Germany begins to look home. The fracture has become explicit when unions and representatives of German industry have openly defended the option of develop your own fighter or, at a minimum, two separate aircraft within the FCAS, a conceptual break with the initial idea of ​​a common system. At the same time, in Berlin he began to discreetly explore a way out towards the rival program led by the United Kingdom, Italy and Japan, while the new German chancellor conveyed to Paris that even abandoning the FCAS was no longer a taboo. At that point, the project stopped being a complex negotiation and became a question of how to communicate its end without assuming the political cost of acknowledging failure. Sentenced in the offices. The last few weeks have confirmed what was privately taken for granted for months: the FCAS is practically dead and a closure announcement is more likely than any credible relaunch, despite Paris’ attempts to save time. As we count a few weeks ago, the confrontation between Dassault and Airbus over control of the Next Generation Fighter remains without a solution, Germany is already contemplating save only the cloud combat and other shared systems, and the program that was to be the flagship of European rearmament has become the best example of its limits. For Spain, the news is especially bitter: the project that was supposed to guarantee it a seat at the high aviation technology table is fading without a clear European alternative in the short term. The hidden winner: F-35. In this strategic vacuum, an indirect winner emerges that summarizes the worst of the paradoxes: the Lockheed Martin F-35, the plane that FCAS was to counterbecomes the default solution for many European countries. With the European program collapsedthe only new generation platform available, interoperable and in production is the American one, along with everything that its closed ecosystem implies, including the controversial technological dependence and the famous “button” symbolizing Washington’s ultimate control over the system. Spain has been clear reject that model and defend a European fighter like guarantee of sovereigntybut the message that comes from Paris and Berlin It’s devastating: The inability to reach an agreement has left the way clear for the F-35, making the United States the great beneficiary of a European failure. Thus, France and Germany have ended up conveying to Spain what it did not want to hear: that the project that was to emancipate Europe is dying, and the plane that symbolizes strategic dependence is the one that comes out stronger. Image | airbus, Vitaly V. Kuzmin In Xataka | If the question is where is the 100 billion European fighter, the answer is simple: stuck on a dead-end runway In Xataka | It is being a complicated summer for the US F-35: after Spain’s “no” Russia and China have appeared to do more damage

