civilians

The drone raids Russians on the european airspace have turned the sky of the continent into a new frontier of hybrid warfare. In a few weeks, these devices have forced the closure of airports, putting the air forces on alert from NATO and reopened a debate that Europe thought distant: how to defend yourself of a cheap, difficult to track and increasingly sophisticated enemy. Then we heard the idea for the first time of the “drone wall”and now it’s starting to take an unexpected shape. The invisible threat. The incidents in PolandDenmark and Germany, where drones of unknown origin flew over military bases and civilian areas before disappearing, have accelerated the creation of an unprecedented defense device. Allies seek to protect the population and its critical infrastructure while balance the answer immediate with the development of a long-term architecture. This is how the idea of ​​raising an antidrone walla technological network that combines sensors, radars, jammers and low-cost weapons to detect, intercept and neutralize threats in a matter of seconds. The birth of the wall. The concept emerged many months ago, inspired by the lessons of Ukraine and the evidence that European armies They lacked adequate systems to counter the proliferation of drones. The Baltic countries, together with Poland and Finland, presented the initial proposal to the European Commission: a technological wall on NATO’s eastern flank, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, financed with border security funds and intended to monitor the skies against possible Russian incursions. But the wave of drones that crossed Polish airspace last September changed the scale of the project. Ursula von der Leyen proclaimed the need for a “wall” to protect all of Europe. What began as a regional idea became the embryo of a continental air defense network against unmanned systems, the so-called European Drone Defense Initiativeincluded in the new military readiness roadmap that the Commission will present this fall. Europe accelerates. Thus, while politics was debated over budgets and powers, the armies acted. Denmark installed Doppler radars in Copenhagen and at its base in Skrydstruphome of its F-16 and F-35, to detect suspicious movements. Sweden announced a investment of 370 million of dollars in interceptors, jammers and frequency sensors. Germany passed a law which allows police to shoot down drones that pose an imminent threat, and the United Kingdom deployed spy planes on twelve-hour missions over the Russian border. Defense manufacturers quickly joined the effort: Saab presented its Nimbrix missiledesigned specifically to take down swarms of drones, and the loke systema modular radar, machine gun and electronic warfare set created in just three months to respond quickly to the threat. And in an unexpected turn of events, the Danes have gone further than anyone else: they even accelerated the instructor training military with shotguns to shoot down drones at close range, an unusual measure that reflects the urgency with which Europe is trying to close a critical technological gap. You have to expand. The initial enthusiasm for the anti-drone wall soon found a political problem: Western and southern Europe felt excluded from an initiative that concentrated resources in the East. Countries like Spain, France or Italy they detected a problem and they warned that the threats are not limited to the Russian front, since drones can operate from any point in the territory. The Commission took note and proposed expand the plantransforming the “wall” into a pan-European network of sensors, jammers and weapons integrated under the same coordination framework. Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius admitted that the EU’s current capabilities are “very limited” and that it will be necessary to resort to Ukrainian experience, accumulated after almost four years of daily fighting against Russian swarms. The remakerenamed the European Drone Defense Initiative, seeks total coverage and proposes a double challenge: demonstrate that the Union can assume a real operational role in defense (traditionally the responsibility of States and NATO) and achieve consensus among twenty-seven countries with very different military priorities. Obstacles of a wall. But there are more obstacles. I told it in an extensive report this morning Reuters. The project faces a complex internal battle over who should lead it. Small and Eastern nations prefer that the Commission centralize coordination, while France and Germany (accustomed to directly managing their arms programs) they refuse to give in leadership. Berlin and Paris also fear that the Commission will end up assuming powers that traditionally belong to national sovereignty. At the same time, experts warn that the idea of ​​a wall can generate a false sense of security: No network, no matter how advanced, can guarantee the downing of all drones. The technical difficulties they are huge: Connecting radars, acoustic sensors, optical systems, interceptors and artificial intelligence software from different countries into a single mesh will require years of testing and billion-dollar investments. The challenge is to achieve a defense staggered and adaptable to a type of threat in constant mutation, where each enemy innovation requires an immediate response. Lessons from Ukraine. It we have counted other times. The war in Ukraine has taught Europeans a costly lesson: you cannot shoot down a 10,000 euro drone with a missile that costs a million. The sustainability of the combat depends on intermediate solutionsfrom interceptor drones that collide with enemies to automatic cannons and low-power laser systems. Rheinmetall, the German giant, defends the use of artillery as a more profitable option and has already received orders from Denmark, Hungary and Austria for its Skyranger mobile system. Emerging companies from the Baltic and Germany, such as Marduk Technologies or Alpine Eagle, have presented your own schemes multi-layer defensewhile Ukraine continues to serve as a testing ground: its operators adjust the speed and maneuverability of the interceptors almost in real time to face increasingly faster Russian versions. This constant evolution turns anti-drone defense into a living disciplineof countermeasure and countermeasure, where human experience and AI must coexist. The utopia of safe heaven. If you will, the future of the alleged European anti-drone wall depends now on three factors: … Read more