In mid-September there was a tense scene in China. It happened on the deck of his brand new Fujian aircraft carrierand all the hopes of his Navy were placed on the reliability of that test: If for decades takeoffs were dominated by steam, his new “monster” was going to do it with electricity. Your electromagnetic catapult confirmed They were very serious.
Although now the United States has something to say.
Structural limitation. The news have given two former US Navy aircraft carrier officers, who conclude, after analyze images of the Fujian, that the deck configuration of the new Chinese aircraft carrier forces takeoffs and landings to be sequenced instead of overlapping them, which reduces its operational rhythm to approximately 60% of a Nimitz no less than half a century.
The explanation. As they say, the angle of support of only 6th compared to 9th of the American ships, the greater length of the landing area (which invades the area where the planes are parked in tip before the catapult) and the position of the two forward catapults intercepting the landing system convert the deck into a plane with kinetic conflict pointswhere moving a recovered aircraft can momentarily block the catapult and disrupt the next sortie.
Given this risk of collisions in an extremely dense and fast environment, the only realistic mitigation, according to officialsis to lower the tempo, which is equivalent to a direct degradation of the output generation capacity.
Technological leap. He FujianAs we said, it is the first Chinese aircraft carrier with electromagnetic catapultsallowing devices to be launched with more fuel and weapons, increasing radius and hit mass. In fact, only Gerald R. Ford American shares this characteristic. It is a radical leap from Liaoning and Shandongwhich continue with ski jumping and limit weight at takeoff.
But the material leap does not imply an immediate doctrinal leap: the deck operational culture (cycles, sequences, discipline of human and mechanical flow under hostile climate) is only achieved through years of operation and “with a blood curve,” as veterans remember. Without that accumulated experience, hardware introduces potential capacity that practice does not yet know how to exploit without a penalty in pace (or risk).
Quantitative advantage. we have told before: China launches ships at an accelerated pace, building the largest navy in the world in total numberbut its deficit in aircraft carriers is not countable but rather generational: eleven compared to two in service, and decades of know-how compared to a first cohort that is barely entering the real training phase.
The Fujian is the first volumetric competitor of the Nimitzbut according to American commanders, it is born with a deck topology that compromises your cadencewhile Washington operates ten Nimitz with doctrine mature and closes the cycle with the Ford class. That the Nimitz, launched in 1975in its last deployment may still surpass Fujian in rate of departures, illustrates that distance between tonnage and competition.
The “intermediate link.” The officials, furthermore, interpret the Fujian as a bridge platform: first introduce the catapult, and then clear restrictions in subsequent generations. The next unit (the Type 004) will adjust, a priori, errors and move geometries to unleash the potential that the Fujian contains but does not release due to its disposition.
China already shows the industrial pattern of fix in production: fail, learn and launch an iteration in a few years, something consistent with its naval pattern in other ship classes. In that sense, it would not be entirely correct to say that the Fujian fails: rather it fulfills the function of teaching and learning so that the successor is born without those collars.
From steam to electricity. Steam catapults dominated shipborne aviation since the fifties: They use steam pressure to drive a piston that drags the plane. They are huge, but energy inefficient, with control thick acceleration and high maintenance requirements.
the arrival by EMALS (Electro-Magnetic Aircraft Launch System), first in the Ford class and now in Fujianreplaces thermal hydraulics with digitally controllable induction force: acceleration can be modulated, reducing the structural fatigue of the aircraft, allowing heavier devices to be launched with less stroke and recovering energy more quickly between departures.
The “but”. It turns out that the electromagnetic advantage is conditional: to translate into real power requires a deck architecture, doctrine, rhythms and sequence discipline capable of capitalizing on the new margin. In other words, the first generation system in the hands of a fleet without “deck kilometers” inherits the physical power but far from the operational efficiency that decades of steam they taught to squeeze.
The key is time. Ultimately, the background thesis of the veteran Marines is not that the Fujian is an unsolvable error, but that its limitation reveals the real nature of naval aviation warfare: it is not pure engineering but engineering amortized with habit, and where the enemy is not design but the chronology.
Although it may seem like it, the combat power of an aircraft carrier is not its displacement or its systems, but rather the cycles per hour and the psychological confidence accumulated to sustain them at night, under storms, with low fuel and/or zero margin. That casuistry, which defines lethal performance, cannot be bought.
AND, according to officialsChina still operates in the stadium in which only through years of cover will it be able to convert the physical leap from Fujian in sustained air power output.
Image | Ministry of National Defense The People’s Republic of China/ LI GANG/XINHUA, Ministry of National Defense
GIPHY App Key not set. Please check settings