Electrica Archives - usatoday24

Red Eléctrica asked for calm. Immediately afterwards, thousands of Spaniards flocked to buy generators and camping gas.

October 16, 2025 by usatoday24

“The ghost of the great blackout has once again haunted Spain,” This is how my partner summed it up after learning that Red Eléctrica Española had detected new “sudden voltage variations” in the peninsular network. The news was enough to reactivate a recent fear: being left in the dark again. And with that fear, the fever for forecasts also ignited. In search of forecasts. Demand for products related to energy supply and survival has increased by 76%, according to data from the European price comparator Idealo. Among which stand out stoves and camping gas, with an increase of 253%, followed by power stations at 87%, radios at 56% and portable batteries at 49%. Interest in products such as water purification tablets has also skyrocketed by 20% and flashlights by 14%. An alert that set off the alarms. The alert issued by Red Eléctrica Española October 7 was enough to put the population on guard. Although the company assured that the voltage fluctuations “do not pose an imminent risk of a blackout,” the population reacted quickly. Many households, still with fresh memories of the April 28 blackout, began to reinforce their domestic emergency kits, as recommended the European Commission at the beginning of the year. The great precedent. The current prudence is not accidental. Half a year ago, the peninsula suffered a blackout that left the entire country without power for more than twelve hours. During that day, the chaos moved to the stores: endless lines and empty shelves in hardware stores and large stores. Servimedia data they confirm it: The demand for electric generators shot up by 639% and that for gas camping stoves by 547% in just 24 hours. Mass hysteria or rational prevention? The figures may suggest an emotional reaction, but the data rather points to a new culture of foresight. Before the blackout, only 5% of Spaniards had an emergency kit prepared. After the event, the figure doubled to 10%, and the intention to prepare for it went from 32% to 58%. as detailed on YouGov. The CIS adds that 78% of citizens did not feel afraid during the blackout, although 53.5% acknowledged that they remembered the kit recommended by the EU. Furthermore, 88.2% positively valued the civic and supportive behavior of their neighbors during those hours of darkness. The phenomenon has revived the debate: are we facing a “collective energy hysteria” or a modern form of domestic resilience? The business of self-supply. In a matter of months, concern about a possible power outage has created a new market niche: that of energy self-sufficiency. Sales of generators, solar panels and stoves they multiplied by five after the blackout in April. Large chains such as Leroy Merlin or Decathlon sold out their stocks in hours, while neighborhood hardware stores had their own special August selling flashlights, radios and batteries. The trend has not stopped. From Idealo confirm that the searches of these products continue to rise. In parallel, interest has grown in so-called portable power stations, small devices capable of charging everything from mobile phones to basic appliances, and which are already among the most consulted articles on the internet. “Prepper” culture is normalized. Added to this fever of prevention is the rise of the so-called prepperspeople who prepare for emergencies. In fact, two of them described how the blackout tested their preparedness: Their kits allowed them to cook and stay informed when most people lost power. A phenomenon that, far from eccentricity, reflects a growing search for domestic autonomy. A new energy consciousness? Electrical Network insists that “There is no imminent risk of a blackout,” but citizens—and the market—think differently. The culture of self-sufficiency is no longer a rarity and has become established in the collective mentality. There is no blackout in sight, but there is a change: many prefer to rely on their generator before the electrical system. In times of uncertainty, energy is no longer only measured in kilowatts, but also in peace of mind. Image | FreePik and FreePik Xataka | A ghost haunts Spain: the ghost of another massive blackout caused by network tension problems

Half a year after the blackout, Red Eléctrica still has problems stabilizing the voltage. And there is a geographical reason

