The terror of wars was always stepping on a mine. In Ukraine they carry scissors, because the panic is thinner: a spider web

In May we count that an unexpected weapon had begun to be added among the Ukrainian troops: scissors. Given the brutality of the conflict, a technology had sneaked in to evade electronic warfare and enter the enemy camp on both sides as he had not done before: destroying the lines, making attacks invisible and evading any attempt at interference. Now, the tangle of cables has intensified.

A deadly web. In 2025, the Ukrainian front is no longer understood without a sky and ground crossed by thousands of drones and by kilometers of optical cable that transform the land into a physical and tactical tangle. What started as a technological revolution to compensate for human shortcomings has evolved into an industrialized war in which each innovation immediately generates a counter-innovation, and where Ukraine, which for years led the initiative, now faces a scenario in which Russia obtains a sustained advantage.

Fiber optic drones (invulnerable to electronic shielding) have colonized trenches, roads and wooded areas, leaving visible and invisible networks that slow down every movement and that, in the middle of the night, they get confused with real traps. Narratives from units like the Ukrainian Rangers show a landscape in which advancing is as dangerous as retreating: cables hanging from trees, entrenched in mud, or accidentally attached to weapons and vehicles after each mission.

There is no “safe zone.” The great transformation is not in territorial advances, but in the Russian ability to hit supply lines tens of km from the front. What yesterday was a rearguard today is a vulnerable gray zoneand what once required manned aviation is now accomplished by swarms of small, remotely guided vehicles.

The explosions that convoys have reached on theoretically protected roads confirm that Moscow has given absolute priority to the war of attrition: attacking where it hurts most, preventing rotations, exhausting Ukrainian drone pilots and forcing brigades to walk dozens of kilometers on foot to avoid detection. This logistical pressure not only undermines military resistance, but also alters the political balance: a country that loses strategic depth also loses negotiating capacity.

The Rubikon unit. It we have counted before. The appearance of Rubikon, the elite unit that reorganized Russian doctrine after the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk, marks a before and after. Recruiting the best pilots, integrating optical drones, FPV and “mother” platforms like the Molniya, they exported a lethal model to the Donbas: attack supply before infantry, eliminate enemy pilots before riflemen, destroy capabilities before positions.

Its success lies less in technology than on the scale: Russia produces more, deploys more and lets China nurture its fiber optic industry without limits. In Pokrovsk (the crudest laboratory of this mutation) Ukrainian soldiers calculate that Russian drones surpass them in a ratio of 10 to 1. The city, turned into a puzzle of ruins where the front line changes every few hours, exemplifies how tactical air dominance has become the decisive factor in controlling the terrain.

The Ukrainian crisis. Ukraine continues to cause severe damage in the final strip before the front, where traditional FPVs remain lethal. But the rest of the board has leaned against her: a shortage of optical cables, pilots forced to launch from ever greater distances, disrupted logistics chains and a military industry struggling to produce what Russia receives on an industrial scale.

Some controls they insist in which the strategic error is to prioritize the destruction of Russian infantry instead of replicating the Rubikon model: hunt down the operators, saturate the logistics nodes and act in depth. However, any solution requires resources that Ukraine does not have and that its allies provide too slowly. Chinese fiber optics, the officers point outis tipping the balance with more weight than many Western diplomatic decisions.

Between swarms and cables. The conclusion is disturbing: war no longer depends so much on territorial advances as on who controls the drone ecosystem, who has more operational pilotswho can saturate the most kilometers of enemy rear and who turns rival logistics into a prohibited zone. The front, turned into a spider web physically by wires and digitally webed by unmanned swarms, is being redefined at a speed that Ukraine struggles to match.

If kyiv does not regain the technological initiative and achieve a steady supply of optical capabilities and long-range platforms, 2026 could be the first year in which Russia’s structural advantage in drones not only complicates Ukrainian offensives, but seriously limits its ability to sustain current defenses.

Image | reddit

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