The biggest geopolitical risk on the planet is not Greenland. It’s a smaller island with a disturbing neighbor: Taiwan

Throughout the cold warthere were points on the map whose real value was not measured by their size, but by what could be triggered if someone tried to force the situation. Today, one of those places once again concentrates gazes, calculations and uncomfortable silences among the great powers. and it is not in Greenlandbut on a smaller island. The global risk enclave. The tension between United States and China is concentrating increasingly evident in Taiwan, a territory small in size but enormous in strategic consequences. While Washington allows itself dramatize scenarios secondary in the Arctic, Chinese military maneuvers around the island they have been become routineincreasingly aggressive and similar to real blocking or maximum pressure tests. The absence of clear and quick responses from the White House projects a dangerous sign in a context where deterrence depends less on formal declarations than on immediate political reflections. The deterrence that is called into question. The contrast between Trump’s political lukewarmness and the warnings of the US military apparatus itself has opened a visible crack. The Telegraph said that Pentagon commanders have been warning for some time that China is preparing to be able to fight and win a conflict over Taiwan before the end of the decade, although that diagnosis does not always translate into credible public messages. This dissonance reduces the perceived cost of a Chinese action and leaves open the possibility of a calculation error on Xi Jinping’s part, especially if he interprets American caution as a lack of will. Taiwan as a key piece. Taiwan’s importance to the United States is not symbolic, but rather structural. We are talking about an advanced democracy in a region dominated by authoritarian regimes, one that houses the core of world production advanced semiconductor and is part of the first island chain that limits military projection China in the Pacific. From that perspective, the fall would be a direct blow to the global economy, Western technological superiority and Washington’s strategic credibility in Asia. Taiwan Navy It’s not 1996 anymore. Unlike previous crises, when American naval and air superiority was overwhelming, today the balance is much tighter. China has built a navy larger than the American in number of ships, an air force with hundreds of fifth generation fighters and, above all, a massive arsenal conventional missiles capable of hitting bases, ports and fleets at great distances. Although the United States continues to spend more on defense, lower Chinese industrial costs and its geographic proximity to the theater of operations significantly erode that advantage. The “logistics” weapon. The New York Times recalled in a column that one of the factors that moderated Beijing’s behavior for years was its dependence on critical raw materials from countries aligned with the West, especially Australian iron ore. That brake is weakening as China secure supplies alternatives from Africa, reducing their vulnerability to sanctions or blockades in the event of conflict. The result: an environment in which the economic costs of a war over Taiwan, while enormous, are already They are not so deterrent for Beijing as they were in the past. No clear winner. The open simulations and internal leaks From Washington they agree on a most uncomfortable diagnosis: if necessary, a war over Taiwan it would be devastating even for those who managed to impose their immediate objective. China could fail in invasion, but the United States and its allies would pay a military price not seen since World War II, with massive losses of aircraft, ships and personnel. Taiwan, even if it managed to resist, would be deeply damaged as a country and as a global economic engine, dragging the world into a prolonged crisis. The island that weighs the most. All this explains why Taiwan is, by far, the increased geopolitical risk of the planet at this time and a strategic priority, surely far above scenarios like greenland. It is not about territory, or not only, but about credibility, balance of power and stability of the international system between two superpowers. And, on that board, every gesture of ambiguity counts, and every sign of weakness can bring closer a conflict that no one would win on paperbut whose consequences would affect everyone. Image | Pexels, 總統府 In Xataka | China has just shown the world that it “plays” in another league: it only needs one soldier to control 200 drones in combat In Xataka | China’s best weapon doesn’t fire a single bullet: 300km ‘moving wall’ to close sea routes instantly

The geopolitical irony that we are experiencing in the chip war has an unexpected beneficiary: Russia

