demographic

a revealing map that anticipates several demographic challenges

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The old continent is older than ever, literally. Because Their average age is already around 50 years old. and the birth rate shows that except in Monaco, our sons and daughters they are not enough replacement (the “magic” number is 2.1). So much so that it can be said that Europe is shrinking, something that It hasn’t happened since the black plague. Old Europe vs young Nigeria. The latest Eurostat update gives an average birth rate of 1.38 babies per woman in the EU and 3.6 million births in 2023 for a population that around 450 million. If we set a “Eurovision” and expand the borders, including states like the United Kingdom or Russia, the figure rises to 6.3 million. It is still little, especially if we take into account that only in Nigeria 7.5 million were born in that same year, has a birth rate of 4.5 babies per woman and that the middle ages around 18 years old. A huge lake is in the making. Note: in Nigeria there are 222 million inhabitants. A picture is worth a thousand words. In Brilliant Maps have synthesized this data into a very simple map with this devastating fact that shows the rapid population growth of Sub-Saharan Africa, specifically Nigeria, which has one of the youngest populations in the world. A single country, with a much smaller area, surpasses an entire continent in births. Brilliant Maps map with data from Our World in Data In perspective. Taking United Nations data for Europe and Nigeria from 1900 to 2100 (until 2023 the data is accurate, from then on the UN predictions are used) the evolution and trend leaves no room for doubt about the change produced in the last century in figures: In 1950, 12 million people were born in Europe and 1.7 million in Nigeria, which had a population of 548 and 37 million people respectively. In 2000, 7.3 and 5.5 million were born in Europe and Nigeria, which had a population of 728 and 126 million people. By 2100, less than 5 million births in Europe compared to 6.6 million in Nigeria and 592 million inhabitants for the old continent compared to 476 million in the African country. The turnaround is such that on reddit there is a graph which, although more qualitative than quantitative, sums it up well: The population difference between Europe and Africa. reddit Why is it important. Beyond statistical curiosity, we are facing a paradigm shift that will define the 21st century. If “demography is destiny”, how they attribute to Auguste Comte, Europe aims for change (renew or die, never better said). Of course, Nigeria’s population explosion is not la vie en rose either. In Europe. Europe’s demographic winter is raising alarm bells for its welfare state simply because the population pyramid is inverting, thus threatening its intergenerational social model: first, delaying the retirement age. On the horizon, the cut of benefits even though there are many people who “the cannon life” is not sticking. On the other hand, the market has found a vein in the “silver” economy in the form of care for the elderly: without going any further, those related professions are already applying for rise like foam in the coming years. In Nigeria. Having 7.5 million new people in a territory is quite a challenge. On paper, it is a fantastic opportunity to train and employ a mass population that can drive massive economic growth (as has China in recent decades). The problem is not doing it and finding yourself with unemployed and frustrated youth. On the other hand and regardless of this difficulty, such a high population increase translates into high pressure on its current infrastructure, for example there will be an urgent need to build schools or hospitals. The communicating vessels. Given the previous perspective, the migratory flow is as inevitable as it is necessary. From old Europe, in search of labor to fill vacancies and thus manage its decline without losing its standard of living. From young Nigeria, to alleviate internal population and infrastructure pressure. A symbiosis not exempt from cultural frictions, culminating identity tensions in the rise of the extreme right and the flight of talents in the African country. In Xataka | If you were born today you would be born at 17.5% in India: the map that shows the distribution of world birth rates In Xataka | Where the world’s next 1,000 babies will be born, in a surprising map Cover | Brilliant Maps

Europe is months away from registering a demographic milestone that has not occurred since the Black Death: it is literally shrinking

