While half the world wants to distance itself commercially from China, there is a country that is increasingly doing just the opposite: Spain
Pedro Sanchez Yesterday he took a selfie with the CEO of Xiaomi as part of his official visit to China. In it he has taken advantage of visit also Tsinghua University in BeijingAI talent pool— and of course for meet with the president of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping. But what this official visit tells us is something important about Spain and Europe: we want to depend less on China, but the data says that we are becoming more dependent. The narrative of decoupling. The discourse that we are seeing in general media or in news programs on television networks is usually the same: The West is reducing its dependence on China. There is talk about how supply chains are diversifying or how geopolitics are reordering global trade. Although the message is coherent and is usually supported by European and North American leaders, the reality is different. The numbers simply do not match. The data that dismantles everything. Between 2014 and 2024, EU imports from China increased by 101.9%, while European exports to China grew by only 47%. The relationship between both economic powers is not cooling, but quite the opposite: it is intensifying and, furthermore, becoming unbalanced. In 2024, the EU exported goods worth 213.3 billion euros to China, and imported 517.8 billion euros with a trade deficit of 304.5 billion euros. China remains by far the largest supplier to the EU and represents 21.3% of all extra-EU imports. Behind her are the US with 13.7% and the United Kingdom with 6.8%. Who “buys” more. The three largest importers of Chinese products within the EU in 2024 were Netherlands (109 billion euros), Germany (96 billion) and Italy (50 billion). The only countries with a trade surplus with China in the EU were Ireland and Luxembourg. The case of Germany is paradoxical, because this country leads this discourse of “reducing strategic dependencies”, but at the same time it is the second largest European buyer of Chinese products. One thing is the political message, and another is the commercial reality. Spain has a deficit, but it doesn’t seem to matter. The case of Spain is also special not because of the figures, but because of how it communicates them. In 2024, Spain imported Chinese goods worth 45,174 million euros, only behind Germany. What is striking is that the trade deficit of this exchange was enormous for Spain: 37,706 million, because Spanish exports to China were 7,467 million euros. That is to say: Spain buys China almost seven times more than what it sells. In 2025, imports grew even more, to 50.25 billion euros, but Spain’s discourse is not that of Germany: it does not seem to have any problem with increasing this commercial dependence. The Bank of Spain warns. The products most imported from China were industrial machinery, telecommunications equipment and motors, that is, goods that feed Spanish production. The Bank of Spain warned in 2024 that China is the great commercial weak point for both Spain and the EU. It is due to the volume of imports as well as their concentration and nature. The problem is that this dependency cannot be resolved with speeches: we would need alternative supply chains that are not being created at the moment, at least on the scale necessary to reduce this strategic dependency. Four visits in four years. Pedro Sánchez has visited China in March 2023, September 2024, April 2025 and April 2026. No other European leader has visited the Asian giant with that frequency in this period. It is true that all the presidents of the Government since Felipe González have traveled to China at least once, but none had done so four years in a row. Zapatero also made four trips, but he made them between 2005 and 2011. What Sánchez has done has no Spanish or European precedents. But Europe also builds ties with China. This movement towards rapprochement with China in 2025 and 2026 is not exclusive to Spain. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron have visited China in recent months. All these movements are a clear consequence of the tariffs that Donald Trump activated in 2025 and that have accelerated this European conversation about the need to reduce dependence on Washington. Which difference to Spain from the rest of its European partners is that he has been forging that alliance for years. Many visits, but the deficit grows. Although the relations between China and Spain are notable, the trade deficit has been at historic highs for years and Pedro Sánchez’s visits have not only failed to correct them, but have aggravated them. What grows with each trip are the cooperation agreements or investment statements in renewable energy, but that still does not affect the short-term trade imbalance. Not only that: while Spain sells to China automotive components, chemicals or serrano hamChina sells to us our industrial future. There is an asymmetry not only of volume, but also of structure. To reduce strategic dependence, nothing. The conclusion after analyzing the data is uncomfortable. The rhetoric of decoupling, digital sovereignty and the reduction of strategic dependence collide head-on with that commercial reality in which Europe imports products from China as if there were no tomorrow. The difference between Spain and the rest of Europe is that Spain does not maintain this fiction of distance, and this “honesty” may have strategic value. We will see if that ends up serving to reduce the enormous trade deficit with China. In Xataka | We thought that US tariffs would prohibit Chinese cars from entering. BYD wants to challenge them