October 15, 2025 by usatoday24

Just six months ago, Spain was left in the dark. The “electric zero” of April 28, 2025 was the most serious warning of a system that he believed himself invulnerable. Since then, Red Eléctrica (REE) operates in “reinforced mode”with dozens of gas plants turned on every day to prevent tension from skyrocketing. But, half a year later, the problem is still there: the Spanish grid is faltering not because of a lack of energy, but because the gas is in the north and the sun is in the south. How are the measurements now? At the beginning of October, the National Markets and Competition Commission (CNMC) approved, at the request of REE, an emergency resolution to introduce exceptional measures “in the event of sudden voltage variations” detected in the system. The document details changes to several operating procedures that affect the way the electrical grid is programmed and regulated. In practice, the rules of the game were tightened for everyone: from solar producers to gas plants. Among the most significant measures is the obligation for renewable plants to carry out their power transitions in a minimum of 15 minutes, when before they did so in two. The intention, have explained from REEis to avoid sudden changes that could destabilize the system and give the thermal power plants time to react. As explained in Cinco Díasthis instruction allows gas plants to “absorb” excess renewable energy without causing power surges. But for many expertsthe underlying diagnosis is different: the problem is not speed, but geography. Two electric Spains. The country is experiencing a geographic imbalance that we already saw it coming. On the one hand, the north and the Mediterranean coast concentrate the majority of thermal power plants and combined cycle plants – the only ones capable of providing the so-called “rotating mass”, that is, inertia and reactive power that stabilize the network. On the other hand, the south of the peninsula—Andalusia, Extremadura and Castilla-La Mancha—has been filled with solar plants and domestic self-consumption, technologies based on power electronics that do not generate natural inertia. “During peak radiation hours, the south produces more electricity than it consumes, the lines are discharged and the grid becomes extremely sensitive,” explains in his column Joaquín Coronado, president of Build to Zero. Under these conditions, starting a thermal power plant in Asturias to stabilize a voltage problem in Seville is as useless as trying to put out a fire in Andalusia with water pumped from Galicia. The tension starts from the local. The error of approach is in confusing frequency with tension. The electrical frequency is a global magnitude: it is the same throughout the synchronous network. But the voltage is a local variable, which depends on the reactive power flows in each area. Coronado sums it up clearly: reactive power “does not travel well.” On 400 kV lines, its radius of action is 30 to 80 km. In 220 kV networks, from 15 to 40 km. And at 132 kV or lower, just 5 to 20 km. This means that a turbine in the north cannot stabilize the voltage in the south, no matter how much power it has. The CNMC, in its resolutionrecognizes precisely that “rapid voltage variations” appear in periods of low demand and high solar production, aggravated by the growth of self-consumption that “reduces the observability of the system” and leaves the operator without control over thousands of small installations. In summary and how we have explained in Xataka: we have more sun than cables. This shows in the pocket. REE’s response has been to maintain lit every day between 20 and 30 combined cycles to ensure stability. This “reinforced operation” has cost more than 1 billion additional euros since April and could add 3 billion more with the new measures. Adjustment services – energy that is paid outside the daily market to keep the network stable – have gone from 240 million in 2019 to 4 billion in 2025, according to Cinco Días. The result is paradoxical: Spain has one of the lowest wholesale prices in Europe, but one of the highest electricity bills. Ember’s report explains why: the market price only covers half of the bill; The other half are fixed network costs, tolls, taxes and system stability, which do not go down even if energy is cheap. Slowing down is not stabilizing. The decisions adopted by REE and temporarily endorsed by the CNMC are “a defensive strategy” for Coronado. Furthermore, he points out that instead of providing the system with rapid response capacity, it is chosen to slow it down to give time to the thermals. The result is maintaining “a 21st century system operated with a 20th century mentality.” Slowing down the renewable ramps does not provide voltage control where it is needed, because the problem occurs in seconds and in specific places, not in the 15 minutes that these ramps last. The measures, therefore, gain time, but they do not gain effectiveness: they mitigate the frequency, not the tension. Is there any future perspective? The solution is to bring the control capacity closer to where the energy is produced. In fact, we have already discussed in Xataka some of those possible solutions that agree with what Joaquín Coronado says. Grid-forming inverters in solar and wind plants, able to behave as synchronous generators and stabilize the network in milliseconds. Batteries strategically distributed in the southern nodes, which provide instantaneous active and reactive power. Devices FACTS and synchronous compensators in critical substations (Guillena, Mérida, Puertollano…) to dampen local voltage changes. Flexible demand from large industries to modulate consumption in real time. And predictive algorithms based on artificial intelligence that anticipate local instabilities. Some of these solutions are already underway. Spain prepare the installation of eight synchronous compensators and 2,600 MW of batteries, with 340 MW already approved. These devices could save 200 million euros annually by reducing the use of gas for network services. A model that is exhausted. Beyond the technique, there is a structural dilemma: how … Read more

