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At this point in the contest it has been clearly clear that, it is not that the war is asymmetric, it is that Russia is attacking Shaheds of thermobárica load and Ukraine with pellets. That reality, in addition, is practically modified every week At a rhythm of updates difficult to continue. The latest: Ukraine radars have begun to see swarins at cruise speed, but they are not missiles.
Again the shaheds. Yes, Russia has introduced into its attacks against Ukraine Reaction version of the Kamikaze Shahed drones, model Shahed-238whose benefits (speeds of up to 600 km/haltitudes of almost 10 km and a radar signal similar to that of a cruise missile) make them much more difficult to intercept than the Helix Shahed-136.
These drones, with an explosive load of about 50 kg and an estimated range 1,000 to 2,000 km According to the variant, they are practically untouchable for mobile groups with light weapons, cannons or electrical interceptors drones. His deployment in the last mass attack, which left At least 13 dead And more than 130 injured, is a qualitative leap in the Russian capacity to saturate Ukrainian defenses and force the use of expensive Earth-Aire missiles, such as The Nasams either Patriotwhose price can reach Millions of dollars per unit.
Tactical impact and adaptation. The introduction of the Shahed-238 seems to be part of A Russian strategy To prove the effectiveness of Ukrainian interceptor drones, developed from high performance FPVs used against recognition aircraft. The Minister of Digital Transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov, recognized that Russia is integrating countermeasures to make fun of these interceptors, which forces Ukraine to adjust tactics daily.
Despite the goal of producing A thousand daily interceptorsscalability is limited by Russian attacks on factories, supply problems and the need to constantly relocate production. Ukrainian experts They point That this deployment could seek not so much the direct destruction of strategic objectives such as the wear of the inventory of long -range anti -aircraft missiles, leaving the space open to more destructive weapons.
Production limitations. They counted the Twz analysts that, although Russia currently produces some 2,000 Shahed-136 per month And it aspires to reach 5,000, the manufacture of the Shahed-238 is more COmpleja and expensive. Their speeds demand more resistant fuselages, more precise guidance systems and high -cost turbojet engines, which restricts its scalability and diverts resources from the production of simpler models.
The dependence of foreign componentsespecially from Chinait could be decisive to sustain or expand production. These limitations suggest that, at least in the short term, Russia will use the Shahed-238 in a combined way with large waves of Shahed-136, creating staggered attacks that saturate defensive systems.
Perspectives and threats. The arrival of the Shahed-238 raises a Operational and economic dilemma To Ukraine: neutralize them with Sam missiles long -range is an unsustainable expense, while the most affordable solutions, such as unmanned interceptors, have not yet demonstrated full efficacy against this threat. In the short term, Russia’s most likely tactics aims to combine them with Great Shahed-136 waves To overload the defensive system, forcing to disperse resources and increasing the probability that other more powerful weapons reach their objectives.
If Moscow manages to maintain a constant flow, even if it is limited, of these reaction drones, they could become a key element to weaken the Ukrainian defenses and open space to more devastating aerial offensives, thus consolidating a new technological front in the war.
Image | PicrylMasoud Shahrestani / Wikimedia
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