The technological and trade war between the United States and China continues to open new fronts of debate. The last one, derived from the singular Nexperia situationis beginning to point to a future in which European decoupling from the Chinese chip industry may end up having an effect that is especially disturbing. Or dad, or mom. The strategic semiconductor sector has become the absolute focus of this trade war, and here Europe has traditionally been a security ally of Washington, but at the same time a key economic partner of Beijing. The problem is that the old continent has been forced to choose sides. US pressure for technological “decoupling”, coupled with concerns about national security, has forced the European Union to harden its stance towards Chinese investments and companies. Risk for Europe. This European effort to decouple its chip industry from China, far from shielding the continent’s security, could end up being counterproductive and self-destructive. With this decision, Europe would be assuming enormous economic and supply chain costs to align with Washington, putting at risk the future of its own industries, such as automotive or electronics, which are highly dependent on the Chinese market and production. The Nexperia case. The recent epicenter of this conflict is the aforementioned Nexperia case. In late September, the Dutch government invoked an old national security law to take effective control of Nexperia, a Dutch automotive chip company. That company is actually owned by the Chinese firm Wingtech, and the intervention marked a dangerous turning point, transforming China’s acquisition of technology from an economic issue to one of geopolitical security. Beijing’s revenge. The Chinese government did not sit idly by. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce banned the export of certain finished Nexperia components from China to Europe. Those reprisals They stopped the delivery of key partsthreatening to provoke a new chip crisis in Europe, and especially affecting to automakers in Germany and other countries that depend on that supply. Russia rubs its hands. If China’s chip industry is forced to operate under strict separation from European markets (decoupling), and Europe ceases to be a viable destination or supplier, China could find it easier to supply those chips to Russia, which desperately needs them for its weapons programs, especially in the wake of severe Western sanctions. Strategic irony. The situation is paradoxical. European “security” actions aimed at containing Chinese influence may end up resulting in a transfer of technological supply capacity to Russia. Thus they would inadvertently strengthen the war machine of what is Europe’s most immediate adversary in the Ukrainian conflict. History repeats itself. In reality, the curious thing is that it is suspected that all these events are part of a historical pattern. Europe is dragged into a conflict by the US (first Iraq, then Afghanistan, now this decoupling) only for Washington to withdraw or change focus later, leaving Europe alone to bear the impact of broken supply chains. It does not appear that there was much strategic thinking on the part of the EU and the Netherlands when making that controversial decision with Nexperia. USA also wins. This dynamic seems to further strengthen the leading role of Washington, which if it pushes Europe towards decoupling, not only restricts a rival (China) but also causes European countries to massively increase their defense spending. An expense that would obviously fall on the US military industry. a crossroads. Europe faces a colossal strategic problem. Its security depends on the US, its economy is closely linked to China, and at the same time it seeks its own autonomy. Restrictions on semiconductors put Europe at risk of sacrificing its own long-term economic prosperity in favor of a strategy that could be abandoned by its main ally. Long term consequences. If this trend that began with the Nexperia case is consolidated, European value chains dependent on Asia will be destroyed, in addition to an increase in inflation due to the cost of decoupling and a possible strengthening of relations between China and Russia. What is happening with Nexperia is no longer just a corporate dispute, but the symbol of an EU that is being governed without a clear vision of its own long-term interests. Image | Nexperia | Kremlin In Xataka | China is taking a giant step in its quest for technological self-sufficiency: its own EDA software

A very rare element of the periodic table is unleashing a new geopolitical battle with China: Germanio