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In June the latest Eurostat data putting the EU median age at 44.7 years (and growing). The reading then seemed more or less clear. Europe’s demographic collapse was bringing it closer to an invisible threshold that was once unthinkable: the Middle Ages. 50 years old. Half a year later, the data has not improved. Historical contraction. Yes, Europe is heading towards a demographic turning point unprecedented since the black plague from the 14th century. After decades of sustained decline in birth rates, the population of the European Union will reach its maximum next year and it will start after a prolonged fallthe first of its kind in centuries. This is not a temporary adjustment, but rather a deep structural change that threatens to redefine the economy, the welfare state and the social balance of the continent. The alarm does not arise only from the total number of inhabitants, but from the aging speed and the thinning of the working-age population, on which the pension, health and care systems built over generations rest. Political panic and a race. counted the Washington Post that, given this panorama, governments of all ideological stripes have entered into a race against time to see if a combination of economic incentives, public policies and cultural messages can reverse (or at least stop) the decline in birth rates. In the Nordic countries, for decades exhibited as a model of conciliation and well-being, commissions of experts have been created to understand why their systems did not prevent the collapse of fertility. In France, the discourse has acquired a almost military tonewith calls for “demographic rearmament” after a drop of 18% in births in just ten years. In the east and south of the continent, especially in countries governed by nationalist forces, the response has been more direct: money, tax advantages and an explicit exaltation of the traditional family as a pillar of the nation. Incentives and results. Italy offers bonuses to working mothers with two or more children. Poland has increased notably the monthly transfers per child and has expanded tax breaks for large families. On paper, these policies seem compelling, even enviable from countries like the United States, where the cost of raising children is systematically cited as the main brake to birth. However, the European experience shows a repeated pattern: even the most ambitious programs barely succeed in slowing the decline, don’t invest it. The problem is not the lack of public effort, but the magnitude of the phenomenon they face. Hungary, the laboratory. No country better embodies the ambitions and limits of this strategy than Hungary. For more than a decade, the government has deployed a support system of a generosity comparable to that of Scandinavia, allocating around 5% of its GDP to family policies, a higher proportion than the United States dedicates to defense. The range of measures it’s wide: leave for grandparents, subsidized mortgages for young married couples, loans of up to $30,000 that become subsidies if the family has three or more children, and lifetime tax exemptions for women with three children, extended to mothers of two children under 40 starting next year. The message is clear: having children is not only desirable, it is a matter of national survival. Initial successes. They remembered in the post that for a time, the data seemed to prove this bet right. Hungary’s fertility rate went from one of the lowest levels in Europe to figures that suggested a sustained recovery. But the relief was short-lived. In recent years, the trend has been reversed and the country has practically returned to the European average. For some demographers, the program did not generate new births, but rather advanced decisions by those who were already planning to have children. Others point out that, although the impact on fertility is limited, the policies have coincided with an increase in marriage, a reduction in child poverty and greater female labor participation. The key question is whether these collateral benefits justify the enormous public spending. State limits. Beyond the checks and exemptions prosecutors, the decision to have children remains deeply personal and increasingly complex. The rise in housing prices, persistent inflation and job insecurity they weigh as much or more than any incentive. Added to this is a factor that is rarely recognized in the political debate: many of the drivers of the decline in birth rates are social advances that no one wants to reverse. Widespread access to contraception, decline in teen pregnancy, and increased education and career opportunities for women have transformed motherhood and fatherhood in a late choice, carefully calculated and, for many, expendable. Modernity as a trap. The fertility drop has spread so widely that many experts interpret it as a consequence inherent to modernity. Parenthood is delayed until one’s thirties, when one has achieved job and economic stability that comes later and later. Social media idealizes a life focused on the individual, travel, and personal freedom. dating apps multiply apparent options, but they make lasting commitment difficult. And a generation raised in small families has less daily contact with babies and children, fueling overly negative perceptions about the sacrifice involved in raising children. A politicized debate. Not everyone considers the population decline to be a tragedy. Some defend assuming it as a gradual transition towards more sustainable societies, questioning apocalyptic visions who talk about “demographic collapse.” In the long term, even in the most pessimistic scenarios, Europe would still have hundreds of millions of inhabitants. But these global figures hide a much more immediate structural problem: the imbalance between workers and retirees. In just a few decades, the ratio of people of working age to each elderly person will increase. will have drastically reducedputting under strain systems designed for a demographic pyramid that no longer exists. The fragility of immigration. For years, immigration has been presented as Europe’s demographic lifeline. However, this option is becomes more uncertain as fertility falls across almost the entire planet. Even countries that until now were large demographic reserves … Read more

