how a relay in Gipuzkoa saved Europe while the Spanish system died of success
Next April 28 it will be exactly one year of the biggest collapse in our recent history: the great blackout that turned the Iberian Peninsula black and left 55 million people in Spain and Portugal without electricity supply for 12 hours. Almost twelve months later, we finally have the official autopsy. The final report. The European Network of Electricity Transmission System Operators (ENTSO-E) has made public the long-awaited final report. Throughout 472 pages, the panel of experts dissects an unprecedented event to the millisecond. The document, which warns from its preamble that it does not seek to assign legal responsibilities but rather to learn from mistakes, reveals a chilling diagnosis: the blackout was the perfect storm caused by the rigidity of new technologies, manual ineffectiveness in the face of a millisecond crisis and an infrastructure incapable of keeping pace with the energy transition. The anatomy of collapse. To understand the ruling, you have to look south. According to the European report, at 12:03 p.m. on April 28 a local vibration was recorded of 0.63 Hz caused by instability in the electronic converters of renewable plants. Minutes later, at 12:19, the swing was amplified, affecting the entire continent. Technical research points to what could be defined as “operational blindness.” The report notes that much of the renewable generation in Spain operated under a “fixed power factor.” That is, the solar and wind plants were blind to the needs of the grid; they could not absorb reactive energy dynamically. When the voltage rose, these plants were simply taken offline for safety. When they stopped generating electricity, their reactive absorption also suddenly stopped, causing a rebound effect that triggered the voltage in an uncontrolled manner. Furthermore, while the crisis required millisecond reflexes, the control of reactances (the machines that absorb excess voltage) was carried out manually. Operators needed vital minutes to assess the situation. The blackout that could have been avoided. The European report not only acts as a notary for what failed, but also puts on the table what should have happened. By diving into the technical simulations of the ENTSO-E document, sector experts such as Joaquín Coronado have drawn a devastating conclusion: The collapse of the Spanish electrical system was not inevitable, but the result of ineffective management of voltage control by the System Operator (Red Eléctrica). The European analysis is blunt. In his simulation of sensitivity (named Analysis 7), the report concludes that if the connection of the reactances – such as the Caparacena shunt reactor at 400 kV – had been automated instead of depending on the slow human factor, the voltage rise would have been limited and the cascade effect avoided. In addition, ENTSO-E simulates alternative scenarios that show that electrical zero would have been stopped cold with measures that should already be operational: an increase in reactive power margins, the requirement that conventional generators absorb more voltage, or the use of the eight new synchronous capacitors that were already planned in the 2021-2026 planning. Without this automated reactive power reserve or dynamic support, the network was orphaned at the worst possible moment. The rescue from Gipuzkoa. The continental disaster was avoided thanks to Gipuzkoa. At 12:33, the high voltage substation in the Osinaga neighborhood of Hernani detected that the Spanish chaos threatened to drag down all of Europe. In milliseconds, the protection relay out-of-step (out of step) decapitated the connection with the French Argia substation. This “shot” left Spain in the dark, but it shielded the continental network. Barely ten minutes later, Hernani became the rescue route, allowing France to inject energy to resurrect the peninsular system from top to bottom (Top-Down). The structural problem of the market. The targeting of clean energy in the moments before the blackout has raised eyebrows, but the sector defends itself by pointing directly to regulatory inaction. In an interview for XatakaHéctor de Lama, technical director of UNEF (the photovoltaic employers’ association), is blunt: “A plant, no matter how large, cannot cause a blackout. Many other factors must come together.” De Lama explains that the current inverters installed in Spain meet very high European technical requirements, but places the structural problem on the roof of the Ministry (MITECO) and the CNMC for not financially incentivizing renewables to provide security services to the grid. “The current remuneration of €1/MVArh is not enough to encourage renewables to provide this service (voltage control) when we are paying combined cycle plants between 100 and 200 times more for the same thing,” details De Lama. The UNEF expert also recalls a historical administrative negligence that took its toll on us on April 28: while Portugal approved regulations to take advantage of the voltage control of its renewables in 2019, Spain took years to implement vital mechanisms such as Operation Procedure 7.4. We were playing with the rules of the past in the face of a crisis of the future. “A gold mine without a road.” This diagnosis fits with the voices of the industry. During the VI Economic Forum of elDiario.esPatxi Calleja, director of regulation at Iberdrola Spain, defined the national system as “a gold mine without a road.” We have enormous cheap generation capacity, but the electricity grid is the great limitation due to lack of investment compared to our European neighbors. And this green shield also has cracks. As we already analyzed in Xatakathe very high renewable penetration shields us from geopolitical crises (such as the increase in gas prices due to the war in Iran) during daylight hours, plummeting prices to zero. However, as soon as the sun goes down, the lack of mass battery storage sends us back to square one, leaving us at the mercy of combined cycles and fossil volatility. The war without quarter. While technicians analyze the ENTSO-E simulations that point to operational failures, a fierce battle is being waged in the offices. The president of Redeia (parent company of Red Eléctrica), Beatriz Corredor, has used the Brussels report in her appearances in the Senate to entrench herself … Read more