For 150 aircraft to bomb Venezuela, the US used one of the most lethal tactics of the war: gunboat diplomacy

Long before the hundreds of aircraft, missiles, drones and special forces came into play, the United States had already begun to move pieces throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. While international attention was focused on Venezuela, Washington was weaving an accelerated network of military agreements with Paraguay, Ecuador, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and other countries in the region, expanding access to airports, deploying troops “temporary” and authorizing operations armed under the umbrella of a renewed “war on drugs.”

The tactic, in fact, was born in the 19th century.

An escalation announced. It we count before the end of last year: the timing and magnitude of these pacts they did not go unnoticed for analysts, who interpreted them as the deliberate creation of a regional logistics infrastructure capable of sustaining a prolonged military operation against Caracas.

Under a rhetoric that mixed drug trafficking, hemispheric security and regional stability, the real objective seemed much more classic: to surround Venezuela, isolate it diplomatically and make it clear that US military power was not only willing, but physically prepared to intervene. In this context, Caracas’ warnings to its neighbors and the growing concern in Latin American capitals reflected a familiar feeling: that of once again being the “backyard” of a power that did not ask for permission.

The qualitative leap. The point of no return has arrived with the military operation which culminated in the capture of Nicolás Maduro and his wife in Caracas. From Mar-a-Lago, Trump not only celebrated the audacity and violence of the operation, but also verbalized something even more significant: the United States was not simply overthrowing a leader, but was arrogating to itself the right to “direct” Venezuela for an indefinite period, dictating key political and economic decisions and recovering, according to his own storythe control of oil resources that he considered “stolen” from American companies.

The rhetoric carefully avoided words like occupation, but while the word “democracy” has not once left Washington, “oil” has been repeated dozens of times, so the substance was hard to hide: a tutelage imposed under threat of a military “second wave” if the new power did not obey. The image of an armada off the coast, ready to intimidate both Caracas and other governments in the region, marked the explicit return to a logic that many believed buried after Iraq and Afghanistan.

Gunboat diplomacy. Also called gunboat diplomacywas born in the 19th century as a brutally direct form of foreign policy: sending warships off the coasts of weaker countries to force political concessionscommercial or territorial without the need for a formal war. Powers such as the United Kingdom, France and the United States used it systematically in Asia, Africa and Latin America, turning the mere naval presence into an instrument of coercion.

In the American case, this doctrine was intertwined with the Monroe Doctrine and his later reinterpretationlegitimizing military interventions, temporary occupations and regime changes under the premise of protecting national interests in the Western Hemisphere. If you want and from that perspective, the attack on Venezuela is not a historical anomaly, but a technological update of that same pattern: where before there were gunboats, today there are aircraft carriersdrones, special forces and economic sanctions, but the logic is identical. Military force does not act as a last resort, but as a political message itself, designed to discipline a particular government and warn all others.

An echo of interventions and their consequences. Latin American history is full of examples that help contextualize this movement. From the war with Mexico in the 19th century until the Banana Wars of the 20th, passing through the supported coups d’état During the Cold War, the United States has intervened dozens of times to shape like-minded governments or curb rival influences. Trump himself has claimed figures as William McKinleya symbol of an era in which territorial expansion and access to resources were considered legitimate expressions of national power.

But they remembered yesterday in the New York Times that these interventions rarely produced lasting stability. They often left fractured societies, legitimized dictatorships and deeply damaged the American reputation, a legacy that strategic rivals today exploit. like china to present themselves as less intrusive (although not necessarily more benign) alternatives.

The perfect operation and the subsequent vacuum. From a military point of view, Maduro’s capture was a demonstration extreme precision: months of surveillance, an exact replica of the target to rehearse the assault, selective blackoutscoordinated airstrikes and special forces breaking into the heart of Caracas in the middle of the night. But the tactical success contrasts with the strategic uncertainty which opens later.

Who will really govern Venezuela? How will your armed forces react? What happens if a future election contradicts Washington’s interests? There is no doubt, these questions evoke familiar ghosts of “eternal wars” and covert occupationsexactly what Trump had promised to fight against. Hence that “gunboat diplomacy”no matter how modernized it is, continues to suffer from the same problem as it did more than a century ago: it is effective at imposing fait accompli, but terrible at managing long term consequences.

The past with weapons of the future. Thus, the attack on Venezuela does not represent a doctrinal innovation, but rather a conscious return to an ancient way to exercise powercovered with 21st century technology. Instead of multilateral negotiations or classic diplomatic pressure, the United States has opted for a direct show of force, combining capture of leaders, control of resources and an intimidating military presence throughout the region above any international law.

It is, in essence, the gunboat diplomacy elevated to an industrial scale: faster, more precise and media-intensive, but equally fraught with risks. History suggests that its effects will not be measured in days or weeks, but in decadesand that Latin America, once again, will be the stage where it is tested if the past can really be reused without paying an even higher price.

Image | White House, United States Department of Defense

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