submarine

The first great Atlantic submarine cable that connected us to the internet says goodbye for a simple reason: it was too expensive to repair it

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It has been at the bottom of the sea for more than two decades, forgotten. But now, finally, the TAT-8, the first fiber optic cable that crossed the Atlantic and connected us to the Internet, is being removed from its place. And to understand the importance of this, it is worth telling its story, since perhaps the Internet would not be as we know it without this cable. The cable that started it all. On December 14, 1988, AT&T, British Telecom and France Telecom developed TAT-8, the acronym for Trans-Atlantic Telephone 8. It was the eighth transoceanic cable system between Europe and the United States, but the first to use optical fiber. Before him, transatlantic cables ran on copper, with very limited capacity. With the TAT-8, voices and data traveled converted into pulses of light through glass threads thinner than a hair. Just like account Wired in its report, at the inaugural event, writer Isaac Asimov connected by video call from New York with audiences in Paris and London to celebrate, in his own words, “this inaugural voyage across the sea on a ray of light.” Why was it so important? When it came into operation, the Internet was still too technical a concept for the general public. But the TAT-8 literally built the highway on which everything later circulated. The curious thing is that in just 18 months it already reached its maximum capacity, so this forced new cables to be laid as soon as possible, especially after the outbreak of the world Wide Webelectronic commerce and in a context in which the Internet became increasingly relevant. By 2001 the TAT series had already reached 14. Disconnection. Just like account In the middle, in 2002, the TAT-8 suffered a breakdown, and repairing it was not worth it, it was that simple. With more modern and higher capacity cables already operational, it made no sense to invest in their recovery. It went offline and was abandoned at the bottom of the Atlantic, where it has remained for more than two decades. Now they are taking it out of the sea. According to collect Wired, a specialist company called Subsea Environmental Services is physically recovering the cable with its vessel MV Maasvliet. It is one of the few companies in the world whose entire business consists of recovering and recycling retired submarine cables. The operation involves dragging a flat hook across the seabed, waiting hours until tension is felt in the cable, and then hoisting it aboard meter by meter. The workers they explain As the ocean floor is an increasingly crowded space, and recovering old cables frees up routes for new ones. What is done with the remains. The TAT-8 is not thrown away. Fiber optic cables contain high purity copper, steel and polyethylene, all recyclable materials with market value. Copper, especially, is a valuable resource and may become scarce in a few years. And according to the International Energy Agency, in less than a decade could be scarce if the industry does not find new sources. On the other hand, the steel of the cable will end up being converted into fences, and the plastic, processed in the Netherlands, will be transformed into pellets to manufacture non-food packaging. In fact, just as they count At Wired, you may soon be using shampoo in a bottle made from remains of the first fiber optic cable to cross the Atlantic. Sharks. Curiously, the TAT-8 is at the epicenter of one of the legends that has lasted the longest in this sector: that sharks bite internet cables. Just like share In the middle, it all started with a test prior to the TAT-8, the Optican-1, which ended up failing due to problems in its insulation. A Bell Labs engineer appeared at a conference with shark teeth that had supposedly been removed from the damaged cable. The story spread instantly. As well as point At the time, AT&T even included four pages on protection against shark bites in its press kit for TAT-8. Actually, there has never been consensus about whether the sharks really caused that damage. Subsequent tests in aquariums, where they were starved to see if they would bite into wires with electric fields, did not yield any clear patterns. At least the outcome of all that testing and debate was positive, as engineers added a layer of steel between the insulation and the fibers, which improved the cable’s overall resistance to abrasions and damage of all kinds. Cover image | What’s Inside? In Xataka | In 1901, a Spanish man had one of the ideas of the century: invent the remote control before television

An “invisible” Russian submarine has set off alarms in the Arctic. Europe’s response: Atlantic Bastion

