The recent crossing of threats between Putin and Trump has revived a tension that seemed buried from the hardest years of the cold war. The Russian president ordered his senior commanders to prepare plans to resume nuclear tests after Trump’s statements on social networks, in which he announced that the United States would resume its tests “immediately.” If so, nuclear weapons experts are clear about how long it would take for Russia to carry out a “real” test. The nuclear ghost. Although the intention of the North American president seemed more political than technical (referring to tests of launch systems and not to real detonations), in Moscow the interpretation it was another: The Ministry of Defense assumed that Washington seeks to reopen the nuclear race and recommended Putin to be ready for “full tests” in the Arctic field of Novaya Zemlya. It we count: that gesture, accompanied by recent demonstrations of the Russian arsenal (since the Burevestnik missile nuclear propulsion to intercontinental torpedo Poseidon), symbolizes the disappearance of the last brakes in the atomic dialectic between the two powers. The end of the agreements. The current climate is the result of years of system erosion of gun control. Russia suspended its participation in the New START treaty in 2023, while the historic INF agreement, which banned intermediate-range missiles, had already been abandoned by both countries in 2019. Despite maintaining some technical respect for launch limits, the absence of verification and transparency has turned the arsenals of Washington and Moscow (5,177 and 5,459 warheads, respectively) in a field of permanent suspicion. The Putin’s orderMore than a technical step, it represents a political message: that Russia will not allow the United States to monopolize the symbolic gesture of resuming tests that, if carried out, would break the taboo in force since 1990 and the spirit of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The Kremlin itself seems to have assumed that the return to “eye for an eye” logic It is part of the new post-Ukraine order, where shows of force count as much as victories on the battlefield. Satellite image showing tunnel construction at the Novaya Zemlya nuclear weapons test site in Russia. Russian viability: the Arctic. To the big question, nuclear security experts agree that Russia could carry out a real test within a margin of weeks or monthsdepending on the degree of instrumentation and preparation desired. Hans Kristensenof the Federation of American Scientistsestimates that an improvised detonation (without complex data collection) could be carried out quickly, although without significant scientific or military value. On the contrary, a complete, “real” test, with sealed tunnels, sensors and wiring, would require at least half a year of jobs in Novaya Zemlyawhere underground works have continued discreetly for years. Jon Wolfsthalfrom the American Federation of Scientists, gives the key: seasonal limitations, since the extreme arctic weather would allow trials of this caliber only in summer or early fall. However, both he and other analysts agree that the purpose would be mainly political (show parity with Washington) more than scientific. The great uncertainty. Most experts consulted on TWZ He stressed that neither Russia nor the United States have a technical or military need to resume nuclear testing. Both have extensive arsenals and advanced simulation programs that guarantee the reliability of their weapons without resorting to detonations. Daryl Kimballof the Arms Control Associationremember that Washington has made 1,030 historical tests and Moscow 715and that any new trial would be “purely for show,” an irresponsible act with no tangible benefit. Stephen Schwartz added that the United States maintains a structural advantage thanks to its arsenal maintenance program, valued in 345,000 million of dollars, and that Russia, although it could act with fewer environmental or political obstacles, would gain nothing beyond fueling the spiral of distrust. Still, Russian infrastructure on Novaya Zemlya, modernized in recent years, demonstrates a capacity to respond quickly if tension turns into action. A new deterrent. Beyond of personal confrontation between Putin and Trump, the real risk lies in precedent. A single test (even if it is underground and of low power) would be enough to break three decades of tacit consensus and open the door to new tests by, for example, China, North Korea or other actors seeking to legitimize themselves as nuclear powers. The gesture would have a huge symbolic power: demonstrate that powers can rewrite the rules of nuclear balance when they consider it necessary. In that sense, the experts’ warnings are clear: what is a rhetorical escalation today could become a tangible competition tomorrow, with unforeseeable global consequences. As Wolfsthal pointed out“this is what an arms race looks like: action, reaction, and a slope that costs much more to go down than to go up.” Echoes of the Cold War. The exchange between Moscow and Washington Not only does it resurrect the shadow of the nuclear confrontation, but it redefines its scenario: it is no longer fought in secret offices or under the logic of the balance of terror, but in televised broadcasts and social media posts. The threat of detonating atomic bombs again in the 21st century reveals a dangerous mix of geopolitical nostalgia and spectacle politics. Deep down, both know that no country can “win” a nuclear race. And yet, the temptation to show power, to regain influence and to project invulnerability to their respective audiences could be enough to reignite the powder keg. most feared on the planet. The silence of thirty years underground could be broken by a simple click on a social network. Image | Ministry of Defense of Russia In Xataka | The US and Russia have agreed on nuclear weapons: the time has come to take them out and see if they work In Xataka | In 1950 two scientists wondered if a 10 gigaton nuclear bomb was possible. Your results are hidden under lock and key
