Ukrainian troops need something much simpler and more urgent than Tomahawks missiles: cheap cars

The month of October began with a trip from Ukraine to the United States and a very specific goal: Tomahawks. The request was as simple as it was dangerous: kyiv requested Washington’s long-range missile to counter Moscow’s attacks. The problem was that this implied crossing a red line that could raise the Russian war escalation. In the end there will be no Tomahawksat least for now, and the truth is that the Ukrainian army has other priorities right now.

The visible and the decisive. He told in an extensive report the kyiv Independent that, in Western public debate, the war is projected around long range missileslegislative packages and iconic systemsbut at the level where the war decides the pace (the axes of infiltration, fine logistics and human replenishment) Ukraine is losing because of elementary things.

Namely: cars that last only two weeks, drones that are lost faster than they are replaced, and units that are emptied of men before they are emptied of ammunition. In that tactical layer, the tomahawk It does not resolve that a company that must simultaneously transport personnel, food and ammunition has only one vehicle and must choose what to sacrifice each day.

The priority: cars. The anecdote of the recruit Ihor in the middle summarized The pattern: three consecutive FPVs against the same vehicle until it is immobilized. The average life of a car in the front is about a monthsometimes two weeks, and each destruction not only takes away mobility but also room for maneuver: without redundancy, each rotation forces us to stretch positions and that exhausts men faster than the ammunition itself.

That’s why what they ask they are carsas cheap as possible, but that work. Hence the heavy armor are not a solution (They become priority targets and are less agile than, for example, an old car that accelerates and disappears). In short, what is needed is not weight but number to absorb losses without collapsing the logistics cycle.

Drones and sensors. Ukraine uses the order of 9,000 drones a daywith a devastating impact at low cost, but also loses at an industrial rate by electronic warfare and operational consumption. Without enough reconnaissance drones, the “line of sight” contracts to five kilometers and they are left blind to disrupting Russian flows.

Some units have a surplus, but others lack the basics: the deficit is not only volume but of distributionand the structural deficiency is not being absorbed by the State but by decreasing donations and the pockets of the troops.

Without spare part. The biggest deficiency is, of course, human: hardened brigades that are not refilled, rotations that do not rotate, training centers without means that even train with stones instead of real grenades.

Mobilization is politically taboo. The national media recalled that 30% of those mobilized He is not fit and part of the rest are returns from absentees. Thus, even when there is a drone and platform, the pilot is missing. Russia, on the other hand, replenishes its human mass every month. Ukraine stretches the same bodies more weeks under greater drone saturation, and structural fatigue is cumulative and irreversible.

System fails. If you also want, the photograph does not describe an army without technology but rather a system with “holes” in its redundancy layer: where there should be five vehicles there is oneand where there should be ten drones per section there is one too, and where there should be a wave of trained reserves arrives a tiny fraction.

Plus: where the same men should be relieved every certain cycle, they are kept for months due to lack of substitutes. That is the plane where continuity is resolved: without those cars that are requested, without density of eyes in the air and without competent human replenishment, each meter becomes more expensive than each missile.

Trivial lack. It ended media report emphasizing an idea. It is not that the Tomahawk don’t matter (they matter for the purposes of depth and possible future negotiation), is that its strategic effect is diluted if the lower network that supports the line is detached due to cheap shortcomings.

Victory today is less like who introduces a miraculous system first than who can continue to move people, food, ammunition and sensors until the last kilometer without breaking the human machine that executes it. Therefore, for those in the trenches, the priority is not the long-range missile that will appear on the front page of all the media, but rather the unglamorous resources that keep alive the ability to continue fighting the next day.

Starting with a car that simply works.

Image | Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Pexels

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