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The launching of the Khabarovskthe new and ultra-quiet Russian submarine capable of deploying nuclear torpedoes Poseidonhas reactivated a fear that had been latent for decades in cities like London: the possibility that the naval balance of the Atlantic is once again tilting in favor of Moscow. The response from the United Kingdom has been forceful, and it is called Atlantic Bastion. Submarine warfare. Although the public image of the Russian threat usually revolves around research vessels like Yantarsuspected of mapping and potentially manipulating underwater cables and pipes, European specialists know that what is truly disturbing lies much further down. Russia has spent decades reducing the acoustic signature of its submarines to levels that they border on invisibilitycombining new propulsion systems, composite coatings and virtually undetectable cooling pumps. In this environment, where silence is power, a ghost submarine with nuclear capacity alters not only the sea routes, but the very heart of the strategic infrastructures that connect Europe with the world. UK reinvents itself. Faced with the resurgent threat from Khabarovskthe Royal Navy has launched what they have called as Atlantic Bastiona plan designed to restore British strategic advantage in its own and allied waters. Its origin is not new and it we have counted before: the United Kingdom has been monitoring the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap (GIUK gap) since before the creation of NATO, and the Second World War already demonstrated that controlling that maritime corridor was essential to prevent enemy forces from slipping into the North Atlantic. But what used to be destroyers and acoustic sweeps is becoming a hybrid framework that combines Type 26 frigates equipped with new generation sonar, aircraft P-8 Poseidon capable of patrolling thousands of kilometers and, above all, swarms of underwater drones equipped with artificial intelligence. According to the Ministry of Defensethis architecture aims to detect, classify and follow any enemy submarine that tries to penetrate British or Irish waters, and to do so constantly, autonomously and with an unprecedented range. The algorithms arrive. The core of the project will be Atlantic Neta distributed network of autonomous underwater gliders equipped with acoustic sensors and guided by artificial intelligence systems capable of recognize sound signatures with a level of precision that until a few years ago was little less than the preserve of science fiction. Unlike the SOSUS of the Cold War, based on gigantic fixed hydrophones placed on the seabed, the new generation will be mobile, expandable and adaptable to the routes and behaviors of increasingly soundproof submarines. The ultimate ambition is to deploy hundreds of cheap, persistent units that together create aa surveillance mesh much harder to evade. The metaphor is revealing: if finding a silent submarine is like searching for a needle in an oceanic haystack, modern technology makes it possible to exponentially multiply the number of searching hands. Khabarovk The technological challenge of hunting shadows. However, even with this technological revolution, experts warn that detecting new Russian submarines will continue to be an extremely complex undertaking. Since the 1980s, Moscow has drastically reduced lacoustic emissions of its fleet, which requires combining passive and active sensors and complex configurations such as bistatic sonar, where one vessel emits a pulse and another collects the echo. These techniques require coordination, multiple platforms, and significant sensor density, something that Atlantic Bastionaims to provide but it is still far from being deployed on a full scale. The arrival of the Type 26 frigates, designed to be the flagship of British anti-submarine warfare, is fundamental to this purpose, as is the cooperation with Norway and other allies that are also strengthening their capabilities in the North Atlantic. The Russian Bastion Puzzle. Even if Atlantic Bastion managed to limit the presence of Russian attack submarines in the Atlantic, there is one dimension that no Western system can solve: Russian strategic submarines already they don’t need to abandon its own bastion in the Arctic to threaten Europe or the United States. Its intercontinental ballistic missiles can hit targets thousands of kilometers without moving from the Barents Sea or the White Sea, protected by layers of defenses and favorable geographical conditions. There they play a hiding place lethal where the West cannot penetrate without significantly escalating the conflict. The paradox is clear: the United Kingdom can reinforce its waters and monitor every meter of the GIUK gapbut it cannot deny the Russian nuclear capacity deployed in its natural refuge, a reality that frames the entire British effort within a logic of containment rather than domination. An underwater chess. If you want, Atlantic Bastion ultimately represents the recognition that underwater competition has returned with a vengeance, now fueled for digital capabilitiesdistributed sensors and autonomous platforms that transform the nature of ocean surveillance. The North Atlantic once again becomes a stage silent maneuvers where Russia and the United Kingdom measure their technological resistance in an environment reminiscent of the Cold War, but with algorithms and autonomy as new weapons. A career that is not decided by great battles, but by the ability to listen better, process faster and anticipate invisible movements. In this theater of shadows, the advantage is not whoever shoots the most, but rather whoever is able to detect first (already happens in Ukraine). Thus, Atlantic Bastion aspires to return that capacity to the British, although the contest that is opening now does not look like it will be brief nor simple: In the depths of the Atlantic, the prelude to the next era of strategic rivalry between Russia and the West is underway. Image | SEVMASH/VKONTAKTE In Xataka | A Russian submarine has appeared off the coast of France. And Europe’s reaction has been surprising: have a laugh In Xataka | Russia’s most advanced nuclear submarine was a secret. Until Ukraine has revealed everything, including its failures

