the shopping basket

If, on the least expected day, someone from the RAE called me asking for a precise definition of a war, my answer would be clear: an armed conflict between two or more countries that inevitably ends up raising the price of our supermarket basket. And what is happening north (and south) of the Strait of Hormuz was not going to be an exception. Almost perfect timing. Since the United States and Israel launched their attacks on Iran on February 28, the situation has gotten out of control on many fronts. And it is not only that the transit of diesel through the strait has been virtually closed, but also; is that, although many people do not know it, a third of the world’s urea passes through this sea route (and, in fact, much of it is manufactured in the liquefaction plants that have been attacked these days). That is to say, a good part of the international stock of nitrogen fertilizers has been compromised just at the moment when the northern hemisphere begins its planting campaign. And what has happened? That, accordingly, the price has passed from 400 dollars a ton to more than 600 in a week. In fact, the North American index it reached 810 dollars. We already know this story. In 2022, after the invasion of Ukraine, we experienced a very similar shock. Russia accounted for around 16% of urea exports and around 12% of phosphates. What’s more, together with Belarus, produced almost 40% of the potassium of the international market. The situation got out of control and prices skyrocketed. The problem is that in 2022, the problem was sanctions and (many times under rope) the market was able to redirect itself and the logistics chains cushioned the blow a bit. Right now and without an alternative way to get urea out of the Gulf, there is no valid plan B. The blow is going to be harder every day that the strait is closed. And why does it affect us? Spain is the second largest fertilizer market in the Union and more than 1.9 billion is spent on it every year. Almost all of that money, by the way, is dedicated to imports because manufacturing it is unviable and, consequently, there is no infrastructure either. To the extent that natural gas represents between 70 and 90% of the variable cost of fertilizer production, the price of food is going to rise (and, if the example of 2022 is anything to go by, it is going to do so very quickly). What will it affect the most? Bread, pasta and cereals (it is one of the crops most sensitive to the price of fertilizers); meat, dairy and eggs (due to their dependence on corn for feed); vegetable oils (because many are also used to make biofuels); and fruits and vegetables (because everything under greenhouses is critically dependent on fertilizers). What can we expect? If the conflict lasts a couple of weeks or a month, the impact will be limited because there is accumulated stock and the urea will arrive in time to be produced. There will be losses and higher prices, but the problem will be less. If we talk about a few months, global food inflation will be noticeable and we would be in a scenario similar to 2022. If the stock out lasts until after the summer, we would enter unknown territory. Be prepared in an increasingly volatile world. And if we think about it calmly, we will realize that there are no strategic reserves of fertilizers and building new plants would take years. The costs of cultivating the Earth have doubled in the last decade and everything seems to indicate that, if we don’t do something, the situation can only get worse. Image | Left Victorian In Xataka | Working the land is becoming more expensive: Agricultural costs have doubled in the last ten years

Nvidia has become the most important company in the world. His problem is that he has all the eggs in the same basket

In Nvidia everything goes on wheels, but Not even enough for Wall Street. The latest quarterly results report has once again demonstrated Eun Eun Exceptional Power, but be careful. The most important company in the world –by stock marketat least – has an Achilles heel. A dangerous concentration of customers. He Official document With the financial results, it refers to a “risk of concentration” of the great clients of Nvidia. The situation is really worrying, because Six customers They accumulate 85% of all income from the company: 10,750 million dollars – Customer A (23% of total ingreoss) 7,480 million dollars – Customer B (16%) 6,540 million dollars – Customer C (14%) 5,140 million dollars – Customer D (11%) 5,140 million dollars – Customer E (11%) 4,670 million dollars – Customer F (10%) The problem goes more, no less. If we only look at the two most important customers, A is responsible for 23% of Nvidia and B revenues of 16%: 39% of income therefore come from only two clients. A year ago the two largest Nvidia clients were responsible for 14% and 11% of income, 25% in total. These data raise an inevitable question: who is who in that client cast. And the answer is not simple. Direct customers … Nvidia makes a distinction between those clients to whom he refers to the document, and that are divided into two large groups, the first is that of direct customers, which are not end users of their chips, but companies that buy the chips and that mounted them in complete systems or on plates that then sell to data centers, infrastructure suppliers in the cloud or final cloud. Among the examples, they indicate In CNBCwould be Foxconn, Quanta or Dell. … and indirect customers. This is where those companies would enter that we are all thinking and use these chips – which they buy from direct customers – in Your gigantic data centers. Microsoft, Openai, Meta, Google, Tesla/Xai and Meta – and even Oracle – are clear candidates, but again, it is impossible to know for sure who is on that list of great buyers. But the two most important are direct. What they do indicate in Nvidia is that customer A and B are direct customers, so they are not theoretically none of those great technological ones. But those definitions of Nvidia are somewhat diffuse, and the company states that some direct customers buy chips to create systems for their own use, so Any of the Big Tech I could enter that definition. To curl the curl, Nvidia said that two of its indirect clients each of them were responsible for 10% of their total income, but above all through the purchase of systems from customers A and B. OpenAI in the pools. In Nvidia they talked about “an AI research and development company” contributed with a “significant” amount of income both through direct and indirect customers. Here are more candidates, but one of the strongest would be Openai, especially now that he is working In the Stargate project. But the situation is dangerous. Be as it may, depending on both so few clients is delicate and creates a dangerous dependency chain. Thus, Nvidia depends on intermediaries that in turn They depend on a handful of technological giants. The company’s destination is in the hands of two buyers who represent almost 40% of their business, but the risk is not only for Nvidia, but for the entire technological ecosystem that depends on their chips. There are not only companies, there are countries buying gpus. Another of the curious data of this report is the one that tells us about how Some foreign governments They are also buying chips massively. In fact, the company expects to enter 20,000 million dollars in these “Sovereign” projects with countries that try to create their own models and artificial intelligence infrastructure. Image | Sharon Waldron edited with Google Gemini In Xataka | Microsoft had a saved secret. His new AI model for Copilot is the clearest statement against Openai’s domain

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