a JF-17 that threatens the US F-35

by

After 20 years of research, development and volatilizing banknotes, the United States declared in 2019 that the F-35 fighter was “ready for combat and ready to win“It is the most expensive fighter in history ($100 million per unit, $400,000 just for the pilot’s helmet), but also a very advanced machine. One that is costing the US the combat drone raceone that not liked in Europe and that, as we say, it’s terribly expensive. And, in troubled waters, China has seen an opportunity. That of converting the JF-17 fighters into their “new” electric cars. In short. Following Israel’s attacks on Doha last year, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defense agreement. Within the agreement, there are billions on the table both to arm itself and to meet certain commitments. And, within that strategy, from Reuters They point to a historic agreement between both countries. The JF-17 is a Chinese-Pakistani development. The program was launched in 1999 and each country contributed 50% to its achievement. It has been demonstrating its versatility in combat for some time and in recent years, different countries have acquired a fleet of fighters. Myanmar was one of the first foreign buyers, followed by Nigeria and Azerbaijan. In recent weeks, it has been Bangladesh that has shown interested in renewing its aging fleet, but its customer base continues to grow. They don’t even play the same sport. In the Reuters report, and as they also point out in South China Morning PostSaudi Arabia would be the next country to acquire the latest version of the JF-17. The sources mention an agreement that would be between 2,000 and 4,000 million dollars, and is point that there would be other nations interested, such as Iraq, Libya or Sri Lanka. The key is the price: a quarter of what the American F-35 costs. In addition, the burden is also shared between China, which manufactures a number of components, and Pakistan, which takes care of the others. That price is the lever for the countries of the Middle East and Africa to modernize their fighter fleet, but it must be taken into account that the JF-17 do not compete in the same league as the F-35. In fact, they don’t even play the same sport. While the Chinese-Pakistani fighter is fourth generation, the American one is fifth, with better features and a minor signature in the airallowing it to be more efficient in stealth operations. It responds to a philosophy of winning combats before the enemy finds out that it has started. The gift of opportunity. However, despite the technological inferiority, the Chinese fighter has the advantage of weapons (more weight to carry more weapons, compromising its signature on radars) and, above all, the price and the costs. The United States is fighting with time when it comes to delivering its F-35s and, furthermore, maintaining them is expensive. The JF-17 is easier to manufacture and maintain, which is a huge advantage for countries. The estimate is that, for the price of two F-35s, you buy a dozen JF-17s. and this is a huge opportunity for African and Eastern countries that want to renew their fleet with current equipment. It is that gift of opportunity from China that we are seeing in other segments, such as the electric car. Frying pan by the handle. This battle to be the supplier of weapons is not only played in the finished and delivered products. It starts much earlier, and China has a say in those F-35 trade delays. The complexity of the fighter implies that its manufacturing is complex, but movements resulting from another war must be added: the commercial. The key components of a fighter depend on materials derived from rare earthand China is the one who has the upper hand in that field. They dominate exploitation and production of metals and elements from rare earths, and in the same way that The US tightened the screws prohibiting China from purchasing Nvidia GPUs and ASML machines to make advanced chips, China activated the lever to regulate the export of magnets and rare earth metals to companies linked to the United States military complex. A J-20 with PL-15 missiles inside the weapons bay Tensions. It is these factors that are turning a less advanced aircraft than the F-35 into an attractive option, but above all practical for the tense times in which we find ourselves. Pakistan and India are in a spiral of geopolitical tensions. India has Russian MIG and French Rafale aircraft, and now the JF-17 has PL-15 missiles Chinese manufacturing. They are China’s most advanced fighter missiles, with an effective range of about 150 km and systems capable of pursuing targets with ease. And, although they were developed for the fighter Fifth generation J-20 (one of the china air banners), can be mounted on the JUF-17. In fact, the current JF-17 is the Block III, considered 4.5 generation. It is the philosophy of the very veteran F-16. If the conflict escalates, there is someone point that a war between India and Pakistan would be a test of Chinese weapons against Western ones. And Europe… what? This is what you may be wondering: what is Europe doing while the others rearm. The old continent has embarked on the path of sovereignty in several fields, being the spaceman and the weapons two important pots of money for the coming years. As for fighters, there are two poles. On the one hand, the FCAS, with French, German and Spanish support. They are three heavyweights in this industry and they have the aim to reach 2040 with a system capable of replacing current fighters. On the other hand, Italy and the United Kingdom (two other powers with companies like Leonardo), as well as Japan, support the GCAP program: a support aircraft that coordinates formations of drones and other fighters. Although before all that, the countries will have to agree, and It’s not something that seems feasible.. Images | Anna Zvereva, emperornie In Xataka | The … Read more

Spain, France and Germany could not depend on the “button” of the F-35. So the future European fighter aims for something else