Convenience stores were an emblem of Japan. Until the demographic crisis has revealed the dark side of opening 24 hours

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The stores japanese convenienceknown as konbini, are not simple shops where you buy fast food or basic products, they are a deep part of the social fabric of the country. Its success is measured not only in numbers (more than 55,000 establishments spread across the 47 prefectures) but in the way in which they accompany daily life: they allow you to pay bills, send packages, print documents, buy tickets for shows, resolve unforeseen events, take refuge in case of emergency or simply take a break in them. And now that the country doesn’t stop agingthe stores are mortally wounded. The konbini. Let’s think that, in urban neighborhoods, rural towns or isolated coastal areas, these establishments have become the minimum infrastructure indispensable where there used to be post offices, banks or small family businesses that have now disappeared. The store, therefore, is not just a business: it is a safe space, open and available 24 hours a day, an emotional and logistical support point that has shaped the Japanese daily rhythm and has captivated even to millions of touristswho find in these establishments a mix of efficiency, warmth and aesthetic thoroughness that is difficult to replicate. Efficiency and expansion. I remembered the new york times in summer that the development of the Japanese konbini has been the result of an evolution of decades. Since 7-Eleven opened your first store In Japan in 1974, the combination of non-stop hours, quality fresh food (onigiri, bentō, noodles, seasonal desserts) and integrated services made the model a unique phenomenon. For many residents, these stores are literally the closest store, the most accessible ATM, the place to go when something is missing or something happens. The associated image is one of precision: perfectly organized shelves, impeccable coffee machines, attentive employees, continually renewed food and a sense of total availability. From Japan to the world. This internal success was projected outwards, so that 7-Eleven, today Japanese owned, is the largest retail chain on the planet, and global expansion plans aim mainly to North America. The konbini became an exportable image of Japan: efficient, friendly, reliable. The hidden reverse. But not everything shined the same. one piece from the Financial Times has revealed that behind that facade of functional perfection A franchise system is under increasingly intense tensions. Japan agesthe active population is decreasing and small businesses are experiencing increasing difficulties to hire staff. The model requires stores open 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and the pressure not to close falls squarely on the owners. He Akiko’s case and her husband, a 7-Eleven manager who worked without a day’s rest for six months until dying by suicide, starkly revealed the human price of this silent perfection. And more. It was not an isolated case: a labor inspection recognized the relationship between death and overwork, but the root of the problem is structural. Franchisees must deliver between 40% and 70% of gross profit to the parent company, which reduces their margin and exposes them to absorbing personnel, overtime and unforeseen charges. Visible efficiency therefore has an invisible cost. The crisis of the model. Faced with the problem, the chains 7-Eleven, FamilyMart and Lawson have tried make schedules more flexibleintroduce automatic checkouts, ordering systems assisted by AI and robots cleaning to reduce the need for labor. But none of these measures solve the main equation: fewer available workers and more opening hours supported by fewer people. Domestic consumption is also not growing as before, which limits the owners’ ability to increase payrolls. As minimum wages rise, margins narrow even more. many managers they work for free for dozens of hours to keep their stores open. Some they confess that, in the current state, closing would be a more rational option than continuing to operate. The fragility of the system thus becomes visible: if there are no new franchisees willing to take over, the model can collapse. Adaptation or goodbye. The response of the companies points towards a profound transformation of the model. 7-Eleven study contracts renewed from 2027, possibly moving towards the “mega-franchise” model, where the same owner manages multiple stores and distributes human resources between them. However, this implies a concentration of the business and could further displace the small independent owners who historically defined the konbini as a community space. The central question is whether the konbini will continue to be a connected capillary network to the territory or whether it will become a centralized corporate system, more profitable but less close. The great dilemma. If you will, the konbini was born as proximity symbol and frictionless service, and became part of emotional memory from Japan: open places when everything else is closed, spaces where the daily routine has a friendly pause. But that same ideal has been held for decades by people whose efforts they have become invisible beneath the surface of efficiency. Today, the system faces a limit that is not technological, but human. The future of the konbini will depend on whether Japan manages to rebalance the contract between the community, the company and those who keep the doors open at any time, 365 days a year. If it manages to adapt without sacrificing those who support it, it will continue to be an intimate and essential institution. If not, it could become the emblem of a society that knew how to take care of every detail… except for the people who made it possible. Image | Pexels, Japanexperterna, Shankar S. In Xataka | While half the planet aspires to retire, in Japan the opposite is true: 100-year-olds who only want to work In Xataka | The aging population and a poor pension system have a new symbol in Japan: grandmothers are rented

