Ukraine has opened Russia’s cruise and ballistic missiles. War is impossible if your allies make weapons for you

He fed up with Ukraine with the hole that exists around international sanctions it is palpable and numeric. kyiv intelligence has hundreds of reports in your possession that reveal that Russian drones have passed those sanctions for the lining. And not just drones, even in the tanks. The latest: Ukraine has begun analyzing parts of Moscow’s latest cruise and ballistic missiles. And what they found is a deja vu. Clandestine circuit. Three and a half years after the start of the invasion, Ukraine continues to dismantle the last Russian missiles and drones and find tens of thousands of parts inside made in the westthe majority of his “allies” (microcontrollers, sensors, connectors, converters) from countries that have theoretically embargoed the supply: United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan. Of course also, Moscow’s allies like china. In fact, Zelensky put in more than 100,000 the foreign components found only among 550 vectors used in a single recent bombing, confirming that the sanctions have not turned off the tap: if anything they have made it more expensive and slowed down, but not dried up. The escape mechanism. It we have counted before. The mode of entry does not require sophisticated espionage, but rather exploiting loopholes in global trade: pieces “dual use” sold to civil actors who then they deviatecomponents placed on the market before sanctions, networks of shell companies and brokers in lax jurisdictions, and triangulated purchases via third countries that do not apply or execute controls. The sanctions gave the West three years to close the gaps, but they also gave Russia (and those who traffic for it) the same time to learn to get around them. In practice, it is a market: if you pay more, there is always someone willing to move the merchandise with layers of opacity sufficient to break traceability. Iran and North Korea. Moscow relies on two veterans of the sanctioning regime: Iran (which has spent decades refining the engineering of commercial border hopping) and North Korea (capable of moving components and complete systems despite being formally embargoed). Cooperation with both not only transfers material: it transfers method. Both logistical routes and corporate and financial camouflage techniques now migrate to the Russian military supply chain. What is possible and what is not. They remembered on Insider that the West hardens the perimeter: compliance guides for companies, “catch-all” to block sensitive exports (even if they are not listed), border inspections, criminal threat to repeat offenders, closures of loopholes when Ukraine identifies specific pieces. But even so, the regime is not airtight: global trade in components is massive, triangulation via third countries It is structural and already exists “pirate” production replacement that replicates or falsifies sanctioned parts. By design, control is reactive: it is as if each new closure encourages Moscow to seek an alternative route. Partial effectiveness. Plus: just because embargoes haven’t cut off the flow doesn’t mean they’re irrelevant. London estimates that the sanctions have deprived Russia of at least 450,000 million of dollars and have multiplied by up to six the price of dual pieces, draining war liquidity and adding temporary friction to the Russian military chain. This, a priori, penalizes rhythms, quality, scaling and maintenance, even if it does not prevent the material from arriving. The structural limit. If you want, the export control It is an instrument of soft power: its real power depends on what the rest of the world is willing to do and tolerate. It can raise the cost, strangle necks, penalize intensities, but it can hardly seal an economy-state Russian size connected to global intermediaries willing to charge for the risk. The result is an industrial war where the blockade is never binary (flows / does not flow), but rather marginal: raising the cost per Russian shot, reducing the cadence, pushing failures due to logistical stress and buy time, but hardly prevent a chip made for a laptop I ended up controlling the guidance of a kamikaze drone over a Ukrainian city. Image | Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation In Xataka | After Cubans and North Koreans fighting alongside Russian troops, new guests have appeared in Ukraine: Chinese In Xataka | In 2023, a pilot from Ukraine had an idea for Star Wars. Not only did it go well: his kamikaze plan has rewritten the war manual

The F-35 and the US ballistic missiles need the key component of a magnet. The problem is that it was “Made in China”

