optimized

Xiaomi Auto, Xiaomi’s car division, reported a few weeks ago something that is considered impossible in the automobile industry: achieving profits in its first year. It has had a healthy gross margin of 25.5% and a net profit of 680 million yuan, about 82 million euros, thanks to 109,000 cars delivered in a single quarter. Barely a year after selling its first car, the division presents numbers that place a newcomer in the same range as BMW or Mercedes. One that took Tesla years to reach and one that other manufacturers like NIO are still not there. Some They died trying to get there. Lei Jun has executed an impeccable launch and his investors have reason to be impressed, but if we take a closer look at the numbers and break down the origin of the margins (something that must be attributed to Poe Zhao’s wonderful analysis in Hello China Tech), a different story appears: that of a company that has perfectly optimized for a moment that will not be repeated. Two figures: The average price per car in the third quarter was 238,000 yuan (about 29,000 euros). The broadest category was close to 260,000 (about 32,000 euros). Those numbers They are not representative of the market that Xiaomi wants to addressbut rather they represent a temporary concentration. In that quarter, many units of the SU7 Ultra and other premium configurations. The first buyers (the biggest fans of the brand, those who wanted to be the first to drive a Xiaomi) ordered the most expensive versions. It’s not that Xiaomi has fooled anyone, it’s the natural dynamic of any technological launch. The early adopters They always buy the higher versions. The testmotto is to confuse that initial demand with sustained market demand. The 25.5% margin does not validate your business model, it only tells you that you have sold the right product to the right people at the right time. The question is what happens when those people run out. Lu Weibing, president of the group, made this clear in the presentation of results. It said auto margins will likely fall in 2026 due to “competitive factors and normalization of the product mix.” It’s careful business language, but lto translation is simple: When you’re done delivering premium configurations and have to sell entry-level versions to maintain volume, you’re going to find out how much it really costs to compete in this market. Apple experienced something similar with the first Apple Watch. The first few quarters showed spectacular margins, but those numbers reflected sales to enthusiasts willing to pay for novelty, not sustained demand from a mature category. They had to learn to sell beyond the circle of fans. The difference is that Apple was not competing in a market with structural overcapacity and price wars. Xiaomi yes. Xiaomi competes in a Chinese electric vehicle industry where overcapacity is systemicgovernment subsidies have an imminent expiration date and the competition is fierce. There is another detail that should worry: Xiaomi is delivering cars faster than it is selling them. They are consuming the backlog of accumulated orders at a rate that exceeds the entry of new orders. An optimized factory running at maximum capacity is impressive, but if demand is not growing at the same rate, you have built production capacity for a level of demand that you have not yet proven exists. What is coming in 2026 is a kind of convergence of pressures: The portfolio of premium configurations will be exhausted. Subsidies will disappear. And security regulations will be tightened. Xiaomi will have to demonstrate that it can be profitable by selling cheaper cars, without public aid and meeting stricter standards. It is the moment when companies that built a real business are separated from those that surfed favorable temporary conditions. The trap of early profitability is not that the numbers are false. It’s that they make you believe that you have solved the problem when you have only optimized for the easier phase. The real test of Xiaomi Auto is not whether it can make quality cars (it has already proven this) but whether it can build a car business that works when the novelty wears off and it has to compete car for car with rivals that cannot afford to lose. That answer is not in the third quarter report. It’s coming. In Xataka | Xiaomi is no longer a brand: there are several brands fighting over the same logo Featured image | Xiaomi