In wars, the number of casualties is usually greater than the officially recognized, but what is the gap of figures? A few days ago, BBC and average They led an extensive analysis of the number of Russian soldiers who died in The Ukraine conflict. In parallel, Another pioneering studybased on artificial intelligence tools, it made the same analysis by throwing very sylurious figures. Both macro studies revealed the obvious: that three years of war suppose thousands of deaths, but also how the forces change over time.
A profile change. The Financial Times counted A reality that looked like a dystopy only three years ago. As the war in Ukraine has advanced entering its third year, Russia has modified the composition of its army, increasingly resorting to men over 50, and most of them In its 60s and 70s.
This change responds to the need of Kremlin to replenish troops without resorting to a new mass mobilization, unpopular measure among the population. Instead, the government has chosen to recruit “volunteers” mediaand substantial financial incentives and one Intense television propaganda that exalts patriotism and the need to defend the nation. The medium exposed examples, such as Yuri Bushkovsky’s casewho would have turned 70 in 2024 and died in the Battle Front in Ukraine in November. Its history is only one among thousands of veterans and elderly citizens who have been persuaded to enlist with promises of economic stability for their families.
The impact of the casualties. As we said at the beginning, the Midazone Analysisin collaboration with the BBC and other media, it has compiled information about almost 100,000 deceased Russian soldiers In the conflict. And next to this, another study, of istoriesbased on AI tools. Both suggest a similar figure, with More than 104,000 identified names. A very high figure, although experts estimate that the real of casualties could be significantly higher.
The transformation of the army. The data in the two works show that in the first phase of the invasion, most troops They belonged to the regular armyincluding soldiers of elite units sent to take Kyiv in a matter of days. However, after the mobilization of 300,000 reservists in 2022, the dead began to include a growing number of soldiers without formal training.
For the beginning of 2023, the fighters of private groups such as Wagner and prisoners recruited in prisons They dominated the casualties. Now, in the third year of war, the strategy has changed again: the Kremlin It depends on military contractswith a growing participation of these older men, who see a Solution to financial problems or legal.


Motivations and the “prize.” The recruitment of older men responds to multiple factors. Some of them have Previous military experience in previous conflicts, while others They face economic difficulties that lead them to be enlisted in exchange for bonuses of up to 4 million rubles ($ 45,500) and annual salaries that can exceed 7 million rubles ($ 79,000). For many, this sum represents an opportunity for Transform the lives of their familiesallowing the purchase of a home or the education of their children. We have it a while ago, there are soldiers that “They are worth” more dead than alive In its regions.
In this regard, the sociologist Kirill Rogov described this phenomenon as A “social jump” For the families of the recruits: in many cases, it is a decision made in conjunction with their loved ones, who see in the money a unique opportunity in a context of economic crisis. However, the human cost of this strategy is evident. According to Mediazona datamore than 4,000 contracted Russian soldiers have died with more than 50 years, a figure much greater than 500 reservists and 869 prisoners who died in the same strip.
And in Ukraine? In contrast, both studies show that the average age of Ukrainian soldiers is 43 years. Despite the reduction of the minimum age for military service 27 to 25 years in 2023the Ukraine government has avoided more drastic measures not to compromise the future of its population. In Russia, however, the aging of the army seems to be an increasing trend, which raises doubts about the sustainability of the long -term war effort.
As for the economic incentive, varies according to the region. In places like Samara, the payment to be enlist is one of the highest, reaching 4 million rubles, while the average monthly salary in the area barely exceeds 66,000 rubles. This contrast reinforces the attractiveness of recruitment for those who face financial difficulties. In some regions, the initial bonus is sufficient to cover the cost of an apartment of a room, which makes the offer seem even more tempting for low -income families.
An invisible war. They counted in both reports that, although the losses have been catastrophic in the front, the Russian society continues greatly disconnected from the real cost of war. Only 30% of the Russians They have had direct contact with the conflict, either fighting or with relatives in combat. In Ukraine, however, almost 80% of the population Meet someone who has died or has been injured in the war.
Not just that. The absence of official information and censorship reinforce this ignorance. In Russia, data on military casualties are classified as state secretwhile in Ukraine, the lists of fallen soldiers remain accessible to the public. This makes the emotional impact of the conflict very different in both societies.
A Proppa studyin collaboration with the University of Helsinki, he found that 43% of Russians They still support the invasion. However, experts as the sociologist Viktor Vakhshtayn They believe that feeling would change dramatically if more citizens were personally affected by losses.
The problem of recovering bodies. It is the last of the legs to be treated in this “war” of figures. A key factor in the underestimation of the Russian casualties is the Difficulty recovering corpses. Many bodies are still on the battlefield, since the troops avoid exposing themselves to drone attacks to rescue their fallen companions. Since September 2024, death records have increased dramatically, partly because Russian families have begun to document losses on your own. As the conflict progresses, it is to assume that the data from independent sources will continue to play a crucial role in revealing the magnitude of the human catastrophe.
In short, the use of elderly soldiers in the Russian army reflects both the need for the Kremlin of Avoid new mobilization like him Impact of the economic crisis in the population. In this way, there is a paradox, another, on the battlefield: through financial incentives and the influence of state propaganda, older men, some in advance, have gone from retirement or informal jobs in front of the front of battle.
Image | Ministry of Defense, Rawpixel, Mstyslav Chernov
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