Since the Cold War, the United States has not only exported weapons, but also forms of control over how, when and what they are used for. For decades, that oversight was exercised through licensing, maintenance and parts supply. Today, in the era of software and network warfare, that logic has changed scale: control is no longer just in the hangar or in the contract, but embedded in the system itself.
With the F-35, for the first time, that old question is no longer theoretical.
The controversy. Just like has stated the Dutch defense minister, the F-35’s “computing brain,” including its cloud components, can be hacked to accept third-party software updates, much like jailbreaking an iPhone.
“If, despite everything, you still want to update, I’m going to say something that I should never say, but I’ll do it anyway: you can jailbreak an F-35 like you would jailbreak an iPhone,” Gijs Tuinman said verbatim during an episode from the podcast “Boekestijn en de Wijk” by BNR Nieuwsradio.
A fighter and more things. The statement by the Dutch Defense Minister that the F-35 can be “released” as a rover does not reveal so much a technical secret as a strategic discomfort that has been latent for years among the allies. The airplane is not just an aerial platform, but a deeply integrated system in a digital, logistical and doctrinal architecture designed in the United States, where software, mission data, maintenance and spare parts supply form an inseparable whole.
In this context, talking about “jailbreak” does not describe a real solution, but rather the expression of a limit: the recognition that operational sovereignty over the F-35 is conditioned from its design and that any attempt to break that dependency is, in itself, a sign of political crisis more than a viable technical option.
Why “releasing” an F-35 is a fear. For Washington’s allies, the fear is not that the fighter cannot be released, but rather that it could be. If it is accepted that the software can be broken, it is assumed that American control over the system is not only contractual, but structuraland that maintaining it depends on political trust between allies.
The F-35 lives connected to networks as ALIS and his successor ODINwhich not only update the aircraft, but also load the mission data packages that make its combat survival possible: calculated routes, enemy defense bubbles, sensor fusion and shared tactics. “Releasing” the plane would mean cut that central arterybut also lose what makes it a decisive tool.
The dilemma. For Washington, the mere possibility of an ally operating the system outside of that ecosystem poses risks of technological security and use not aligned with its interests.
For their part, for the allies, the dilemma is even more uncomfortable: either they accept a permanent dependency, or they risk being left with a technically advanced fighter, but operationally amputated, without data, without support and without a future.
A member of the US Air Force uses a laptop to review ALIS system maintenance data
The Israeli exception. Israel is the anomaly which confirms the rule. It is the only operator that has negotiated integrate own softwareoperate largely outside of ALIS/ODIN and maintain their F-35s with industrial autonomy. This exception is not replicable for the rest because it responds to a unique strategic relationship, built over decades and based on a level of trust and alignment that does not exist with other partners.
For European countries like the Netherlands, any real “liberation” would imply not only enormous technical capabilities, but assuming a head-on crash with the manufacturer and the US Government, with immediate consequences in spare parts, maintenance and logistical support. The result would be paradoxical: a freed F-35 that would quickly end up immobilized, not by a digital blockade, but by the suffocation of its supply chain.
The myth of the button and the reason of Spain. This is where, indirectly, the controversy ends up agreeing with Spain in his historical skepticism about the famous off “button”. No secret switch or hidden kill switch is needed to neutralize an F-35 in the hands of an ally with whom relations are broken.
Control is not in remote command, but in everyday dependence on validated software, mission data, certified maintenance and critical parts. Spain always maintained that the problem was not a magic button, but something more deep and less visible: the dependency architecture. The Dutch statements They reinforce that idea, because they implicitly admit that, although the plane can continue flying, its real military value quickly degrades if it is disconnected from the ecosystem that feeds it.
A symptom of a relationship that is strained. Ultimately, talking about “jailbreak” is talking about directly from distrust. As far as is known, no country is seriously considering releasing an F-35 while the relationship with Washington works, because the system is designed to operate in a network, not in isolation.
But the fact that this debate resurfaces now does not seem trivial, and reflects a geopolitical context rougherwith allies who are beginning to wonder what happens if the political umbrella folds. The F-35 remains, as even its critics acknowledge, an extraordinary fighter in its current state. But it is also proof that modern technological superiority is not bought with airplanes alone, but with a tacit acceptance of strategic dependence. And when that dependency begins to bother, the problem is no longer (only) technical: It’s political.
Image | Robert SullivanUSAF
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