by

In the month of September the future European fighter in which Spain participates began to disfigure publicly. Germany threatened to open FCAS to new partners if there was no agreement with France, while Spain joined Berlin with Indra and, on the opposite sidewalk, a continental bet appeared, the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) that brought together Italy, the United Kingdom and Japan around a different philosophy. Now, in a new twist of the script, the European fighter is aiming for something else. An overflowing program. He Future Combat Air System (FCAS), conceived in 2017 as Europe’s great bet to build the combat air ecosystem of the second half of the 21st century and put aside the american dependencyis going through its crisis deeper. Germany and France, political and industrial drivers of the project, they study abandoning the most symbolic piece (the new generation fighter) to take refuge in its only still viable element: the combat clouda command and control network based on artificial intelligence capable of integrating manned aircraft, swarms of drones, radars, sensors and naval and land systems in the same operational environment. The shift does not seem like a simple technical reorientation, but rather a tacit recognition that the differences between Airbus and Dassault Aviation They have reached a point of no return. At a time when Europe wants to demonstrate strategic autonomy after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the largest military program of the continent is at risk of fracturing due to the inability of its two main contractors to share responsibilities, cede control and coordinate incompatible industrial visions. The Airbus-Dassault divorce. The conflict between Dassault and Airbus it’s not recentbut it has now reached an intensity that makes advancing the fighter impossible. Dassault, creator of the Rafale and a family-owned company, demands total authority on the design of the aircraft and selection of suppliers. For its part, Airbus (which represents Germany and part of Spain) considers that a European project of this magnitude should be governed by a balanced distribution of work. Negotiations have been stalled for years, with each party accusing the other of breaking agreements. While Dassault threatens to continue alone because “it has all the necessary experience”, the temptation to replace France grows in Berlin through the United Kingdom or Swedentwo partners who already participate in the rival Tempest program. The result is a vicious circle: without trust, there is no cooperation, without cooperation, there is no plane, and without plane, the FCAS becomes an empty shell supported only by the idea. from combat cloud. FCAS The German temptation and the French dilemma. The pressure is not symmetrical. Germany, which has relaxed its spending limit to rearm on a large scaledoes not want to be held hostage by a French company that is blocking progress. According to the Financial Timesin the environment of Chancellor Friedrich Merz an increasingly clear message is heard: if collaboration does not work, Berlin has the resources to continue without Paris. France, for its part, shows caution: its nuclear deterrent It depends on the replacement of the Rafale starting in the next decade, and an abrupt divorce could delay a key system for its strategic security. Although Macron hoped to rebuild trust after years of disagreements, even French voices admit that the project is “immobilized and almost dead,” and that the only real way out is through direct intervention by the president on Éric Trappier, the powerful CEO of Dassault. Combat Cloud The combat cloud as a strategic refuge. Just because the plane stalls doesn’t mean FCAS is meaningless. The most transformative piece of the program is not the fighter, but the AI-based distributed command and control system: a combat cloud european that allows any platform (Rafale, Eurofighter, long-range drones, naval sensors or ground radars) to share data in real time. This system, developed by Airbus (Germany), Thales (France) and Indra (Spain), is the only thing that everyone agrees on: Europe can (co)live with several planes, but not with incompatible networks that depend entirely on the American technological umbrella as was the case with the F-35. That is why it is proposed to accelerate the entry into service from the cloud to 2030a decade ahead of schedule, and armor it as a common pillar even if the joint fighter disappears. For many European countries, having their own cloud is the only way to guarantee that, if Washington one day looks the other way, the continent’s armies can operate in a cohesive and autonomous manner. Failure with implications. If he FCAS collapsesit will not just be an industrial setback, but a devastating geopolitical message. Europe has been proclaiming its desire for military autonomy for years, but every time it tries to create its own capabilities it runs into problems. same obstacles: competition between nations, political misgivings, absence of common governance and divergent priorities. This crisis also comes at a critical moment, when the war in Ukraine has demonstrated that technological superiority it is played onlinethat reaction time is vital and that Western systems must interoperate seamlessly. That the largest European defense project could collapse for corporate disputes shows the extent to which the dream of an integrated defense continues to depend on fragile foundations. What is played in a few weeks. The Financial Times recalled that the calendar is tight. Paris, Berlin and Madrid must decide before the end of the year whether to finance the airplane demonstration, an investment of several billion that no one wants to approve while the project remains blocked. The meetings between the French minister Catherine Vautrin, her German counterpart Boris Pistorius, Merz and Macron will be decisive: or the FCAS is redefined around to combat cloud or formally disintegrates. Everyone repeats that the Franco-German bilateral relationship should not be damaged, but the reality is that companies have carried out the program to the limit. The FCAS was born to symbolize defense Europe, but today only the combat cloud keeps that symbol alive as the last possible bridge between two industries that no longer … Read more