The government blames Red Eléctrica. Electric network blames electric. Electricity blames the Government and Red Eléctrica

June 18, 2025 by usatoday24

Crossing accusations among the actors of the Spanish energy system. The Government of Spain published at the last minute of Tuesday the report that will submit to Brussels on the blackout of April 28, in which it indicates the poor planning of the network operator. Hours later, Red Electrica has submitted its own report, pointing to the bad praxis of electric companies. The electric, on the other hand, deny all responsibility, ensuring that their systems acted correctly to an unstable network, and accusing the opacity authorities. In a corner of the ring, the Government of Spain. The official report of the analysis committee created by the Government is overwhelming: the blackout was the result of a surge chain reaction that the system could not support. Although the 182 pages technical research Distribute responsibility between the planner and the executors (plants that were connected, but did not comply with the criteria set to control the tension), the Ministry for Ecological Transition directs directly to the network operator due to structural weakness. Among entire pages censored to maintain the confidentiality of those involved, the Government report indicates the two critical errors committed by Electricity that day: poor programming and insufficient capacity for dynamic control of tensions. On the one hand, the number of thermal groups scheduled to regulate the tension was lower than that of previous weeks. On the other, the operator did not replace a group in the southern zone that had been out of service the previous afternoon. It was where the waterfall caused the three disconnections They made the system fall like a nipe castle. Following the protocols was the third “mistake” that, without being considered bad praxis, the operator committed. According to the report, Red Eléctrica made three decisions to reduce system oscillations that rose the tension: 1) increase the misery of the network, connecting several 400 kV lines previously disconnected; 2) reduce exports to France and Portugal; and 3) disconnect several reactances, equipment that absorbs reactive energy to lower the tension. The result was the waterfall that triggered the automatic disconnection. In the other corner of the ring, Red Electric. Faced with the conclusions of the Government, Red Electrica has submitted its own report and a closed defense of his performance. Their managers denied any planning error and aimed directly at the electric: “If the third -party centrals had regulated the tension as they should, the blackout had not occurred,” said Concha Sánchez, director of operation of the system, at the press conference on Wednesday. Electric Red defends that its programming was enough. That calculations and technical restrictions were made “whenever all groups comply with the obligations imposed by current regulations.” And that this would have been the right plan if the others had fulfilled their part. Who are the others? The electric. Operator’s analysis determines that disconnections that caused the blackout They should not happen: the plants shot without the tension reaching the ranges required by the regulations. They coincide with the government in which the generation “did not comply with the established obligations” to regulate the tension and “did not absorb the reactive energy” that was obliged to absorb. As a cake, the president of Redeia, Beatriz Corredor, accused the electric Do not facilitate all the required information or to do it without sufficient quality for a technical analysis. On the other side of the quadrilateral, the electric. Large electric companies (Iberdrola, Endesa and EDP) categorically deny any failure in their facilities. Its version is that the protection systems acted “as established by the electrical regulations in the face of a serious situation of network instability.” That the disconnections were automatic and correct to protect the equipment from a network that was already unstable. And that its centrals followed at all times the instructions of the system operator. The electric They also accused the government of “issuing public judgments that only result in the confusion and hinder of the process”, and claimed to Red Electric to share all the technical information transparently. The employer assures that Electric detected tension problems “Before the incident occurs” and communicated them to Red Electric. Problems that, according to the employer’s version, were discarded by the operator. A significant fact is that the report presented on Wednesday by Red Electrica focuses on events after 12:03 of April 28, qualifying the previous facts as “non -relevant.” A statement criticized by analysts, since the government’s own report details “atypical” volatility in tensions throughout the morning and previous weeks. In the words of the electric, the operator cannot act as “judge and part” of the investigation. And in the corner that remains, consumers. Those who We will pay at the light bill The cost of restoring electricity with synchronous generators, later recovering The cheapest renewable energy. Those who are at the mercy of little transparent data to choose who to believe in this war of accusations, whose backdrop is the foreseeable legal battle for compensation. The blackout not only affected Spain, but also Portugal and partially to France, which anticipates millionaire claims, which in turn explains the defensive position of all those involved and the meticulous construction of their respective stories. The great blackout of April 28 was not a simple technical failure. It was the collapse of a system that operated on the edge, evidencing a chain of vulnerabilities That, once the responsibilities were purified, it will have to be corrected. Another put to the point that We will undoubtedly end up noticing In the light invoice. Image | Marvel, Freepik, Xataka In Xataka | After the blackout, a proposal gains strength: dividing Spain into three price areas for light