to develop its own nuclear submarine

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Brazil takes almost half a century pursuing an ambition that no other Latin American country has managed to pursue: developing its own nuclear-powered submarine. This objective takes shape around the “Alvaro Alberto”, a project that combines specialized infrastructure, technology transfer and a naval nuclear program that launched late 1970s. It is not an operational submarine nor an immediate advance, but it is a plan with specific pieces in place that explain why the country has located itself in a terrain reserved for very few countries in the world. The official documentation It places its launch in 2023. It is a work forecast within the program calendar, not a closed guarantee. The initiative aims at a submarine significantly more complex than the diesel-electric propulsion ones used by the region. It is a platform that will combine its own nuclear reactor with combat systems and sensors derived from those used in conventional submarines of the Riachuelo classdeveloped from the Scorpène family, but adapted to a hull of greater length and displacement. It is a conventionally armed attack submarine, with nuclear propulsion but without nuclear weapons, in line with nonproliferation commitments assumed by Brazil. Nuclear propulsion would allow operation without the need to go to the surface to recharge batteries, extending the range and discretion in prolonged missions, and according to data released by Nuclepthe state company that manufactures part of the hull, the design will be around 100 meters in length and 6,000 tons in displacement. Half a century to reach a Brazilian nuclear submarine The Brazilian nuclear submarine project is better understood if we go back to the seventies, when the Navy started its own program to master the fuel cycle and develop nuclear technology applied to propulsion. That effort was born with the idea of reduce external dependencies and guarantee that Brazil could advance in sensitive areas without being conditioned by foreign suppliers. Over time, the Marinha Nuclear Program was consolidated, which laid the foundations for designing a naval reactor autonomously. That line of work is what, decades later, leads to the current attempt to build a nuclear-powered submarine. The current structure of the project is not understood without the PROSUBthe program signed with France in 2008 that drove the construction of shipyards, docks and specialized workshops in Itaguaí. Thanks to that agreement, Brazil incorporated technologies from the Scorpène family and formed teams capable of producing advanced conventional submarines. The Riachuelo class units served as an industrial and operational learning stage, showing that the country could undertake a complex construction process. This journey is what allows us to consider the transition towards a nuclear-powered submarine developed in Brazilian territory. A Riachuelo-class submarine The concept of Blue Amazon summarizes the importance that Brazil gives to its maritime space, an area of ​​millions of square kilometers where strategic resources and key routes are concentrated. Surveillance of this environment requires means capable of operate for long periods without depending on stopovers or frequent recharges. The infrastructure developed in Itaguaí, together with the support network deployed on the coast, provides the logistics base for that type of operations. In this framework, the Navy considers that a nuclear-powered submarine would provide the necessary autonomy to reinforce its presence in the South Atlantic. Before there is an operational submarine, Brazil must demonstrate that it can safely integrate a naval reactor, and that work is done at LABGENEa ground module that reproduces the key systems of the future “Álvaro Alberto”. The prototype incorporates a pressurized water reactor of national design and uses fuel produced by the nuclear program itself under international supervision. Testing the plant on land allows failures to be identified and performance optimized without the risks that would entail doing so inside the hull. This phase constitutes the most demanding technical element of the project. The current situation of the “Álvaro Alberto” reflects a balance between what has already been built and what has yet to be completed. On the one hand, Brazil has a defined design in its master lines, an industrial chain cpeaceful to produce sections of the submarine and nuclear development that progresses within the facilities planned for it. On the other hand, the final integration of the reactor, propulsion systems and hull will require time, testing and independent supervision. The program advances with a gradual logic, typical of a project that aspires to a technological level unprecedented in the region. If the project is completed, Brazil would become part of the small group of countries capable of operating a nuclear-powered submarine, a leap that would have a clear impact on the naval balance of the South Atlantic. It would also be the first ship of this type in Latin America, a circumstance that reinforces the strategic weight of the program and explains the sustained interest of the Navy. This progress, however, is conditioned by political continuity, non-proliferation commitments and the costs associated with maintaining such a specialized industrial chain for decades. The result will depend on the country’s ability to sustain that effort in the long term. Images | Brazilian Navy (CC BY-SA 2.0) In Xataka | The shortest launch in history: a million-dollar luxury yacht sank just 200 meters from the dock

The US believed it had an invincible aircraft carrier. Until Sweden “knocked him down” again and again with a tiny submarine