The world keeps asking for more F-35 fighters, but China has turned off the tap to build them

by

He F-35 Lightning IIthe fighter more expensive and complex never built, is going through a critical point in its history. In September 2025, a report of the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) revealed that all deliveries in 2024 arrived late, accumulating an average of 238 days late. Now, a leak has revealed that delays can multiply, and China plays a fundamental role. The problem of the largest military program. They remembered a few months ago on Insider that the 2024 delays had one main cause: the stagnation of the Technology Refresh 3 technology package (TR-3), an essential hardware and software update on which the block 4 modernizationalready with an extra cost of 6,000 million dollars and five years behind schedule. The paradox was that, despite maintenance failures, deficiencies in availability and costs that already exceed 2 trillion dollars Throughout its service life, the F-35 remains the cornerstone of American and allied air defense. More than 2,500 units remain in the Pentagon’s planning, while the current fleet is barely “operational” half of the time. More money. Lockheed Martin, its prime contractor, continues to receive incentives even for late deliveriesin a program that no longer only faces technical delays, but a much more structural threat: global dependence on its supply chain. A global network. The F-35 is, by definition, a multinational aircraft. Of the more than 1,200 devices manufactured to date, about 42% of its components are produced outside the United States, in an industrial network that involves more than twenty countries. The United Kingdom, the only Tier 1 partner, manufactures in Lancashire the rear fuselages of all the F-35s in the world, as well as their tails, ejection seats and part of the electronic warfare system code. Italy and the Netherlands assemble structures and optical systems, while Australia, Canada, Norway or Denmark provide fuselage sections, wings or specialized electronics. Germany, Japan and Israel also contribute critical parts: from fuel tanks to helmet-mounted visors. This ecosystem, which combines thousands of suppliers under a single oversight, has made the F-35 the largest industrial cooperation project of defense of the planet. The small print. But, despite the geographical dispersion, total control The United States preserves it: the Department of Defense and Lockheed Martin jealously guard it the source codemaintenance keys, stealth algorithms and the ALIS logistics system, without which no country can operate the aircraft independently. Each export includes clauses that maneuvers are prohibited joint with Russian or Chinese systems and allow Washington to supervise every flight, every review and every software update. You hunt like hotcakes. By 2025, Lockheed Martin has opted to reverse the narrative of delays with a figure that reflects both ambition and vulnerability: manufacturing 200 fighters in a single yearone for each working day. In its third quarter earnings call, CEO Jim Taiclet announced that 143 units had already been delivered, with an order book valued at 179 billion dollars, the largest in the company’s history. The boom responds to the global increase in defense spending, with European countries accelerating its rearmament and new buyers (such as Finland or Japan) incorporating the F-35 as the central axis of their fleets. The plane has become a tool deterrence and cohesion between allies, a symbol of interoperability under the umbrella of Washington. But industrial success hides a strategic fragility: the complex network of components of the F-35 depends, directly or indirectly, on materials that almost entirely come from Chinafrom rare earth magnets to elements for critical sensors, servomotors and actuators. Beijing’s silent weapon. Through a Wall Street Journal exclusive We have learned that, while Lockheed Martin celebrated its best year for deliveries, China moved its own parts with surgical precision. Beijing announced the creation of a system of “validated end users” (VEU) to regulate the export of magnets and rare earth metals: essential materials for both F-35 fighters and submarines, drones or electric vehicles. The plan, presented as a measure of trade opening after the tariff truce between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump, in reality aims to exclude any company from the flow of exports. linked to the military complex United States. In other words, the companies that supply the F-35 (from engine manufacturers to aerospace subcontractors) will be blocked, while supplies to civilian industries are prioritized. Strategic deterrence. With this system, Beijing can formally fulfill its promise of liberalize tradewhile suffocating the critical chains of the North American defense sector. The VEU architecture, inspired by the United States’ own export control mechanisms, turns industrial policy into a deterrent instrument strategic. The bottleneck. Chinese control over rare earths (70% of the extraction and more than 90% of the world’s processing) places Washington before a structural dilemma: Your most advanced hunting depends on a monopolized resource by its main geopolitical rival. Although the White House seeks to diversify sources through agreements with countries such as Kazakhstan, Greenland or Ukraine, replacing Chinese capacity will take years. In recent months, Chinese magnet exports to the United States fell 29%which has already begun to affect engine and guidance system manufacturers. If Beijing strictly implements its new system, it would not only slow down F-35 production, but could temporarily interrupt the logistics chain for maintaining fleets already deployed. In that scenario, the program that symbolizes Western technological supremacy would be conditioned by dependence on a strategic enemy. The paradox of a fighter. The F-35 was born as an emblem of interoperability and technological masterybut its evolution shows that military superiority is no longer measured only in radars or missiles, but also in access to mineralschips and advanced materials. As the world’s most expensive plane is assembled from parts manufactured on three continents and with magnets processed in China, its story becomes a metaphor for the 21st century: a war of interdependencies where each fighter that takes off carries within it a dose of global vulnerability. Thus, while Lockheed Martin tries to maintain its record pace of production and the Pentagon reinforces its leadership narrative, the real battlefield is being fought in the mines, laboratories … Read more

