an F-35 squadron that does not belong to China, Russia or the United States

In the month of January it was known America’s plan B in the Arctic once it seemed that “the Greenland thing” was not going to be so easy: a underwater cave in Norway. Two months later, eight icebreakers attested that Russia was there tooand in August, both nations looked with surprise at the arrival of five icebreakers with the flag of China.

Now, at congregation a squadron of F-35s has been added… from a fourth contender.

New strategic axis. we have been counting throughout the year. The Arctic has ceased to be a remote space and has become a central theater of power: a place where geography dictates the rules, meteorology sets human limits and the proximity between platforms The military turns every kilometer into a possible avenue of attack or surveillance. What was once a map and science is now state policy.

From the Nunalik deck (a freighter that traveled thousands of km avoiding growlers and storms to deliver material to Canada’s northernmost intelligence network) brutal lessons emerge: presence in the north is not improvised, it is built with infrastructurespecialized logistics and sustained budgetary will. The fact that a delivery can be delayed for 48 hours because the dockworkers are closed for a weekend, or that a 2.5 ton anchor ends up dragging a 180 meter chain between icebergs, illustrates the basic arithmetic of the Arctic: distance and climate are permanent enemies of any defense project.

Logistics and fragility. They remembered in The Wall Street Journal to maintain bases like Pituffik’s either Alert (the latter just 800 km from the North Pole) means dealing with very narrow seasonal windows: the sealifts (sea supply operations) are possible only four or five months a year, air transport must cover the invisible, and a single missing part can delay crucial work a whole year. Inuit communities, icy runways that require constant maintenance, satellite platforms and underwater cables make up a network in which any weak link puts the whole at risk.

Thus, if creatures such as musk ox and polar bears are found on the coast, behind the tracks and radars there are also human lives that depend punctual suppliesand errors like 1991 plane crash that cost lives in the approach to the Alert base remind that Arctic logistics is not a technical variable but a matter of survival.

Russian advantage and western window. Geographically, Moscow starts with objective advantages: the Kola Peninsula is home to the Northern Fleetnuclear systems launchable by Arctic routes and a depth of deployment that the West took decades to erode. However, the weakening of part of the Russian ground forces after the war in Ukraine has opened a window for allies to rebuild capabilities in the north. The question is whether to take advantage of it quickly and consistently.

Western allies face the task of recover strategic ground almost from scratch: the lessons learned in Afghanistan or the Sahel are not directly exportable to a region of polar darkness, snow storms and ice that makes even the best prepared ships creak. If these gaps are not closed, the russian advantage and/or the appearance of foreign actors They will make Western deterrence, more than a policy, an urgent technological requirement.

Hypersonics, sensors and more. The challenge is not only to be present, but detect and anticipate. The hypersonic missiles (unpredictable trajectories and speeds of at least Mach 5) put traditional radar networks in check, and have pushed Ottawa to commit 6 billion of Canadian dollars (in collaboration with Australia) to far horizon radars and Washington to accelerate space sensors that track ballistic and hypersonic vectors from orbit.

In other words: detection is a necessary condition to deter, and without early detection there is no response. The problem, they pointed out in the Journalis that technology is not the panacea: it requires logistics integration, data centers, resilient command posts and continuous maintenance that the polar climate makes prohibitively expensive if not planned for the long term.

Denmark on the front line. And on that board where the flags of China, Russia and the United States are already found, the recent decision of Copenhagen is inscribed: 8.7 billion dollars to increase the fleet from F-35 to 43 devices and 4.2 billion expressly dedicated to reinforcing Arctic security, with a joint headquarters in Nuuk, two new ships, maritime patrol vessels, surveillance aircraft and units in the polar territory.

Denmark mixes the purchase of American technology with the will to act as regional guarantordriven by both Allied pressure and the commotion caused for the idea (proclaimed by Trump in January) of “buy” Greenland. The package shows two things: the first, that European states are willing to spend considerable sums on advanced projection and detection systems. The second, that sovereignty and territorial presence have become in currency geopolitics, where the air force and naval capabilities are not only military but also diplomatic pieces.

Local sovereignty and criticism. Not only that. The extension of the military presence in Greenland does not occur in a vacuum. Local voices, represented by figures such as Aleqa Hammond, former Greenlandic Prime Minister, they reproach Copenhagen to decide without sufficiently consulting the 57,000 people on the island, remembering that militarization affects ways of life and resources shared.

Furthermore, the pressure on ecosystems fragile and the need to respect indigenous rights make it essential to combine security with listening and real compensation. If the Arctic is a strategic boardis also a home: decisions about bases, radars and icebreaker routes They must incorporate the social and environmental dimension or risk legitimizing internal tensions that erode any long-term military base.

Costs, industries and alliances. Plus: building a presence in the north is not just about buying fighters and installing radars. I remembered the BBC which requires shipyards to manufacture icebreakers, polar cargo ships, maintenance lines for icy runways, contracts held with operators and, above all, the political will to sustain recurring spending.

The NORAD modernizationcoordination between Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Nordic countries, and the incorporation of partners like Australia They form a coalition that seeks to close tactical and strategic gaps. An investment that should be accompanied of human training, specific cold doctrine and industrial adaptation: the logistics demand generated by Arctic security will provide work for polar transport companies, logistics companies and maintenance centers, now becoming a key part of the defensive scheme.

A decades-long operation. If you also want, the Nunalik metaphor teaches that big decisions in the Arctic crash or survive based on patience, foresight, and robust planning. The West is waking up, perhaps late, but not without resources: has technology, alliances and recent political capital to accelerate projects.

There remains, however, the test of sustaining these commitments when the public interest is diluted and the recurring costs are reflected in domestic budgets. Defending the Arctic requires not only radars and fighters, but organizational culturelogistics and a policy that combines deterrence, consultation with local populations and environmental protection.

Image | RawPixel, RawPixelUS Air Force, GRID-Arendal

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