Ukraine has opened Russia’s cruise and ballistic missiles. War is impossible if your allies make weapons for you

He fed up with Ukraine with the hole that exists around international sanctions it is palpable and numeric. kyiv intelligence has hundreds of reports in your possession that reveal that Russian drones have passed those sanctions for the lining. And not just drones, even in the tanks. The latest: Ukraine has begun analyzing parts of Moscow’s latest cruise and ballistic missiles.

And what they found is a deja vu.

Clandestine circuit. Three and a half years after the start of the invasion, Ukraine continues to dismantle the last Russian missiles and drones and find tens of thousands of parts inside made in the westthe majority of his “allies” (microcontrollers, sensors, connectors, converters) from countries that have theoretically embargoed the supply: United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan.

Of course also, Moscow’s allies like china. In fact, Zelensky put in more than 100,000 the foreign components found only among 550 vectors used in a single recent bombing, confirming that the sanctions have not turned off the tap: if anything they have made it more expensive and slowed down, but not dried up.

The escape mechanism. It we have counted before. The mode of entry does not require sophisticated espionage, but rather exploiting loopholes in global trade: pieces “dual use” sold to civil actors who then they deviatecomponents placed on the market before sanctions, networks of shell companies and brokers in lax jurisdictions, and triangulated purchases via third countries that do not apply or execute controls.

The sanctions gave the West three years to close the gaps, but they also gave Russia (and those who traffic for it) the same time to learn to get around them. In practice, it is a market: if you pay more, there is always someone willing to move the merchandise with layers of opacity sufficient to break traceability.

Iran and North Korea. Moscow relies on two veterans of the sanctioning regime: Iran (which has spent decades refining the engineering of commercial border hopping) and North Korea (capable of moving components and complete systems despite being formally embargoed).

Cooperation with both not only transfers material: it transfers method. Both logistical routes and corporate and financial camouflage techniques now migrate to the Russian military supply chain.

What is possible and what is not. They remembered on Insider that the West hardens the perimeter: compliance guides for companies, “catch-all” to block sensitive exports (even if they are not listed), border inspections, criminal threat to repeat offenders, closures of loopholes when Ukraine identifies specific pieces.

But even so, the regime is not airtight: global trade in components is massive, triangulation via third countries It is structural and already exists “pirate” production replacement that replicates or falsifies sanctioned parts. By design, control is reactive: it is as if each new closure encourages Moscow to seek an alternative route.

Partial effectiveness. Plus: just because embargoes haven’t cut off the flow doesn’t mean they’re irrelevant. London estimates that the sanctions have deprived Russia of at least 450,000 million of dollars and have multiplied by up to six the price of dual pieces, draining war liquidity and adding temporary friction to the Russian military chain. This, a priori, penalizes rhythms, quality, scaling and maintenance, even if it does not prevent the material from arriving.

The structural limit. If you want, the export control It is an instrument of soft power: its real power depends on what the rest of the world is willing to do and tolerate. It can raise the cost, strangle necks, penalize intensities, but it can hardly seal an economy-state Russian size connected to global intermediaries willing to charge for the risk.

The result is an industrial war where the blockade is never binary (flows / does not flow), but rather marginal: raising the cost per Russian shot, reducing the cadence, pushing failures due to logistical stress and buy time, but hardly prevent a chip made for a laptop I ended up controlling the guidance of a kamikaze drone over a Ukrainian city.

Image | Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

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