The satellite images left no room for doubt: the United States has been adding pieces in the southern Caribbean until it forms the closest thing to a military army prepared for an attack against Venezuela, it remains to be seen on what scale and if that is really Washington’s idea. And in the face of this artillery, the greatest threat to American warships lies in the Venezuelan Air Force.
To be more exact, in one of their fighters and their missile.
Supersonic capability. The presence of Russian supersonic anti-ship missiles Kh-31A in the hands of Venezuela, integrated into their Soviet fighters Su-30MK2V of the Bolivarian Military Aviation, turns the Venezuelan coast into a high-risk environment for US ships that today operate at very short distances.
The missile, conceived by the USSR to pierce Western air defenses and later adapted to anti-ship penetration rolescombines low flight over the sea, active tracking guidance before or after launch, terminal maneuvers of up to 15 G and a penetration warhead that detonates after passing through the side of the hull, making it difficult to intercept when the ship is within its short warning zone. The very fact that the US Navy purchased units to convert them into targets MA-31 to test its defenses illustrates that, although it is not cutting-edge technology, it is a system whose lethality is taken very seriously.
Launching platform. Venezuela has of 21 fighters Su-30 Flanker in service, has advertised early warning exercises with Kh-31 off the coast and has spread images of armed flights with the clear intention of signaling their denial capacity to Washington.
Although it is not certain that the Kh-31P anti-radiation variant will be available in significant quantities, it could be used de facto against naval radars. Close-range encounters (even with Venezuelan F-16s approaching to US ships) show that, in an improvised incident, fighters could be placed within the launch envelope before being detected or deterred.
Promotional image of a Kh 31
Physics, distance and reaction. The profile of Kh-31A missile (initial acceleration by rocket to Mach 1.8 and transition to Mach 3.5 at high altitude or Mach 1.8 at sea level) drastically reduces the defense reaction time, especially when the ship is close to the coast, with a shortened radar horizon and degraded early warning.
The employment envelope (the three-dimensional zone in which the missile can be launched, fly and reach its target, encompassing variables such as range, altitude and speed), means that an approaching armed aircraft without being ejected from the zone can place missiles in flight before the ship completes its defense cycle.
Comparison of arsenals. They counted the TWZ analysts than the rest of the Venezuelan anti-ship arsenal (Otomat Mk 2 on a frigate Marshal Sucreaged versions in Constitution boatsmissiles Sea Killer in helicopters and Iranian CM-90s) is sub-sonic, of doubtful availability and much inferior in penetration and probability of impact compared to modern defenses.
In practice, the only vector that alters the American calculation is that Su-30/Kh-31 pairing: is sufficiently fast, sufficiently provided, and sufficiently close to impose significant risk.
Missile infographic
United States position. It we counted yesterday. The American deployment (ARG/MEU Iwo Jima, Arleigh Burke destroyersa cruise Ticonderoga and the special operations ship Ocean Trader) is in itself a coercive message designed to project the capacity for punishment or specific assault from international waters.
However, this same deployment creates specific vulnerabilities: the Ocean Trader lacks organic defense and has operated very close to the coast. A successful attack, even isolated, would have far-reaching strategic and political consequences, turning a limited clash into cause for war. The Pentagon has reinforced kinetic and electronic warfare subsystems (including Burkes ahead of Rota to operate under threat of cruise missiles), but the speed and proximity of the theater mean that the risk is far from theoretical.
The logic of last resort. While a direct Venezuelan attack would almost certainly amount to an open war with the United States, the variables that could make it imaginable exist: a regime collapse scenario, an outbreak of operational error in a close air encounter, or a misattributed US covert operation could precipitate “last resort” decisions from Caracas.
Precisely because the probability of something like this happening is low but the expected damage if it occurs is extreme, the US Navy treats the Kh-31 as a priority threat of active management, not as technological waste.
Implications. The mere presence of a supersonic missile of denial in the hands of a sanctioned State amplifies political pressure: it forces the United States to assume more heavy (cruises as escort, separation cordons, additional ISR), makes persistent operations more expensive and raises the threshold for intervention.
The tactical result (a reaction window of seconds) translates into a strategic effect: Venezuela has a de facto veto on the degree of safe intrusion of American ships, if you will, a kind of chip of negotiation that Caracas has already turned into a public message with its armed flights at short distance.
Image | NavyRosoboronexport, Boeing
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