Since the start of the full-scale invasion, the war in Ukraine has been a succession of adaptations forced, where each side has had to learn faster than the other to survive. What began as a bet on speed and political collapse led to a long conflicttechnical and increasingly ruthless, one in which the rules have changed as many times as the weapons on the field.
From wear to operational calculation. After almost four years of war, Ukraine has begun to accept that inflicting massive casualties like explained recently A minister, by himself, does not change the logic of the conflict. Russia has shown that it can absorb huge losses without modifying its strategy, while using drones and deep strikes to erode the Ukrainian rear, cut off supplies and psychologically break the troops holding the front.
This context has forced a rethinking from kyiv: the battlefield is no longer decided only on the line of contact, but in what happens dozens of kilometers behind, where commanders, drone operators and logistics routes support the Russian advance in slow motion.
The war of the rearguard. In open regions like Zaporizhzhia, the difference between resisting and giving ground comes down to the ability to deny the enemy freedom of movement in the rear. Russia has converted medium-range drones in your key weaponattacking Ukrainian roads, convoys and equipment before they even enter combat.
Ukraine, on the other hand, has depended for too long of death zones close to the front, betting on annihilating Russian infantry when it is too late to stop the general pressure. More and more Ukrainian commanders assume that, if it is not hit before to the system that fuels the assaults, war becomes a race of attrition impossible to win.
The window of opportunity. This change of mentality coincides with a series of blows that have disorganized the Russian army. Disconnection of terminals key communications and internal decisions that have limited its own coordination channels have created a temporary vacuum in enemy command and control.
Ukraine has read that weakness not as an occasion to launch local attacks, but as a strategic opportunity rare: for the first time in months, a large Russian formation appears exposed, dependent on fragile lines of communication and struggling to coordinate its defense in depth.
And not just any one.
The hunt for an army, not adding corpses. The plan that begins to take shape It goes far beyond “kill more or how many more.” The objective now is to encircle, isolate and destroy a specific and hitherto implacable formation of the Russian army, depriving it of reinforcements, ammunition and effective command until it becomes a a burden for Moscow instead of an offensive instrument.
Where? In the southeast of Ukraine, where movements indicate that kyiv tries to wrap to the 36th Russian Navybut not through a great armored advance, but with a constant pressure on their flanks, selective attacks on key nodes and a systematic denial of their rear. In other words, it is not a spectacular offensive, because the least important thing is the shots, but rather a prolonged and methodical hunt.
A risky but necessary position. There is no doubt, the shift involves risks more than obvious: for example, it demands more intelligence, more medium-range drones and even complex coordination at a time when Ukraine remains very limited by resources and irregular external support. But it also reflects a harsh and realistic conclusion: as long as Russia can rotate units and replenish men, the casualty accounting does not decide the war.
Only the destruction of formations entire, unable to withdraw or reorganize, may alter the operational balance and, with it, Ukraine’s position both on the front and in any future negotiations. In that sense, what is underway is not just another offensive, but an attempt to change the rules of the game on the ground.
Image | RawPixel
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