pipeline

The European energy map is changing at a speed that few would have imagined just three years ago. The old gas pipelines that linked Siberia to the industrial heart of the EU have been sidelined, while new routes and alliances reconfigure the power table around gas. The old continent proclaims its purpose of isolating Moscow, but in the center of the continent it is drawn an exception that alters the planned script and that may change the balance of forces in the coming winters. A map in transformation. Yes, the European gas map has changed radically in a few years, to the point that this winter of 2025 is the first in decades in which Russian gas ceases to be decisive throughout the European Union. After the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the energy crisis that broke out between 2021 and 2023, Brussels urged urgently diversification of supplies, relying on imports liquefied natural gas (LNG), especially from the United States and Qatar, and in the fortress of norway as a stable partner. The great gas pipelines that for half a century linked the Siberian fields with the European industrial heart have been underutilizeddamaged or reduced to a secondary role, as energy security moves towards the global balance of the LNG market and towards the vulnerability of infrastructures increasingly exposed to cyber attacks and hybrid incidents. On this new board, each molecule counts, but not all of them weigh the same: there are some that define true European autonomy more than others. The two exceptions. Despite the EU’s declared desire to eliminate purchases from Moscow, two countries have kept the valve open: Hungary and Slovakia. In August 2025, according to the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air, both added imports of Russian crude oil and gas by more than 690 million of euros, that is, the majority of the European total. In fact, they continue to receive oil through the gigantic Druzhba pipeline, which crosses Ukraine and Belarus from Russian fields to Central Europe, and have used temporary exception granted by Brussels to landlocked countries to justify their dependence. The contrast is evident: while countries like France, the Netherlands and Belgium have limited themselves to importing residual Russian LNG, Budapest and Bratislava continue buying crude oil and gas straight from Moscow, keeping alive the energy artery that the rest of Europe has tried to close. Hungary and Slovakia are investing in gas infrastructure and creating a gas block in the heart of Europe aimed at protecting against any risks USA, Brussels and pressure. The intransigence of Viktor Orbán and Robert Fico has not gone unnoticed. At the UN, Trump accused Europe of “financing the war against itself” and pointed out with their own name to the Central European partners that do business with the Kremlin. Brussels, for its part, debate sanctions growing: the nineteenth package included a ban on Russian LNG starting in 2026 and restrictions on giants such as Rosneft or Gazprom Neft, although it avoided imposing immediate vetoes on crude oil and gas by gas pipeline, fearing a head-on crash with Budapest and Bratislava. However, the Commission is already preparing specific tariffs against imports that are still They arrive through Druzhbaand requires all Member States to submit disconnection plans before 2027the year in which the final cut is expected. The discourse of dependency. Hungary insists that its economy would fall 4% immediately if they were closed russian flowsand both Orbán and Fico speak of “economic suicide” and “ideological impositions” from Brussels. However, experts and analysts dismantle many of these arguments: geography is no excuse in an integrated European market where other equally landlocked countries, such as Austria or the Czech Republic, have reduced drastically reduce its Russian imports. Alternative infrastructures there are. The Adria pipeline, which connects to the Adriatic in Croatia, could supply enough crude oil to Hungary and Slovakia, although the reliability of its capacity tests is disputed. The Croatian oil company JANAF itself assures which can supply both refineries (Százhalombatta in Hungary and Slovnaft in Bratislava) with up to 12.9 million tons per year. In gas, the interconnections with neighboring countries and the expected abundance of LNG after 2026 suggest that the cutoff of Russian flows would be more political than technical. Politics, benefits and a shadow. Budapest’s stubbornness also has an internal political and economic dimension. The MOL company, close to the Orbán Government and owner of the Slovak refinery, has reaped huge benefits thanks to the price difference between Russian Urals crude oil and Brent, which has allowed extraordinary income for both the company and the state budget itself through taxes. In parallel, the speech of the Hungarian Executive associates the continuity of supply russian with stability of its star program of subsidies on household energy bills, despite the fact that the prices that Budapest pays for Russian gas follow the same international references as for the rest of Europe. In Slovakia, Fico also protects contracts with Gazprom valid until 2034, although the national company SPP itself has flexible agreements with large Western companies that would allow demand to be met without Moscow. The new axis of the Black Sea. Be that as it may, the most revealing element of the new energy map is that Hungary and Slovakia not only resist cutting the Russian gas pipelines inherited from the Cold War, but are betting on new connections. The route that arrives through the TurkStream and enters from Türkiye towards central Europe through the Black Sea consolidates a direct link with Moscow at the same time that Brussels seeks to isolate it. Paradoxically, the two Central European countries are becoming the main russian corridor towards the heart of the EU, a role that openly contradicts the energy autonomy strategy and reinforces the structural dependence on a partner considered hostile. Europe contradicts itself. The dilemma is obvious. The European Union proclaims its purpose to end with Russian imports in just two years, but at the same time tolerates exceptions that feed … Read more