China has been weaving, little by little, a network of power around critical minerals: first Rare earthsafter Copper And now Germanio. Although its name barely says anything to the general public, this metal is essential for the defense industry – from the night vision systems of the fighters to the satellites – and for the optical fibers that support the Internet. Today there is almost no market, its price has been quintupled in two years and the origin of the collapse has a clear name: Beijing. The origin of the crisis. Two years ago, China announced controls At the exit of Germanio, Gallium and Antimony in response to the restrictions of the United States and the Netherlands on advanced semiconductors. However, the real blow arrived at the end of 2024: Germanio’s exports collapsed, leaving merchants without supply. Terence Bell, from Strategic Metal Investments, I recognized Financial Times That had been able to buy a gram six months. “The situation is desperate,” he said. Aaron Jerome, from Lipmann Walton & Co, described a devastated market: “Before we could buy 100 kilos; now we are lucky if we got 10, and the triple price.” And Christian Hell, from the Tradition Commercial House, added to the same medium that the demand was “for the clouds” and that he received desperate consultations of companies from the United States and Europe. The figures confirm the collapse. According to a Policy Accelator Silverado analysis cited by Financial Timesbetween January and July of this year, Germanio imports to the United States from China fell 40%. The result has been an unprecedented price escalation: just $ 1,000 in 2023 to almost $ 5,000 in September this year. This is the highest level registered since 2011. A strategic role. The importance of Germanio is not in its geological rarity, but that it is very difficult to extract, since it is obtained as a zinc and coal byproduct. In addition, its use in defense is irreplaceable for thermal image systems in fighters, drones and satellites. In the civil sector, it is used in optical fiber, solar panels and chips. “Finding substitute materials is complicated, because it would imply a complete redesign and a loss of unacceptable precision in military applications,” explained the analyst Caroline Messecar in Financial Times. For these reasons, According to estimates from the Fastmarkets agencyworld demand is around 180-200 tons per year of Germanio. One more piece of a much wider board. In Beijing they have converted critical minerals into geopolitical weapons. At the end of 2024, They prohibited export from Gallium, Antimony and Germanio to the United States, and shortly after added Scandio and Disposioessential in chips, telecommunications and storage. The strategy behind the Asian giant is to monopolize the control of the entire chain. To name a few examples, China has 4% of world copper reserves, but controls 49% of the global refining. “More than accumulating raw materials, China is building an intentional bottleneck in the supply chain,” My partner has detailed in Xataka. The same goes for the Tungsten, where it controls 83% of the world supply and tightened the export controls in February 2025, What fired prices 55%. In simple words: Beijing seeks to be essential. It controls the most valuable link – the defendant – and with it conditions global access to strategic metals of the 21st century. However, its power is not absolute: it depends on importing concentrates from countries such as Chile, Peru or Mexico. If any of those partners change position – Mexico, for example, 50% tariffs have already imposed Chinese products in 2025-, Beijing risks a cut of vital supplies. In addition, this control strategy has a price: Chinese copper foundations work with negative margins and some have had to close. A movement to counterreloj. Before the blockade, Germanio’s great consumers try to move quickly. On the one hand, in the United States, defense giant Larkheed Martin signed in August a direct agreement with the South Korea Zinc to ensure supply, something unpublished so far. Lightpath Technologies, with government support, works in optical alternatives, although its director Sam Rubin warns in ft: “No one is going to redesign an existing system until it is inevitable.” On the other hand, the options are scarce. Umicore in Belgium and Teck Resources in Canada produce some Germanio, but insufficient. Germany He already warns thatif the crisis lasts, its automotive industry could stop part of the production in a matter of weeks. The European Chamber of Commerce has even asked Beijin to release supplies for chips factories. The historical supplier, Russia, has also been out of the board. For years it was one of Germanio’s main sources for the West, thanks to its production associated with zinc and coal mining. However, international sanctions for the Ukraine War cut that flow almost completely. Moscow continues to produce, but its exports are now directed to China and countries that do not participate in the sanctions, According to FT. For the United States and Europe, that means having lost another supply route in the worst possible time, which has further reinforced Beijing’s domain. Looking to the future. In Germany, a group of researchers from the Technical University of Freiberg Work in a method surprising: extract Germanio from plants after fermentation processes for biogas. At the moment, they only achieve some milligrams per liter, but they aspire to reach a gram, which would open the door to a sustainable and local production. From anonymity to key element. Germanio has become a symbol of a new era: that of minerals as strategic weapons. As Financial Times has pointed outdemand does not stop growing while the offer narrows. And the lesson is clear: in an electrified and militarized world, who controls critical minerals will control power. Image | Freepik and Unspash Xataka | Nickel’s paradox: West needs it more than ever for electrification, but China and Indonesia have market dominance

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