May America return to “walk” bombers strategic actions against Venezuela gives shape to an idea: this is no longer a tactical whim, it is a military campaign that moves on a dangerous border between ambiguity and prelude of something of greater significance. Not only that: the presence in the air, sea and territorial periphery of a country without the capacity for military parity introduces a geopolitical message directed towards third partiesand places the region before an unprecedented scenario.
The visible phase. United States has done it again. Now they have been B-1 Lancer (long-range bombers, high payload and supersonic speed) from Dyess (Texas) to the outskirts of Venezuelawithout entering sovereign airspace but close enough to constitute an unequivocal signal of availability of remote fire.
These flights are added to previous demonstrations with B-52 and F-35B, and are part of a expanded deployment which includes eight warships, a submarine, P-8 maritime patrol, MQ-9 Reaper and a squadron of F-35s already advanced in the theater. The novelty is not the capacity but the frequency: what used to be an annual exercise has become a sustained cadence that Pentagon officials already hint will grow, under the operational argument of surveillance and destruction of boats, but with a clear transition potential to fixed targets ashore.
What the bombers reveal. Air traffic scans showed pairs of B-1 with BARB21/22 and nodal planes (KC-135 for replenishment, RC-135 ISR and a E-11A BACN) composing architecture of command, link and persistence typical of complex operations, not symbolic gestures.
The immediate precedent of the B-52 in the same areadescribed by the Department of Defense itself as a “demonstration of attack”, reinforces the reading that Washington is setting up an environment from which it will be able to strike from outside the Venezuelan tactical range without the need to preposition bombers in regional bases, exploiting the strategic autonomy of the heavy wing.
The E-11 BACN
The bridge and options. The campaign against suspicious vessels (with at least seven confirmed attacks on speedboats and a submersible since September) complies a double function: produces immediate kinetic effects and, at the same time, normalizes the use of lethal power without explicit congressional authorization on targets politically designated as “narco-targets.”
Trump openly declared that, once the maritime phase has been exhausted, the attacks could move to land against distribution or production facilities, and former USAF officers admit that the B-1 platform is ideal for that scenario. The Republican-dominated Congress has blocked attempts to limit presidential authority, and the line between war on cartels and strategic coercion of the regime has been blurred. deliberately blurred.
A B-52 and two F-35Bs seen flying together during the “bomber strike demonstration mission” last week
The background. Before reappearing heavy wing on the Caribbean, Washington had consumed three cycles without success: maximum sanctions, political negotiation and recognition of a parallel government. They all failed in dislodging Maduro, protected by a Cuban counterintelligence apparatus and armored by alignment with Russia, China and Iran.
The turn to military coercion (destroyers with Tomahawk, embarked special forces, ISR means and precision fire) replicates a repertoire with long and bumpy genealogy in Latin America, but here with a deliberately ambiguous purpose.
The Caribbean without law. The Pentagon has sunken vessels alleging narcoterrorism, with no specific congressional authority to equate cartels with al-Qaeda-type threats.
Trump came to contemplate blows on the ground that would produce high-impact viral images, but without a sure path to a stable political outcome: the available force (some 10,000 troops) is not enough for a conventional invasion, and a surgical assault to capture Maduro would entail catastrophic risks if it failed.
The limits and fragility. I remembered a few hours ago the financial times that the recent history of the United States in “nation-building” after the use of force is poorand in Venezuela the vacuum after a forced decapitation could be occupied by hard factions of the apparatus or consolidate Maduro himself if a failed operation gave him an alibi for deeper repression.
The legitimate opposition is fragmented or in exileand institutional continuity after a crash would be uncertain. The main weight of the warning lies not so much in the probability of an immediate attack as in the fact that, by declaring the war open to “narco-terrorists” and pointing to Maduro as one of them, the administration has crossed a line from which it is difficult to retreat without showing strength.
The strategy. If you want, the bomber flyover In the face of Venezuela, it functions as an element of psychological pressure, as an enabling infrastructure for a rapid kinetic leap, and as an extra-regional message to those who support the regime.
Until now, the legal elasticity of this “anti-drug” framework has served to go through it lining barriers to the use of force without declared war. Now, with the appearance of heavy wingWashington points out that coercion has left the discursive plane to settle in the closest thing to a real architecture of the theater.
Image | USA, USAF
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