an F-35 squadron that does not belong to China, Russia or the United States

by

In the month of January it was known America’s plan B in the Arctic once it seemed that “the Greenland thing” was not going to be so easy: a underwater cave in Norway. Two months later, eight icebreakers attested that Russia was there tooand in August, both nations looked with surprise at the arrival of five icebreakers with the flag of China. Now, at congregation a squadron of F-35s has been added… from a fourth contender. New strategic axis. we have been counting throughout the year. The Arctic has ceased to be a remote space and has become a central theater of power: a place where geography dictates the rules, meteorology sets human limits and the proximity between platforms The military turns every kilometer into a possible avenue of attack or surveillance. What was once a map and science is now state policy. From the Nunalik deck (a freighter that traveled thousands of km avoiding growlers and storms to deliver material to Canada’s northernmost intelligence network) brutal lessons emerge: presence in the north is not improvised, it is built with infrastructurespecialized logistics and sustained budgetary will. The fact that a delivery can be delayed for 48 hours because the dockworkers are closed for a weekend, or that a 2.5 ton anchor ends up dragging a 180 meter chain between icebergs, illustrates the basic arithmetic of the Arctic: distance and climate are permanent enemies of any defense project. Logistics and fragility. They remembered in The Wall Street Journal to maintain bases like Pituffik’s either Alert (the latter just 800 km from the North Pole) means dealing with very narrow seasonal windows: the sealifts (sea supply operations) are possible only four or five months a year, air transport must cover the invisible, and a single missing part can delay crucial work a whole year. Inuit communities, icy runways that require constant maintenance, satellite platforms and underwater cables make up a network in which any weak link puts the whole at risk. Thus, if creatures such as musk ox and polar bears are found on the coast, behind the tracks and radars there are also human lives that depend punctual suppliesand errors like 1991 plane crash that cost lives in the approach to the Alert base remind that Arctic logistics is not a technical variable but a matter of survival. View of Thule Air Base Russian advantage and western window. Geographically, Moscow starts with objective advantages: the Kola Peninsula is home to the Northern Fleetnuclear systems launchable by Arctic routes and a depth of deployment that the West took decades to erode. However, the weakening of part of the Russian ground forces after the war in Ukraine has opened a window for allies to rebuild capabilities in the north. The question is whether to take advantage of it quickly and consistently. Western allies face the task of recover strategic ground almost from scratch: the lessons learned in Afghanistan or the Sahel are not directly exportable to a region of polar darkness, snow storms and ice that makes even the best prepared ships creak. If these gaps are not closed, the russian advantage and/or the appearance of foreign actors They will make Western deterrence, more than a policy, an urgent technological requirement. Russian icebreaker Hypersonics, sensors and more. The challenge is not only to be present, but detect and anticipate. The hypersonic missiles (unpredictable trajectories and speeds of at least Mach 5) put traditional radar networks in check, and have pushed Ottawa to commit 6 billion of Canadian dollars (in collaboration with Australia) to far horizon radars and Washington to accelerate space sensors that track ballistic and hypersonic vectors from orbit. In other words: detection is a necessary condition to deter, and without early detection there is no response. The problem, they pointed out in the Journalis that technology is not the panacea: it requires logistics integration, data centers, resilient command posts and continuous maintenance that the polar climate makes prohibitively expensive if not planned for the long term. Denmark on the front line. And on that board where the flags of China, Russia and the United States are already found, the recent decision of Copenhagen is inscribed: 8.7 billion dollars to increase the fleet from F-35 to 43 devices and 4.2 billion expressly dedicated to reinforcing Arctic security, with a joint headquarters in Nuuk, two new ships, maritime patrol vessels, surveillance aircraft and units in the polar territory. Denmark mixes the purchase of American technology with the will to act as regional guarantordriven by both Allied pressure and the commotion caused for the idea (proclaimed by Trump in January) of “buy” Greenland. The package shows two things: the first, that European states are willing to spend considerable sums on advanced projection and detection systems. The second, that sovereignty and territorial presence have become in currency geopolitics, where the air force and naval capabilities are not only military but also diplomatic pieces. Local sovereignty and criticism. Not only that. The extension of the military presence in Greenland does not occur in a vacuum. Local voices, represented by figures such as Aleqa Hammond, former Greenlandic Prime Minister, they reproach Copenhagen to decide without sufficiently consulting the 57,000 people on the island, remembering that militarization affects ways of life and resources shared. Furthermore, the pressure on ecosystems fragile and the need to respect indigenous rights make it essential to combine security with listening and real compensation. If the Arctic is a strategic boardis also a home: decisions about bases, radars and icebreaker routes They must incorporate the social and environmental dimension or risk legitimizing internal tensions that erode any long-term military base. Costs, industries and alliances. Plus: building a presence in the north is not just about buying fighters and installing radars. I remembered the BBC which requires shipyards to manufacture icebreakers, polar cargo ships, maintenance lines for icy runways, contracts held with operators and, above all, the political will to sustain recurring spending. The NORAD modernizationcoordination between Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom … Read more