Sign up to Red Electrica for insufficient control

June 18, 2025 by usatoday24

On April 28 at 12:33:30, an energy zero disconnected the electrical systems of Spain and Portugal from the rest of Europe. It was not a cyber attack, but a waterfall of surge and an insufficient control system, according to the Spanish government. The analysis committee report. Minister Sara Aagesen has presented 49 days after the blackout (half of the term established by Brussels) the result of an analysis of more than 300 GB of information carried out by the Government Committee. He Complete document He concludes that there was no unique cause, but a waterfall of failures that pushed the system beyond its limit, and mainly indicates Red Electric, who will answer Wednesday by making his own report public. The Government points to Red Electrica. During the morning of the incident, the system already showed an “atypical volatility” in tensions, according to the analysis. The situation worsened between 12:00 and 12:30, when the network suffered two major oscillations. The first, at 12:03, was an anomalous phenomenon of 0.6 Hz originated within the Peninsula. The second, at 12:19, was a more common oscillation at European level of 0.2 Hz but of a three -time amplitude. To stabilize the system, Electric Red reduced energy exports and increased the network’s misery, actions that, ironically, raised more the general tension of the system. A domino effect in 12 seconds. From 12:32, with the already tension network, the trigger occurred: a sequence of disconnections of large blocks of renewable generation. The report identifies three key events that started the catastrophe. At 12:32:57 355 MW were disconnected In a substation of Granada. At 12:33:16, approximately 730 MW was lost in a collecting substation in Badajoz. At 12:33:17 another 550 MW fell into a substation in Seville. Each of these disconnections caused the system tension to rise a little more. The more the tension rose, the more generators they disconnected to protect themselves, which in turn raised the tension, causing new disconnections. In just 12 seconds, the massive generation loss caused a frequency drop, which was a consequence, not the cause. At 12:33:19, The Iberian system lost synchronism with Europe And it was completely disconnected. Why the system fell. The underlying problem was a “insufficiency of dynamic control capabilities of tensions”, inability to manage surge, according to the committee. The report indicates that some of the first disconnections in Granada, Badajoz and Seville “would have occurred before the voltage thresholds established by the regulations”, one of the critical points of the collapse. Another critical point was that the large thermal plants that should act as a brake of the voltage increases did not do it with the necessary force because the number of synchronous plants coupled for this function was the lowest of the year. To top it off, some of the centrals that were operating “did not respond properly.” Instead of absorbing reactive energy to lower the network pressure, they acted anomalously, even producing it, “the opposite of what is required, contributing to increase the problem.” In the words of Ministry for Ecological Transitioncontrol resources were missing, “but not because they were missing in the country; there was a generation park rather than enough to respond.” Again, the committee points to the network operator. The measures on the table. To prevent an event from these dimensions, the report proposes to strengthen supervision to guarantee compliance with the regulations, regulate the legal regime of evacuation infrastructure, implement in an “immediate and priority” way a new service that allows renewables to participate in voltage control, invest in new synchronous compensators and increase interconnection with France. On the other hand, a cybersecurity investigation that, according to the Government, was “the largest in the history of Spain” with more than 75 experts, concluded that there was no cyber attack. However, deficiencies were identified, so the Committee recommends streamlining the application of European regulations, strengthening access controls and segmenting networks. On the Electric Red Roof. After the tough coup of the government, it only remains that Red Eléctrica published on Wednesday its report as a system operator to have the other point of view. For now, the Committee will put its findings in the knowledge of the National Markets and Competition Commission to, in its case, open the corresponding administrative procedures, with all guarantees, and all its consequences. ” Technical research is over, now begins the search for responsibilities. Image | Victor Romero (CC BY-C-SA 2.0) In Xataka | A town of Granada of one thousand inhabitants with 700 MW of renewable energy: the place where the blackout began

Log In

Sign In

Forgot password?

Your password reset link appears to be invalid or expired.

Log in

Privacy Policy

Add to Collection

No Collections