Japan already knows how to get out of the demographic catastrophe in which it has sunk: with foreign babies

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Japan seems to have found the key to solve its demographic crisisperhaps the most serious problem, entrenched and apparently unsolvable (apparently) that the country faces. The latest data of the Government show that last year the nation softened its birth rate thanks to babies born to foreign couples. Not only did they grow in net terms, they also grew proportionally, partially alleviating the disaster of Japanese households. It is nothing that many other countries have not experienced before, including Spainbut there, in Japan, the data fuels the debate on immigration. What has happened? That the latest statistics from the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare show that Japanese demographics are advancing at two very different rates. If we talk about Japanese households (local population), the birth rate is clearly declining, with around 41,000 fewer babies in a matter of a year. Things are, however, very different when we look at foreign couples. Among them, the same indicator has skyrocketed to almost total 23,000 babies3,000 more than in 2023. The global birth rate remains negative, but it casts little doubt on its demographic driver. What does the data say? That immigration is the lifeblood of Japanese demography. And without a doubt also. The government figures, which show the balance for 2024 and have been published by Nikkei, They reflect how immigration has softened the country’s population setback. In 2024, the government registered 22,878 births of “foreign citizens in Japan,” a label that identifies babies born to foreign parents or a single foreign mother. The data is interesting for three main reasons. First, because they represent 3,000 more than in 2023. Second, because if we look even further back to gain perspective, we see that it represents a growth of 50% in a decade. And third, because thanks to this trend, foreign newborns now account for 3.2% of all births in Japan. It is a percentage very similar to the weight of the foreign population in the country: 3.6 million on a total of 124 million. And Japanese couples? The opposite has happened with them. Among Japanese couples, 686,173 births41,115 less than in 2023. If the blow of that ‘hole’ was not greater in the country’s final census, it was precisely because the foreign birth rate grew to provide almost 23,000 babies. Particularly noteworthy is the number of children born to mothers of Chinese origin (4,237), Filipino (1,897) and Brazilian (1,351). The remaining 14,425 births are attributed to a much broader and more diffuse category called “other nationalities”, which include, for example, Vietnam or Nepal. How many foreigners are there in Japan? Not that many, actually. The Nikkei agency specifies that at least at the end of 2024 in Japan there were around 3.77 million resident foreigners, more or less 3% of the global population. It represents a historical maximum and, above all, a sufficient volume to have strained the migratory pressure between the hottest topics of the national public debate. It is especially relevant that the big surprise of the July elections was Sanseito, a populist party that stands out (among other things) for the harshness of his speech against foreigners and tourism. In fact their motto was “Japan first”with which it won 14 seats and became the third force in the opposition. Even the candidates to preside over the PLD, including Sanae Takaichiwho will probably be the country’s new prime minister, toughened their speech. Why is it important? Because it shows the extent to which Japan faces an existential dilemma. The increase in the foreign population has become a topic of debate, but at the same time official data show that right now it is its demographic float. And that is not a minor issue in a country that has long been mired in a deep birth crisis that is undermining its census and aging society, with all the implications that this entails at an economic, labor, social and health level or even for defense of the nation. Is the situation so serious? In 2024 the country lost more than 900,000 people, a historic collapse that left its global census around 124.3 million of people, far from the maximum 126.6 million registered in 2009. Not only that. The ‘national’ birth rate (among Japanese) stood at its lowest level since there are records (1899) and the country has seen how those over 65 years of age have come to represent around 30% of the global population. Among foreign residents, 56% They move between 20 and 30 years old. Images | Yanhao Fang (Unsplash) 1 and 2 In Xataka | Japan has found the three most serious problems with the massive arrival of tourists. And none of it has to do with tourists.