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Exactly 20 years ago there was a fascinating scene which showed that brute force or dimensions monstrous They are not as fundamental as was believed when it comes to naval warfare. Shortly before that true story, the United States had announced to the four winds its most modern, heaviest and most grandiose nuclear aircraft carrier in history. So they took the most logical step: put it to the test. The exercise that turned out regular. In 2005, during maneuvers off the coast of California, the United States Navy allowed something unusual: Repeatedly engage a small, relatively inexpensive foreign conventional submarine to improve its anti-submarine doctrine. The chosen one was HMS Gotlanda Swedish diesel-electric submarine of just 1,600 tons. The objective was to train the aircraft carrier battle group USS Ronald Reaganone of the most powerful ships in the world, equipped with escorts, anti-submarine helicopters and advanced sensors. What followed it was unexpected: Time and time again, over two years of simulations, the Gotland managed to infiltrate the formation, position itself to fire, and “sink” the carrier without being detected. The result caused concern in Washingtoninterest in Moscow and Beijing, and a profound reassessment of the role of modern diesel submarines in contemporary naval warfare. The Gotland and the silent advantage. Gotland’s success was based on its system Air Independent Propulsion (AIP), specifically a Stirling engine capable of generating energy without needing to take air from outside. This allowed the ship to remain submerged for up to two weeks, maintaining a constant speed and extremely quiet, something that previous diesel versions they could not achieve. While nuclear submarines require cooling systems that generate detectable vibrations and noise, the Gotland could move almost without leaving an acoustic trace. Its hull was covered with materials that decreased sonar reflection, its tower included radar-absorbing materials, and the internal machinery was mounted on rubber shock absorbers to silence vibrations. Furthermore, it had with 27 electromagnets capable of reducing their magnetic signature before specialized sensors. HS Gotland Mobility and stealth. The Gotland maneuverability It was also decisive. Its design with X-shaped rudders and automated control systems allowed sudden changes in course and depth with great precision, making it suitable for operating in shallow coastal waters, where nuclear submarines are most vulnerable. In the context of the maneuvers against USS Ronald Reaganthe Gotland demonstrated that it could approach at great depth, obtain a firing position, and withdraw before American sensors will even detect alterations in the environment. Although in a real combat the aircraft carrier could survive several impacts, the essential fact is that it would have been knocked out of combat, which would change the strategic outcome of any naval operation. The US Ronald Reagan Economic and doctrinal threat. The Gotland cost about 100 million of dollars, which is approximately equivalent to the cost of two embarked F/A-18 aircraft. The USS Ronald Reagan, on the other hand, cost more than 6 billionwithout counting its escort or its air wing. In terms of cost-effectiveness, a relatively affordable submarine demonstrated that could neutralize an asset which represents the core of US naval projection. This revelation resonated especially in China and Russiawhich have since accelerated the development of AIP submarines. Today, China operates multiple submarine variants equipped with Stirling and Russia works on updated versions from the Lada projectwhile countries such as Japan, Germany, France, Israel, India and South Korea also develop or acquire submarines of this type. The challenge is not only technical, but also strategic: a small number of submarines of this type can make it difficult to use aircraft carriers near hostile coastlines, altering the way powers deploy their force. The “no” to diesel in the US. Despite the impact of the exercise, the US Navy decided not to repeat operate diesel submarines. Their reasoning is based on logistics and strategic reach: the United States deploys submarines thousands of miles from their bases, and needs units that can operate for monthspursue targets at long distances and sustain high speeds without the need to recharge batteries. Diesel-AIP submarines are ideal for defending territorial waters or coastal areas, but less suitable for prolonged ocean operations. For this reason, the US Navy has preferred to invest in nuclear submarines and, more recently, in unmanned underwater systems that could complement or replace escort and patrol missions. What the Gotland revealed. The history of HMS Gotland proves that naval supremacy is not guaranteed for size or cost of combat platforms, but for technological adaptation and understanding the strategic environment. Aircraft carriers remain formidable tools for projecting power, but their vulnerability to silent AIP submarines forces rethink doctrinesinvest in advanced detection and reconsider the type of forces used in environments close to enemy coasts. The key lesson was not the symbolic sinking of an aircraft carrier, but the realization that 21st century naval warfare can turn hierarchies upside down that seemed immovable. Those days showed that, in the ocean, silence is worth more than steel, and a small submarine can change the balance of an entire fleet. Image | WikimediaUS Navy In Xataka | The US has detected a naval advantage over China. The catapult of the Beijing aircraft carriers comes with a “factory” failure In Xataka | China has discovered an advantage to win the aircraft carrier race against the US: a “bubble” in its defense

When the Titan submarine exploded there was nothing left to rescue. Except one very important thing: a memory card

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It has been more than two years since the Titan submarine tragedy and the story continues to make people talk. The last thing we know is that the recovery teams found the camera that was part of the submarine. The camera was damaged, but inside it housed a memory card from which they were able to extract image and video files, although none from the implosion. The discovery. Youtuber Scott Manley told it in your X account. In a series of posts, Manley has published several images of the camera’s recovery report detailing its characteristics and condition. It was a Rayfin Mk2 Benthic underwater cameracapable of submerging up to 6,000 meters deep thanks to its titanium body. Although the case appeared intact, the sapphire crystal lens was shattered. Upon disassembly, many of the components had light damage, but one of the boards included an SD card that was in good condition. The content of the card. Investigators and forensics managed to make a duplicate of the card and extract the contents. In total, they obtained nine images and twelve videos. However, the camera had been configured to save the captures on an external storage device, so it did not contain any images from the day of the fateful dive, but rather they were images taken at the Marine Institute in Newfoundland, which was where the missions to the Titanic departed. In the images they have shared you can see the facilities and some underwater images, but at shallow depths. Catastrophic implosion. The Titan left Newfoundland on June 16, 2023. An hour and 45 minutes had passed when communication was lost, but it was not until four days later that the coast guard found the first remains of the vehicle and confirmed what they suspected: it had imploded. They found remains of the vehicle, but no body of the five crew members could be found. It was avoidable. The Titanic is located at a depth of 3,800 meters, where the pressure is 380 atmospheres. There is vehicles capable of reaching this depth and even more, but the Titan had a long history of problems and his own Former director of operations called the tragedy avoidable. In fact, several members of the underwater exploration community, including James Cameron, They had written a letter to OceanGate where they expressed their concern and assured that they were “going down the path of catastrophe.” The company ceased its activity after the accident. Image | Scott Manley in X In Xataka | Seven questions (and seven answers) about what really happened to the Titanic submarine

A Russian submarine has appeared off the coast of France. And Europe’s reaction has been surprising: have a laugh

