For weeks, Allied commanders did not understand why their most advanced systems were unable to intercept all the projectiles falling on the cities. The surprise was enormous when they verified that, in full Gulf Warsome were enough few Scud missiles thrown irregularly to force deploy huge resources defensive forces and alter the pace of an entire military campaign.
The mathematics of missiles. After weeks of war, the confrontation in the Middle East It has ceased to be just a question of military capacity and has become a problem of specific inventories, with figures that condition any future decision.
CNN counted through the last CSIS analysis that the United States has already consumed about 45% of its Precision Strike Missileabout 50% of the THAAD interceptors and Patriot, in addition to approximately 30% of their Tomahawks and more than 20% of the JASSM. In other words, although these levels do not prevent continued operations in the short term, they do significantly reduce the ability to sustain another high-intensity conflict in parallel, especially against an adversary like Iran.
It’s not shooting, it’s replacing. The replacement of these systems introduces a clear boundary: annual production barely reaches about 100 Tomahawk units and less 500 JASSM-ERwhile interceptors like SM-3 or SM-6 They have even lower rhythms.
Even with contracts to expand production, the period to recover previous levels oscillates, according to the Pentagonbetween three and five years. In practice, this means that every current launch has a future strategic cost, because there is no quick way to replace it in the event of escalation.
Iran maintains the volume. Faced with this wear and tear, analysts from the Pentagon itself have assured that Iran preserves thousands of missiles ballistic and cruise, although many require reconditioning or have failures resulting from hasty modifications.
Plus: problems in aerodynamic stability, propellant wear or changes in guidance systems (such as the transition to BeiDou after GPS interference) have reduced accuracy in some cases. Even so, they said that the volume is still sufficient to maintain launch rates for weekswhich introduces a saturation factor that complicates any defense.
David Sling
Defenses to the limit. The impact of that pressure has already been seen in the intensive use of interceptorswith systems like David’s Sling o Arrow 3 operating near critical levels. In fact, several analysts said that, in some scenarios, the reserves would not allow a continuous defense to be sustained. beyond 72 to 96 hours without immediate replenishment.
It is not a trivial fact and, in fact, it would change the logic of the conflict, because even with advanced systems, a prolonged defense depends directly on the interceptor availabilitynot only its effectiveness.
Operational limitations if resumed. The data that handles Washington They talk about a scenario where, if the war were reactivated, the United States would have about 2,800 to 3,000 Tomahawk and little more than 400 long-range guided bombssupported by aircraft carriers and destroyers, but with clear restrictions after prior consumption.
For example, the use of less advanced munitions like the JDAM would imply greater exposure of aircraft to enemy defenses. In addition, logistical factors such as fuel arise here (with reduced European reserves around 20%) that would limit the duration of an intensive air campaign.
The strait as added pressure. In parallel, Iran is clearly demonstrating ability to challenge the blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, maintaining exports through oil tankers that avoid control by turning off transponders and indirect routes.
Despite interceptions and diversions of more than 28 vessels, dozens of cargo ships and oil tankers they have managed to crosswhich shows that maritime control is not absolute and that Tehran retains room for economic and strategic maneuver.
The great unknown. If you like, the result of all these factors is a scenario very different and disturbing for Washington, one where, after weeks mass consumptionthe United States enters a possible resumption with limited inventorieswhile Iran, despite its failures, continues to have sufficient volume to sustain throws.
There is no doubt, that at least partially reverses the usual logic, because the risk for the United States is no longer just what it can launch, but what Iran can still continue launching day after day in a second part of the war where the dictates the missiles can change name.
Image | National Museum of the US Navy, Naval Surface WarriorsUnited States Missile Defense Agency
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