For decades Madrid was a demographic vacuum for Valladolid. Now it is Valladolid who takes away neighbors

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For a simple matter of work, For decades Many Valladolid had no choice but to make their bags and move to Madrid. There are the companies. And good professional perspectives. Today things are different, how they reveal The latest data of the Castellanoleon City Council. The Telework expansion and the Communications improvement He has allowed not a few Pucelanos to return to his city without giving up his jobs in the capital and even turn the demographic tortilla: now it is Valladolid that grows at the expense of Madrid. The data are of course eloquent. What do the figures say? That for years the Castellanoleonese city endured a migratory balance with the clearly negative capital. Many more Pucelanos went to Madrid than Madrid arrived in Valladolid. If it follows The historical series From the municipal census it is proven that this favorable imbalance to Madrid dates back to at least 1997, with years in which the difference was brutal: in 2014, for example, Valladolid scored 736 casualties of Pucelans who made the bags to move to Madrid; The reverse tour (from Valladolid to Madrid) did only 305 people. And is it like that? No. And that is the novelty. We know the change thanks to An analysis of The confidentialwhich has had access to updated data from the Valladolid City Council. They show how between 2022 and 2023 the migratory balance between the cities of Valladolid and Madrid experienced a turning point: if in 2022 the Pucelana city registered 799 casualties of neighbors to Madrid destination in front of 617 high in the opposite direction, in 2023 the photo was the opposite: it computed 765 high and 566 casualties. From the red numbers he went to a positive balance of 199 people with Madrid. The trend was confirmed in 2024 with a new positive migratory balance. The Pucelano City Council scored 796 high from Madrid compared to 504 casualties from neighbors who moved to the state capital. Again a positive balance, of 292 people. In a matter of only two years Valladolid has therefore gone to drag a historical deficit in the exchange of population with Madrid to “win” 491 new registered at the expense of its southern neighbor. That trend has coincided with the general growth of the Valladolid register, which has been gaining population for several years and is now located in 303,843 inhabitants according to The municipal censusthat It does not always coincide with that of the INE. Is there more data? Yes. The general “picture” can be completed with more brushstrokes that help to understand the change. The turn in the migratory flow has also been found in the whole of the Madrid region, not only in its capital. After decades, moving in “Red Numbers” (in demographic terms), in 2023 Valladolid registered higher from new residents from the Madrid community than Low of Pucelanos who had moved to municipalities such as Móstoles, Alcalá de Henares, Leganés, Fuenlabrada, Getafe or Madrid itself. Between 2023 and 2024 in that sense a positive balance of 758 new registered. At the end of 2024 The North of Castile I already pointed the change of tendency citing the statistics of the INE, although in its article it managed data until 2023 and provincial level, not exclusively of the municipality of Valladolid. What did they show? Something similar to what the Pucelano City Council register reflects. In 2023 they arrived at the Valladolid set 1,785 from the Community of Madrid, while they left the province 1,270 person to settle at some point in Madrid. Result: a positive balance of 515 people for Valladolid. It is not bad if one takes into account that the previous year (2022) the province had lost 115 people in favor of the Community of Madrid. And what is the reason? Rather, we should talk about reasons, in the plural. When analyzing the change in trend there are those who speak of The expansion of teleworking After the pandemic or attractiveness of the Valladolid real estate market in front of the Madrid, which makes the purchase of housing much more assumed there than in Madrid. According to Idealista, the square meter costs in Valladolid 1,832 euros while in Madrid it is located in 5,467. Something similar occurs in the rental market: in the Pucelana city, the M2 regrets average to 8.9 euros in front of the 21.4that Madrid charges. But … why this abrupt change? While it is true that COVID-19 marked a before and after in the implementation of teleworking in Spain and that the real estate market He has not stopped tense In recent years, both trends have not explained why the population flow between Valladolid and Madrid has experienced such a sharp change in such a short time. Nor why it has been accentuated in 2023. Hence, when the analysis of the phenomenon adds another determining factor: the improvement of transport between Valladolid and the Community of Madrid. At the end of 2007 The line was released High speed Madrid-Segovia-Valladolid, which made it possible to arrive from Valladolid to Madrid in less than 60 minutes, instead of the more than two hours that it has the same route by car. Since then the service It has improved In medium distance services until, today, A wide grill of frequencies in birds Ave, Avant, MD, Alvia or Avlo capable of going from Valladolid to Chamartín in 54 minutes. The key in recent years has been nevertheless another: the price. What has changed? In 2019, take the train daily to go to Madrid from Valladolid demanded to disburse hundreds of euros Every month. Today the situation is different. Regular users have benefited from Free bonds MD and a 50% discount For recurring travelers of the Avant trains. In January The Council of Ministers agreed to maintain at least until June 30 the direct aid to the transport of travelers for frequent customers of nearby, rodalies and conventional MD, with “free fertilizers”. The Avant offers a 50% reduction … Read more