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August 2025. After learning through satellite images that the Russian nuclear submarine base had been was damaged After an earthquake, Ukraine leaked all the secrets of Moscow’s most advanced submarine, including its failures. Now, two months later, one of them has appeared off the coast of France. And, instead of fear, Europe has been amused. The silence broken. For days, NATO radars followed the strange figure of a Russian submarine that, instead of slipping secretly under the sea, clumsily advanced on the surface. Was Novorossiyska Kilo-class diesel-electric of the Black Sea Fleet, one of the few assets that still maintained Moscow’s flag in the Mediterranean. His march was slow and visible, accompanied by French, British and Dutch ships that escorted him with the same mix of caution and curiosity with which an injured animal is observed. For the Atlantic Alliance, that voyage was more than just a naval anomaly: it was a exhaustion signa reflection of what remains of Russian maritime power after three and a half years of war, sanctions and irreparable losses. Adrift. The official Moscow version It was immediate. According to the Black Sea Fleet, the Novorossiysk was sailing on the surface simply to comply with international standards when crossing the English Channel. But allied intelligence reports and leaks on Russian security channels painted a different picture: a damaged submarine, with a possible fuel leak, forced to surface repeatedly and, according to some reportseven to empty flooded compartments. The presence of a tugboat, he Yakov Grebelskiyreinforced that suspicion. For NATO commanders, the image of an attack ship “limping” toward its base was not only a metaphor for a technical breakdown, but the demonstration how Russian naval machinery is rusting in the eyes of the world. From Tartus to the Mediterranean. Until a few years ago, Russia maintained a permanent force in the Mediterranean, anchored in the Syrian base of Tartusits strategic bastion in the region. From there it projected power towards the Middle East and North Africa, protecting energy routes and monitoring Western transit. But the fall of the regime of Bashar al Assad in 2024 erased that balance in one fell swoop. With the new Syrian government, Moscow lost its last platform safe outside the Black Sea. Today, how he ironized NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, “there is hardly any Russian presence left in the Mediterranean: just a lonely, broken submarine returning from patrol.” The decline is not measured in the number of sunken ships, but in the disappearance of an entire naval projection doctrine. The laughs. In his speech at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Slovenia, Rutte was so precise as biting. “What a change from Tom Clancy’s novel The Hunt for Red October, he said. Today, more like the hunt for the nearest mechanic.” The phrase, celebrated among the attendees, synthesized the new allied narrative: humor and joke as a language of power. Making fun of your opponent, taking away the mystique of their strength, is also a way of undermining their influence. Behind the irony, however, there was a geopolitical calculation. Rutte remembered the multiple Russian provocations in the last few months (drones over Europe, sabotage of underwater cables, failed plots, cyber attacks and instability in Finland and Poland), and warned that Moscow retains the capacity to inconvenience, although its military muscle has been reduced to symbolic gestures and worn-out threats. The invisible collapse. The Novorossiysk debacle It is not an isolated case. Since 2022, Ukraine has managed to destroy or disable more than thirty of Russian vessels with anti-ship missiles and marine drones. The losses have forced the Kremlin to withdraw a large part of its fleet from Sevastopol and move it to Novorossiysk, on the eastern coast of the sea, to avoid new attacks. That strategic refuge, paradoxically, bears the same name as the damaged submarine that is now trying to reach it. What was a symbol of supremacy in the Soviet era has become a floating cemetery of incomplete projects and demoralized crews. Mirror of war. If you like, the episode from Novorossiysk transcends the anecdotal. It represents the convergence of all fronts where Russia is wasting away: the military, the economic, the technological and the symbolic. Its fleet, once the second in the world, now depends on units that they age without spare partsas Ukraine innovates with drones that cost a fraction of its missiles. And NATO, aware of this, has learned to transform its silent victories in public stories that erode the perception of Russian invulnerability. The image of Novorossiysk advancing in the sight of everyone, towed and watched, it is the perfect image if you want to degrade an empire that can no longer hide its weaknesses. From shadow to emptiness. In the years of the Cold War, Soviet submarines were the silent terror of the Atlantic. Today, his most visible heir is a damaged ship that sails with the flag raised so as not to sink. This passage from shadow to void explains better than any report the real state of the Russian navy. What was previously feared, is now observed even with sarcasm, and what previously inspired respect, now provokes a mocking headline. In this transit we measure, according to Europe, the decline of a power and the rise of a Western communication strategy that no longer needs to confront directly to win. It is enough to unintentionally let the enemy show his shipwreck. And have a few laughs. Image | BORN In Xataka | Russia’s most advanced nuclear submarine was a secret. Until Ukraine has revealed everything, including its failures In Xataka | A ghost fleet has mapped the entire underwater structure of the EU. The question is what Moscow is going to do with that information.

A ghost fleet has mapped the entire submarine structure of the EU. The question is what Moscow will do with that information

