descent

In the most advanced missile defense systems, each interception can cost millions of dollars and requires seconds of decision perfectly coordinated. It turns out that these systems were designed under a key assumption: that each threat would be identifiable, unique and treatable as a single objective. Iran has found a “hole.” Multiply a missile. In the last weeks of war, Iran has found a gap in the “millionaire” shield of Israel: convert a missile into everything a “rain” of threats in the middle of the descent, in a matter of seconds and just at the moment when the defensive systems have less room to react. The key is not to launch more missiles, but to change their nature at the critical moment, transforming a single interceptable target in dozens of submunitions that fall at high speed over large areas. It is a subtle but decisive change, because it breaks the logic on which anti-missile defenses are designed: detect, track and destroy a single target before impact. The “rain” that overflows the system. The analysts counted in The Guardian that Iranian cluster warheads release between several dozen and up to nearly a hundred submunitions at high altitude, dispersing them over areas that can span dozens of kilometers. At that point, the system stops dealing with a missile and starts dealing with multiple simultaneous threatsFurthermore, each one with a different trajectory and impact point. The result is an instant saturation where what was a controllable problem becomes a chaotic scenario where the defense must decide in seconds. what to intercept and what notknowing that it can’t cover everything. Chart providing an overview of the typical trajectory of a ballistic missile compared to other missiles and hypersonic boosted glide models The structural failure. The success of this tactic lies in exploiting a fundamental limitation: the systems like David’s Sling or even the iron dome They are optimized to intercept before dispersal, not after. If the missile is not destroyed in high phases (especially in the middle phase outside the atmosphere), the window of opportunity closes quickly. Once the submunitions are released, intercepting them individually is, in practice, unfeasible even for the world’s most advanced defensive networks. The invisible cost. Beyond the physical impact, the Iranian strategy introduces a problem economic and logistic. Intercepting a missile is already very costly, and trying to neutralize dozens of submunitions it is much moreto the point that the exchange stops making sense for the defender. Each attack requires interceptors to be expended expensive and limited against much cheaper threats, progressively eroding arsenals. Thus, even when most attacks are intercepted, the simple act of forcing defense already fulfills a strategic objective. Less missiles, more effect. Paradoxically, Iran does not need to launch large salvos to maintain the pressure. The reason: its current doctrine aims to combine moderate volumes with amplified effects, relying on hard-to-locate mobile launchers and a decentralized command structure designed to survive intensive bombing. This allows you to sustain constant attacks, even if they are few, but with the ability to impact specific objectives and keep Israeli defenses active continuously, forcing them to react again and again. A preview of the war to come. As we have been seeing in Ukraine and since the beginning of the war in the Middle East, what is happening with Iran’s missiles It is not just a tactical adaptation, but a preview of how can they evolve high intensity conflicts. Turn a single system into multiple threats, saturate advanced defenses and wear down the adversary without need for numerical superiority redefines the balance between attack and defense. And if this logic is extended (and everything indicates that other actors are watching it closely), current anti-missile systems could face a challenge for which they were not designed: not stopping missiles, but stopping real storms of explosives. Image | Yoav Keren In Xataka | The US is going to end its war in the Middle East with a very uncomfortable reality: Iran had years of advantage underground In Xataka | If the question is “how close are we to an escalation in Iran,” the answer is US A-10s flying there