A kilometer report could be made with the different analysis that has led out Ukrainian intelligence when a Russian artifact has been found. The drones have revealed on numerous occasions that, in war, international sanctions they don’t work of great deal. And not just drones, even in the tanks. Now, and after the brutal Russian offensive last Sunday, Ukraine has once again dissected the enemy.
The surprise at this point is no longer “who,” but “how much.”
The fragility of chains. one night of massive attack exhibited, with crude clarity, a paradox that has been brewing for some time in modern war: the destructive capacity of a State that declares itself sanctioned and isolated continues to depend (and to a large extent prosper thank you) to the circuits, chips and parts that circulate in civilian markets and manufacturers around the world.
In the night assault that combined 496 attack drones and 53 missilesthe Ukrainian authorities counted 102,785 components of foreign origin embedded in the munitions and devices that tore the country’s sky; Of them, around 100,688 were on drones (among them about 250 powerful replicas of the Shahed type) and the rest distributed in Iskander (about 1,500), Kinzhal (192) and Kalibr (405). Zelensky has said That Ukraine does not only intend to point out culprits: it is a forensic exercise that reveals how everything, from a converter to a microcontroller, ends up accelerating the aggressor’s ability to persist.
What and from where. The identified components cover parts that the civil industry mass produces: converters (analog and power), sensors, analog-digital converters, microelectronics and microcomputers, which, according to kyivcome from companies located in the United States, United Kingdom, China, Taiwan, Germany, Switzerland, Japan, Korea and the Netherlands.
Ukraine has pointed out concrete examplessuch as British microcomputers for flight control, Swiss microcontrollers, German connectors, and has stressed that the greatest diversity and volume comes from from China and Taiwanwhich explains why, even when the most advanced parts are restricted, technological proliferation keep feeding arsenals.
Sanctions, double use and illusion. The figures and traceability reveal the essential limitation of sanctions: the international export control regime collides with complex global chainsintermediary agents and pieces cataloged as “dual use” that circulate through civil markets and logistics centers that do not ask about the final destination.
The compliance standards of companies and state controls are necessary but insufficient regarding re-exports, transshipments and suppliers that serve to non-military sectors. Furthermore, even large corporations do not have absolute visibility over the useful life and final destination of each component. The practical consequence is a war economy that thrives on the tenuous border between the legal and the hidden, between licit manufacturing and war use.
Politics and geostrategy. If you also want, the ukrainian reaction It is political and operational: beyond reporting, kyiv transfers the data of the pieces and their origins to its partners to pressure for concrete measures. Zelensky demands to close “now” the flows of critical components and proposes additional restrictions, from boarding controls to logistical blockades.
Experts from Ukraine itself they claim a coordinated decision at G7 level that addresses implementation gaps and harmonizes checklists, due diligence procedures and interdiction measures in ports and trade routes. Vladyslav Vlasiuk and other sanctions officials they underline that without systemic and synchronized action (inspections, conditional cargo insurance, monitoring of re-exports) the prohibitions would remain on paper.
Industrial and ethical implications. It we have commented other times. The phenomenon also raises a question moral and practical for the industry: to what extent should a company assume responsibility for the end use of its products and what investments does this require in traceability, auditing and third-party controls.
The technical answers there are (tracking servers, controlled party lists, customer integrity certifications), but they have costs that, in practice, fragment markets and raise prices. For allied governments, the solution is to tighten controls without suffocating critical civil chains. For the firms, for redoubling diligence and collaborating with the authorities.
Industrialized war. In military terms, the availability of these components speed up production mass of drones and missiles, reduces manufacturing times and makes it more difficult to dismantle a threat that finds pieces in the global economy.
The continuous waves of attacks that damage infrastructure civilians and kill or wound to non-combatants They demonstrate that pieces are not mere objects: they are damage multipliers. For Ukraine, the battle over sanctions It is, therefore, another front line, and its success depends both on the diplomatic and legal effectiveness of its allies and on the technical capacity to track and block logistical routes.
Technological containment. They remembered the analysts at Insider that closing the gaps requires mixing diplomacy, intelligence and regulation: harmonizing control lists, coordinating port inspections, conditioning insurance and logistics services, and building international standards on industrial traceability.
It also implies strengthening national capacities for alternative production (relocation of critical chains) and reducing dependence on strategic components in jurisdictions with less export control. However, no isolated measure will be enough: experience shows that flows adapt very quickly. That’s why Ukraine ask and need a G7 outreach strategy that combines smart sanctions, pressure on intermediaries, and a clear map of risks and responsibilities.
An uncomfortable diagnosis. The verification of those more than 100,000 foreign components in a single attack is a clear photograph of how technological globalization has reconfigured conflicts: now the vulnerabilities are no longer just ammunition depots or bases, but supply networks, commercial contracts and neutral ports.
The lesson for “friendly” governments of Ukraine is twofold: suppressing supplies is as important as supplying defenses, and for companiesacting responsibly is not only ethics, but collective security. In the end, the question this episode raises is not just technical (how to cut off that supply chain) but politics and morals: to what extent industrial prosperity can be sustained without control rules and without effective mechanisms that prevent a seemingly innocuous chip from ending up igniting large-scale violence.
Image | National Guard of Ukraine
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