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In January 2025 United Kingdom He raised his voice At the international level. The British Secretary of Defense, John Healy, explained that a nuclear submarine and two ships from Royal Navy had sighted a spy ship in the waters of the nation, and that it was the second time in just three months. The message did not stay there. The United Kingdom gave a name and a nation behind the incursion: Yantar and Russia. Now it has been discovered that the ship has been doing much more than that. The resurgence of a war. In recent months, NATO’s attention has moved to a less visible but increasingly critical front: the European seabed. The protagonist of this new concern is, again, The Yantara Russian spy ship that, disguised as a civil ship, toured during almost 100 days The waters of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean with an accurate objective: map and monitor the submarine cables on Europe and North America for their digital communications, their financial transactions, their energy and even their most sensitive military systems. We know all this Thanks to the Financial Timesthat after an investigation based on interviews with NATO naval officers and former members of the Russian north fleet, as well as in radar images of the European Space Agency, he has confirmed that the Yantar came to be located on critical cables in the sea of ​​Ireland and in front of Norway, on the strategic route to Svalbard. The role of Gugi. The Yantar operates under the orbit of the GLAVNOYE UPRAVLENIE GLUBOKOVODNIKH ISSLEDOVII (GUGI), the director of Deep Water Research created in the Cold War and known in the West as Military Unit 40056. Based on Olenya Guba, in the Kola Peninsula, this force is located on the border between the Russian Navy and military intelligence (Gru), dedicated less to science than to espionage. Gugi has about 50 platforms (From minisubmarines capable of reaching 6,000 meters deep to nodriza ships such as Yantar), designed to place sensors, manipulate or sabotage cables and, if necessary, destroy strategic infrastructure in a conflict scenario. Despite the blows suffered (such as the submarine fire Losharik in 2019 or the death of its historic boss by Covid), the organization has continued to receive resources Even in full war of Ukraine, which has allowed to commission new spy units. The Yantar The threat in the gray zone. The reactivation of Yantar’s missions Since the end of 2023 Indicates that Moscow has abandoned the initial caution he showed after invading Ukraine. Analysts like Sidharth Kaoushal (Rusi) They point that Russia has measured NATO’s red lines and is now more willing to take risks. The plans detected in the sea of ​​Ireland, where several cables converge that connect the United Kingdom and Ireland, fit into the Russian logic to act in The so -called “Gray Zone”: Operations of covert sabotage that do not equals an open military attack but can destabilize entire societies. In fact, Western Officers They warn That Moscow could, the case, cut energy or communications to force governments to the negotiation, or even alter the temporal signals that travel through the cables, with devastating effects in sectors such as high frequency financial trade. European vulnerability. The United Kingdom obtains the 99% of its communications Digital of submarine cables and three quarters of its gas through underwater pipelines. Ireland, which does not belong to NATO, is a particularly exposed point: cutting its connections would be to isolate it from the continent without directly attacking an allied member. He parliamentary report British of September 19 warned that the country “could not guarantee an attack or recover in an acceptable period,” also criticizing the fragmentation of responsibilities between ministries. In Denmark, the case of explosions of Nord Stream in 2022 evidenced the same bureaucratic dispersion. Although London has assigned the Royal Navy the mission of Protect these infrastructureexperts point out that the lack of anti -submarine frigates and patrol dependence limit the real response capacity. The Atlantic Bastion project. To close that gap, NATO and especially the United Kingdom they consider the creation of “Atlantic Bastion”: A defensive ring of sensors, submarine drones and acoustic stations in the seabed that reinforces the control of the Greenland-Islandia-Rio-Reinian corridor. Although the plan still lacks concrete financing, its need is increasingly evident. In parallel, surveillance ships such as The British proteus They rehearse with autonomous vehicles capable of documenting the activities of the Yantar and other GGI units, with the idea of ​​exhibiting public evidence and generating deterrence. Admiral Gwyn Jenkins, head of the Royal Navy, He warned This month that Gugi, after a period of relative stillness, “is returning.” Silent war. The activity From Yantar It is not an isolated case: between autumn of 2023 and November 2024, eleven Russian ships (military and supposedly civil) held a almost constant presence in British and Irish waters. Allied intelligence services suspect that Moscow already prepares sabotage scenarios against cables as a pressure measure on the countries that arm Ukraine. While until now these operations have been maintained under the threshold of the open confrontation, the possibility of Russia “turning off” the United Kingdom or Aisle Ireland is not a crazy hypothesis. As summarized Excapitan David Fields, former British naval aggregate in Moscow: “Russian military doctrine consists of hitting first, strong and where it hurts most, to prevent the enemy from even getting rid of war.” On that silent board, the Yantar has become the key piece of a underwater chess that threatens to redefine the limits of European security. Image | Defense ImageryAndrey Luzik In Xataka | A British nuclear submarine has discovered a Russian ship in front of its submarine cables. The second time in three months In Xataka | Research on submarine cables cut in the Baltic has taken a turn: it was not Russia, it was inexperience

The submarine cables were from the teleoperators, and now the great technological ones are controlling them

