Europe lives a strategic transformation that few had imagined possible in such a short time. What began as a series of “flats” (intermittent blackouts, suspicious fires, minor incursions) has become a coherent pattern: a campaign of directed hybrid war that is no longer limited to destabilizing, but rather deliberately explore the thresholds of what it can inflict without provoking a direct military response.
It all started a year ago.
The silent climb. The plot is explained more clearly from July 2024when several DHL packages exploded in centers logistics from the United Kingdom, Poland and Germany, devices powerful enough to shoot down a plane if they had detonated in mid-flight.
The episode, an infiltrated bomb at the heart of the European air system, marked a before and after, because it showed to what extent Moscow was willing to strain continental security and because it exposed the fragility of an Old Continent trapped between an increasingly aggressive Russia and a United States whose commitment has stopped being reliableand. Since then, Europe no longer sees hybrid warfare as a peripheral nuisance, but as a structural threat which targets critical infrastructures, social cohesion and the European institutional framework itself.
The Russian laboratory. I counted this week the financial times that the Russian campaign has been refined in breadth and depth. European intelligence services have disabled plots to derail trains full of passengers, set fire to shopping malls, damage dams or contaminate water in urban areas. The attacks are not isolated improvisations: they respond to a “gig economy” model of sabotage in which young recruited by Telegramlocal criminals or foreigners with residence permits act as expendable pawns for unknown objectives.
Plus: they are difficult to detect, impossible to anticipate and legally ambiguous, since they rarely there is a direct connection with Russian intelligence that allows them to be accused of espionage. The case of frustrated railway sabotage in Poland (an explosive planted on the Warsaw-Lublin line that came within seconds of causing a massacre) exposed that pattern in its clearest form: unimpeded entry and exit, cryptocurrency financingfalse identities issued by Moscow and a diffuse chain of command that leads to intermediaries as Mikhail Mirgorodsky or even networks managed by former Wagner members.
And there is more. Yes, because each cell discovered suggests others not yet detected, and what is worrying is not the errors of saboteurs (sometimes incapable to delete videos of its own attacks) but the scale that this model offers to a Russia resentful of decades of diplomatic expulsions and doctrinally rearmed to a pre-war period.
The doctrine that returns. The ISS analysts They recently reported that the archives of the KGB and the StB (Czechoslovak intelligence) reveal parallels disturbing differences between the sabotage manuals of the Cold War and what Europe witnesses today. The objectives listed decades ago (military bases, energy infrastructures, dams, communication systems, transportation) match almost exactly with the whites of the last two years.
Equally revealing is the doctrinal sequencing: during times of peace, minor attacks with the appearance of accidents, in pre-war phases, massive sabotage, increased risk tolerated and increasing willingness to cause civilian casualties, and in open war, total activation of clandestine networks for lethal operations.
The prelude to something more fat. It we count very recently. If you will, Europe seems to have entered fully into a intermediate stage: a pre-war phase where each incident also functions as offensive reconnaissance, a permanent exercise by razvedka boyem to measure Western reaction capacity, locate vulnerabilities and exploit any weaknesses.
The episode of the unidentified drones airports and military bases European operations illustrate this dynamic: cheap raids, of uncertain origin, that revealed systemic failures in the continental air defense and that, due to their replicator effect (copies, jokes, hysteria, false alarms) multiply the psychological and financial wear and tear.
A continent without a network. I remembered the new york times This morning an added problem for Europe: that if the Russian threat escalates, the other half of the problem is the growing disconnection with the United States. For the first time since 1945, Europe perceives that Washington is not unequivocally on your side in a matter of war and peace. The Trump administration is not only pressuring kyiv to accept an agreement In Moscow’s terms, it also redefines Europe as a suspicious actor, criticizes the democratic integrity of its governments and promises to openly support the European extreme right.
The result is an unprecedented scenario: a Russia that intensifies its hybrid campaign, a Ukraine that depends almost entirely on continental support and a Europe that must finance your own safety while compensating for the withdrawal of US capabilities (satellites, long-range missiles, command and control) that it cannot replace before 2029the year that NATO considers the limit to have a credible deterrent. European leaders also face depleted budgets, electorates hostile to increased military spending, and a rising far-right that Moscow sees as a strategic multiplier.
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The battle of money. The internal European debate on how to finance the resistance Ukrainian reflects the magnitude of the challenge. To support kyiv for the next two years, about $200 billion is needed, an unaffordable figure without activating the 210,000 million euros on Russian assets frozen in Europe.
The problem? Right now it takes the name of Belgiumwhich guards the majority through Euroclear, and which fears retaliation from Moscow and the possible erosion of the credibility of the euro as a safe haven. Washington, despite its strategic ambiguity, is also pressing for these funds to be don’t touch each othersince its eventual return is part of the US scheme for a peace agreement favorable to Russia.
One more thing. And yet, without that money, Europe would have to coordinate (outside the EU framework) a colossal loan and politically explosive. The crossroads are so profound that in Berlin and Paris they are beginning to admit that this decision will determine whether Europe continues to be a relevant geopolitical actor or whether it becomes “other people’s toy.”
Forced to wake up. European commanders recognize that, even without Trump, the continental defense architecture should change: Europe must prepare to fight alone, because it may have no choice. And so everything, the bill it would be huge: more military spending, new recruitment systems, accelerated war reindustrialization and a social consensus that does not yet exist.
The paradox is that Europe sees Ukraine as its line of defense and at the same time does not fully assume what it means to support it. Without real economic pressure on Moscow, without solid security guarantees for an eventual agreement, without political will to take on greater risks (such as warns Anna Wieslanderfrom the Atlantic Council) the future price will be higher or, perhaps, intolerable.
Perhaps for this reason, the question no longer seems to be whether Europe is being attacked, but rather whether it is willing to assume what it means to defend itself. Because, as they warn the analysts themselveswhen a pattern moves and acts like an attack, it doesn’t look like it, it is.
Image | 7th Army Training Command, RawPixel, II
In Xataka | Europe faces a question it can no longer avoid: how to respond to a war that is rarely declared
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was originally published in
Xataka
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Miguel Jorge
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