Japan has found the number of children per woman to avoid demographic extinction. Two thirds of the planet are very far

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A group of researchers in Japan He started studying What number of children by women could be understood as a key to “avoid extinction”, understanding this, not as prevention before a total apocalypse of our civilization, but as the prevention of statistical extinction of the lineages or family lines over time. They found two things: that the number that was presupposed above was very low, and that a large part of the population is late. Beyond the threshold. For decades, the magic number to keep the human population “stable” It has been 2.1: It was believed that, on average, each woman should have just over two children to ensure The generational replacement and avoid population decline. However, a New study warns that this threshold is outdated and insufficient. According to Japanese researchers, the true level of fertility necessary to guarantee the long -term survival of a human population is not 2.1, but of 2.7 children per woman. The reasons? This adjustment is due to the fact that the traditional calculation does not contemplate the Stochastic variability (that is, randomness) in factors such as individual fertility, mortality, sex proportions at birth and the probability that some people simply never have offspring. By incorporating these real fluctuations into population mathematical models (through Galton-Watson Model), The authors concluded that a higher rate is needed for Avoid progressive extinction of family lineages in generations of the future, especially in societies with low sustained birth. Map of when European fertility rates fell below replacement levels Ignored warning. The finding is especially alarming because currently two thirds of the population World Cup lives in countries with fertility rates below the old 2.1 threshold, and well below the new estimated 2.7. Among the most affected, many highly developed, are South Korea (0.87), Italy (1.29), Japan (1.30), Canada (1.47), Germany (1.53), United Kingdom (1.57), France (1.79) or the United States, with a rate of just 1.6 children per woman. These levels, which have remained low for decades, mean that almost all family lines in these countries are intended, statistically, to extinguish at some point in the future. Plus: The study clarifies that A slight bias Towards female births (that is, a slightly greater proportion of girls than boys) could marginally decrease the risk of extinction, increasing the probability of reproduction in future generations. But even that factor, by itself, would not be enough to compensate for a persistently low fertility rate. Map of countries according to global fertility rate Pronatalists Interestingly, this information reinforces the alarms that have sounded from certain sectors concerned about the future demographic. One of the most visible faces of pronatalism contemporary It’s Elon Muskwho has repeatedly warned that the low birth rates “will end civilization” and whose prolific paternity (at least 11 known children) is presented as a deliberate act in this fear. For pronatalists, raising birth rate is a Existential priority. However, this position is not widely shared by the general population. United Nations Population projections by location (the vertical axis is logarithmic and represents millions of people) Social realism. Fortune told that a Population Connection survey carried out at the beginning of the year showed that most people do not consider low birth rate An urgent problem. Only 15% perceived it as one of the main global challenges, while 45% expressed more concern about excessive population growth, given the fear that children are born in poverty conditions or with exhausted natural resources. More perceptions. Another more recent survey, Made by Yahoo News and Yougov revealed that only 8% of Americans were “very concerned” about the fall in the country’s birth rate, and only 32% expressed any degree of concern about it. In the background, another reality that We have been counting: a majority of those who do not have children, or have few, do not do it for apathy towards the future of humanity, but For practical reasons: The lack of institutional support, the loss of life, the high cost of parenting or the perception that the world is not a conducive place to form large families, they are also key. In addition, it generates an increasingly acute contrast between the demographic predictions of experts and the immediate priorities of the population. So? The warning of Japanese researchers seems clear: without a change of course, demographic extinction will be slow but inevitable in many regions of the world. And although the term “extinction” may sound apocalyptic, what is at stake, according to scientists, is not the sudden disappearance of the human species, but the progressive erosion of family and cultural continuity, in a process where future generations will be more scarce, more isolated and, in many cases, non -existent. From that prism, reproducing is more conditioned than ever to social, economic and environmental factors, and the figure of 2.7 children per woman may seem more a demographic utopia than an attainable objective. It does not seem that we are going to extinguish in the short term, at least not through “fertility”, but The study It puts the focus on the population growth to which many regions point out. Image | Pexels, JOHNSONRED, Korakys In Xataka | We thought we were 8,000 million people throughout the planet. Until some researchers began to make numbers In Xataka | In Japan there is no doubt that they live worse than 30 years ago. Literally, houses are getting smaller and smaller