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Submarine cables They transport 95% of data traffic between continents. They hold Ten billion dollars daily in financial transactions, according to figures collected by Telegeographyand feed from streaming to artificial intelligence networks. And yet, its control no longer belongs to the great traditional teleoperators: it has largely passed to technological giants such as Google, Meta, Microsoft and Amazon. A deep transformation that raises questions about dependence, digital sovereignty and resilience to geopolitical risks. For more than a century, the submarine cables were a matter of consortiums of public operators and large telecos. Installing them cost hundreds of millions of dollars, And it was common to distribute the risk among several actors in exchange for assigning fiber pairs to each participant. Recent examples, as the 2Africa cable, promoted by goalThey follow this model. However, in just a decade, this balance has jumped through the air. Today, Google, Meta, Microsoft and Amazon They control or manage approximately half of the world underwater bandwidth. Between 2019 and 2023, They financed about 25% of activated cable systems, according to Carnegie Endowment. Globally, The construction of about 60 new submarine cables until 2027 is expected, as indicated by the latest telegeography mapwhich gives an idea of ​​the magnitude of the change of cycle in the control of critical internet infrastructure. How technology took over the underwater routes The qualitative leap is not only in participation: also in full property. Google has in full cables such as Curie (USA-Chile), Dunant (USA-France), Grace Hopper (USA-Spanish-Spanish Reino) and Equiano (Portugal-Nigeria-Sudaphrica). Goal, meanwhile, He has planned Waterworth: A cable of just over 40,000 km that will connect USA directly with important markets of the southern hemisphere, including points in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia-Pacific, deliberately avoiding risk areas such as the Red Sea and the Sea of ​​Southern China. The case of 2Africa, although still based on consortium, also reflects the evolution: here, goal participates significantly as a key partner of the consortium with several operators. Europe is the continent with more mooring cables on the planet, according to the Carnegie Endowment. Two thirds of its external connectivity depend on submarine cableswhich underlines your high strategic exposure. Besides, Much of the European traffic is stored in data centers located in the US, as analyzed by the ITIFincreasing its technological dependence. Faced with this panorama, Europe has some strategic assets, such as Alcatel Submarine Networks (ASN), World leader in kilometers of cable installed between 2020 and 2024and Orange Marine, which operates one of the largest installation and repair fleets. Paris and Rome have already launched movements to protect Asn and Sparkle as “sovereign industrial champions.” The threat to cables It is no longer just accidental. Russia has intensified its underwater patrols around strategic nodes, and in 2025 China presented a ship capable of cutting cables at 4,000 meters deep, according to the South China Morning Postincreasing its asymmetric pressure capacity on critical routes. In addition, the lack of response capacity complicates the scenario: There are barely 80 ships around the world dedicated to laying and cable repair, according to the Carnegie Endowmentand Europe lacks specialized breaking, necessary to operate in Arctic regions or in marine ice conditions, where new strategic connectivity routes are being explored. The underwater critical infrastructure also faces a fragmented legal framework. Several European countries have not even ratified the 1884 convention cablewhich hinders the Persecution of sabotage acts. Meanwhile, installation and repair permits in Europe They have doubled in duration in the last decadecomplicating the response to incidents. To correct it, the EU and the NATO have created joint initiatives, such as the Critical Unclea Infrastructure Coordination Cell and a Task Force Industrial. However, some analysts insist that Without a drastic increase in resources, Europe will remain at a disadvantage. Towards a more fragmented and dependent Internet The massive entry of great technological responds to a clear logic: Control the physical layer of the Internet allows them to reduce costsimprove efficiency and guarantee alternative routes to crises. For traditional telecos, the dilemma is clear: collaborate or be displaced. Some operators continue to play a relevant role, although adapting to an ecosystem with a strong presence of the great technological giants. In the near future, Intercontinental traffic is expected to double every two years5G driven, cloud distributed e artificial intelligence. Alternative routes are being explored, such as polar corridors, which would significantly reduce Europe-Asia latency. In parallel, fears of a physical “splinternet” grow: cable networks segmented by political alliances, with Europe discussing between its historical openness and the need to protect His strategic interests, as Oxford analysts point out. Although we usually imagine the cloud as an intangible space, the reality is that much rest on a complex physical infrastructure. And that infrastructure, more and more, is controlled by US multinationals. For Europe, the challenge is not just building more cables: it is to ensure that the next generation of the Internet does not depend mostly on foreign actors. Images | Goal | Screen capture In Xataka | Digital serendipia is in danger of extinction. Internet understands us too well

99% of the Internet travels through submarine cables. Now there is a much more ambitious plan in progress: join the electricity grid