veto the F-35 that the US sends to Israel

by

The first blunt scene took place last week. The decision of the Government of Pedro Sánchez to send the ship Maritime Action Furor P-46 to escort the Global International Flotilla Sumud was a milestone in contemporary Spanish foreign policy. The second, which has been known a few hours ago, has a more “nuclear” range: Spain is vetoing the sending of weapons from the United States to Israel. Solidarity and geopolitics. As we said, sending Furor P-46 It is included in the flotilla safety Integrated by half a hundred civil vessels with activists from 45 countries, including figures such as Greta Thunberg or Ada Colau, which seeks to take help to Gaza and symbolically break the Israeli naval block, after having suffered drones attacks in Greek waters. With more than 65,000 dead Palestinians Since the beginning of the Israeli offensive in October 2023 and a population undergoing hunger, forced displacements and ruins, the Spanish gesture becomes political and moral relevance. Sanchez defended In the UN General Assembly that international law and safety of navigation in the Mediterranean are respected, stressing that Spain will not remain indifferent to a humanitarian catastrophe of this magnitude. The furor P-46 in front of the Italian. The Spanish deployment contrasts with the Italian response under the command of Giorgia Meloni, which despite criticizing the mission as “unnecessary and dangerous,” said two frigates, have sent two frigates, The Virginio Fasan and The alpineboth with anti -submarine combat capabilities, long -range missiles and crews of more than 160 sailors. The furor P-46, on the other hand, is a maritime action ship smaller (2,840 tons, 93.9 meters in length and 51 crew members), armed with a cannon 76 mm pick autumn and two MK-38 machine guns. Although limited in military power against Italian frigates, their deployment transmits a different message: It is not a matter of war, but of symbolic protection of civilians and a commitment to international legality. If you want, even the fact that the machine guns of the fury are of Israeli origin adds a paradox loaded with meanings, placing Spain in a field where diplomacy mixes with symbolic and political pressure. The furor P-46 A historical veto. The other face of the Spanish strategy has been THE VETO TO TRANSIT for the bases of Rota and Morón of American aircraft and ships loaded with armament for Israel. Although the bilateral agreement 1988 defense grants the United States wide prerogatives Use, Madrid retains the last word and has applied the clauses that exclude “controversial charges”. In other words, this has forced, for example, DESCRIBE F-35 fighters Israelis towards the Azores, and even took the official plane of Netanyahu To avoid space Spanish aerial to go to the UN. The measure reflects a will to exercise full sovereignty in strategic infrastructure, unchecking American logic without breaking the alliance. If in 2002 the government of José María Aznar allowed, through A secret orderthat planes with prisoners for Guantanam Mark distance With Washington, aware that Gaza’s political sensitivity does not admit ambiguities. Historical comparative: from Iraq and Libya to Gaza. The