The demographic debacle in Europe, exposed on this map with a misleading guest: Monaco

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A few days ago we commented that Spain’s demographic engine is gripped. Very few babies are born Every day, they are not enough for the generational relief and, although we are heading to the record of inhabitants, this is thank you to immigration. In addition, more babies are born than 41 -year -old mothers than 25but it is not an exclusive problem from Spain. And, to understand the scope in our most immediate environment, let’s see this graph prepared by Visual Capitalist which shows the fertility rate in Europe: Fertility rate. It is the average number of children that a woman would have throughout her reproductive life (period between 15 and 49 years). It is estimated that 2.1 children per woman is the right rate for generational relief and is a long -term indicator. Bad news: according to UN estimates by 2025, in Europe there is no country that reaches that desired fertility rate. A small green redoubt. Well, there is one: Monaco. The problem is that it is not something that is important in a Europe that has a very low fertility rate because its population is extremely small (only 39,000 residents) and any change in the indicator that is significantly alters the measurements. The economy is not a problem in Monaco. Montenegro with 1.8 and Romania with 1.7 are the ones that complete the podium. In the lower part, we have Ukraine (which, due to their situation, is not representative) and countries such as Malta or Andorra with a rate of 1.1. Spain, next to Italy, San Marino or Lithuania, is also closer to the well than to see the light due to a rate of 1.2. Decay. There are already those who said that The true challenge of the 21st century It would be the demographic because, although by 2080 we will be 2.3 billion more people On the planet, not all territories will grow homogeneously. In the European case, there are a number of issues that have formed the perfect cocktail so that both birth rates (births per 1,000 inhabitants) and fertility have collapsed in recent years. The Independence age has increased These last two decades, standing above 30 years on average in the Spanish case. The rental price for the clouds prevents assets from saving or raising a child. And this, together with cultural factors, has caused the downturn of the fertility rate. A few decades ago, in fact, worldwide It was five children per woman. Today we settle for the aforementioned 2.1. Immigration. That this generational relay does not occur has a multitude of implications, two of the most visible being the impossibility of maintaining systems such as pension and the lack of labor personnel. Now, something that can make the renovation rate immigration. In the Spanish case, four out of ten jobs From January to June 2024 they were covered by an immigrant, but in birth, immigration also has a positive impact. In 2021, almost a third of babies born in Spain, 32.4%, He had at least one foreign father or mother. With the magnifying glass in hand, 42% were of Latin American origin, 28% African, 22% European and 7% Asian. Now, something that has been observed is that fertility rates of immigrant mothers tend to line with that of the local population. World problem. As we say, beyond in Europe, demography is A problem in many countries. But although in this article we have put the focus on the countries of our environment because the representation of the Visual Capitalist map is very clear, if we look at the East, the situation is devastating. South Korea either Japan They have suffered a demographic debacle. China, more of the same, and although the three countries have launched many Measures to stop that depopulationsomething they have in common is the intention of reactivating their population thanks to the immigrant labor. Either in the field… either hiring babysitters so that fathers and mothers can get to work. Returning to Europe, what all graphics and measurements indicate is that it is not a passing problem, but a long -term challenge with very deep implications. In Asia there are countries that seem trace with some proposalsbut it is something that will be seen in the medium and long term. In Xataka | The population of Japan has aged so much that the country is living the closure of thousands of schools

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