Finally, China carried out what the global industry feared: blocking the export of rare earths more valuable. In this way, without more, it sounds tremendous, although surely many will wonder how far the scope of the veto really comes, or which supply chain will be affected in the short term with Beijing’s decision. There are many sectors against the strings, but there is an especially delicate one for Washington: Defense. If everything remains the same, you have a few months left for your F-35 or ballistic missiles to have a serious problem. The Achilles heel. I told it The New York Times A few hours ago. China’s decision to impose restrictions on the export of critical minerals and, especially, of certain rare earth magnets, represents a direct warning to the national security of the United States, whose military capacities They depend largely of these resources. Which is it? We talk about Combat fighters of the Air Force, like F-35of guided ballistic missiles of the army or electric drones of the Marines, where these magnets (made with elements such as neodymium, disposium or ititrium) are essential for the operation of motors, guidance mechanisms or emergency systems. If, for example, a ballistic missile does not include the component of these magnets, it would be impossible for their goal to reach. The background problem. That 90 % of these components are produces in Chinaand six of the key metals that compose them are only refined there, which gives Beijing a powerful pressure tool. This maneuver, considered a “warning shot” by An official From the Air Force, it could easily climb towards fees, tariffs or even a total prohibition, generating an immediate impact on the costs and availability of American military technologies. A vulnerable chain. It We have counted other times. Rare earth (a set of 17 elements) is not that they are scarce in the strict sense, but its processing is expensive (and polluting), which is why China managed to dominate both its extraction and the associated refining and manufacturing. This supremacy has allowed him control much of the final cost of the modern American weapons, including those poachers, submarines, war ships, tanks, missiles and laser systems. To get an idea, only one F-35 contains around 400 kg of rare earth materialswhile some submarines They exceed 4,000 kg. Although the American defense industry and the pentagon have accumulated strategic reserves of these elements, analysts warn that these collections would barely reach to cover a few months of production and maintenance, not even years. From there, as we recently counted, that Washington has noticed the Pacific fund. Future warnings. Actually, the United States already knew about this unit and what could happen for a few years. It happened with an emblematic case, the call “F-35 “magnet debacle”when in 2022 the Department of Defense temporarily suspended the delivery of these aircraft after discovering that a component contained a Alloy manufactured in Chinacontravening defense acquisition standards. Although at that time it was considered that the material did not represent a direct threat, the incident highlighted the depth of the US dependence. Now, with the obligation that Chinese exporters Request special permits Before sending rare earth to the United States, experts anticipate a price increase that will affect the entire industrial defense base. Yes, the MINTAIN PASS MINA In California it has resumed operations, but its production is far from competing with Chinese capacity. Historical precedents. Looking back, history offers examples of how the United States must have adapted to interruptions of the supply of strategic materials in times of war. For example, now It happened with the bauxite During World War II, when Germany sank allied charges that transported it from Surinam. So Washington turned to Domestic reserves in Arkansas to guarantee the production of airplanes. Today, The Times told that there are already voices from the sector, such as American Enterprise Institutewhich insist that current reserves are not enough to sustain the military-industrial complex in the face of a long interruption of the Chinese supply. Despite the initiatives of Trump and Biden governments to Reactivate national production Of critical minerals, the industry remains highly vulnerable to Beijing’s decisions. A critical dilemma. No doubt, there is a much broader background with what happened in the commercial war. Chinese control over rare earth supply not only implies logistic or economic vulnerability: it represents A geostrategic challenge First order for the technological supremacy of which the United States has always presumed in the military. The recent Chinese measure does not close trade routes completely, but it makes it clear that Beijin possesses A pressure lever Formidable about the American defense industry. Faced with this, analysts agree that Washington must accelerate efforts to diversify their sources of supply, recover internal industrial capabilities and ensure the resilience of a supply chain that supports a good part of its global power. Otherwise, the next crisis may not limit yourself to that “warning shot”, but to become a direct blow to the technological backbone of the National Defense. Image | Jasper Nance In Xataka | The United States imagined that China would veto its export of rare earths. Has a plan B: The Pacific Fund In Xataka | China has done what the global industry feared: block the export of the most valuable rare earths

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