current position inevitably recalls Spanish management in previous conflicts. In 2003, Aznar aligned with George W. Bush and Tony Blair in the invasion of Iraq, in a decision that It generated massive rejection in Spanish society and ended up eroding its political capital. A decade later, in 2011, under the government of Zapatero, Spain participated In the intervention of NATO in Libya, sending fighters and frigates in combat operations against Gaddafi, although presenting it as part of a Civil Protection Mission. In both cases, Spain acted as an obedient ally within the Atlantic framework, prioritizing cohesion with Washington and Brussels about the affirmation of its own policy. Loop represents the reverse: Now the nation is placed as a critical voice in the EU, sending a ship Not to fightbut to protect a civil flotilla, and prohibiting the transit of weapons towards a traditional ally in the United States such as Israel. The Mediterranean as a board. The scenario is not accidental. The Eastern Mediterranean has become a space of geopolitical friction where the interests of Israel, Türkiye, Egypt, Greece and now of the European powers converge. With its involvement, Spain seeks to strengthen its profile as Mediterranean power With your own agenda. He Furor shipping P-46 and the Veto to Rota and Morón They place Madrid in the thin line between humanitarian solidarity and diplomatic pressure, between the symbolic gesture and the strategic calculation. The message, a priori, is clear: Spain does not intend to be a mere spectator or a simple appendix of American politics, but an actor who intends to recover space on a board where the EU still seeks a common voice. Giro and projection. The combination of measures configures a Background change In Spanish foreign policy. Of secondary partner in Iraq and Libya, Spain aims to be actor with proper name In Gaza, articulating a strategy that combines three axes: Humanitarian solidarityDefense of International Law and affirmation of sovereignty in its strategic bases. If you want also, when betting on a line different from Washington’s (I had already done it With the “rearme”) and align with a speech closer to European public opinion, the Sánchez government seeks to reposition the nation as moral power in the Mediterranean and as a reference in the defense of humanitarian causes. Of course, it remains to be seen if this strategy will be sustainable in the face of diplomatic pressure and tensions with allied partners, but what it seems indisputable right now is that it marks a historical turn regarding the role that Spain had played in international conflicts during the last decades. Image | Pikiwikisrael, Carlosvdehabsburg In Xataka | The F-35 not only costs a fortune, it has a button that Spain does not like. So he told the US that he doesn’t want them In Xataka | A group of countries is being formed after the decision of Spain: those that are closing the door … Read more

Log In

Forgot password?

Forgot password?

Enter your account data and we will send you a link to reset your password.

Your password reset link appears to be invalid or expired.

Log in

Privacy Policy

Add to Collection

No Collections

Here you'll find all collections you've created before.