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At first glance, the seas are an empty landscape. Under its waters, the image is another, through it a network of invisible highways that already support our day to day: the submarine cables that carry the 99% of world communications. Now, a new generation of electrical interconnectors – thousands of kilometers and gigavatio power – aspires to bring sun, wind and hydraulic where they are missing, when they are missing. The promise is simple: that electricity travels with the sun and wind through schedules; The execution, not so much. The starting point: The North Sea. The United Kingdom and Denmark premiered at the end of 2023 the Viking Link, a 765 km cable that crosses the North Sea and allows you to import electricity when wind is missing on the island and export when left over. It is the longest interconnector in the world in operation, but, as Financial Times warned: “It may not be for a long time.” The British media report details That on the horizon there are much more ambitious plans: join Canada with the United Kingdom and Ireland through a 4,000 km cable, link Morocco with Europe or export Australian solar energy to Singapore through more than 4,300 km of submarine cable. Through the cables. This new megaproject makes it clear that countries have been pursuing a connection with renewables for some time, because there is a mismatch between production and consumption, and we must solve it. The most illustrative example is AapowerLink in Australia. The Suncable company plans to install 3 GW from Solar in the northern territory, store part in batteries and sell it both to Darwin and Singapore, through an underwater cable of more than 4,000 km. In the words of his CEO, Ryan Willemsen-Bell, collected by Financial Times: “Australia has abundant land and sun. The ability to share those benefits with our neighbors has enormous potential.” In parallel, the North Atlantic Transmission One Link seeks to connect the Canadian hydroelectric plant with Europe. The time differential is its great asset: when Canada sleeps, the United Kingdom starts the day; When in the North Sea, wind blows at midnight, New York is preparing dinner. A lesson from the Internet. The idea may sound futuristic, but there are already solid precedents. As we have underlined Xatakathe entire planet is furrowed by submarine data cables, authentic digital highways that have demonstrated the viability of infrastructure of tens of thousands of kilometers. The Southern Cross Cable Network, 30,500 km, connects Australia, New Zealand and the United States since 2000. The newly opened 2Africa, 45,000 km, surrounds the African continent and reaches Barcelona and India. And in Spain, cables such as tide (6,605 km, Meta and Microsoft) or Grace Hopper (7,191 km, from Google) link Bilbao with the east coast of the US. The experience of these data networks provides an obvious parallelism: if we already move information on a global scale, why not also clean energy? Although not everything is so easy. From Financial Times alert a tensioning supply chain: The manufacture of cables, transformers and converting stations does not supply. The waiting deadlines are lengthened, and the availability of specialized ships to tend cable is limited. To that are added political risks. In Norway, the export of electricity to its neighbors has triggered the internal debate on prices. In the United Kingdom, the Government rejected this year to support the X-Links project to bring energy from Morocco, claiming “high level of inherent risk”. And with the ongoing Ukraine War, the threat of sabotages to critical infrastructure It is a fact. Looking inside. In the Spanish case, the problem is more domestic than international. As we have explained in Xatakathe country has run more than anyone to lift renewables in the “emptied Spain”, but has not deployed the cables to bring that electricity to the cities. The result is a “broken bridge”: at noon there are plenty of cheap megawatts that are cut or sell at zero price, and at night the network needs gas support, more expensive the market. According to data from the AELēC employer, 83.4% of connection knots are already saturated, which prevents hooking new consumptions such as industries, data centers or electrolyiners. The challenge, in short, is not to plan and reinforce the networks; as well as improve interdependence with other countries to break With the French bottleneck. A map of interdependencies. Beyond the technical and economic, these electric highways draw a new geopolitical map. Just as pipelines and gas pipelines marked the twentieth century, renewable interconnections can define alliances and dependencies in the XXI. The engineer Simon Ludlam, co-founder of the Canada-UK project, summed it up in Financial Times: “The most important nuclear reactor is in heaven, and its energy can be shared thanks to the rotation of the earth. But we need to be interconnected.” The sun that shines in the Australian desert or the water that falls in Canada could light, in a matter of seconds, the lights of cities to thousands of kilometers. The energy transition not only depends on producing renewables, but also on learning to move them. If the pipelines defined the petroleum geopolitics, the electric highways can become the invisible arteries of the coming world. Image | Unspash and What’s Inside Xataka | The Google Maps of submarine cables: an imposing interactive map that allows us to know the skeleton of the modern world

Storing CO2 is now a business and the first submarine reservoir is in Europe

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Europe already has its first large underwater warehouse of carbon dioxide. The Northern Lights projectdriven by equinor, Shell and totalenergies, just Inject the first tons of CO2 in a reservoir located 2,600 meters under the seabed on the western coast of Norway. Why is it important. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is emerging as one of the few ways to reduce emissions in difficult sectors of decarbonizesuch as cement production, steel or energy from waste. Until now, these technologies looked as experimental or too expensive. With this project, Europe thus opens a commercial system for CO2 transport and storage. As assured Anders Opedal, CEO of Equinor, “This demonstrates the viability of carbon storage as a scalable industry.” In detail. The stored CO2 comes from the cement of Heidelberg Materials in Brevik, south of Norway. After being liquefied and transported by boat until Øgarden, it was pumped by a 100 -kilometer pipeline to the submarine reservoir known as Aurora. The first phase of the project will inject 1.5 million tons per year of CO2, although this same year Northern Lights gave green light to an expansion of the project thanks to a commercial agreement with Stockholm Exergi. A larger bet. The investment of 7.5 billion Norwegian crowns (about 740 million euros) will be the trigger for that expansion with a second phase that The capacity will increase More than 5 million tons per year from 2028. In addition to Stockholm Exergi, among the first clients is also the Danish Ørsted, the Dutch Yara and the Heidelberg Materials itself. “With the beginning of Northern Lights operations, we enter a new phase for the carbon storage industry in Europe,” affirmed Arnaud Le Foll, Vice President of Carbon Neutrality Business in Totalenergies. And now what. Although it is of course a true turning point, the doubt remains in the air about whether the model will scaling enough to contribute in a real way to the climatic objectives that are proposed by Europe. Norway opens the way, but the key will be especially in how much business, and how much reduction of emissions, these reservoirs can generate in the coming years. Cover image | Equinor In Xataka | The Era of Petroestados is ending: China is the first “electrostate” of the world and not because of its climatic moral

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